United States v. Nicholas Slatten ( 2017 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued January 17, 2017                Decided August 4, 2017
    No. 15-3078
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    APPELLEE
    v.
    NICHOLAS ABRAM SLATTEN,
    APPELLANT
    Consolidated with 15-3079, 15-3080, 15-3081
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:14-cr-00107-1)
    (No. 1:08-cr-00360-1)
    (No. 1:08-cr-00360-3)
    (No. 1:08-cr-00360-4)
    Brian M. Heberlig, appointed by the court, argued the
    cause for appellants Slough, Liberty and Heard. William F.
    Coffield, appointed by the court, argued the cause for appellant
    Liberty. With them on the brief were Michael J. Baratz, Bruce
    C. Bishop, Linda C. Bailey, David Schertler, Lisa Hertzer
    Schertler, Janet Foster and Laina C. Lopez. Danny C.
    Onorato, appointed by the court, entered an appearance.
    2
    Timothy J. Simeone, appointed by the court, argued the
    cause for appellant Slatten. With him on the briefs were
    Thomas G. Connolly, Steven A. Fredley and Jared P. Marx, all
    appointed by the court.
    Timothy P. O'Toole, Kathleen T. Wach and Addy R.
    Schmitt were on the brief for amicus curiae National
    Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support of
    appellants.
    Demetra Lambros, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were
    Anthony Asuncion, Jay I. Bratt, John Crabb Jr., Christopher R.
    Kavanaugh, Gregg A. Maisel and Jonathan M. Malis, Assistant
    U.S. Attorneys.
    Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and BROWN, Circuit
    Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.
    Opinion concurring in Part VI filed by Circuit Judge
    HENDERSON.
    Opinion concurring in the judgment in Part VII and
    dissenting from Part VIII filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
    Opinion concurring in part in, and dissenting in part from,
    Part II filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.
    3
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    I. BACKGROUND                                                   4
    II. MEJA JURISDICTION/MEJA JURY CHARGE                          7
    A. Jurisdiction                                            7
    B. Jury Charge                                            17
    III. VENUE                                                     22
    IV. NEW TRIAL MOTION                                           28
    A. Background                                             28
    B. Analysis                                               30
    V. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE                                 33
    A. Liberty                                                34
    B. Slatten                                                40
    VI. VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION                                     44
    A. Background                                             44
    B. Analysis                                               46
    VII. MOTION TO SEVER                                           51
    A. Background                                             52
    B. Hearsay and Its Exceptions                             56
    VIII. EIGHTH AMENDMENT                                         69
    A. Proportionality                                        70
    B. Comparable Sentences                                   79
    PER CURIAM: Nicholas Slatten, Paul Slough, Evan Liberty
    and Dustin Heard (“defendants”) were contractors with
    Blackwater Worldwide Security (ABlackwater@), which in 2007
    was providing security services to the United States State
    Department in Iraq. As a result of Baghdad shootings that
    injured or killed at least 31 Iraqi civilians, Slough, Liberty and
    Heard were convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter,
    attempted manslaughter and using and discharging a firearm in
    relation to a crime of violence (or aiding-and-abetting the
    commission of those crimes); Slatten was convicted of first-
    degree murder. They now challenge their convictions on
    jurisdictional, procedural and several substantive grounds.
    4
    For the following reasons, we hold that the Court has
    jurisdiction pursuant to the Military Extraterritorial
    Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”), 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3261
     et seq., and that
    venue in the District of Columbia was proper. We further hold
    that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
    defendants= motion for a new trial based on post-trial
    statements of a government witness. Regarding the challenges
    to the sufficiency of the evidence, we hold that the evidence
    was sufficient as to all except one of Liberty’s attempted
    manslaughter convictions, and that the evidence was sufficient
    as to Slatten. We further hold that Slatten=s indictment charging
    first-degree murder did not constitute vindictive prosecution.
    The Court concludes, however, that statements made by a
    co-defendant shortly following the attack, statements asserting
    that he—not Slatten—fired the first shots on the day in
    question, were admissible. Accordingly, the Court concludes
    that the district court abused its discretion in denying Slatten’s
    motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants and
    therefore vacates his conviction and remands for a new trial.
    Moreover, the Court concludes that imposition of the
    mandatory thirty-year minimum under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c), as
    applied here, violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition
    against cruel and unusual punishment, a holding from which
    Judge Rogers dissents. The Court therefore remands for the
    resentencing of Slough, Liberty and Heard.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On September 16, 2007, a car bomb exploded in Baghdad
    near a United States diplomat who was under the protection of
    Blackwater, a private security firm under contract with the
    State Department. The defendants were members of
    Blackwater=s Raven 23 team, which was sent to provide
    secondary support in the effort to evacuate the diplomat. Rather
    5
    than meeting the primary team at the pre-arranged checkpoint,
    Raven 23 shift leader Jimmy Watson ignored his orders and
    directed the team to Nisur Square, a traffic circle in downtown
    Baghdad that Watson intended to Alock down.@ A car bomb had
    exploded in Nisur Square earlier that year, in response to which
    Iraqi security had been dramatically increased, with multiple
    checkpoints at the Square=s entrances for potential threats.
    The Raven 23 convoy, which consisted of four armored
    vehicles, came to a stop at the south end of the Square, and
    together with Iraqi police they brought all traffic to a halt. Two
    or three minutes later, witnesses heard the Apops@ of shots being
    fired, and a woman screaming for her son. The car that had
    been hit, a white Kia sedan, had been flagged days earlier by a
    Blackwater intelligence analyst as a type that might be used as
    a car bomb. According to the government, the Kia then rolled
    forward and lightly bumped the vehicle in front of it. The
    driver=s side of the Kia windshield had a hole in it and was
    splattered with blood.
    Two nearby Iraqi police officers approached the Kia on
    either side, and they saw the driver=s face full of blood, with a
    bullet wound in the middle of his forehead. One turned back
    to the convoy, waving his hands to indicate the shooting should
    stop, while the other made similar gestures as he tried to open
    the driver=s door. At that point, the vehicle in front of the Kia
    moved away, causing the Kia to roll forward again. Heavy
    gunfire erupted from the Raven 23 convoy into the Kia, and the
    Iraqi officers took cover behind their nearby kiosk. Multiple
    grenades were fired at the Kia, causing it to catch fire. The
    Kia passenger was shot and killed.
    Indiscriminate shooting from the convoy then continued
    past the Kia, to the south of the Square. Victims were hit as
    they sought cover or tried to escape, giving rise to the bulk of
    6
    casualties that day. At some point a Raven 23 member
    radioed that they were taking incoming fire, but others could
    not locate any such threat. When the shooting died down, a
    radio call indicated one of the Raven 23 vehicles had been
    disabled and needed to be hooked up to another vehicle to be
    towed. During the hook-up, a member of the Raven 23
    convoy saw an Iraqi shot in the stomach while his hands were
    up, by an unidentified Blackwater guard who had exited his
    vehicle. Once the hook-up was complete, the Raven 23
    convoy began moving slowly around the circle and north out
    of the Square, where isolated shootings continued both to the
    west and north. By the time the convoy finally exited the
    Square, at least thirty-one Iraqi civilians had been killed or
    wounded.
    In the immediate aftermath of the shootings, the State
    Department conducted mandatory de-briefing interviews of the
    Raven 23 team. Because the testimony of certain witnesses
    before the grand jury relied on those statements, the district
    court dismissed the case as tainted as to all defendants. United
    States v. Slough, 
    677 F. Supp. 2d 112
    , 166 (D.D.C. 2009)
    (citing Kastigar v. United States, 
    406 U.S. 441
     (1972)). This
    Court agreed that the oral and written statements that resulted
    from the de-briefings were compelled, and thus could not be
    used directly or indirectly by the government against the
    defendants who made them, but remanded the case for a more
    individualized analysis of the effect of the taint. United States
    v. Slough, 
    641 F.3d 544
    , 548, 554-55 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
    On remand, the government used a new prosecutorial team
    and convened a new grand jury, which returned indictments
    against the defendants for voluntary manslaughter, attempted
    manslaughter and using and discharging a firearm in relation to
    a crime of violence. Slatten moved to dismiss the charges
    against him as time-barred, which this Court ultimately granted
    7
    by writ of mandamus. In re Slatten, No. 14-3007 (D.C. Cir.
    Apr. 18, 2014). The government thereafter obtained an
    indictment charging Slatten with first-degree murder. The
    defendants were tried jointly in the summer of 2014, and after
    seven weeks of deliberation, the jury returned guilty verdicts
    on all counts except three. The district court sentenced Slatten
    to life imprisonment, and it sentenced Slough, Liberty and
    Heard to the mandatory term of imprisonment of thirty years
    for their convictions under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c), plus one day on
    all of the remaining counts.
    II. MEJA JURISDICTION/MEJA JURY CHARGE
    We begin with the defendants’ challenges to the
    applicability of MEJA. The defendants argue that they are
    entitled to acquittal on all counts because MEJA does not
    authorize their prosecution. Alternatively, even if their actions
    do fit within MEJA’s scope, the defendants maintain that the
    jury was erroneously instructed regarding MEJA. On both
    claims, we disagree.
    A. Jurisdiction
    1. History
    Historically, civilians accompanying American armed
    forces overseas were subject to military court-martial for
    crimes committed in a host country. See Reid v. Covert, 
    354 U.S. 1
    , 3-4 (1957) (plurality op.). In a pair of opinions,
    however, the United States Supreme Court put an end to that
    practice, deeming it unconstitutional because the courts-martial
    failed to provide civilians with certain constitutional rights
    guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
    Id. at 5
     (“[W]e
    reject the idea that when the United States acts against citizens
    abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights.”); Kinsella v.
    8
    Singleton, 
    361 U.S. 234
    , 249 (1960) (civilian defendant “is
    protected by the specific provisions of Article III and the Fifth
    and Sixth Amendments and . . . her prosecution and conviction
    by court-martial [was] not constitutionally permissible”).
    Thereafter, many crimes committed by civilians overseas fell
    into a jurisdictional vacuum as generally our country’s criminal
    statutes do not apply extraterritorially and, “[a]lthough host
    foreign nations [did] have jurisdiction to prosecute such acts
    committed within their nation, they frequently decline[d] to
    exercise jurisdiction when an American [was] the victim or
    when the crime involve[d] only property owned by
    Americans.” H.R. Rep. No. 106–778, Pt. 1, at 5 (2000); accord
    United States v. Arnt, 
    474 F.3d 1159
    , 1161 (9th Cir. 2007).
    In 2000, the Congress began to address the “jurisdictional
    gap” by enacting MEJA. H.R. Rep. No. 106–778, at 5. In its
    original version, MEJA authorized the prosecution of
    extraterritorial crimes committed by civilians employed by the
    Department of Defense (DOD) or its contractors. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3267
    (1)(A) (2000). Following a series of high-profile
    offenses committed by non-Defense Department contractors—
    including those committed by private contractors employed by
    the United States Interior Department at the Abu Ghraib prison
    in Baghdad, Iraq—the Congress expanded MEJA’s scope. See
    150 CONG. REC. S6863 (daily ed. June 16, 2004). Indeed, then-
    United States Senator Jeff Sessions—the chief sponsor of the
    2004 amendment—acknowledged that the amendment’s
    purpose was to address a jurisdictional gap through which
    “private contractors who may not have in every instance been
    directly associated with the Department of Defense . . . might
    not be prosecutable under [MEJA].” 
    Id.
     Sessions noted that the
    gap “highlighted [the Congress’s] need to clarify and expand
    the coverage of the act” by giving “the Justice Department
    authority to prosecute civilian contractors employed not only
    by the Department of Defense but by any Federal agency that
    9
    is supporting the American military mission overseas.” 
    Id.
    Senator Charles Schumer likewise noted that the proposed
    amendment addressed “a dangerous loophole in our criminal
    law that would have allowed civilian contractors who do the
    crime to escape doing the time.” 
    Id.
     at S6864.
    2. Text
    As amended, then, two key sections of MEJA work
    together to authorize the prosecution of qualifying offenses
    committed by a civilian overseas: Section 3261 and Section
    3267. See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3261
    , 3267.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3261
     provides:
    (a) Whoever engages in conduct outside the United
    States that would constitute an offense
    punishable by imprisonment for more than 1
    year if the conduct had been engaged in within
    the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
    of the United States—
    (1) while employed by or accompanying the
    Armed Forces outside the United States
    ...
    shall be punished as provided for that offense.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3267
     sets out alternative definitions of “employed
    by the Armed Forces outside the United States” depending on
    the defendant’s employment status. Section 3267(1)(A)(iii)(II)
    applies to the defendants and provides as follows:
    (1) The term “employed by the Armed Forces outside
    the United States” means--
    10
    (A) employed as . . .
    (iii) an employee of a contractor (or
    subcontractor at any tier) of . . .
    (II) any . . . Federal agency . . .
    to the extent such employment
    relates to supporting the
    mission of the Department of
    Defense overseas . . . .
    When Section 3267(1)(A)(iii)(II) applies, we believe there are
    two preliminary questions posed by MEJA’s text: 1) whether
    the defendant’s criminal conduct occurred “while employed
    by” a non-DOD contractor; and 2) whether his employment
    (not his conduct) “relates to supporting” the DOD overseas
    mission. See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3261
    , 3267. The latter question,
    however, is subject to an additional restriction. Section
    3267(1)(A)(iii)(II)’s “to the extent” clause operates as a
    temporal limitation applicable only to non-DOD contractors.
    See 
    id.
     That is, because MEJA authorizes the prosecution of
    only those crimes a defendant commits “while” employed by a
    non-DOD contractor and “to the extent” such employment
    relates to a DOD mission, it applies only if the defendant’s
    employment at the time of the offense relates to supporting a
    DOD mission. See 
    id.
     (emphasis added).
    Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to
    address Section 3267(1)(A)(iii)(II)’s “relates to” language, it
    has interpreted similar language broadly. For example, in Smith
    v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he
    phrase ‘in relation to’ is expansive,” noting that “[a]ccording
    to Webster’s, ‘in relation to’ means ‘with reference to’ or ‘as
    regards.’” 
    508 U.S. 223
    , 237-38 (1993). Likewise, in District
    of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, the
    11
    Supreme Court interpreted “relate to,” as used in the Employee
    Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, to include any law
    that “has a connection with or reference to” a covered benefit
    plan, thereby “giv[ing] effect to the ‘deliberately expansive’
    language chosen by Congress.” 
    506 U.S. 125
    , 129 (1992)
    (emphasis added) (some internal quotation marks omitted)
    (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 
    481 U.S. 41
    , 46 (1987);
    Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
    463 U.S. 85
    , 97 (1983)); accord
    Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 
    504 U.S. 374
    , 383
    (1992) (“For purposes of the present case, the key phrase,
    obviously, is ‘relating to.’ The ordinary meaning of these
    words is a broad one—‘to stand in some relation; to have
    bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association
    with or connection with[.]’” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
    1158 (5th ed. 1979)). Circuit precedent, too, employs a broad
    interpretation. We have noted that the “ordinary meaning” of
    “relating to” is a “broad one,” see Friedman v. Sebelius, 
    686 F.3d 813
    , 820 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
    omitted) (quoting Morales, 
    504 U.S. at 383
    ), and that “a
    statutory provision containing the phrase therefore has ‘broad
    scope,’” 
    id.
     (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 
    471 U.S. 724
    , 739 (1985)).
    3. Application
    Having addressed both MEJA’s required elements and
    expansive scope, we next consider whether the evidence was
    sufficient to support jurisdiction under MEJA. 1 The district
    court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment of acquittal
    1
    The district court concluded that MEJA adds a jurisdictional
    element to the underlying offenses, which element constitutes a jury
    issue that must be established by the government beyond a
    reasonable doubt. See United States v. Williams, 
    836 F.3d 1
    , 6-7
    (D.C. Cir. 2016).
    12
    on this ground and the Court must affirm so long as any
    reasonable factfinder could conclude that the evidence, viewed
    most favorably to the government, satisfied each element
    beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Kayode, 
    254 F.3d 204
    , 212 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979).
    We begin with two unchallenged elements. It is
    undisputed that all of the charges against all four defendants
    are within MEJA’s scope as it relates to included offenses. See
    supra 6-7; 
    18 U.S.C. § 3261
    (a). Moreover, all four defendants
    were employed by Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC, a
    contractor of the United States Department of State. JA 3743,
    3760, 3776, 3794, 1228-29. At the time of the Nisur Square
    attack, they were therefore “employee[s] of a contractor (or
    subcontractor at any tier) of . . . [a] Federal agency.” See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3267
    (1)(A)(iii)(II). The remaining question is
    whether that employment, at the time of the attack, related to
    supporting DOD’s mission.
    The government sufficiently established the DOD’s
    overseas mission. By 2007, “the mission of the Department of
    Defense overseas”—specifically, in Iraq—went beyond
    military operations against the insurgency. 
    Id.
     Witnesses
    testified that the Defense Department mission was to rebuild
    the war-torn country, including the fostering of economic and
    political stability. United States Army Colonel Michael Tarsa
    testified that the military’s goal was to “stimulat[e] local
    governance” by “identifying local leaders [and] trying to
    organize them.” JA 1374. Tarsa also recounted that the military
    sought to improve the Iraqis’ “quality of life” by “restoring
    essential services, sewer, water, electricity [and] trash
    removal” and by “foster[ing] economic development,” all with
    the hope that such restoration would “dissuad[e] people from
    joining the insurgency.” JA 1373-77. Tarsa’s testimony was
    13
    echoed by United States Marine Corps Officer Shelby Lasater,
    who testified that, as the United States’ presence in Iraq
    continued, the mission became “to rebuild the country and set
    up a government.” JA 1478-79. Then-Deputy Secretary of
    Defense Gordon England affirmed that the Defense
    Department “strategy” was to “help the Iraqi people build a
    new Iraq with constitutional representative government that
    respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient to
    maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from becoming a safe
    haven for terrorists.” JA 2949.
    The government also produced abundant evidence that the
    defendants’ Blackwater employment supported the
    Department of Defense’s expanded mission at the time of the
    Nisur Square attack. Paralleling the testimony of Tarsa, Lasater
    and England, Blackwater guard Matthew Murphy testified that
    Blackwater’s “clients . . . the State Department [were] trying to
    bring along the country, . . . trying to mentor the Iraqi
    government and . . . get them up and running.” JA 1044.
    England also testified that the “U.S. Government had to rely on
    all of its departments and agencies in order to achieve the
    mission in Iraq.” JA 2950. The State Department was an
    important part of the rebuilding effort the Defense Department
    was engaged in; its diplomats were helping the Iraqis restore
    their country. Blackwater employed the defendants to provide
    security for the diplomats whose work plainly supported the
    DOD mission. The defendants’ employment, then, “relate[d]
    to”—that is, had a “connection with or reference to,” see
    Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 
    506 U.S. at 129
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted)—supporting the Defense Department’s
    rebuilding mission.
    In addition, the defendants’ contracts required them to
    complete unspecified “security-related duties requested by
    Blackwater or [the State Department] in support of the
    14
    Engagement.” JA 3761. This necessarily requires
    consideration of the types of duties that Blackwater or the State
    Department in fact requested in order to determine whether
    they “relate[] to supporting the mission of the Department of
    Defense.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3267
    (1)(A)(iii)(II). The evidence
    showed that, consistent with this contract provision,
    Blackwater employees were assigned to assist distressed
    military units during firefights, train Army security escorts and
    provide escorts to Provincial Reconstruction Teams when
    Army escorts were unavailable. JA 1622-23, 1762-64, 2956.
    Although it may be true that the defendants did not themselves
    participate in these assignments, this evidence nevertheless
    illustrated for the jury the types of “security-related duties”
    within the scope of the defendants’ employment. JA 3761.
    The defendants’ employment “relate[d] to supporting the
    [DOD overseas] mission” in another way; it allowed military
    personnel previously responsible for providing State
    Department security to concentrate exclusively on their
    rebuilding mission. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3267
    (1)(A)(iii)(II). Tarsa
    affirmed that the Defense Department was “able to reduce the
    amount of [its] platoons . . . . dedicated for Department of State
    security convoy missions” as “Blackwater took the majority of
    those tasks.” JA 1381. The platoons were then able to return to,
    inter alia, “the continued development of the Iraqi security
    forces.” JA 1382. United States Army Lieutenant Peter
    Decareau and England corroborated Tarsa’s testimony. JA
    2581 (testimony of Army Lieutenant Peter Decareau) (agreeing
    that “from roughly February 2007 going forward, [Decareau’s]
    company and platoons within it did not need to provide [State
    Department] escort service missions anymore,” allowing his
    platoon “to focus on what [he] described as civil affairs and . .
    . night operation missions”); JA 2952 (testimony of Deputy
    Secretary Gordon England) (before Blackwater’s arrival, State
    Department “was draining personnel from the DOD mission”).
    15
    Again, then, the defendants’ employment, which increased the
    manpower available to the military by replacing military
    personnel previously assigned to guard State Department
    personnel, had some “bearing or concern” regarding—that is,
    “relate[d] to”—supporting the Defense Department mission.
    See Morales, 
    504 U.S. at 383
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed.
    1979)). Providing security to State Department personnel who
    themselves acted jointly with the Defense Department to aid
    the Iraqi people and whose protection would have continued to
    require military personnel but for the defendants’ employment
    necessarily “relate[d] to” supporting the Defense Department’s
    mission.
    4. Defendants’ Arguments
    The defendants attempt to narrow MEJA’s scope by
    reading the “to the extent” language of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3267
    (1)(A)(iii)(II) and the “while employed” language of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3261
     as more than a temporal limitation. They argue
    that MEJA applied “only in the limited capacities or at those
    limited times” when Blackwater guards actively and directly
    supported the Defense Department mission. Joint Appellants’
    Br. 59. That is, they claim that MEJA required the jury to
    consider not their employment but instead their challenged
    actions to determine whether those actions—that is, securing
    Nisur Square—supported the Defense Department mission. 
    Id. at 41, 58-60
    . But, as noted, MEJA’s scope is not so narrow.
    Instead, the most natural conjunctive reading of “while
    employed by,” as used in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3261
    , and “to the extent,”
    as used in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3267
    , is one that interprets these
    provisions as establishing that the point in time when the
    defendants’ actions occurred is the benchmark by which their
    16
    employment’s relation to a DOD mission is measured. 2 See
    supra 10. The defendants’ misreading of the statute to require
    that their challenged actions must relate to a Defense
    Department mission violates both MEJA’s text and its purpose.
    MEJA’s goal, after all, was to close “a dangerous loophole in
    our criminal law that would have allowed civilian contractors
    who do the crime to escape doing the time.” 150 CONG. REC.
    S6863.
    Alternatively, the defendants maintain that we should look
    not to their on-the-ground actions but only to their Blackwater
    contract to determine whether they were “employed by the
    Armed Forces outside the United States.” Joint Appellants’ Br.
    50-52. Because their contract required them to provide security
    for State Department personnel, rather than to further a Defense
    Department mission, they argue that MEJA does not authorize
    their prosecution. Id. at 53. We decline to take such a cramped
    view of MEJA’s text given the “deliberately expansive”
    language used by the Congress. See Greater Wash. Bd. of
    Trade, 
    506 U.S. at 129
    .
    Finally, the defendants insist that the rule of lenity requires
    construing MEJA in their favor. The rule of lenity, however,
    applies only if, “after considering text, structure, history, and
    purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in
    2
    Although we agree with our dissenting colleague that MEJA’s
    “to the extent” phrase is limiting language meant to distinguish
    between DOD and non-DOD contractors, see BROWN, J., Dissent
    Op. 2, we need not reach the question of the potential criminal
    liability vel non under MEJA’s “to the extent” restriction of a non-
    DOD contractor, say, a State Department food service contractor
    whose employee assaults another while off-duty or while serving
    meals to State Department employees in Iraq. All we decide today is
    that these defendants’ criminal liability fits within MEJA’s scope.
    17
    the statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what
    Congress intended.” Maracich v. Spears, 
    133 S. Ct. 2191
    , 2209
    (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barber v.
    Thomas, 
    560 U.S. 474
    , 488 (2010)); accord Reno v. Koray, 
    515 U.S. 50
    , 65 (1995) (rule of lenity applies “only if . . . [the Court]
    can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The rule [of lenity] comes
    into operation at the end of the process of construing what
    Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding
    consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.” Maracich, 
    133 S. Ct. at 2209
     (alteration in original) (quoting Callanan v.
    United States, 
    364 U.S. 587
    , 596 (1961)). Although the phrase
    “relates to” gives MEJA a broad scope, breadth does not equal
    ambiguity. See Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 
    524 U.S. 206
    ,
    212 (1998) (“[T]he fact that a statute can be applied in
    situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not
    demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.” (internal
    quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, to the extent—if any—
    that MEJA’s text is ambiguous, MEJA’s “context, structure,
    history, and purpose resolve it.” Abramski v. United States, 
    134 S. Ct. 2259
    , 2272 n.10 (2014); see supra at 7-9. We conclude
    that the rule of lenity is inapplicable here.
    B. Jury Charge
    The defendants also challenge the district court’s jury
    instructions regarding MEJA. “Whether the district court
    properly instructed the jury is ‘a question of law that we review
    de novo.’” United States v. Ring, 
    706 F.3d 460
    , 465 (D.C. Cir.
    2013) (quoting United States v. Orenuga, 
    430 F.3d 1158
    , 1166
    (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Our responsibility is to “determine whether,
    taken as a whole, [the instructions] accurately state the
    governing law and provide the jury with sufficient
    understanding of the issues and applicable standards.” United
    States v. DeFries, 
    129 F.3d 1293
    , 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
    18
    (alteration in original) (emphasis added); accord Ring, 706
    F.3d at 465. An “improper instruction on an element of the
    offense violates the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.”
    Neder v. United States, 
    527 U.S. 1
    , 13 (1999).
    The district court instructed the jury on the meaning of
    “employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States” as
    follows:
    [T]he definition of ‘employed by the Armed
    Forces outside the United States’ includes not
    only a direct employee or contractor of the
    Armed Forces of the United States, but also a
    contractor (including a subcontractor at any
    tier) or an employee of a contractor (or
    subcontractor at any tier) of any Federal agency
    of the United States Government to the extent:
    (1) such employment relates to
    supporting the mission of the
    Department of Defense overseas . . . .
    ...
    [T]he Government may prove that the
    defendant was ‘employed by the Armed Forces’
    by establishing that:
    (a) the defendant was employed as a
    contractor, or an employee of a
    contractor        (including       a
    subcontractor at any tier) of any
    federal agency, and
    (b) that the defendant’s employment
    related to supporting the mission of
    the Department of Defense overseas.
    19
    JA 497-98.
    The challenged jury instruction was not erroneous. First,
    it quoted MEJA’s “to the extent” clause verbatim:
    “‘[E]mployed by the Armed Forces outside the United States’
    includes . . . an employee of a contractor . . . of any Federal
    agency of the United States Government to the extent . . . such
    employment relates to supporting the mission of the
    Department of Defense overseas.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added); see
    
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3261
    , 3267. Granted, the instruction also stated
    that the government could establish jurisdiction if the jury
    found “the defendant’s employment related to supporting the
    [DOD] mission,” JA 498; taken out of context, a juror could
    conceivably understand the latter statement to mean
    jurisdiction would exist if “the defendant’s employment [at
    any time] related to supporting the mission” of DOD, see 
    id.
    But we “do not read the language thus criticized in isolation.”
    Jones v. United States, 
    404 F.2d 212
    , 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
    see also Cupp v. Naughten, 
    414 U.S. 141
    , 147-48 (1973). To
    the contrary, we have “long recognized that one ambiguous
    part of an instruction may be made clear by another
    unambiguous part of the same instruction,” United States v.
    Gaviria, 
    116 F.3d 1498
    , 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and the “to the
    extent” language unambiguously precludes an erroneous, all-
    or-nothing understanding of the statute, see John Hancock
    Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 
    510 U.S. 86
    ,
    104-05, 109 (1993).
    The defendants’ challenge to the instruction largely
    repeats their argument against the applicability of MEJA itself.
    For example, they argue the district court erred in failing to
    instruct the jury that it could consider only their contract
    employment to determine whether they were “employed by the
    Armed Forces . . . .” Joint Appellants’ Br. 66-68. The
    defendants also revive their claim that, even if the jury could
    20
    consider evidence aliunde their employment contract, it should
    have been instructed that MEJA applied only when the
    defendants were acting within the scope of their employment
    and only if their specific acts supported the DOD mission. Id.
    at 64-66. To that end, they proposed the following instruction:
    [I]f you find that part of a defendant’s contract
    employment for the Department of State related to
    supporting the mission of the Department of
    Defense, and part of his contract employment did not
    relate to supporting the mission of the Department of
    Defense, you must consider whether the work the
    defendant was performing at the time of the conduct
    charged in the indictment related to supporting the
    mission of the Department of Defense in Iraq. For
    purposes of this case, a Defendant is ‘employed by
    the Armed Forces of the United States’ only if the
    contract employment he was performing at the time
    of the charged conduct related to supporting the
    mission of the Department of Defense in Iraq.
    JA 473. In construing MEJA’s text, the Court earlier rejected
    the premise underlying the defendants’ instruction, see supra
    15-16, and continues to do so in this context.
    The defendants’ remaining argument is that the district
    court “grievously erred” by failing to instruct the jury expressly
    that diplomatic security is a State Department responsibility.
    Joint Appellants’ Br. 68. They note that 
    22 U.S.C. §§ 4801-02
    assigns to the Secretary of State responsibility for “the security
    of diplomatic operations . . . abroad,” 
    id.
     § 4801(b)(1), and
    requires the Secretary to implement measures “to provide for
    the security of United States Government operations of a
    diplomatic nature,” id. § 4802(a)(1). For the defendants, there
    is a “fundamental conflict between that statutory assignment of
    21
    responsibility [to the State Department] and MEJA’s
    requirement that the defendants’ contract employment relate to
    supporting the Defense Department’s mission.” Joint
    Appellants’ Br. 74-75. The defendants offered the following
    instruction:
    The Defendants in this case were independent
    subcontractors employed by the Department of
    State to provide personal security to State
    Department personnel in Baghdad, Iraq. By
    law, the provision of personal security to State
    Department personnel overseas is the
    responsibility of the Department of State.
    JA 475.
    The defendants fail to recognize, however, that State
    Department contractors—and their employees—could help
    meet the State Department’s duty to provide security for
    diplomatic operations abroad and, at the same time, support the
    Defense Department’s overseas mission. Blackwater without
    question employed the defendants to protect State Department
    personnel, see, e.g., JA 1169-74, 1853-54, 3861; the critical
    question for the jury, however, was whether, in carrying out
    that responsibility, the defendants’ employment also “relate[d]
    to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense
    overseas,” see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3267
    (1)(A)(iii)(II). We agree with
    the district court that the defendants’ proposed instruction
    “would just be confusing to the jury.” JA 3279-80. The district
    court’s charge, “taken as a whole . . . accurately state[d] the
    governing law and provide[d] the jury with sufficient
    understanding of the issues and applicable standards.” DeFries,
    
    129 F.3d at 1304
    .
    22
    III. VENUE
    The defendants next complain the District of Columbia
    was an improper venue for their trials. On November 18,
    2008, the United States District Court for the District of
    Columbia issued an arrest warrant for Ridgeway, and
    Ridgeway voluntarily flew to Washington, D.C. from
    California. Once he arrived in Washington, he was met by an
    FBI agent, formally booked and taken to district court to plead
    guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter and one count of
    attempted voluntary manslaughter. While Ridgeway was not
    put in handcuffs when apprehended by the FBI, he testified he
    believed he was under arrest. After pleading guilty, Ridgeway
    was permitted to return to his home.
    If an offense is committed outside the United States and
    involves charges against multiple people, Congress has
    declared venue to be proper in the district where any of the joint
    offenders are first arrested. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3238
    . The
    defendants argue the government improperly used the arrest of
    Jeremy Ridgeway, one of the other turret gunners who fired in
    Nisur Square, to satisfy the venue statute because (1) Ridgeway
    was not arrested in connection with their charged offenses, (2)
    he was not a “joint offender” with the defendants and (3) the
    government impermissibly manufactured venue in the District
    of Columbia.
    Since the parties dispute the meaning of the phrases “joint
    offender” and “is arrested” in the venue statute, we focus on
    the statute’s text. Section 3238 states, “[t]he trial of all
    offenses begun or committed . . . out of the jurisdiction of any
    particular State or district[] shall be in the district in which the
    offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is
    arrested.” 
    Id.
     “The Government bears the burden of
    establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that venue is
    23
    proper with respect to each count charged against the
    defendant[s].” United States v. Morgan, 
    393 F.3d 192
    , 195
    (D.C. Cir. 2004). When reviewing whether venue was
    properly established, this Court views the evidence “in the light
    most favorable to the Government.” 
    Id.
     In order to assure
    the case would be heard in the District of Columbia, the
    government entered into a plea agreement with Ridgeway and
    arranged for him to travel to the District of Columbia from his
    home in California to be arrested.
    While this Court has not specifically defined “arrested” in
    the context of Section 3238, our sister circuits have consistently
    interpreted it to mean situations “‘where the defendant is first
    restrained of his liberty in connection with the offense
    charged.’” United States v. Wharton, 
    320 F.3d 526
    , 537 (5th
    Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Erdos, 
    474 F.2d 157
    , 160
    (4th Cir. 1973)). We believe this definition is correct and that
    the test is easily satisfied here. The record shows the district
    court issued the arrest warrant for Ridgeway. On the same
    day, he was arrested by the FBI in the District of Columbia and
    formally booked. The defendants argue Ridgeway’s freedom
    was never restrained because he voluntarily flew across the
    country from California and was never put in handcuffs or
    confined in a cell, but this misconstrues the meaning of arrest.
    Supreme Court precedent makes clear an arrest can either
    be carried out with “physical force [against a suspect] . . . or,
    where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.”
    California v. Hodari D., 
    499 U.S. 621
    , 626 (1991). What
    really matters is whether a “reasonable person would have
    believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v.
    Mendenhall, 
    446 U.S. 544
    , 554 (1980). Here, Ridgeway
    testified he understood himself to be under arrest when he was
    seized by the FBI upon arrival in the District of Columbia.
    Any reasonable person in Ridgeway’s position would have
    24
    understood he was not free to leave. 3 Ridgeway was first
    arrested in the District of Columbia; and that arrest established
    venue here.
    The defendants interpret the phrase “joint offender” to
    mean each offender must possess “a mutual intent” with others
    to commit a crime. Joint Appellants’ Br. 97–98. Because
    Ridgeway did not form this mutual intent, they claim he was
    not a joint offender. They rely primarily on the fact that many
    of the cases examining Section 3238 have involved
    collaborative criminal schemes. See, e.g., United States v.
    Levy Auto Parts of Can., 
    787 F.2d 946
    , 948–49 (4th Cir. 1986)
    (involving a conspiracy to sell munitions); United States v.
    Hong Vo, 
    978 F. Supp. 2d 49
    , 64 (D.D.C. 2013) (involving a
    conspiracy to commit visa fraud).
    However, this interpretation impermissibly narrows
    Section 3238 to one category of offenses. As noted by the
    district court, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a joint offense as
    a crime “committed by the participation of two or more
    persons.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 838 (6th ed. 1990).
    While the defendants are certainly correct that a joint crime can
    be committed by several defendants with a mutual intent to
    achieve a criminal goal, this is not the only type of crime in
    which a group may participate. In fact, Federal Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 8(b) allows multiple defendants to be
    charged with the same offense “if they are alleged to have
    participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series
    of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses.”
    3
    Judge Rogers concurs that the objective standard for an arrest
    has been met here, see Hodari D., 
    499 U.S. at 628
    , in light of
    testimony that upon meeting FBI Agent John Patarini in Washington,
    D.C., Ridgeway was handed an arrest warrant, told he was under
    arrest, and further told “If you can behave yourself, I will not put
    these [handcuffs] on you.” 7/31/14 (PM) Tr. 12:12-18.
    25
    Accordingly, instead of limiting “joint offender” to one
    category of offenses that requires participation by multiple
    people, a more natural reading of the statutory text
    encompasses not only people with a mutual intent to commit a
    crime, but also anyone who has joined others in participating
    in the same act or transaction constituting a crime or crimes.
    This interpretation is further supported by this Court’s
    preference for joint trials in cases involving multiple
    defendants. See United States v. Manner, 
    887 F.2d 317
    , 324
    (D.C. Cir. 1989). We have explained joint trials “promote
    efficiency” and noted that “this preference is especially strong
    when the respective charges require presentation of much the
    same evidence, testimony of the same witnesses, and involve
    [multiple] defendants who are charged . . . with participating in
    the same illegal acts.” United States v. Wilson, 
    605 F.3d 985
    ,
    1015, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2010). These rationales are especially
    compelling in a case like this. Ridgeway was working in the
    relevant convoy on the day of the Nisur Square attack, and,
    with other defendants, he opened fire on the civilians in Nisur
    Square. Thus, in order to convict Ridgeway, the government
    would be required to present the same evidence and to rely
    upon testimony from the same witnesses as they would for the
    other defendants. Also, concerns for efficiency are especially
    compelling here because many of the witnesses reside in Iraq.
    Multiple trials would mean arranging multiple international
    trips for the witnesses, which would likely be both difficult to
    schedule and costly. Thus, our interpretation of Section 3238
    is consistent with both the text of the statute and the general
    preference for joint trials. 4 We conclude “joint offenders”
    4
    We also note this interpretation is consistent with Section
    3238’s legislative history. See S. Rep. No. 88-146 at 1–2 (1963),
    reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 660, 660–61 (stating Congress
    desired to amend Section 3238 to avoid the “substantial burden” and
    “unnecessar[y] expens[es]” imposed by requiring the government to
    26
    encompasses all defendants who participated in the same act or
    transaction constituting the charged crimes.
    Thus, it is clear Ridgeway was a joint offender.
    Testimony at trial established Ridgeway was present in Nisur
    Square as a member of the Raven 23 convoy and that he fired
    at civilians to the south, to the west and finally to the north.
    Ridgeway participated in the “same series of acts or
    transactions” that gave rise to the prosecution, FED. R. CRIM. P.
    8(b), which makes him a joint offender. The defendants’
    emphasis on personal participation in every count returned by
    the grand jury focuses on the wrong thing. Although it is true
    that the government must show that “venue is proper with
    respect to each count charged,” United States v. Lam Kwong-
    Wah, 
    924 F.2d 298
    , 301 (D.C. Cir. 1991), it does not follow
    that Ridgeway must have personally participated in each act
    giving rise to each count. Section 3238 requires that
    Ridgeway be a “joint offender,” which is satisfied by his
    participation in the same series of acts or transactions giving
    rise to those counts, i.e., Ridgeway’s persistent, multi-
    directional shooting throughout the entire Nisur Square attack.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3238
    ; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) (“All
    defendants need not be charged in each count.”). Because
    Ridgeway clearly did participate in the Nisur Square shootings,
    he was a joint offender within the meaning of Section 3238.
    Likewise, the defendants’ claim that the government
    manufactured venue, while appealing on an intuitive level, fails
    in light of the congressional design of Section 3238. The text
    of the statute gives the government a choice regarding
    prosecution of an extraterritorial crime: either arresting a
    arrange and finance multiple trips to the United States for overseas
    witnesses for multiple trials). Thus, it appears the legislature meant
    what it plainly said.
    27
    cooperative defendant in a jurisdiction of the government’s
    choosing or seeking an indictment in the district where a
    defendant resides. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3238
     (stating venue “shall
    be in the district in which the offender, or any one of two or
    more joint offenders, is arrested”); see also United States v.
    Gurr, 
    471 F.3d 144
    , 155 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reading Section
    3238’s clauses disjunctively). Thus, by choosing to arrest
    Ridgeway in the District of Columbia, the government simply
    exercised the choice given to it under the statute. Something
    more is required to sustain a claim that venue has been
    manufactured. See United States v. Spriggs, 
    102 F.3d 1245
    ,
    1250–51 (D.C. Cir. 1996). For example, “where the key
    events occur in one district, but the prosecution, preferring trial
    elsewhere, lures a defendant to a distant district for some minor
    event simply to establish venue,” a claim of manufactured
    venue might have traction. 
    Id. at 1251
    . However, Section
    3238 forecloses that scenario here by explicitly allowing the
    government to choose where to arrest a cooperative joint
    offender.    Thus, venue was proper in the District of
    Columbia. 5
    5
    Equally unpersuasive is the defendants’ contention that the
    district court committed reversible error by ruling on the venue issue
    itself instead of presenting the question to the jury. Venue becomes
    a jury question if a defendant raises a genuine issue of material fact
    regarding venue. See United States v. Fahnbulleh, 
    752 F.3d 470
    ,
    477 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Here, the defendants failed to do so. The
    parties do not dispute what happened—i.e. that Ridgeway
    participated throughout the Baghdad shootings and that he flew from
    California to the District of Columbia and was arrested once he
    arrived there—they dispute the legal significance of those facts.
    The defendants disagree with the district court’s interpretation of the
    phrases “joint offender” and “arrest,” which, as discussed above,
    were correctly considered. Therefore, the district court did not err
    by withholding this issue from the jury.
    28
    IV. NEW TRIAL MOTION
    A. Background
    The defendants say the district court abused its discretion
    in denying a new trial based on the victim impact statement
    (“VIS”) from Officer Monem that appeared to contradict his
    testimony at trial.
    During the trial, the government called Sarhan Dheyab
    Abdul Monem, an Iraqi police officer, to testify about his
    observations in Nisur Square during the attack. Before the
    shooting began, Monem was stationed at a traffic kiosk located
    close to where the Raven 23 caravan had stopped. Monem
    testified that, after he heard shots being fired from the Raven
    23 caravan, he heard a scream coming from the Kia, so he
    approached the vehicle. As he neared the Kia, he saw its
    driver had been shot in the head. After examining the driver’s
    injury, Monem testified he moved in front of the convoy and
    attempted to tell them to stop shooting by speaking to them in
    Arabic and waving his hands. When this had no effect,
    Monem stated he returned to the Kia and attempted to help the
    Kia’s passenger, who was weeping and holding the body of the
    driver. According to Monem, the car began to slowly move
    forward, which caused the Raven 23 squad to begin firing at
    the Kia again. When the second burst of gunfire erupted,
    Monem fled back to his kiosk and hid behind it to shield
    himself from the bullets.
    After the defendants were convicted, the government
    solicited victim impact evidence from Iraqis who were present
    in Nisur Square on the day of the attack, including Monem.
    The purpose of this evidence was to allow victims and
    witnesses to describe how the Nisur Square shootings had
    affected them, including “feelings of anger, rage, blaming self,
    29
    . . . helplessness, [and] vulnerability.” JA 4032. In his VIS,
    Monem wrote about his guilt for not being able to help the
    Kia’s occupants; but, he also painted a different picture of what
    happened that day. Contrary to his testimony at trial,
    Monem’s VIS stated he “remained in [his] traffic cabin unable
    to move nor think.” JA 637. The VIS also stated Monem
    heard the driver of the Kia pleading with his mother to get out
    of the car before they were both killed. When the government
    produced Monem’s VIS to the court and defense counsel four
    days later, the defendants raised concerns about the
    inconsistency of the VIS with Monem’s trial testimony.
    This prompted the government to conduct an ex parte
    telephone conversation with Monem regarding his VIS. The
    government did not record this conversation and instead
    submitted notes to the district court summarizing Monem’s
    responses. According to these notes, Monem allegedly stated
    he did not understand his VIS to be a factual statement but
    rather an “expression” of what he imagined it was like to be the
    Kia driver. The notes also indicated Monem reaffirmed key
    portions of his trial testimony, including that he approached the
    Kia and saw the driver was dead.
    The defendants moved for a new trial based upon this
    newly-discovered evidence, but the district court denied their
    motions without conducting a hearing. United States v.
    Slough, 
    144 F. Supp. 3d 4
    , 5 (D.D.C. 2015). The defendants
    now appeal, claiming the district court committed reversible
    error by denying their motions for a new trial. Slatten argues
    the VIS provides direct evidence of his innocence by
    establishing that the person he was convicted of murdering was
    alive after the shooting in Nisur Square began, thus disproving
    the government’s theory of the case. Additionally, the other
    defendants argue the VIS shows Monem committed perjury at
    trial and that this new account refutes many facts vital to the
    30
    government’s case. Finally, all defendants argue the district
    court reversibly erred by failing to hold a hearing to examine
    Monem regarding the conflict his VIS created with his
    testimony at trial.
    B. Analysis
    Trial courts have broad discretion when deciding whether
    to grant a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence.
    Thompson v. United States, 
    188 F.2d 652
    , 653 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
    A district court’s denial of a new trial is reviewed for abuse of
    discretion. United States v. Oruche, 
    484 F.3d 590
    , 595 (D.C.
    Cir. 2007). In order to obtain a new trial because of newly-
    discovered evidence, the party seeking a new trial must prove:
    (1) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (2) the party
    acted diligently in its attempts to procure the newly-discovered
    evidence; (3) the evidence relied on is not “merely cumulative
    or impeaching,” (4) the evidence is “material to the issues
    involved” in the case and (5) the evidence is “of such nature
    that in a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal.”
    Thompson, 
    188 F.2d at 653
    . “[W]hen perjury by a prosecution
    witness is discovered after trial and when the prosecution did
    not know of the perjury until then,” a defendant is entitled to a
    new trial only if he can prove he “would probably be acquitted
    on retrial.” United States v. Williams, 
    233 F.3d 592
    , 594 (D.C.
    Cir. 2000).
    We begin by noting the unusual nature of the allegedly
    exculpatory evidence upon which the defendants rely. In
    homicide cases, victim impact statements are typically used
    during the sentencing phase of a trial. They allow the
    government to either offer a “quick glimpse” into a life taken
    by the defendant or to “demonstrat[e] the loss to the victim’s
    family and to society which has resulted from the defendant’s
    homicide.” Payne v. Tennessee, 
    501 U.S. 808
    , 822 (1991).
    31
    Nothing in the record suggests the government intended to use
    the VIS in this case as substantive evidence of guilt. See JA 637
    (asking Monem to describe how the crime affected him); cf.
    Payne, 
    501 U.S. at 856
     (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating victim
    impact statements “shed[] no light on the defendant’s guilt or
    moral culpability”). However, this is exactly the purpose for
    which the defendants now seek to use Monem’s VIS.
    Monem’s statements viewed in isolation could be seen as
    puzzling if not contrary to his testimony at trial, as the
    defendants suggest. Considered in context, however, as
    responses to the specific questions posed by the government in
    preparing for sentencing after the jury had returned its verdicts
    finding the defendants guilty, his statements take on another
    cast. Still, the Court is troubled by the government’s conduct
    upon discovery of what might appear to contradict his trial
    testimony. Instead of inviting defense counsel to participate in
    the phone call with Monem or—at a minimum—recording the
    phone conversation, the government conducted an ex parte
    phone call and offered nothing but its own notes as evidence of
    what was said during the call. Because the Court has no way
    of verifying what was said, we do not believe the notes
    constitute a repudiation of Monem’s contradictory statements.
    However, even if we view the statements in the light most
    favorable to the defendants and consider them to be an
    admission of perjury and a recantation of Monem’s trial
    testimony, we do not believe the district court abused its
    discretion in declining to grant a new trial. In order to succeed
    on their claims, the defendants must prove Monem’s VIS
    would probably result in an acquittal at a new trial.
    Thompson, 
    188 F.2d at 653
    . “This is a high bar to cross.”
    United States v. Celis, 
    608 F.3d 818
    , 848 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
    Here, even if Monem’s statements did constitute a recantation
    of his trial testimony, we do not believe they meet this high bar.
    32
    This holds especially true for Liberty, Slough and Heard,
    whose convictions regarding victims to the south, east, west
    and north of Nisur Square did not depend on Monem’s
    testimony regarding the first moments of the shooting attack.
    Regarding Dr. Al-Khazali, the Kia passenger, other evidence
    corroborated Monem’s testimony that the Kia was stopped
    when the first shots were fired, and Officer Al-Hamidi testified
    about his own efforts to stop the shooting independent of
    Monem’s.
    The only defendant with even a slight chance of a different
    outcome based on Monem’s contradictory VIS statements was
    Slatten. However, even if we were to assume that Monem
    would reaffirm his VIS testimony, acquittal would still not be
    likely due to the other record evidence that al-Rubia’y was
    killed instantly. As discussed in more detail below, testimony
    from Officer Al-Hamidi established that al-Rubia’y was shot
    in the head, killing him instantly. Only then did the car begin
    rolling forward unguided.          Comparing this consistent
    testimony from Officer Al-Hamidi with this new testimony
    from Monem, which only came to light after he was prompted
    to describe “feelings of anger, rage, blaming self, . . .
    helplessness, [and] vulnerability” resulting from the Nisur
    Square shootings, JA 4032, there is little reason to believe the
    outcome of the case would have been any different. Thus, it
    was hardly an abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse
    to grant a new trial based on evidence unlikely to produce a
    different outcome.
    Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion
    in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding Monem’s
    VIS. This Court gives a trial judge “broad discretion in ruling
    on a motion for a new trial, both in his actual decision and in
    what he considers before making that decision.” Lam Kwong-
    Wah, 
    924 F.2d at 308
    . “A motion for a new trial can ordinarily
    33
    be decided . . . without an evidentiary hearing, and a district
    court’s decision not to hold such a hearing may be reversed
    only for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Kelly, 
    790 F.2d 130
    , 134 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Kearney,
    
    682 F.2d 214
    , 219 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting the need for a
    hearing is diminished “where the trial judge has had an
    opportunity to observe the demeanor and weigh the credibility
    of the witness at trial”). Here, the district court judge presided
    over the entirety of this multiple-week trial and observed
    Monem’s testimony when it was given. Also, Monem’s
    testimony was subject to thorough cross-examination by
    several defense attorneys and—unlike the VIS—was largely
    corroborated by other evidence presented at trial. All of these
    factors combined made the district court “well qualified to rule
    on the motion for a new trial” based solely on the written
    motions and the evidence submitted. Kearney, 
    682 F.2d at 220
    . While we agree with the defendants that a hearing would
    have been helpful to clarify what Monem meant when he wrote
    his VIS, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the
    district court to decide the motion without a hearing.
    V. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    Liberty and Slatten challenge the sufficiency of the
    evidence supporting their convictions. The Court must affirm
    if, Aafter viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.@
    Jackson, 
    443 U.S. at 319
    . The jury is Aentitled to draw a vast
    range of reasonable inferences from evidence, but may not base
    a verdict on mere speculation.@ United States v. Harrison, 
    103 F.3d 986
    , 991 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Long,
    
    905 F.2d 1572
    , 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Applying this Ahighly
    deferential@ standard, United States v. Williams, 
    836 F.3d 1
    , 6
    (D.C. Cir. 2016), the Court concludes that the evidence
    34
    supporting the convictions was sufficient, with the exception
    of one of Liberty=s attempted manslaughter convictions.
    A. Liberty
    Liberty, the driver of the third vehicle in the four-vehicle
    convoy of Blackwater guards, was convicted of eight counts of
    voluntary manslaughter, twelve counts of attempted
    manslaughter and a Section 924(c) weapons count. The jury
    was also instructed, in view of the charges under 18 U.S.C. '
    2, that it could convict on each of these counts if it determined
    that Liberty aided and abetted their commission. Liberty
    contends that there was insufficient evidence that he
    unjustifiably fired his weapon at, or caused the death of, any
    victim, or that he took some action to aid another defendant=s
    unjustifiable shooting at any specific victim.
    First, Raven 23 member Jeremy Krueger=s testimony
    provided evidence from which the jury could find that Liberty
    fired at the white Kia in which the passenger, Dr. Al-Khazali,
    was killed. Krueger, who was in the vehicle in front of
    Liberty=s, testified that each member of the Raven 23 team
    had been assigned roles and that he was responsible for
    securing one sector of Nisur Square. Krueger testified that he
    saw shots fired at the Kia from the vehicle behind by Asomeone
    sitting in the driver=s position, and [he] assumed it to be Mr.
    Liberty, just based on [his] knowledge of [Liberty=s] position
    that day, [of the team members=] assignments.@ 8/5/14 (PM)
    Tr. 34:3-9. Although Krueger was not in a position to see the
    shooter=s face, he inferred that the shooter was the driver
    because the shooter was Asitting with his back against the
    driver=s seat@ like a driver would ordinarily sit. 8/5/14 (PM) Tr.
    91:10-12.
    35
    Liberty maintains that this evidence could just as plausibly
    describe Jimmy Watson, the Raven 23 leader, who testified that
    he leaned across Liberty=s body and shot into the Kia from the
    passenger seat. This, however, ignores that Krueger testified
    the shooter was sitting with his back Aup against the [driver=s]
    seat,@ 8/5/15 (PM) Tr. 91:17-20, and that the shooter=s upper
    body was above the steering wheel, not Atilting down or out@ of
    the vehicle like someone who was leaning across the driver=s
    body. 
    Id. at 35:25-36:11
    . Watson also described Liberty as
    having his back Aup against the seat.@ 7/28/14 (PM) Tr. 79:14-
    15. Although Watson testified that Liberty did not shoot into
    the Kia Aat that time,@ 7/28/14 (PM) Tr. 50:4-6, the jury could
    have reasonably disbelieved him because Watson=s testimony
    was inconsistent on other key points, such as whether Slatten
    shot first, and what Liberty did when he exited the vehicle
    during the tow hook-up. Compare, e.g., 7/28/14 (PM) Tr.
    30:18-22, with 
    id. at 30:23-31:20
    ; 
    id. at 95:12-16
    , with 
    id. at 95:25-96:13
    . Further, even if the jury credited Watson=s
    testimony on that point, it could reasonably have understood
    his other testimony that, after the initial burst of shooting, he
    told Liberty Ato open the door again and fire again,@ 
    id. at 50:13-14
    , to show that Liberty had taken part in the second
    burst of shooting at the Kia. Given the close proximity of the
    convoy to the Kia, 7/1/14 (PM) Tr. 138:4, the jury could
    reasonably find that Liberty=s shots hit Dr. Al-Khazali,
    contributing to her death.
    With regard to the victims shot to the south, Watson
    testified that Liberty Awas engaging in the direction of the
    south@ as the two of them fired simultaneously out of the
    driver=s side door, which was oriented in that direction.
    7/28/14 (PM) Tr. 61:18-62:7. Eddie Randall, another Raven
    23 member, testified that he saw shots fired southward from the
    same door, which, given Liberty=s driving assignment, he too
    assumed were fired by Liberty. 8/11/14 (AM) Tr. 80:5-82:3.
    36
    There was also testimony from Jeremy Ridgeway that in the
    immediate aftermath of the shootings in Nisur Square, Liberty
    admitted that he had done Aanother Grey 55,@ which Ridgeway
    explained meant firing blindly out of his porthole with his rifle
    across his lap. 7/31/14 (AM) Tr. 44:3-9. Liberty maintains
    nonetheless that the Grey 55 testimony did not establish
    shooting Ain a particular direction at a particular time,@ Joint
    Appellants’ Reply Br. 54, but because Liberty=s door faced
    south until the convoy pulled away to leave the Square, the jury
    could reasonably have found that the Grey 55 shots went south.
    That said, evidence showing only that Liberty fired south
    is not especially probative that he hit any particular victim
    because there were multiple shooters, multiple victims in that
    area and Amillions of square feet to the south.@ 7/29/14 (AM)
    Tr. 31:21-22 (Watson). Even so, and even were the Court to
    assume that the evidence already discussed was insufficient to
    show Liberty was directly responsible for the victims to the
    south, there was sufficient evidence to support Liberty=s
    convictions under an aiding-and-abetting theory. See United
    States v. Branch, 
    91 F.3d 699
    , 731-32 (5th Cir. 1996). To
    establish aiding and abetting, the government had to prove,
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that Liberty intentionally
    Afacilitated any part . . . of [the] criminal venture,@ with enough
    Aknowledge [of the crime to] enable[] him to make the relevant
    legal (and indeed, moral) choice@ to opt out instead.
    Rosemond v. United States, 
    134 S. Ct. 1240
    , 1246, 1249
    (2014). Given the evidence before the jury, we Afind no
    difficulty in holding that actively participating in a gunbattle in
    which a gunman kills [multiple victims] can aid and abet that
    killing@ even if the government cannot prove which gunman
    killed which victim. Branch, 
    91 F.3d at 732
    . This is
    especially true where, as here, the gunfire of each shooter
    hindered potential escape, leaving victims exposed to the
    others= bullets. Cf. Rosemond, 
    134 S. Ct. at
    1247 n.6.
    37
    The evidence showed that with Slough, Ridgeway and
    Heard firing to the south from their location and Watson and
    Liberty firing south from inside their vehicle, victims in that
    area had nowhere to turn in order to escape. Krueger, for
    instance, described people running and Aone gentleman
    particularly hiding behind a car and kind of frantically
    wondering what to do and how to get away,@ as rounds
    impacted the car and the ground around him. 8/5/14 (AM) Tr.
    47:12-16. This unarmed man appeared to be Adeciding which
    way to run, and he just didn=t know what the safe direction
    was,@ before eventually falling as he tried to make a run for
    safety. Id. at 48:18-49:18. Similarly, Raven 23 member
    Matthew Murphy described a man near the white Kia that he
    perceived to be shot while the man was Alooking around, . . .
    trying to think about what he was going to do, you know, [how
    to] get out of the way@ of the gunfire. 7/1/14 (AM) Tr. 11:2-
    12:10. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably find that
    Liberty=s southern shooting aided the gunmen who actually
    inflicted the harm.
    Liberty suggests that there is no evidence that he knew
    what anyone other than Watson was doing, and therefore his
    shooting could not have knowingly aided in the commission of
    any crime with the requisite intent. To the extent he relies on
    the fact that Watson was never charged as a co-defendant,
    aiding-and-abetting liability can arise even when the principal
    offense goes uncharged. United States v. Catalan-Roman,
    
    585 F.3d 453
    , 473 (1st Cir. 2009). The jury could readily find
    that Watson=s southern shooting was unjustified and thus
    criminal—for instance, when Watson repeatedly shot at and
    eventually hit a man running away from the convoy—and
    further, that Liberty knew of the lack of justification and yet
    continued to fire his weapon. Liberty=s failure to opt out
    satisfies the mens rea element, which can arise during the
    crime=s commission. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1249. Even
    38
    assuming that Liberty may not have been able to see Slough,
    Ridgeway, or Heard, who were firing their weapons from
    above Liberty, Watson testified he was aware that they were
    firing their weapons, and the jury could have reasonably
    imputed that same awareness to Liberty, who was sitting beside
    Watson. A number of southern-facing Raven 23 members,
    including Mark Mealy, who was the turret gunner in the lead
    vehicle, testified to the lack of apparent justification for any
    southern shooting from the convoy. E.g., 8/4/14 (PM) Tr.
    91:18-21 (Ridgeway was unable Ato personally identify a
    legitimate target@ as he fired south); 7/15/14 (PM) Tr. 113:16-
    114:16 (Mealy Adidn=t see any reason@ for the shots fired at
    people attempting to flee). Despite Liberty=s claim that Mealy
    had a different vantage than Liberty, the jury could
    reasonably find that Liberty, who was looking in the same
    direction, continued to fire his gun despite the unjustified
    shooting that was happening around him.
    With regard to the two victims shot to the east of the Nisur
    Square traffic circle, Mealy testified that an unidentified Raven
    23 member fired east while the disabled convoy vehicle was
    being hooked up for evacuation. Mealy saw an Iraqi man with
    his hands in the air, saw the Raven 23 guard kneeling outside
    his vehicle holding an M-4 rifle with an ACOG scope, and after
    he heard two or three shots, Mealy saw the Iraqi man double
    over with a stomach wound. Watson=s testimony placed Liberty
    outside their vehicle during the tow hook-up, and although his
    testimony about what Liberty was doing was inconsistent with
    his statement to the grand jury that he did not know what
    Liberty did, at trial he testified Liberty helped with the hook-
    up. Two rifle magazines later found in Nisur Square bore
    Liberty=s name and inasmuch the three other guards who were
    outside during the hook-up testified that they did not fire their
    weapons, the jury could reasonably infer that Liberty killed Ali
    Hussein.
    39
    Liberty disputes the import of this evidence. First, he
    maintains that the magazines prove only that he fired his
    weapon that day, something he does not deny. The jury,
    however, could have reasonably viewed this evidence to show
    that Liberty fired his weapon from outside the vehicle,
    consistent with Mealy=s testimony. Watson did not recall
    Liberty dropping a spent magazine while shooting inside the
    vehicle, and it is unclear how else the magazines might have
    ended up outside the vehicle. Second, Mealy testified that
    whoever shot Hussein used an ACOG scope. That Liberty had
    been issued an EOTech scope undercuts the inference that
    Liberty killed Hussein, but it does nothing to preclude it; the
    jury heard testimony that swapping scopes Awould [not] be that
    hard,@ 7/28/14 (PM) Tr. 97:20-21, and that over time one guard
    went from using an EOTech to an ACOG and then back again.
    Third, Liberty further points out that Mealy described the
    victim as wearing blue, traditional garb, and no victim matched
    that description. There was, however, testimony that Hussein
    was shot in the stomach, which is consistent with Mealy=s
    testimony.      Fourth, Liberty maintains that six Raven 23
    members testified that no shots were fired during the tow hook-
    up. This overstates the testimony to a degree, because Frost,
    Krueger and Rhodes testified that they did not recall or
    perceive any shots being fired during the hook-up, while
    Murphy and Ridgeway testified only that no incoming shots
    (i.e., shooting at the convoy) were fired. Even so, the jury was
    entitled to credit Mealy=s specific recollection over that of the
    others. Jackson, 
    443 U.S. at 319
    .
    In sum, although Liberty may have poked holes in some of
    the evidence against him, this Court does not review the jury=s
    verdict de novo. See 
    id.
     Given Mealy=s testimony and the
    spent magazines found outside the vehicle, Liberty has not
    shown that no reasonable factfinder could find him guilty of
    Hussein=s death. The jury could reasonably have credited
    40
    Mealy=s testimony and evidence that only Liberty fired his
    weapon during the hook-up efforts. On the other hand, the
    government has pointed to no evidence linking Liberty to the
    attempted manslaughter of Mahdi Al-Faraji, who was also shot
    to the east of Nisur Square. Mealy testified only to seeing the
    Blackwater guard taking Atwo or three shots@ to the east, hitting
    a single victim. 7/15/14 (PM) Tr. 120:1-121:11. An
    inference that one of those shots also hit a second victim would
    be based on mere speculation, Harrison, 
    103 F.3d at 991
    , and
    consequently that count of attempted manslaughter must be
    vacated for insufficient evidence.
    B. Slatten
    Slatten was convicted of first-degree murder in the death
    of Ahmed Al-Rubia=y, the driver of the white Kia. At the time
    of the shooting, Slatten was laying across a bench in the back
    of the third vehicle, aiming his weapon south out of a driver=s
    side porthole. The government=s theory was that while traffic
    was at a standstill waiting for the Blackwater convoy to exit the
    Square, Slatten fired two shots from a sniper rifle into the Kia
    windshield, killing Al-Rubia=y instantly and setting into motion
    the day=s horrific events. See, e.g., 6/17/14 (PM) Tr. 7:16-9:19.
    Slatten maintains there is insufficient evidence to support that
    theory and that testimony from two government witnesses
    disproves it.
    The jury heard testimony that at the outset, while all traffic
    was stopped in Nisur Square, there were two distinct pops, after
    which the Kia started to roll slowly and a woman began to
    scream. Officer Al-Hamidi testified that he approached the
    car to see that Al-Rubia=y=s Awhole face was full of blood,@ that
    the woman in the passenger seat was holding him and
    screaming AMy son, my son,@ and then the car Astarted moving
    slowly because the young man was killed, and he did not have
    41
    control of the car.@ 7/2/14 (AM) Tr. 92:11-93:10. Officer
    Monem similarly testified that, on his approach, he saw that Al-
    Rubia=y had been shot in the middle of his forehead, while a
    nearby witness saw a hole in the blood-splattered driver=s side
    windshield. From this, the jury could reasonably conclude
    that the first shots were fatal, and Slatten does not dispute this
    point.
    The jury also heard testimony from Jimmy Watson, who
    was in the front passenger seat of Slatten=s vehicle. Although
    unable to recall at trial, Watson had testified before the grand
    jury to his fairly strong recollection that Slatten fired twice and
    then the gunners began shooting, and this testimony was
    admitted into evidence at trial. Watson described Slatten=s
    first shots as Avery rhythmic . . . retort then retort,@ 7/28/14
    (PM) Tr. 34:14-15, consistent with others= descriptions of the
    fatal shots as Atwo pops,@ e.g., 7/14/14 (PM) Tr. 76:2-3.
    Watson could not see Slatten=s target, but testified that Slatten
    was aimed generally south, which was Athe direction . . . where
    the [Kia] was,@ 7/28/14 (PM) Tr. 38:25-39:2. Similarly, Eddie
    Randall testified that he heard the first shots come from in front
    of him, where Slatten=s vehicle was positioned. Slough was in
    Slatten=s vehicle, and on direct examination Randall testified
    that nothing he saw in Slough=s appearance indicated to him
    that Slough had taken the shots.
    The jury heard further testimony that Slatten was Raven
    23's best marksman, who carried a sniper rifle that had been
    modified to be on a hair trigger, and that Slatten was known for
    his particular disdain for Iraqis, viewing himself as getting
    payback for 9/11. Indeed, Jeremy Ridgeway testified that
    Slatten later recounted shooting someone who was taking aim
    at the convoy, with Slatten saying matter-of-factly that he
    Apopped his grape@ and caused him to slump forward. 7/31/14
    (AM) Tr. 49:5-16. From this evidence, a reasonable jury
    42
    could understand this to describe Al-Rubia=y, after being shot
    in the middle of the forehead by Raven 23's best marksman.
    Slatten=s bias against Iraqis, moreover, provided a basis for
    finding that Slatten had fired first, in the absence of any
    insurgent fire or other threat to the heavily armed convoy.
    Witnesses testified that Slatten had previously engaged in a
    pattern of preemptively shooting (or encouraging others to
    preemptively shoot) at targets in order to draw fire from
    potential adversaries. See United States v. Long, 
    328 F.3d 655
    , 661 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
    Slatten, like Liberty, pokes some holes in the government=s
    theory but does not overcome the jury=s reasonable
    determination of guilt in light of the evidence before it. He
    makes much of the fact that Ridgeway testified that Slatten
    confessed to killing an active shooter who slumped forward
    when shot, while Al-Rubia=y was an unarmed driver who,
    according to Officer Monem, slumped to the side. The jury
    could reasonably find that Slatten=s Aactive shooter@ claim to
    Ridgeway was self-serving and therefore not trustworthy. See
    Williamson v. United States, 
    512 U.S. 597
    , 599-600 (1994).
    As the district court found, the jury had Aample support in the
    record to find that Slatten was lying or unreasonably mistaken@
    about an active shooter. United States v. Slough, 
    144 F. Supp. 3d 4
    , 13 (D.D.C. 2015). Aside from two witnesses who
    thought they heard shots from what sounded like an AK-47,
    there was no evidence of any active shooters that day, let alone
    a seated one. And as for Monem=s testimony that Al-Rubia=y
    was slumped to the side, to the extent it conflicted with
    Slatten=s recounting the jury was entitled to disregard such a
    minor discrepancy. Given the lack of evidence that Slatten
    fired any other shots that day, the jury could reasonably
    understand his Apopped his grape@ comment to describe Al-
    Rubia=y, who had been shot in the middle of his forehead.
    43
    With regard to Watson=s testimony, Slatten highlights the
    equivocation at trial as to who shot first, Slatten or the gunners.
    He also points out that Watson testified to hearing three AK-47
    shots outside the convoy prior to Slatten firing, which Slatten
    suggests shows that he was returning incoming fire rather than
    firing at the Kia. Slatten=s attempt to revive the defendants=
    discredited self-defense theory lacks merit—the jury
    necessarily rejected it, and the district court noted that Ano
    witness . . . ever testified that they ever saw [an insurgent=s]
    weapon at the scene,@ 4/13/15 Tr. 152:6-8. In his reply brief,
    Slatten suggests that the initial shots Watson heard might have
    come from the gunners rather than insurgents, but Watson
    testified that he first heard AK-47 rounds in the distance, at
    which point either Slatten or the gunners began to fire. The
    jury could reasonably conclude that, despite his equivocation,
    Watson=s testimony supported the government=s theory that
    Slatten fired first, and also, in light of the overwhelming
    evidence to the contrary, that there was no incoming fire
    directed at the convoy.
    Slatten points out that Jeremy Krueger testified hearing
    5.56 caliber rounds as the first shots fired, which Krueger
    claimed he could distinguish from the sound of 7.62 caliber
    rounds, the caliber that Slatten=s sniper rifle would have fired.
    This testimony is probative, but not forcefully so in view of
    Krueger=s acknowledgment that his hearing was limited by
    noise-reducing ear protection and being inside of a different
    vehicle than the shooter. Still, it was for the jury to resolve the
    credibility of Krueger=s testimony that depending on the
    situation and circumstances, he Astill [thought he] could@
    distinguish caliber rounds even when inside another vehicle
    and while wearing ear protection. 8/5/14 (AM) Tr. 21:22-
    22:2.
    44
    Slatten=s strongest counterevidence comes from Officers
    Monem and Al-Hamidi, who testified that the first shots came
    from the gunners. Al-Hamidi was A100 percent certain@ that
    the first shots came from a gunner on top of a vehicle, 7/2/14
    (PM) Tr. 35:4-15, while Monem Adid not see the explosion
    from the mouth of [a gunner’s] rifle, but it was so close@ that
    he could tell from the sound that it did. 6/23/14 (AM) Tr.
    12:12-13. This testimony, however, does not Adisprove[]@ the
    government=s theory of Slatten=s guilt. Slatten’s Br. 47. It
    simply creates a dispute of fact, and it was the jury=s
    responsibility to weigh the officers= conflicting testimony
    against that of Watson to resolve the dispute. Jackson, 
    443 U.S. at 319
    . That a different jury might have resolved the
    conflict differently is not tantamount to showing that no
    reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Slatten shot first.
    See 
    id.
     Without any other plausible target for Slatten=s first
    shots, and given the proximity of the Kia, it would have been
    reasonable for the jury to find that Slatten killed Al-Rubia=y.
    VI. VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION
    Slatten further contends that his re-indictment for first-
    degree murder, after he successfully challenged his previous
    indictment for manslaughter, attempted manslaughter and
    weapons charges, constituted vindictive prosecution. Our
    review of the district court=s contrary finding is for clear error.
    United States v. Safavian, 
    649 F.3d 688
    , 692 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
    A. Background
    In December 2008, Slatten was indicted jointly with his
    co-defendants for identical counts of manslaughter, attempted
    manslaughter and weapons charges. When the government
    later concluded that Atainted@ testimony against Slatten had
    been presented to the grand jury, see generally Kastigar v.
    45
    United States, 
    406 U.S. 441
     (1972), it moved to voluntarily
    dismiss the indictment as to Slatten. The district court granted
    defendants= motion to dismiss the indictment as to all
    defendants on related Kastigar grounds. United States v.
    Slough, 
    677 F. Supp. 2d 112
    , 166 & n.67 (D.D.C. 2009). On
    appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the dismissal as to all
    defendants except Slatten, concluding that the district court had
    already granted the government=s motion to dismiss and Ataken
    Slatten out of the case for now.@ Slough, 
    641 F.3d at 547
    .
    Two years later, the government secured a superseding
    indictment charging Slatten with the manslaughter of Al-
    Rubia=y, and jointly charging all defendants with various other
    manslaughter, attempted manslaughter and weapons counts.
    Slatten moved to dismiss the charges as time-barred because
    this Court=s earlier reversal of dismissal had not applied to him
    and the limitations period had continued to run. The district
    court denied his motion, and Slatten filed a petition for a writ
    of mandamus. This Court granted the writ upon concluding
    that its earlier reversal Aclearly applied@ only to Slatten=s co-
    defendants. In re Slatten, No. 14-3007, at 1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7,
    2014). It denied the government=s own petition for rehearing,
    observing that the government=s concern about a miscarriage of
    justice if its prosecution of Slatten were time-barred was
    caused by the government=s Ainexplicable failure to [timely]
    reindict Slatten.@ In re Slatten, No. 14-3007, at 2 (D.C. Cir.
    Apr. 18, 2014). The government subsequently obtained an
    indictment charging Slatten with first-degree murder in the
    death of Al-Rubia=y, a charge not subject to the statute of
    limitations. 18 U.S.C. '' 1111(b), 3281. The prosecutor
    conveyed to Slatten=s counsel an offer to reduce the charge to
    manslaughter if Slatten would waive any limitations defense,
    explaining that the murder charge was the government=s only
    remaining option for holding Slatten accountable.
    46
    Slatten moved to dismiss the first-degree murder charge
    on due process grounds, arguing that the increased charge
    constituted vindictive prosecution. The district court denied the
    motion, finding that the facts did not raise a presumption of
    vindictive prosecution. It found that Slatten exercised his rights
    in a pre-trial context, in which courts are far more hesitant to
    presume vindictiveness. It further found that the prosecutor=s
    offer to reduce the charge was a permissible pre-trial
    negotiation, akin to plea bargaining, and that no other facts
    suggested that the government was improperly motivated.
    Instead, the government simply sought to hold Slatten
    accountable for a heinous crime it believed he committed. The
    district court also rejected Slatten=s argument that the
    government was required to provide a contemporaneous
    explanation of its decision to increase the charge. United
    States v. Slatten, 
    22 F. Supp. 3d 9
    , 12-16 (D.D.C. 2014).
    B. Analysis
    The Due Process Clause prohibits prosecutors from
    Aupping the ante@ by filing increased charges in order to
    retaliate against a defendant for exercising a legal right.
    Blackledge v. Perry, 
    417 U.S. 21
    , 27-28 (1974). At the same
    time, however, prosecutors have broad discretion to enforce the
    law, and their decisions are presumed to be proper absent clear
    evidence to the contrary. United States v. Armstrong, 
    517 U.S. 456
    , 464 (1996). Thus, to succeed on a claim of
    vindictive prosecution, a defendant must establish that the
    increased charge was Abrought solely to >penalize= [him] and
    could not be justified as a proper exercise of prosecutorial
    discretion.@ United States v. Goodwin, 
    457 U.S. 368
    , 380 n.12
    (1982) (emphasis added). This can be accomplished in two
    ways: through objective evidence showing actual
    vindictiveness, or through evidence Aindicat[ing] a >realistic
    likelihood of vindictiveness,=@ which gives rise to a
    47
    presumption that the government must then attempt to rebut.
    United States v. Meyer, 
    810 F.2d 1242
    , 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
    (quoting Blackledge, 
    417 U.S. at 27
    ). Slatten relies on the
    latter, presumptive route.
    In presumption cases, the Supreme Court has
    distinguished between pre-trial and post-trial settings.
    Goodwin, 
    457 U.S. at 381
    . In a pre-trial setting, Athe
    prosecutor=s assessment of the proper extent of prosecution
    may not have crystallized,@ so an increase in charges may be
    the result of additional information or further consideration of
    known information, rather than a vindictive motive. 
    Id.
     The
    routine exercise of many pre-trial rights also weakens any
    inference of vindictiveness, i.e., that a prosecutor would
    retaliate simply because a defendant sought a jury trial or
    pleaded an affirmative defense. 
    Id.
     On the other hand, a
    post-trial increase in charges is unlikely to be based on new
    information, and thus it is Amuch more likely to be improperly
    motivated than is a pretrial decision.@ 
    Id.
     For this reason, a
    presumption of vindictiveness will Aautomatically@ arise
    whenever charges are increased post-trial, but in the pre-trial
    context, a defendant must provide additional facts sufficient to
    show that Aall of the circumstances, when taken together,
    support a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.@ Meyer, 
    810 F.2d at 1245-46
    .
    The parties dispute whether the first degree murder
    indictment is properly characterized as occurring in a pre-trial
    or post-trial setting. The government maintains that as a
    factual matter the charging decision was unquestionably made
    prior to Slatten=s trial, while Slatten maintains that it was more
    akin to a post-trial decision because it followed a hotly
    contested mandamus proceeding in which this Court chastised
    the government for failing timely to reindict him. Slatten also
    points out that this case was closely watched by U.S. and Iraqi
    48
    leaders, citing former Vice President Biden=s assurance to
    former Iraqi President Talabani that the earlier Kastigar
    dismissal would be appealed. Anthony Shadid, Biden Says
    U.S. Will Appeal Blackwater Case Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
    23, 2010. This Court has acknowledged that particularly in an
    important, highly publicized case, a prosecutor Abeing but
    human >may have a personal stake in [obtaining a] conviction
    and a motivation to engage in self-vindication.=@ Safavian,
    649 F.3d at 692 (quoting United States v. Stanfield, 
    360 F.3d 1346
    , 1362 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Especially when compared to
    the routine pretrial motions identified in Goodwin, 
    457 U.S. at 381
    , there can be little question that the extraordinary
    mandamus grant here, followed by a rather sharply-worded
    criticism in denying reconsideration, in a high-profile
    prosecution with international ramifications no less, had far
    greater potential to give rise to a vindictive motive. But these
    unusual facts do not convert the pre-trial setting into a post-trial
    one in which a presumption would automatically apply; rather
    they constitute Aadditional facts@ that support the finding of a
    presumption. Meyer, 810 F.2d at 1245B46.
    Slatten=s other contentions, derived from the Court=s
    analysis in Meyer, 810 F.2d at 1246B47, do not fare as well.
    He maintains that he received disparate treatment from his co-
    defendants, but he ignores that his co-defendants had no viable
    limitations defense and were not similarly situated, as the
    Meyer defendants were. See 
    810 F.2d at 1246
    . Next,
    although the government had twice considered the facts and
    twice charged manslaughter, Athe initial charges filed by a
    prosecutor may not reflect the extent to which an individual is
    legitimately subject to prosecution.@ Goodwin, 
    457 U.S. at 382
    . Here, the government=s decision in the superseding
    indictment to charge Slatten alone in the death of Al-Rubia=y
    indicates that it continued to develop facts after its initial
    charging decision. But even where the government has full
    49
    knowledge of the facts, it can initially exercise its discretion to
    bring lesser charges. E.g., United States v. Saltzman, 
    537 F.3d 353
    , 361 (5th Cir. 2008). Moreover, Slatten is incorrect that,
    as in Meyer, A[t]he only relevant intervening event@ before the
    charge increase was Slatten=s assertion of rights. Slatten’s Br.
    21-22. Here, Slatten exercised his right to file a mandamus
    petition and this Court granted it, nullifying the government=s
    ability to proceed on the existing charges. Finally, the
    government=s offer to charge manslaughter in exchange for
    Slatten waiving his limitations defense was not improper. As
    the district court found, Slatten was advised by competent
    counsel and was free to accept or reject the government=s offer,
    which was a permissible give-and-take. See Bordenkircher v.
    Hayes, 
    434 U.S. 357
    , 363 (1978); see also Paradise v. CCI
    Warden, 
    136 F.3d 331
    , 335 n.6 (2d Cir. 1998).
    Still, although it is a close question, the unusual, high-
    profile and potentially embarrassing context surrounding
    Slatten=s mandamus petition could be viewed to Asupport a
    realistic likelihood of prosecutorial vindictiveness.@ Meyer,
    
    810 F.2d at 1246
    . In that situation, the burden would shift to
    the government to provide any objective evidence showing a
    non-retaliatory justification for the increased charge.
    Safavian, 649 F.3d at 694. The government has met this
    Aadmittedly minimal@ burden, id., pointing to this Court=s grant
    of Slatten=s mandamus petition that left the government with
    no alternative but to charge him with murder or else see Aa
    heinous crime@ go unpunished. Appellee’s Br. 88 (quoting
    Slatten, 22 F. Supp. 3d at 14). In closely analogous
    circumstances, the Second Circuit found no vindictiveness
    when a defendant successfully pursued a statute of limitations
    defense in the state=s highest court, and the prosecution then
    reindicted him for a capital charge not subject to any limitations
    period. Paradise, 
    136 F.3d at 334, 336
    . As here, the capital
    charge Awas simply the only charge available[] after the other
    50
    charges had been dismissed . . . as time barred,@ and the
    government=s desire to see the crime punished Adoes not
    amount to a constitutional violation.@ 
    Id. at 336
    .
    This does not mean, as amicus asserts, that prosecutors can
    permissibly Aup the ante@ any time a defendant succeeds on
    appeal. Amicus Br. 27. In many cases, the same charges will
    remain available to the prosecution after a defendant=s
    successful appeal, and any increase in the charges will still give
    rise to the specter of vindictiveness. See Meyer, 810 F.2d at
    1245B46. And even if the same charges are unavailable on
    retrial, a defendant can still marshal any available evidence of
    actual vindictiveness to show that the prosecution=s purported
    desire to see the crime punished is mere pretext. Nor should
    this result cause doubt about whether Slatten was punished for
    exercising a legal right. Again, the Court relies little on the
    government=s stated desire to see the crime punished, and
    instead places dispositive weight on the intervening grant of
    mandamus, as this Court has held that an adverse appellate
    ruling can provide an objective basis for the prosecution=s new
    charging decision. Safavian, 649 F.3d at 694. It is also
    immaterial that the new charge was the result of the
    prosecution=s initial mistake in allowing the limitations period
    to run. See Paradise, 
    136 F.3d at
    336 n.7. Slatten and amicus
    urge that the government can only increase charges when,
    Athrough no fault of its own,@ the government learns of new
    information after the initial charging decision. United States
    v. Jamison, 
    505 F.2d 407
    , 416B17 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But the
    Supreme Court has rejected the Apresum[ption] that every
    prosecutor is infallible.@ Goodwin, 
    457 U.S. at
    382 n.14; see
    also Paradise, 
    136 F.3d at
    336 n.7. Finally, as the district
    court ruled, the government was not required to state its
    justification when it obtained the first-degree murder
    indictment because Athe prosecutor is not required to sustain
    any burden of justification@ until after the defendant comes
    51
    forward with evidence of vindictiveness. Goodwin, 
    457 U.S. at
    384 n.19.
    With the presumption rebutted, Slatten=s vindictive
    prosecution challenge fails because he does not offer any
    evidence to support a finding of actual vindictiveness.
    Safavian, 649 F.3d at 694. The district court reached the same
    conclusion, albeit by considering the government=s objective
    justification to rule out a presumption of vindictiveness at step
    one, rather than to rebut it at step two. Otherwise, the substance
    of its analysis is much the same as our own, and as such, we
    hold that the district did not err, let alone clearly err, in rejecting
    Slatten=s defense of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
    VII. MOTION TO SEVER
    We next turn to Slatten’s challenge to the district court’s
    denial of his Rule 14 motion to sever his trial from that of a co-
    defendant. Slatten argued for severance because he sought to
    introduce      exculpatory     evidence—the        co-defendant’s
    admissions that he, not Slatten, initiated the Nisur Square
    attack by firing on the white Kia—evidence inadmissible in a
    joint trial with the co-defendant. See Kastigar v. United States,
    
    406 U.S. 441
    , 458-61 (1972) (government cannot prosecute
    declarant based on immunized statement). The district court
    denied Slatten’s motion to sever, finding the co-defendant’s
    admissions constituted inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.
    Because the co-defendant’s admissions were vital to Slatten’s
    defense and possessed sufficient circumstantial guarantees of
    trustworthiness, we believe they were admissible under Federal
    Rule of Evidence 807. Accordingly, because the district court
    erroneously denied severance, we reverse Slatten’s first-degree
    murder conviction—Count One of the superseding
    indictment—and remand his case for a new trial.
    52
    A. Background
    As we outlined earlier, Slatten’s first-degree murder
    conviction arose from the killing of the driver of the white Kia.
    As the Raven 23 convoy entered Nisur Square on September
    16, 2007, shift leader Jimmy Watson gave the command to
    “lock[] down” the area to aid the movement of other
    Blackwater teams operating nearby. JA 1776, 1846-48, 1856-
    57, 2351-52. With the help of Iraqi policemen, the Blackwater
    convoy brought traffic in the Square to a halt, as was their usual
    procedure. After the traffic stopped, shots rang out. The shots,
    originating from the Raven 23 convoy, targeted and hit a white
    Kia, shattering its windshield and striking its driver, Ahmed
    Haithem Ahmed Al-Rubia’y, in the head. 6 General gunfire
    then began as Raven 23 team members fired on Iraqi civilian
    pedestrians in several directions in Nisur Square and the
    surrounding area.
    As noted, the government maintained that Slatten’s shot
    was the match that ignited the Nisur Square firestorm—that
    Slatten intentionally opened fire on the white Kia because of
    an anti-Iraqi animus. See also Appellee’s Br. 103 (“The
    evidence also showed that Slatten had both the intent and
    6
    On appeal, as at trial, the government has maintained that
    “once Raven 23 was in the Square, ‘no car [was] moving.’”
    Appellee’s Br. 12 (citing JA 1247-48). It argues that it was only after
    Slatten, unprovoked, fired upon the white Kia that it “started to move
    slowly forward” towards the convoy. Id. at 13. The defendants,
    however, insist that the “white Kia sedan pulled out of a line of
    stopped cars entering the circle from the south, and drove directly
    towards the convoy.” Joint Appellants’ Br. 17. According to the
    defense, it was only after the white Kia started moving that Slatten’s
    co-defendant opened fire on the vehicle to stop its advance. Id. at 18-
    19. We highlight this discrepancy to underscore the importance of
    the co-defendant’s admissions to Slatten’s defense.
    53
    motive to open the firing in the Square. His hatred toward Iraqis
    stood out, even among those who held such views.”). The
    government insisted that the Nisur Square attack was part of
    Slatten’s plan to “get[] payback for 9/11,” JA 2117, and the
    white Kia presented him with the target for which he had been
    waiting.
    But in the hours and days following the Nisur Square
    attack, it was another member of the Raven 23 team—a co-
    defendant here—who said that he had fired the first shots at the
    white Kia. SA 1, 4, 6-7. Just hours after the shooting, the co-
    defendant was interviewed and debriefed by State Department
    investigators operating in Baghdad. SA 1. Before his interview,
    the investigators told the co-defendant that if he was “honest
    and truthful, that nothing would be used against [him], and that
    they were there to gather information not to be used in a
    criminal setting.” SA 22. During his first debriefing, the co-
    defendant told the investigators that he had “engaged and hit
    the driver” of the white Kia sedan. SA 1. The investigators’
    corresponding report states:
    [T]he team came into and locked down the
    circle. Traffic was very heavy, but responded to
    their commands to stop. A white vehicle
    approached the team at a high rate of speed and
    would not stop despite [the co-defendant’s]
    hand signals and throwing a water bottle. Other
    civilians tried to waive the vehicle down, but it
    still would not stop. [The co-defendant]
    engaged and hit the driver.
    SA 1. Two days later, on September 18, 2007, the co-defendant
    signed a sworn written statement regarding the Nisur Square
    attack. SA 3-5. As with his earlier statement, the co-
    defendant’s September 18 statement was made with the
    understanding that “neither [the co-defendant’s] statements nor
    54
    any information or evidence gained by reason of [his]
    statements [could] be used against [him] in a criminal
    proceeding, except that if [he] knowingly and willfully
    provide[d] false statements or information, [he could] be
    criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States
    Code, Section 1001.” SA 3. In his second statement, the co-
    defendant repeated his earlier statement:
    As our motorcade pulled into the intersection I
    noticed a white four door sedan driving directly
    at our motorcade from the west bound lane. I
    and others were yelling, and using hand signals
    for the car to stop and the driver looked directly
    at me and kept moving toward our motorcade.
    Fearing for my life and the lives of my
    teammates, I engaged the driver and stopped the
    threat.
    SA 4. On September 20, 2007, the co-defendant again spoke to
    State Department investigators and with the same limited use
    condition as obtained in his first two interviews. SA 6-7; 22-
    23. The investigators’ report recounted the co-defendant’s
    statement made at that time:
    On the day of the incident . . . [the co-defendant]
    was positioned just west of the police booth that
    is located near the north end of the median south
    of the Circle. A white car was moving north on
    Jinub Street toward the motorcade, and [the co-
    defendant] gave commands for the driver to
    stop. The car did not stop, and [he] engaged it
    with his M4. [The co-defendant] is not sure
    whether he was the first one to fire during this
    incident. He is not aware of any shots being
    fired before his. The car kept moving straight
    toward the motorcade without braking. [The co-
    55
    defendant] used one magazine             of   M4
    ammunition to engage the white car.
    SA 6-7.
    Taken together, then, the co-defendant’s statements relate
    a different version of the Nisur Square events from that
    presented by the government at trial. The government’s case
    against Slatten hinged on his having fired the first shots, his
    animosity toward the Iraqis having led him to target the white
    Kia unprovoked. See supra 40-44. The co-defendant’s
    statements, however, strike at the heart of that theory and
    instead point to the co-defendant, not Slatten, as the Blackwater
    convoy member who first “engaged and hit the driver” of the
    white Kia. SA 1.
    At Slatten’s arraignment, the district court granted the
    government’s motion to join Slatten’s trial with that of Liberty,
    Heard and Slough. JA 388-91. Slatten asked the district court
    to reconsider joinder on two grounds, insisting, first, that,
    because of his need for a co-defendant’s testimony, severance
    was essential so that the co-defendant could be called as a
    witness for Slatten at the latter’s separate trial. See SA 42-43.
    Further, if, in a joint trial, the co-defendant statements were
    deemed admissible as exculpatory evidence as to Slatten, then
    severance was appropriate to protect the co-defendant’s Fifth
    Amendment right. SA 43.
    The district court rejected both rationales and denied the
    motion to sever. Regarding Slatten’s first argument, the district
    court concluded that Slatten had failed to show a “reasonable
    probability” that the co-defendant would be willing to testify at
    a separate trial, as required by United States v. Ford, 
    870 F.2d 729
    , 731 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (when weighing appropriateness of
    severance based on alleged need for co-defendant’s testimony,
    court should consider, inter alia, “the likelihood that the co-
    56
    defendant will testify if the cases are severed”). SA 42-43. The
    district court further found no constitutional problem in joining
    Slatten’s and his co-defendant’s trials because the latter’s
    “statements [were] . . . inadmissible hearsay.” SA 43. Slatten
    challenges only the second ruling on appeal. See Slatten’s Br.
    36-46.
    B. Hearsay and Its Exceptions
    Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is inadmissible at
    trial to establish the truth thereof. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c)
    (defining hearsay); FED. R. EVID. 802 (hearsay generally
    inadmissible). The hearsay rule is rooted in the belief that an
    out-of-court statement lacks necessary assurances of veracity.
    See Williamson v. United States, 
    512 U.S. 594
    , 598 (1994)
    (“The hearsay rule . . . is premised on the theory that out-of-
    court statements are subject to particular hazards.”). With any
    statement, a “declarant might be lying; he might have
    misperceived the events which he relates; he might have faulty
    memory; [or] his words might be misunderstood or taken out
    of context by the listener.” 
    Id.
     To avoid these shortcomings,
    our judicial system chooses in-court statements that can be
    tested by “the oath, the witness’ awareness of the gravity of the
    proceedings, the jury’s ability to observe the witness’
    demeanor, and, most importantly, the right of the opponent to
    cross-examine.” 
    Id.
     Admitting hearsay would prevent
    opposing parties, and our judicial system as a whole, from
    using these checks. United States v. Evans, 
    216 F.3d 80
    , 85
    (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“The problem with hearsay is that it deprives
    the defendant of the opportunity to cross-examine the person
    who uttered the statement at issue.”).
    “Nonetheless, the Federal Rules of Evidence also
    recognize that some kinds of out-of-court statements are less
    subject to these hearsay dangers, and therefore except them
    from the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible.” Williamson,
    57
    
    512 U.S. at 598
    . The enumerated exceptions apply to hearsay
    that possesses certain guarantees of trustworthiness. See FED.
    R. EVID. 803-04 (enumerating exceptions and exclusions to
    hearsay rule).
    On appeal, Slatten does not argue his co-defendant’s
    statements fall outside the definition of hearsay. See FED. R.
    EVID. 801(c). Indeed, he could not succeed if he did so argue—
    Slatten acknowledges that he seeks to use his co-defendant’s
    out-of-court statements to establish the truth thereof, that is,
    that his co-defendant fired the first shots at the white Kia. See
    Slatten’s Br. 36. Slatten does, however, challenge the district
    court’s conclusions that his co-defendant’s statements do not
    fit within any of three exceptions to the hearsay rule: 1) Rule
    804(b)(3)’s statement against interest exception; 2) Rule
    803(6)’s business record exception; and 3) Rule 807’s residual
    hearsay exception. 7 SA 43-45.
    7
    Neither the district court nor the parties on appeal distinguish
    among the co-defendant’s three separate statements—the September
    16 report, the September 18 statement and the September 20 report—
    for the hearsay analysis. See supra 53-55. This approach likely
    reflects the fact that the content of the three statements is largely
    overlapping. See SA 1, 4, 6-7. Nevertheless, two of the reports—the
    September 16 report and the September 20 report—contain hearsay
    within hearsay. Id. at 1, 6-7. The September 18 statement was
    completed by the co-defendant himself so that, to be admissible, only
    one “link” in the hearsay chain need fall within an exception: the
    incorporation of the co-defendant’s statements in the report. As set
    forth infra, we believe the September 18 statement is admissible
    under Rule 807’s residual hearsay exception. See infra Part VII.B.3.
    The September 16 and September 20 reports, however, were
    completed by investigators to whom the co-defendant made his
    statements. Id. These two reports thus have an additional “link” in
    the hearsay chain: the transmission of the co-defendant’s statements
    to the investigators and the agents’ incorporation of the statements
    58
    1. Standard of Review
    Ordinarily, the Court reviews the exclusion of a hearsay
    statement under the abuse of discretion standard. United States
    v. Moore, 
    651 F.3d 30
    , 83 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
    Nevertheless, for Rule 807, we have enunciated a slightly
    different standard; namely, we should be “particularly hesitant
    to overturn a trial court’s admissibility ruling under the residual
    hearsay exception absent a definite and firm conviction that the
    court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it
    reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” United
    States v. North, 
    910 F.2d 843
    , 909 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal
    quotation marks omitted) (quoting Balogh’s of Coral Gables,
    Inc. v. Getz, 
    798 F.2d 1356
    , 1358 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc)).
    into their reports. But “[h]earsay within hearsay is not excluded by
    the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements
    conforms with an exception to the rule.” FED. R. EVID. 805. We
    believe the first instance of hearsay—the transmission of the co-
    defendant’s statements to the investigators—falls within Rule 807’s
    residual hearsay exception. See infra Part VII.B.3. And the second
    hearsay—the investigators’ incorporation of the co-defendant’s
    statements into their reports—falls within Rule 803(8)’s public
    records exception, which makes admissible a public record’s “factual
    findings from a legally authorized investigation” so long as they are
    offered “against the government in a criminal case” and “the
    opponent does not show that the source of information or other
    circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” See FED. R. EVID.
    803(8); United States v. Warren, 
    42 F.3d 647
    , 657 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
    (“[Rule 803(8)] appears to provide for admission of police officers’
    statements in public records even in the absence of a demonstration
    that the statements reflected the officers’ personal knowledge.”);
    accord Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 
    488 U.S. 153
    , 169 (1988)
    (taking “[a] broad approach to admissibility under [Rule 803(8)]”).
    59
    Because “the legislative history of [Rule 807] indicates
    that it should be applied sparingly,” we believe it appropriate
    to engage in a Rule 807 analysis only if it is apparent that no
    other exception renders a hearsay statement admissible. See
    SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 
    890 F.2d 1215
    , 1225 (D.C. Cir.
    1989); accord United States v. Kim, 
    595 F.2d 755
    , 759-66
    (D.C. Cir. 1979) (analyzing admissibility of statement under
    Rule 803(6) before residual hearsay exception analysis).
    Therefore, before discussing the residual hearsay exception, we
    briefly turn to Slatten’s arguments that his co-defendant’s
    statements are admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) and Rule
    803(6).
    2. Rule 804(b)(3) and Rule 803(6)
    Rule 804(b)(3) provides an exception to the hearsay rule
    if: “(1) the declarant [is] unavailable, (2) the statement [is]
    against the declarant’s interest, and (3) corroborating
    circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
    statement.” Moore, 
    651 F.3d at 82
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted); see FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). Although we agree with
    Slatten that, at their joint trial, his co-defendant qualified as “an
    unavailable witness,” see United States v. Harris, 
    846 F. Supp. 121
    , 124 n.6 (D.D.C. 1994) (witness “on the advice of counsel,
    invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
    incrimination and did not testify at trial . . . [a]s a result, he
    became an unavailable witness”), and that his co-defendant’s
    statements do possess indicia of trustworthiness, 8 see infra at
    Part VII.B.3, Slatten could not show that his co-defendant’s
    statements were so inculpatory that a reasonable person in the
    8
    In this respect, we disagree with the district court’s statement
    that “the unreliable context under which the statements were given
    surely does not ‘indicate [the statement’s] trustworthiness.’” SA 44;
    see infra at Part VII.B.3.
    60
    latter’s position would have made the statements only if he
    believed them to be true; his co-defendant’s statements were
    immunized and, as a general matter, a self-defense claim is not
    “clearly” against a declarant’s interest, see United States v.
    Henley, 
    766 F.3d 893
    , 915 (8th Cir. 2014) (affidavit of
    unavailable declarant “was not clearly against his own interest
    because in it he claims he shot [the victim] in self defense”);
    United States v. Shryock, 
    342 F.3d 948
    , 981 (9th Cir. 2003)
    (“The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding [a
    declarant’s] statement that he shot the victims in self-defense
    because the statement was exculpatory, and not against his
    penal interest.”). Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion
    to conclude, as the district court did, that the co-defendant’s
    statements did not fit within Rule 804(b)(3)’s exception. See
    FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
    Rule 803(6) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for
    records that are, inter alia, “kept in the course of a regularly
    conducted activity of a business.” FED. R. EVID. 803(6). Rule
    803(6) does not support the admissibility of the co-defendant’s
    statements because he himself was not acting in the regular
    course of business when he made his statements to State
    Department investigators. 9 United States v. Warren, 
    42 F.3d 647
    , 656 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Rule 803(6) “allows admission of
    9
    During the trial, the district court focused on the fifth element
    of Rule 803(6)’s test, finding that the “source of the information . . .
    indicate[s] a lack of trustworthiness” because “the natural tendency
    of the target of an investigation who is furnishing a compelled
    statement following a shooting incident would be to provide ‘self-
    serving exculpatory statements.’” SA 45. We disagree with the
    district court’s assessment of the trustworthiness of the “source of
    the information.” See infra Part.VII.B.3. Nonetheless, we “may
    affirm on grounds other than those presented and relied on below.”
    United States v. Lawson, 
    410 F.3d 735
    , 740 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
    61
    statements in [police] reports only if they reflect the maker’s
    personal knowledge, or if they were reported to the maker,
    directly or through others, by one who is himself acting in the
    regular course of business, and who has personal knowledge”
    (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A
    “witness’[s] description of [an incident], recorded by [a public
    official] in his report, is not made in the regular course of the
    witness’[s] business and does not deserve the presumption of
    regularity accorded a business record.” United States v. Smith,
    
    521 F.2d 957
    , 964 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Having rejected Rule
    804(b)(3)’s and Rule 803(6)’s applicability, we turn to Rule
    807.
    3. Residual Hearsay Exception
    Using the United States v. North standard of review, we
    consider Slatten’s argument that his co-defendant’s statements
    are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 807 (“Rule
    807”)—the residual hearsay exception. Rule 807 makes
    admissible a statement otherwise violative of the hearsay rule
    if the statement meets five criteria. First, the statement must
    have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness”
    comparable to those found in Rule 803’s and Rule 804’s
    enumerated hearsay exceptions. FED R. EVID. 807(a)(1).
    Second, it must be “offered as evidence of a material fact.” 
    Id.
    § 807(a)(2). Third, the statement must be “more probative on
    the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the
    proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.” Id.
    § 807(a)(3). Fourth, “admitting it [must] . . . serve the purposes
    of these rules and the interests of justice.” Id. § 807(a)(4). And
    finally, the proponent of the statement must have given “an
    adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer the
    statement and its particulars, including the declarant’s name
    and address, so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.”
    Id. § 807(b).
    62
    The residual hearsay exception “was designed to
    encourage the progressive growth and development of federal
    evidentiary law by giving courts the flexibility to deal with new
    evidentiary situations which may not be pigeon-holed
    elsewhere.” United States v. Mathis, 
    559 F.2d 294
    , 299 (5th
    Cir. 1977); see also Dallas Cty. v. Commercial Union Assoc.,
    
    286 F.2d 388
     (5th Cir. 1961). As the Federal Rules of Evidence
    Advisory Committee noted, the enumerated hearsay exceptions
    of Rules 803 and 804, “while they reflect the most typical and
    well recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, may not
    encompass every situation in which the reliability and
    appropriateness of a particular piece of hearsay evidence make
    clear that it should be heard and considered by the trier of fact.”
    FED. R. EVID. 803(24) (advisory committee’s note to 1974
    enactment). 10
    That said, we also recognize that the residual hearsay
    exception is “extremely narrow and require[s] testimony to be
    ‘very important and very reliable.’” United States v.
    Washington, 
    106 F.3d 983
    , 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam)
    (quoting Kim, 
    595 F.2d at 766
    ); accord First City Fin. Corp.,
    890 F.2d at 1225 (“[T]he legislative history of the [residual
    hearsay] exception indicates that it should be applied
    sparingly.”). Indeed, were Rule 807 to be liberally applied, the
    exception might read out the rule. See Akrabawi v. Carnes Co.,
    
    152 F.3d 688
    , 697 (7th Cir. 1998) (“We . . . narrowly constru[e]
    the residual provision to prevent it from becoming the
    10
    As of 1997, Rule 807 is the successor provision to Rule
    803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5). See FED. R. EVID. 807 (advisory
    committee’s note to 1997 amendment) (“The contents of Rule
    803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) have been combined and transferred to
    a new Rule 807. This was done to facilitate additions to Rules 803
    and 804. No change in meaning is intended.”). Accordingly, our
    precedent relating to the residual hearsay exceptions formerly set
    forth in Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) now applies to Rule 807.
    63
    exception that swallows the hearsay rule.”); Mathis, 
    559 F.2d at 299
     (“[T]ight reins must be held to insure that this provision
    does not emasculate our well developed body of law and the
    notions underlying our evidentiary rules.”). Thus, only in the
    most “exceptional circumstances” does Rule 807 make
    admissible a statement that does not fall within one of Rule
    803’s or Rule 804’s enumerated hearsay exceptions. See Kim,
    
    595 F.2d at 765-66
    ; United States v. Phillips, 
    219 F.3d 404
    , 419
    & n.23 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The [residual hearsay] exception is to
    be used only rarely, in truly exceptional cases.” (internal
    quotation marks omitted)).
    We believe this case presents one of those exceptional
    circumstances. Our analysis begins with Rule 807’s first
    element—the requirement that the co-defendant’s statements
    contain     “equivalent       circumstantial    guarantees     of
    trustworthiness” to those ensured by the Rule 803 and Rule 804
    hearsay exceptions. See FED R. EVID. 807(a)(1). In assessing
    trustworthiness, we look to the “totality of circumstances . . .
    that surround the making of the statement and that render the
    declarant particularly worthy of belief”; and drawing parallels
    from the enumerated hearsay exceptions, we must gauge
    whether the declarant was “highly unlikely to lie.” Idaho v.
    Wright, 
    497 U.S. 805
    , 819-20 (1990). As we have recognized
    before, “in order to find [a] statement trustworthy, a court must
    find that the declarant of the prior statement ‘was particularly
    likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made.’”
    Washington, 
    106 F.3d at 1002
     (quoting United States v. Tome,
    
    61 F.3d 1446
    , 1453 (10th Cir. 1995)); accord Rivers v. United
    States, 
    777 F.3d 1306
    , 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2015) (“By requiring
    hearsay admitted under the residual exception to have
    circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that are like the
    guarantees of the specific exceptions, Rule 807 is clearly
    concerned, first and foremost, about whether the declarant
    64
    originally made the statements under circumstances that render
    the statements more trustworthy.”).
    Several of the circumstances surrounding the co-
    defendant’s declarations indicate their reliability and manifest
    that he was likely telling the truth at the time he made his
    statements. See Washington, 
    106 F.3d at 1002
    . For one, during
    his debriefing interviews with the State Department, the co-
    defendant had “the incentive . . . to speak truthfully . . . .” See
    United States v. Bailey, 
    581 F.2d 341
    , 349 (3d Cir. 1978)
    (emphasis added). He was almost completely immunized when
    he made his statements—he faced no criminal liability (absent
    one exception discussed below) as a result of his providing the
    investigators his account of the Nisur Square attack. See SA 1,
    4, 6-7, 22-23. Immunity can indicate trustworthiness,
    particularly if the immunized statements do not cast blame or
    “divert attention” to another. See, e.g., Curro v. United States,
    
    4 F.3d 436
    , 437 (6th Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
    Henderson, 
    406 F. Supp. 417
    , 428 n.19 (D. Del. 1975) (“The
    purpose of an immunity statute is to obtain truthful
    information,      most      frequently    regarding      otherwise
    undiscoverable offenses.”). But cf. United States v. Gomez–
    Lemos, 
    939 F.2d 326
    , 333-34 (6th Cir. 1991) (expressing
    skepticism that immunity makes trustworthy statement
    “divert[ing] attention to another”). More importantly, the one
    exception to the co-defendant’s immunity may have been an
    even greater incentive encouraging his honesty; that is, he
    faced criminal liability under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
     if he made a
    materially false statement to the investigators and he expressly
    acknowledged that he could be so prosecuted. See SA 3 (“I
    further understand . . . that if I knowingly and willfully provide
    false statements or information, I may be criminally prosecuted
    for that action under 18 United States Code, Section 1001.”);
    SA 22-23 (co-defendant testified that his understanding was
    that if he was “honest and truthful, that nothing would be used
    65
    against [him]. . . .” (emphasis added)). We have previously
    concluded that the threat of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
     liability bolsters
    the trustworthiness of a declaration for the residual hearsay
    exception. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d at 1225 (affirming
    district court’s application of residual hearsay exception where,
    inter alia, statement was “subject to criminal prosecution under
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    ”); see United States v. Int’l Bhd. of
    Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am.,
    AFL-CIO, 
    964 F.2d 1308
    , 1312-13 (2d Cir. 1992) (hearsay
    statement was reliable because, inter alia, declarants “faced
    possible criminal sanctions for making false statements” under
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    ).
    Additional factors point to the trustworthiness of the co-
    defendant’s statements. He “consistently reported the essential
    details of [his] story . . . over the course of multiple
    [interviews]” on September 16, see SA 1, September 18, see
    SA 4, and September 20, see SA 6-7. See Al Alwi v. Obama,
    
    653 F.3d 11
    , 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Consistency supports the
    reliability of his multiple statements and, consequently, his
    veracity. See United States v. Bumpass, 
    60 F.3d 1099
    , 1102
    (4th Cir. 1995) (listing consistency of declarant’s statements as
    a factor in assessing trustworthiness under Rule 804(b)(3)).
    Other circuits have reached the same conclusion in applying
    the Rule 807 exception. See United States v. Harrison, 
    296 F.3d 994
    , 1005 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting, in Rule 807 analysis,
    “the consistency of the declarant’s statements” is “a factor that
    we find particularly persuasive”).
    The record also contains evidence “corroborating the
    veracity of the statement[s].” See Rivers, 777 F.3d at 1315
    (quoting Bailey, 
    581 F.2d at 349
    ) (naming corroboration of
    veracity of statements as factor to be considered in assessing
    guarantee of truthfulness under Rule 807); United States v.
    Hall, 
    165 F.3d 1095
    , 1110-11 (7th Cir. 1999) (in gauging
    trustworthiness of statement under residual hearsay exception,
    66
    corroboration of declarant’s statement, inter alia, is
    considered). Iraqi Police Officer Ali Ghalaf Salman Mansur
    Al-Hamidi was “within feet” of the Blackwater convoy in
    Nisur Square on the day of the attack. JA 1248. Al-Hamidi
    testified that the Raven 23 team “started throwing bottles of
    water” in order to stop traffic. JA 1247-48; accord SA 1 (co-
    defendant stated that he had “throw[n] a water bottle” to stop
    traffic). Additionally, Al-Hamidi agreed that, from his
    proximity to the convoy, he was “100 percent certain” that a
    man in the co-defendant’s precise position fired the first
    shots. 11 JA 1270. Al-Hamidi’s partner, Sarhan Dheyab Abdul
    Monem, also testified that, from his “very close” vantage point
    “about three to four meters away from [the] armored cars,” he
    also witnessed the first shots coming from the co-defendant’s
    precise position and “not from the holes or the windows that
    are in the [Raven 23] vehicles.” JA 797. Blackwater convoy
    member Jeremy Krueger also provided corroboration,
    testifying that the first shots he heard in Nisur Square sounded
    like “5.56 rounds,” the co-defendant’s ammunition, not 7.62
    rounds, Slatten’s ammunition. JA 2302-03. Collectively,
    then, this evidence corroborates the co-defendant’s statements
    that he “engaged and hit the driver,” of the white Kia, see SA
    1, and was unaware “of any shots being fired before his,” see
    SA 7.
    We find that Rule 807’s remaining requirements are also
    met; indeed, the government raises no dispute in this respect on
    appeal. There is no doubt that Slatten seeks to offer his co-
    defendant’s statements “as evidence of a material fact.” FED.
    R. EVID. 807(a)(2). That is, Slatten seeks to introduce the
    statements to bolster his defense that his co-defendant—not
    he—fired the first shots at the white Kia. See Slatten’s Br. 42.
    11
    As noted earlier, Slatten sat inside the armored command
    vehicle; his co-defendant did not. JA 3847.
    67
    After thorough review of the record, we are not aware of
    evidence “more probative on the point for” which Slatten seeks
    to admit his co-defendant’s statements. 12 See FED. R. EVID.
    807(a)(3). The co-defendant’s statements contradict the core of
    the homicide count against Slatten, charging him with
    “willfully, deliberately, maliciously, and with premeditation
    and malice aforethought, [unlawfully killing] the driver of a
    white Kia sedan.” JA 383. Indeed, the co-defendant
    acknowledged that he was “not aware of any shots being fired
    before his,” SA 7, and that he “engaged the driver” to respond
    to the active threat posed by the white Kia, SA 4. We also
    believe that “admitting [the co-defendant’s statements]
    serve[s] the purposes of [the federal evidentiary] rules and the
    interests of justice.” FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(4). Allowing the jury
    to weigh the statements—to determine their weight, if any, as
    against the evidence incriminating Slatten—advances the
    Federal Rules of Evidence’s goal of “ascertaining the truth and
    securing a just determination.” 
    Id.
     § 102. Finally, the record
    demonstrates that Slatten gave the government “reasonable
    notice of [his] intent to offer the statement[s].” Id. § 807(b).
    In finding Rule 807’s residual hearsay exception
    inapplicable to the co-defendant’s statements, the district court
    relied on two points: 1) its determination that the statements
    lacked       “equivalent     circumstantial       guarantees    of
    trustworthiness” because the co-defendant “provided his
    statements under the specter of dismissal from his position, or
    even criminal penalty,” and 2) its belief that Slatten had no
    additional guarantees of trustworthiness. SA 44. Regarding the
    first point, the only criminal penalty that the co-defendant faced
    was 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
     false statement liability, a factor that
    weighs in favor (not against) the trustworthiness of the
    12
    It is an “uncontroversial observation that many confessions
    are powerful evidence.” See Premo v. Moore, 
    562 U.S. 115
    , 130
    (2011).
    68
    statements. See First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d at 1225
    (application of residual hearsay exception appropriate where,
    inter alia, statement was “subject to criminal prosecution under
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    ”). Regarding the second, Slatten possessed
    additional guarantees of the trustworthiness of his co-
    defendant’s statements given their consistent repetition and
    factual corroboration. See supra at 65-66.
    In sum, we are left with a “definite and firm conviction”
    that the district court clearly erred in excluding the co-
    defendant’s statements as inadmissible hearsay. See North, 
    910 F.2d at 909
    ; see also United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 
    161 F.3d 545
    , 547-48 (9th Cir. 1998) (reversing district court’s refusal
    to admit statements under Rule 807 where, inter alia, the
    statements in question were made “under oath and subject to
    the penalty of perjury,” were made voluntarily, were based “on
    facts within [the declarants’] own personal knowledge” and
    “did not contradict any of their previous statements to
    government agents and defense investigators”). Moreover,
    because of the critical nature of the co-defendant’s statements,
    we believe their exclusion had a “substantial and injurious
    effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” and was
    therefore not harmless error. See United States v. Mahdi, 
    598 F.3d 883
    , 892 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[E]rror is harmless unless it
    has substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
    the jury’s verdict . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    Having found the co-defendant’s statements admissible, we
    leave it to the “jury [to] . . . make the ultimate determination
    concerning the truth of the statements” in light of all of the
    evidence. United States v. Price, 
    134 F.3d 340
    , 348 (6th Cir.
    1998).
    In view of our conclusion that the co-defendant’s
    statements were admissible, we return to Slatten’s motion to
    sever his trial from that of the co-defendant. We review the
    district court’s ruling on a motion to sever under the abuse of
    69
    discretion standard as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14
    “leaves the determination of risk of prejudice and any remedy
    that may be necessary to the sound discretion of the district
    courts.” Zafiro v. United States, 
    506 U.S. 534
    , 541 (1993). That
    said, the district court recognized that the severance issue here
    largely hinged on the admissibility of the co-defendant’s
    statements; in fact, it expressly acknowledged the
    government’s concession that “[i]f admissible, [the co-
    defendant’s] Garrity statements would justify severance of
    Slatten’s case from [the former’s] case in deference to [the co-
    defendant’s] Fifth Amendment rights as enunciated in
    Kastigar.” SA 43. There is no record indication that the
    government has changed its position on this point.
    The Supreme Court has instructed that “a district court
    should grant a severance . . . if there is a serious risk that a joint
    trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the
    defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable
    judgment about guilt or innocence” such as when “essential
    exculpatory evidence that would be available to a defendant
    tried alone were unavailable in a joint trial.” Zafiro, 506 U.S.
    at 539. Because joinder of Slatten’s and his co-defendant’s trial
    rendered the latter’s otherwise admissible statements—
    “essential exculpatory evidence,” id.—unavailable to Slatten,
    it was an abuse of discretion to deny Slatten’s motion to sever.
    Accordingly, we reverse Slatten’s conviction on Count One
    (first-degree murder) and remand for a new trial thereon.
    VIII. EIGHTH AMENDMENT
    Slough, Liberty and Heard also claim the application of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)’s mandatory 30-year sentence to their
    convictions violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
    against cruel and unusual punishment. We review this
    question de novo. United States v. Said, 
    798 F.3d 182
    , 196
    70
    (4th Cir. 2015); Pharaon v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve
    Sys., 
    135 F.3d 148
    , 157 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
    Under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(B)(ii), anyone who uses a
    machine gun or a destructive device during and in furtherance
    of a crime of violence is subject to a mandatory sentence of no
    less than thirty years. Here, the jury found defendants Slough
    and Heard violated Section 924(c) by discharging machine
    guns and destructive devices during the Nisur Square
    shootings, and it found Liberty violated Section 924(c) by
    discharging a machine gun during the same attack. In
    response to these findings, Slough, Heard and Liberty were
    each sentenced to imprisonment for thirty years for their
    Section 924(c) conviction plus one day for their remaining
    voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter
    convictions. They now challenge their sentences as being
    cruel and unusual punishments because the sentences are
    “unconstitutionally rigid and grossly disproportionate.” Joint
    Appellants’ Br. 110. We conclude the mandatory 30-year
    sentence imposed by Section 924(c) based solely on the type of
    weapons Slough, Heard and Liberty used during the Nisur
    Square shooting is grossly disproportionate to their culpability
    for using government-issued weapons in a war zone. We
    therefore also conclude these sentences violate the Eighth
    Amendment and remand for resentencing.
    A. Proportionality
    The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel
    and unusual punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
    Central to this prohibition is the requirement that the
    punishment for crime “be graduated and proportioned to the
    offense.” Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    , 59 (2010).
    However, this proportionality principle is narrow, and it only
    forbids “extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to
    71
    the crime.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 
    501 U.S. 957
    , 1001 (1991)
    (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
    There are two types of Eighth Amendment challenges to
    sentences: 1) challenges to sentences as applied to an
    individual defendant based on “all the circumstances in a
    particular case” and 2) categorical challenges to sentences
    imposed based on the nature of the offense or the
    “characteristics of the offender.” See Graham, 
    560 U.S. at
    59–61. Slough, Liberty and Heard assert their sentences are
    disproportionate both as applied to their situations individually
    and categorically to all defendants who have discharged
    government-issued weapons in a war zone. We begin by
    addressing the as-applied challenges.
    When addressing an as-applied challenge, courts begin
    “by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the
    sentence” based on “all of the circumstances of the case.” Id.
    at 59, 60. When engaging in this comparison, courts are to
    give “substantial deference to the broad authority that
    legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and
    limits of punishments for crimes.” Solem v. Helm, 
    463 U.S. 277
    , 290 (1983). Also, the imposition of a severe mandatory
    sentence does not in itself make a sentence unconstitutional.
    See Harmelin, 
    501 U.S. 994
     (“Severe, mandatory penalties
    may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional
    sense.”); see also 
    id.
     at 1006–07 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
    part and concurring in judgment) (“We have never invalidated
    a penalty mandated by a legislature based only on the length of
    sentence . . . .”). Thus, courts should be “reluctant to review
    legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment,” and
    “successful challenges to the proportionality of particular
    sentences should be exceedingly rare.” Hutto v. Davis, 
    454 U.S. 370
    , 374 (1982) (per curiam). However, the unusual
    circumstances of this case make it one of those “exceedingly
    rare” instances.
    72
    We begin by evaluating the gravity of the defendants’
    crime. When evaluating the severity of a crime, we consider
    “the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society and the
    culpability [and degree of involvement] of the [defendant].”
    See Solem, 
    463 U.S. at 292
    . When examining a defendant’s
    culpability, the Court may look to the defendant’s intent and
    motive in committing the crime. See 
    id. at 293
    . The Court
    may also consider the defendant’s criminal history. See
    Rummel v. Estelle, 
    445 U.S. 263
    , 276 (1980).
    Here, we believe it is important to distinguish between the
    predicate crimes of violence for which Slough, Heard and
    Liberty were convicted and the conviction under Section
    924(c) that carries with it a mandatory 30-year sentence. We
    agree with the district court that the actions of these defendants,
    which killed fourteen Iraqi civilians and injured seventeen
    others, constitute very serious offenses. We also agree the use
    of automatic weapons or explosives during a crime of violence
    typically does increase the severity of that crime. Moreover,
    under normal circumstances, we would be “reluctant to review
    [Congress’s] legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment.”
    Hutto, 
    454 U.S. at 374
    . However, we do not believe such
    deference is owed when a statute’s application only
    tangentially relates to Congress’s purpose for creating the
    statute in the first place. See Gonzalez v. Duncan, 
    551 F.3d 875
    , 884–86 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding the application of a
    statute to a defendant that was only tangentially related to the
    legislature’s reason for creating the law undermined the gravity
    of the offense).
    The Supreme Court has described Section 924(c)’s basic
    purpose as an effort to combat the “dangerous combination” of
    “drugs and guns.” Smith v. United States, 
    508 U.S. 223
    , 240
    (1993). For this reason, the text of the statute applies to any
    73
    person who “uses or carries a firearm” “during and in relation
    to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A).      Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
    recognized Section 924(c) was created “‘to persuade the man
    who is tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at
    home.’” Muscarello v. United States, 
    524 U.S. 125
    , 132
    (1998) (quoting Representative Poff, the chief legislative
    sponsor of Section 924(c)); see also Busic v. United States, 
    446 U.S. 398
    , 405 (1980) (describing Representative Poff’s
    comments as “crucial material” in interpreting the purpose of
    Section 924(c)). Thus, precedent clarifies Section 924(c)
    applies against those who intentionally bring dangerous guns
    with them to facilitate the commission of a crime.
    None of these concerns are remotely implicated by this
    case. On the day of the Nisur Square attack, Slough, Heard
    and Liberty were providing diplomatic security for the
    Department of State in Iraq. As part of their jobs, they were
    required to carry the very weapons they have now been
    sentenced to thirty years of imprisonment for using. While we
    acknowledge some courts have held the text of 924(c) is broad
    enough to allow the statute to be applied against individuals
    using government-issued weapons while on duty, see, e.g.,
    United States v. Ramos, 
    537 F.3d 439
    , 457 (5th Cir. 2008)
    (upholding the application of Section 924(c) against Border
    Patrol agents who shot a fleeing felon); see also S. Rep. No.
    98-225, at 314 n.10 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
    3182, 3,492 (stating that “persons who are licensed to carry
    firearms and abuse that privilege by committing a crime with
    the weapon, as in the extremely rare case of the armed police
    officer who commits a crime, are as deserving of punishment
    as a person whose possession of the gun violates a state or local
    ordinance”), there is no evidence Congress intended for
    Section 924(c) to be applied against those required to be armed
    74
    with dangerous guns who discharge their weapons in a war
    zone.
    When Congress amended Section 924(c) in 1984 so it
    would also apply against those who were licensed to carry
    firearms, compare 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) (1982), with Pub. L. No.
    98-473, 
    98 Stat. 1837
     (1984), MEJA did not exist. In fact,
    Congress did not create MEJA until over a decade later in 2000.
    See Pub. L. 106-523, 
    114 Stat. 2488
     (2000). Because
    Congress had not yet considered the extra-territorial
    application of federal criminal law to employees of the Armed
    Forces at all, Congress could not have possibly contemplated
    applying Section 924(c) against private contractors providing
    diplomatic security for a federal agency. Thus, combining the
    public interests Section 924(c) was intended to advance with
    the lack of evidence Congress ever intended the law to apply
    against military employees in a war zone, we conclude this case
    does not involve the usual legislative judgments on the severity
    of a crime that would cause us to defer to Congress’s
    determinations regarding the punishments for crimes.
    This conclusion is further supported by the events
    preceding the Nisur Square shootings. When the Raven 23
    convoy arrived in Nisur Square on the day of the incident, it
    was responding to the explosion of a car bomb near a U.S.
    diplomat under its protection. Accordingly, this is not a case
    where the defendants went out with the intention of committing
    a crime and brought their weapons with them to assist them in
    the commission of that crime. This is not even a case where
    these three defendants acted recklessly by inserting themselves
    into a dangerous situation in a place filled with innocent
    bystanders. The decision to go to Nisur Square was made by
    Watson, the Raven 23 shift leader, and once he decided to
    ignore his orders and proceed to Nisur Square, they had no
    choice but to follow their commander’s lead. Once they
    75
    arrived in Nisur Square, they found themselves in a crowded
    environment, where the ability to differentiate between
    civilians and enemies was significantly diminished. The
    tragedy that unfolded shortly after their arrival in Nisur Square
    owed more to panic and poor judgment than to any coordinated
    plan to murder Iraqi civilians. While we agree the defendants
    are responsible for their exaggerated response to perceived
    threats, the crime’s severity and Defendant’s culpability flow
    from the harm caused by their hypervigilance, not from the use
    of weapons which would have been appropriate had they not
    misperceived the threat.
    The government argues Slough, Heard and Liberty could
    have used less deadly weapons, such as pistols or the semi-
    automatic setting on their rifles, in response to perceived
    threats. But this argument mistakenly applies the “20/20
    vision of hindsight,” an approach the Supreme Court has
    explicitly rejected when evaluating a police officer’s use of
    force. See Graham v. Connor, 
    490 U.S. 386
    , 396 (1989).
    Instead, this Court applies an analysis that “‘allow[s] for the
    fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
    judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and
    rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary
    in a particular situation.’” Robinson v. Pezzat, 
    818 F.3d 1
    , 8
    (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Connor, 
    490 U.S. at
    396–97). If
    courts are to give police officers this type of leeway in making
    split-second judgments about which of their tools to use based
    upon tense and uncertain situations, we must give an even
    greater amount of latitude to decisions made by those
    supporting our military overseas in a hostile environment.
    Here, we believe it is imprudent to second-guess the
    defendants’ choice of firearm in responding to what they
    believed to be an approaching car bomb or enemy fire. We
    emphasize they are still culpable for their decision to fire at all,
    as encompassed by their manslaughter and attempted
    76
    manslaughter convictions, but the type of weapon used should
    not be more determinative of their punishments than the death
    and destruction that resulted from their decisions to fire.
    We also find it highly significant that none of the
    defendants sentenced under Section 924(c) have any prior
    convictions. Although the government is free to impose
    harsh, mandatory penalties for first-time offenders, see
    Harmelin, 
    501 U.S. at
    994–95, a regime of strict liability
    resulting in draconian punishment is usually reserved for
    hardened criminals. As the Supreme Court has noted,
    recidivism is a legitimate consideration to support the
    imposition of a more severe penalty. See Ewing v. California,
    
    538 U.S. 11
    , 29 (2003) (“In weighing the gravity of [the
    defendant’s] offense, we must place on the scales not only his
    current felony, but also his . . . history”); Rummel, 
    445 U.S. at 276
     (stating legislatures have a legitimate interest in dealing
    more harshly with recidivists). In fact, in virtually every
    instance where the Supreme Court has upheld the imposition
    of a harsh sentence for a relatively minor nonviolent crime for
    an as-applied challenge, it has done so in the context of a
    recidivist criminal. 13 Here, none of these defendants have a
    13
    See Rummel, 
    445 U.S. at 284
     (upholding a mandatory
    sentence of life with the possibility of parole for obtaining $120.75
    under false pretenses under Texas’s recidivist statute); Ewing, 
    538 U.S. at
    30–31 (upholding a sentence of 25 years to life under
    California’s “three strikes law” for the theft of golf clubs); Hutto, 
    454 U.S. at
    370–74 (per curiam) (upholding a recidivist’s sentence of 40
    years for possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of
    marijuana); Lockyer v. Andrade, 
    538 U.S. 63
    , 73–77 (2003) (denying
    habeas relief for a sentence of 50 years to life under California’s
    “three strikes law” for the theft of $153.54 worth of videotapes); cf.
    Solem, 
    463 U.S. at
    296–97 (holding the existence of a criminal record
    filled with “relatively minor” offenses weighs against a state
    imposing a more severe penalty against a recidivist).
    77
    criminal record at all. The district court noted they were
    “good young men who [had] never been in trouble.” JA 3330.
    It also stated they had “served their country honorably in the
    military and nothing in their backgrounds suggest[ed] that they
    would have ever committed offenses such as these.” 
    Ibid.
    Based upon these observations and the distinctions made by the
    Supreme Court, we hold the defendants’ clean criminal records
    weigh against the imposition of a harsh, mandatory sentence.
    Additionally, the imposition of a mandatory 30-year
    sentence through Section 924(c) fails to truly account for the
    culpability of Slough, Heard and Liberty individually.
    Because these men were not convicted of the same counts, it
    makes little sense for the sentences to be identical. See Koon
    v. United States, 
    518 U.S. 81
    , 113 (1996) (stating a sentencing
    judge must “consider every convicted person as an individual
    and every case as a unique study in the human failings that
    sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the
    punishment to ensue”). Thus, a more prudent way to sentence
    would be to examine each defendant as an individual, taking
    into account all of the aggravating and mitigating factors
    typically considered by sentencing judges. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    . While it does appear the sentencing judge might have
    been inclined to align sentences more closely to the
    circumstances, his hands were tied by Section 924(c)’s
    mandatory minimum. Thus, we do not know if he would have
    imposed the same sentence on each of these three defendants
    or if he would have allowed for the differing number of victims
    and the presence of other mitigating factors, like the existence
    of post-traumatic stress disorder at the time of the shootings, to
    lead to a reduced sentence for some of them. Because the
    mandatory sentence hindered the sentencing judge’s ability to
    individually examine the severity of each defendant’s crime,
    we find the one-size-fits-all nature of these sentences troubling.
    78
    Turning now to the severity of the sentence, we consider
    the actual severity of the penalty, not the penalty’s name. In
    the context of life sentences, the Supreme Court has
    acknowledged there is an important distinction between a life
    sentence with the possibility of parole and a life sentence
    without the possibility of parole. See Rummel, 
    445 U.S. at
    280–81; Solem, 
    463 U.S. at 297
    . Thus, we evaluate Slough,
    Heard and Liberty’s sentences based upon the amount of time
    they will actually spend in prison and the possibility of early
    release.
    Here, there is no doubt that a mandatory, 30-year sentence
    is a severe sanction. United States v. Spencer, 
    25 F.3d 1105
    ,
    1110 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Thirty years’ imprisonment is, by
    anyone’s lights, a severe sanction.”). With the exception of
    the death penalty or a life sentence, a 30-year sentence is the
    harshest mandatory sentence the federal criminal law can
    impose on a first-time offender. The severity of these
    sentences is amplified by the fact that there is no possibility of
    parole in the federal system. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 
    98 Stat. 1837
     (1984). Even if we were to presume the defendants
    would receive fifty-four days of good-time credit each year for
    the duration of their incarceration, see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3624
    (b)(1),
    the most their sentences could possibly be reduced is
    approximately four years. Thus, even with the maximum
    amount of good-time credit available, these sentences are
    among the harshest in existence for first-time offenders.
    Combining all of these considerations, we conclude
    Slough, Heard and Liberty’s mandatory 30-year sentences
    create the “rare case” that “leads to an inference of gross
    disproportionality.” Graham, 
    560 U.S. at 60
    . We do not
    believe their culpability in this case—based solely on using
    weapons they were required to carry when performing
    diplomatic security missions—is on par with the typical
    79
    culpability of defendants convicted under Section 924(c), and
    we are troubled by the imposition of such a harsh mandatory
    sentence without any individualized examination of each
    defendant’s underlying crimes.
    B. Comparable Sentences
    Typically, once we have found an inference of gross
    disproportionality, we would “compare the defendant’s
    sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the
    same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same
    crime in other jurisdictions.” 
    Id.
     Here, such a comparison is
    of little value because Section 924(c)’s penalty for using a
    machine gun or explosive device is the same for all
    defendants—thirty years’ imprisonment. This case also
    presents a unique challenge for comparison purposes because
    of its unusual facts. The parties have not identified a single
    instance in which a defendant was convicted and sentenced
    under Section 924(c) in a manner similar to this case.
    Moreover, the closest this Court has come to locating a similar
    situation is United States v. Drotleff, where two Department of
    Defense contractors were convicted of a single count of
    involuntary manslaughter for killing two civilians and
    sentenced to 30 and 37 months of imprisonment. 497 F.
    App’x 357, 358–59 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see also
    United States v. Drotleff, No. 10cr00001-002, 
    2011 WL 2610190
     (E.D. Va. June 21, 2011); United States v. Cannon,
    No. 2:10cr00001-001, 
    2011 WL 2610188
     (E.D. Va. June 30,
    2011). The case is similar because—like the Nisur Square
    attack—the shooting began when a vehicle began driving
    towards the contractors in what they perceived to be a
    threatening manner. Drotleff, 497 F. App’x at 358–59. Also
    like this case, the government charged the contractors with
    violating Section 924(c). United States v. Cannon, 
    711 F. Supp. 2d 602
    , 603 (E.D. Va. 2010). However, the similarities
    80
    end there because the number of victims was substantially
    lower and because the jury did not convict on the Section
    924(c) counts. See Drotleff, 497 F. App'x at 359. Thus, it
    appears this case presents a novel application of Section 924(c)
    to government contractors in a war zone, and direct
    comparisons to another case are therefore not possible.
    Notwithstanding the uniqueness of this case, we find it
    helpful to examine the other instances in which Section 924(c)
    has been applied against people who were licensed to carry the
    weapon that they were later convicted of carrying or using. In
    doing so, the Court has located numerous instances in which
    the government has applied Section 924(c) against law
    enforcement personnel. The overwhelming majority of cases
    in which the statute has been applied against those carrying
    government-issued firearms have involved instances in which
    the defendant made a conscious decision to commit a crime
    outside the scope of their duties as police. See, e.g., United
    States v. Washington, 
    106 F.3d 983
    , 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
    (applying Section 924(c) to police officers carrying
    government-issued firearms while engaging in drug
    trafficking); United States v. Guidry, 
    456 F.3d 493
    , 507–09
    (5th Cir. 2006) (applying Section 924(c) against a police officer
    who carried a government-issued firearm while committing
    sexual assault). However, there are also instances where
    Section 924(c) has applied against law enforcement officials
    who commit a crime of violence while on duty. See Ramos,
    
    537 F.3d at 457
     (applying Section 924(c) against a police
    officer who shot a felon without justification); United States v.
    Williams, 
    343 F.3d 423
    , 429–34 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming a
    Section 924(c) conviction against an officer who shot a fleeing
    suspect in the back after he had surrendered); United States v.
    Winters, 
    105 F.3d 200
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming the
    conviction of a prison guard convicted under Section 924(c) for
    81
    hitting a recaptured inmate in the back of the head with his
    service revolver after the inmate had attempted to escape).
    While the government urges us to treat this case identically
    to the cases discussed above, this argument overlooks the
    different environments in which domestic law enforcement and
    private international security contractors live and the different
    functions they serve. Law enforcement officers are a vital part
    of any community.           They live and work among the
    community’s citizens and are tasked with performing a variety
    of functions, including “reduc[ing] the opportunities for the
    commission of some crimes . . . , aid[ing] individuals who are
    in danger of physical harm, assist[ing] those who cannot care
    for themselves, resolv[ing] conflict, creat[ing] and
    maintain[ing] a feeling of security in the community, and
    provid[ing] other services on an emergency basis.” 3 WAYNE
    R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
    FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.6 (5th ed. Oct. 2016). While they
    may sometimes be called upon to use lethal force in the line of
    duty, it is not a routine part of their job and is instead reserved
    only for situations in which a suspect poses a substantial risk to
    law enforcement personnel or the community. See Tennessee
    v. Garner, 
    471 U.S. 1
    , 11 (1985) (stating law enforcement
    officials must have “probable cause to believe that the suspect
    poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or
    to others” before using deadly force).
    Conversely, private security contractors work in places
    that are “extremely dangerous” because of “conflicts, wars,
    political unrest, and . . . terrorist activity.” JA 3861.
    Accordingly, they live and work in a hostile environment in a
    war zone in which the enemy could strike at any moment.
    Because of this ever-present danger, they are often required to
    use lethal force. In fact, using lethal force to eliminate hostile
    forces is a central component of assuring the safety of any
    82
    American personnel they are tasked with protecting. They are
    issued powerful weapons to assist them in performing this task.
    Thus, because these three defendants were living in a much
    more dangerous environment and performing a substantially
    different function than law enforcement officials, we find the
    government’s attempts to analogize this case to other
    applications of Section 924(c) to be unpersuasive.
    Because comparisons to other applications of Section
    924(c) are of little value, we now broaden our comparison to
    encompass other types of crimes that bear similar types of
    penalties. We are mindful of the fact that each crime is unique
    and that it is difficult to quantify the harm done by a crime, but
    the Supreme Court has recognized courts are competent to
    make these kinds of determinations “on a relative scale.”
    Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. In doing so, we consider factors
    traditionally applied by courts, such as whether the crime
    involves violence, the gravity of the harm caused by the crime
    and the intent of the offender. See id. at 292–94. “If more
    serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious
    penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue
    may be excessive.” Id. at 291; see also Weems v. United
    States, 
    217 U.S. 349
    , 380–81 (1910) (listing more severe
    crimes subject to less serious penalties than the offense at
    issue).
    Here, Slough, Heard and Liberty each received a 30-year
    sentence based on their use of government-issued weapons
    during the Nisur Square attack. While their crimes obviously
    did involve violence, we note the gravity of the harm done
    would be essentially the same regardless of whether they used
    an automatic rifle, a semi-automatic rifle, or a pistol.
    Moreover, neither their conviction under Section 924(c) nor
    their underlying crimes of violence were intentional. The
    defendants used weapons their profession required them to
    83
    carry, and their convictions for voluntary manslaughter
    involved extreme recklessness and gross misjudgments, not an
    intention to kill innocent people.
    Comparing their sentences to other federal crimes with
    similar sentences for first-time offenders, we find it significant
    that other crimes with comparable sentences involve the
    intentional commission of serious crimes. For example, the
    federal criminal code contains numerous 30-year sentences for
    first-time offenses involving the intentional infliction of harm
    to children. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251A(a) (30-year sentence
    for a parent or legal guardian who sells his child for the purpose
    of sexual exploitation); id. § 2251A(b) (30-year sentence for
    purchasing a child for the purpose of sexual exploitation); id.
    § 2241(c) (30-year sentence for engaging in a sexual act with a
    child under the age of twelve); id. § 3559(f)(1) (30-year
    sentence for murdering a child under eighteen). Likewise, a
    person who causes or conspires to cause damage to or
    destruction of a motor vehicle carrying high-level radioactive
    waste or spent nuclear fuel with intent to endanger the safety
    of others will receive an identical 30-year sentence. 
    18 U.S.C. § 33
    (b). Perhaps most extreme of all, a person who attempts
    or threatens to use an atomic weapon while in possession of
    one also receives a minimum sentence of 30 years. 
    42 U.S.C. § 2272
    (b). Thus, it appears that outside of Section 924(c), a
    30-year mandatory sentence is typically reserved for instances
    where the defendant has intentionally committed a heinous
    crime that either harms the most vulnerable of our society or
    has the potential to result in wide-spread devastation. The use
    of government-issued rifles and explosives in a war zone is
    simply not comparable. While the weapons these three
    defendants fired do have the potential to—and in this case
    did—unleash wide-spread destruction, they are the tools our
    government gave to them to adequately perform their job. If
    84
    circumstances had been as they believed them to be, it would
    have been negligent to rely on less effective weapons.
    In reaching this conclusion, we by no means intend to
    minimize the carnage attributable to Slough, Heard and
    Liberty’s actions. Their poor judgments resulted in the deaths
    of many innocent people. What happened in Nisur Square
    defies civilized description.         However, none of the
    penological justifications our society relies upon when
    sentencing        criminals—incapacitation,         rehabilitation,
    retribution, or deterrence—are properly served here by a
    sentence whose length is determined solely based on the type
    of weapon used during the crime. See Ewing, 
    538 U.S. at 25
    (discussing the penological goals of criminal punishments).
    While we acknowledge our Constitution “does not mandate
    adoption of any one penological theory” and that sentencing
    rationales should generally be made by legislatures and not
    federal courts, 
    id.
     at 24–25, the Supreme Court’s examination
    of penological goals in previous cases suggests those goals
    should be a relevant part of our analysis. See 
    id.
     at 25–28;
    Harmelin, 
    501 U.S. at 999
     (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
    concurring in judgment); see also Graham, 
    560 U.S. at 71
    (stating “[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penological
    justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense”).
    Regarding incapacitation, nothing in any of these
    defendants’ records suggests they pose a danger to society such
    that they must remain in prison to prevent them from
    committing more crimes. Before the Nisur Square shootings,
    none of them had any prior convictions, and nothing in the
    record or their backgrounds suggests they are likely to commit
    more crimes in the future. For similar reasons, rehabilitation
    is not an issue. No doubt Nisur Square and its haunting
    aftermath will provide reason enough for these defendants to
    avoid any analogous circumstances. As to retribution, we
    85
    recognize the 30-year sentence does punish the defendants for
    their crimes and allows society “to express its condemnation of
    [their] crime[s] and to seek restoration of the moral imbalance
    caused by [their] offense[s].” Graham, 
    560 U.S. at 71
    .
    However, “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a
    criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal
    culpability of the criminal offender.” Id. at 71; see also
    Ewing, 
    538 U.S. at 31
     (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
    (“Proportionality—the notion that the punishment should fit
    the crime—is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal
    of retribution.”). Here, we have concluded the mandatory 30-
    year sentence imposed by Section 924(c) is grossly
    disproportionate as applied to Slough, Heard and Liberty and
    that such a sentence actually prevents the sentencing judge
    from directly examining the personal culpability of each
    defendant in this case. Furthermore, society’s interest in
    retribution can be equally served by a sentence imposed based
    solely on the voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary
    manslaughter convictions. Therefore, this sentence cannot be
    justified based on retribution.
    Regarding deterrence, the district court observed there was
    no need to deter the defendants individually. JA 3332. We
    agree with this observation based on the defendants’ lack of
    criminal background. Thus, we are left with examining
    whether this sentence serves the penological goal of general
    deterrence. Under the theory of general deterrence, the
    government essentially seeks to make an example of an
    offender through punishing him so that other potential
    offenders are intimidated into refraining from committing the
    contemplated crime. 1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 3 (15th
    ed. Sept. 2016); see also Pell v. Procunier, 
    417 U.S. 817
    , 822
    (1974) (stating the premise of general deterrence is that “by
    confining criminal offenders in a facility where they are
    isolated from the rest of society, a condition that most people
    86
    presumably find undesirable, they and others will be deterred
    from committing additional criminal offenses”). The harsh
    sentences imposed under Section 924(c) generally do operate
    as strong deterrents against using firearms when committing a
    crime of violence or a drug trafficking offense. In fact, this is
    precisely what Congress envisioned when it first passed the
    law. See Muscarello, 
    524 U.S. at 132
     (stating Section 924(c)
    was created “to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a
    Federal felony to leave his gun at home”). However, as
    discussed above, the application of Section 924(c)’s mandatory
    sentence does little to advance this purpose. Instead, it will
    only deter future private security contractors from quickly
    making the split-second decisions their jobs require them to
    make. In theory, if they are wrong even once about a potential
    threat and use their machine gun in response, they are
    potentially subject to this penalty.         In the dangerous
    environments in which these contractors live and work, even a
    single moment’s hesitation because of fear of such a harsh
    criminal sanction could be the difference between life and
    death for themselves, their fellow contractors and the diplomats
    they were hired to protect. Thus, deterrence is both an
    irrational and unjust reason to justify these sentences under
    Section 924(c). This is especially true given that contractors
    will already be deterred from recklessly firing their firearms
    based on the possibility of receiving other criminal sanctions,
    such as manslaughter charges, for any severe lapses in
    judgment. Thus, these sentences cannot be justified under any
    of our society’s penological goals.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the application of
    Section 924(c) to Slough, Heard and Liberty is cruel and
    87
    unusual punishment. 14 The sentences are cruel in that they
    impose a 30-year sentence based on the fact that private
    security contractors in a war zone were armed with
    government-issued automatic rifles and explosives. They are
    unusual because they apply Section 924(c) in a manner it has
    never been applied before to a situation which Congress never
    contemplated. We again emphasize these defendants can and
    should be held accountable for the death and destruction they
    unleashed on the innocent Iraqi civilians who were harmed by
    their actions. But instead of using the sledgehammer of a
    mandatory 30-year sentence, the sentencing court should
    instead use more nuanced tools to impose sentences
    proportionally tailored to the culpability of each defendant.
    For the foregoing reasons, we vacate defendant Nicholas
    Slatten’s first degree murder conviction and remand for a new
    trial. Further, we vacate defendant Evan Liberty’s conviction
    for the attempted manslaughter of Mahdi Al-Faraji. The Court
    remands the sentences of Liberty, defendant Paul Slough and
    defendant Dustin Heard for resentencing consistent with this
    opinion. In all other respects, the Court affirms the judgment of
    the district court.
    So ordered.
    14
    Because we conclude the sentences violate the Eighth
    Amendment as applied to Slough, Liberty and Heard, we decline to
    reach their categorical arguments.
    HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in Part VI: I write
    separately to express my view that the aftermath of Slatten’s
    mandamus petition did not, and could not, give rise to a
    realistic likelihood of prosecutorial vindictiveness. United
    States v. Meyer, 
    810 F.2d 1242
    , 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
    Although the majority notes that “the extraordinary mandamus
    grant here, followed by a rather sharply-worded criticism in
    denying reconsideration, in a high-profile prosecution with
    international ramifications no less, had [great] potential to give
    rise to a vindictive motive,” Maj Op. 48, that description fails
    to account for our Court’s own mistake leading to the
    mandamus petition (and its aftermath) in the first place.
    The Nisur Square attack took place on September 16,
    2007. Under MEJA, then, the government had until September
    16, 2012 to indict (or reindict) Slatten on a non-capital offense.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3282
    (a).
    On December 4, 2008, a grand jury indicted Slatten and
    his co-defendants on, inter alia, multiple manslaughter
    charges. One year later, on December 31, 2009, the district
    court dismissed the indictment based on the government’s
    violation of Kastigar v. United States, 
    406 U.S. 441
     (1972), and
    Garrity v. New Jersey, 
    385 U.S. 493
     (1967). See United States
    v. Slough, 
    677 F. Supp. 2d 112
     (D.D.C. 2009). Although the
    government had earlier moved to voluntarily dismiss Slatten’s
    indictment, the district court expressly denied that request as
    moot given its simultaneous dismissal of all charges against all
    defendants. 1 
    Id.
     at 166 n.67 (“Because the court dismisses the
    1
    In its motion to dismiss Slatten, the government had conceded
    that “key testimony used to indict defendant Nicholas Slatten
    resulted from the exposure of grand jury witnesses to his compelled
    statements.” See United States v. Slough, 
    677 F. Supp. 2d 112
     n.2
    (D.D.C. 2009). Subsequently, all five defendants moved to dismiss
    the joint indictment and the district court, identifying improper
    evidentiary uses of all defendants’ Garrity statements in violation of
    Kastigar, 
    id.
     at. 144-66, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and,
    2
    indictment against all of the defendants, including defendant
    Slatten, it denies as moot the government’s motion for leave to
    dismiss the indictment against defendant Slatten without
    prejudice.”).
    The government appealed the dismissal. Our Court
    reversed the district court, concluding that Kastigar required it
    to determine with greater specificity the taint, if any, each
    defendant’s compelled statements had on the grand jury
    evidence. United States v. Slough, 
    641 F.3d 544
    , 550-55 (D.C.
    Cir. 2011). Importantly, however, it did so assuming—
    mistakenly—that “the government itself moved to dismiss the
    indictment against Nicholas Slatten, without prejudice to
    possible later re-indictment, and the district court’s grant of the
    motion has taken Slatten out of the case for now.” 
    Id. at 547
    (emphasis added). Stated differently, it did not overturn the
    district court’s dismissal of the manslaughter charges against
    Slatten because it incorrectly believed that the district court had
    granted the government’s motion to dismiss and therefore
    Slatten was already out of the case. See 
    id.
     (reversing and
    remanding “as to four of the defendants”). Slatten’s co-
    defendants unsuccessfully petitioned for certiorari and,
    because of that delay, the Slough mandate did not issue until
    June 5, 2012.
    Over one year later, on October 17, 2013, a grand jury
    reindicted Slatten and his co-defendants on, inter alia, multiple
    manslaughter charges. JA 314. Although the superseding
    indictment issued after September 16, 2012—the date MEJA’s
    five-year statute of limitations for non-capital offenses was set
    to expire—it related back to the filing of the original indictment
    for statute of limitations purposes because it did not broaden
    the original indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Grady, 544
    accordingly, denied the government’s motion to dismiss Slatten as
    moot. 
    Id.
     at 166 n.67.
    
    3 F.2d 598
    , 602-03 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Since the statute stops
    running with the bringing of the first indictment, a superseding
    indictment brought at any time while the first indictment is still
    validly pending, if and only if it does not broaden the charges
    made in the first indictment, cannot be barred by the statute of
    limitations.” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Yielding, 
    657 F.3d 688
    , 703 (8th Cir. 2011) (“For limitations purposes, ‘a
    superseding indictment filed while the original indictment is
    validly pending relates back to the time of filing of the original
    indictment if it does not substantially broaden or amend the
    original charges.’”); JA 323. The critical question regarding
    Slatten, however, was whether Slatten had remained in the case
    and was therefore covered by the relation back. See Opposition
    to Slatten’s Motion to Dismiss Superseding Indictment on
    Statute of Limitations Grounds, United States v. Slatten, et al.,
    Docket No. 1:08-cr-00360-RCL, Doc. 352 (November 29,
    2013). On the one hand, the district court’s December 2009
    order manifested that Slatten’s dismissal was based on the
    same Kastigar/Garrity rationale applicable to his co-
    defendants, the rationale we rejected in reversing the dismissal.
    On the other hand, our Court declared (incorrectly) that Slatten
    was no longer in the case because it mistakenly believed the
    district court had granted the government’s motion to dismiss
    Slatten’s indictment in its December 2009 order. Slough, 
    641 F.3d at 547
    .
    Once the superseding indictment against him issued,
    Slatten moved to dismiss it on the ground that he was no longer
    in the case based on our Court’s Slough opinion. The district
    court—a successor judge—denied Slatten’s motion to dismiss.
    In doing so, it expressly discussed the mistake caused by our
    Slough language. See Memorandum Opinion, United States v.
    Slatten, No. 1:08-cr-00360-RCL, Doc. 388 (February 18,
    2014). It noted that the “only ambiguity in [Slough] was the
    judgment appealed from,” pointing out that “[e]ven though the
    4
    Government conceded that Slatten’s indictment was deficient,
    [the original judge] found that it was deficient on broader
    grounds than the Government sought in its own motion” and,
    thus, “[i]t was those broader grounds that the Government
    appealed from as to all five defendants including Slatten.” Id.
    at 2-3 (emphasis added). Attempting to adjust to our Court’s
    error, the district court reasoned that the “letter” of the district
    court’s December 2009 order and the “spirit” of Slough’s
    mandate established that Slatten remained a defendant and
    therefore the non-capital MEJA charges against Slatten
    remained timely. Id. at 2-4.
    Following the district court’s decision, Slatten petitioned
    this Court for mandamus relief “to prevent the district court
    from expanding the scope of Slough.” See Emergency Petition
    for Writ of Mandamus, In re Nicholas Abram Slatten, Case No.
    14-3007 (D.C. Cir. March 6, 2014). In reviewing that petition,
    our Court again failed to focus on the relevant portion of the
    December 2009 dismissal order (which expressly denied the
    government’s motion to voluntarily dismiss Slatten) and
    instead granted Slatten’s petition, stating that the “mandate
    reversing and remanding [to] the district court clearly applied
    only to Slatten’s four co-defendants” because the “government
    conceded to us, both in its briefs and at oral argument, that
    Slatten’s indictment was infirm.” See Per Curiam Order, In re
    Nicholas Abram Slatten, No. 14-3007 (D.C. Cir. April 7, 2014).
    Given the mandamus’s limitation on what charges could
    (and could not) be brought against Slatten, the government
    pressed the issue by petitioning for rehearing. See Petition, In
    re Nicholas Abram Slatten, No. 14-3007 (D.C. Cir. April 17,
    2014). In its petition, the government expressly drew the
    Court’s attention to the fact that “[t]he [Slough] opinion
    incorrectly stated that the district court granted the
    government’s motion to dismiss the indictment as to Slatten”
    and that “the record compels the conclusion . . . that this Court
    5
    in Slough reversed the dismissal order with respect to all five
    defendants.” Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
    On April 18, 2014, our Court—for the first time—
    recognized that it “erred in stating that the district court’s
    dismissal as to Slatten had come in response to the
    Government’s own motion to dismiss, rather than to Slatten’s
    motion.” See Per Curiam Order, In re Nicholas Abram Slatten,
    No. 14-3007 (D.C. Cir. April 18, 2014). Nevertheless, it denied
    the government’s petition, declaring that “the dispositional
    posture following [Slough] was unaffected” by the error
    because “Slatten’s indictment had been dismissed, and we had
    reversed only as to the other four.” Id at 1. It appears the error
    was seen as harmless because, if Slatten had been within the
    scope of the mandate, the district court—which, in its
    December 2009 order, had denied as moot the government’s
    motion to dismiss Slatten—would have then granted that
    motion, leaving the same scenario, that is, Slatten would no
    longer be a defendant. Id. 2
    I believe our Court incorrectly—albeit in good faith—
    contributed to the Hobson’s choice facing the government at
    that point. First, and critically, MEJA’s statute-of-limitations
    clock would not have run on any non-capital offense had
    Slatten remained a defendant throughout the Slough appeal and
    remand because, to repeat, “a superseding indictment brought
    at any time while the first indictment is still validly pending, if
    . . . it does not broaden the charges made in the first indictment,
    cannot be barred by the statute of limitations.” 3 Grady, 544
    2
    The record “dispositional posture,” however, was plainly
    affected: based on the district court record, supra 1 n.1, the reversal
    applied to all five defendants.
    3
    In denying the government’s rehearing petition, our Court
    minimized this point by noting that the government had originally
    6
    F.2d at 601-02. “[T]he dispositional posture following
    [Slough],” then, was anything but “unaffected” by the
    misreading of the December 2009 dismissal order; it disabled
    the government from filing any non-capital charge against
    Slatten in the superseding indictment. Moreover, our Slough
    language left the government uncertain regarding Slatten’s
    status. 
    641 F.3d at 547
    . Indeed, on July 25, 2012—two months
    before MEJA’s five-year statute of limitations clock ran—the
    government announced it intended to seek a superseding
    indictment covering all five Slough defendants (including
    Slatten), indicating no recognition of the need to omit Slatten
    on all non-capital counts. It took almost the next two years for
    it to recognize definitively that Slatten could not be indicted on
    a non-capital offense. Although the wiser move would have
    been for the government to reindict Slatten immediately upon
    remand, I believe our Court’s mistaken reading of the
    moved to voluntarily dismiss Slatten’s indictment and the district
    court had simply denied that motion “as moot.” See Per Curiam
    Order, In re Nicholas Abram Slatten, No. 14-3007 (D.C. Cir. April
    18, 2014) (emphasis in Per Curiam Order). Apparently, the thought
    was that, if Slatten had remained in the case through remand, the
    government could have simply renewed its motion to dismiss the
    original indictment against Slatten. But such a dismissal—leaving
    aside its counterintuitive nature (the original indictment had to
    remain in place for the superseding indictment’s “relation back”)—
    would have required (at least) leave of the court. See FED. R. CRIM.
    P. 48(a) (“The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an
    indictment, information, or complaint.” (emphasis added)); FED. R.
    CRIM. P. 48(a) advisory committee’s note to 1944 adoption (“The
    first sentence of this rule will change existing law. The common-law
    rule that the public prosecutor may enter a nolle prosequi in his
    discretion, without any action by the court, prevails in the Federal
    courts . . . This provision will permit the filing of a nolle prosequi
    only by leave of court.”); United States v. Cowan, 
    524 F.2d 504
    , 513
    (5th Cir. 1975).
    7
    December 2009 order contributed to the government’s failure
    to do so.
    The government faced a forced choice—indict Slatten on
    the only charge unaffected by MEJA’s five-year deadline or
    completely forego prosecution of him. “[These] circumstances,
    when taken together,” plainly fail to “support a realistic
    likelihood of vindictiveness.” Meyer, 
    810 F.2d at 1246
    .
    ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment in Part
    VII and dissenting from Part VIII: I join the Court’s opinion
    with two exceptions. First, in accordance with the Supreme
    Court’s instruction, portions of a co-defendant’s statements to
    investigators1 should have been admitted in Slatten’s defense,
    but not as a result of unduly expanding a narrow residual
    hearsay exception when the statements are covered by an
    established exception. Second, defendants’ Eighth Amendment
    challenge lacks any merit whatsoever, especially in view of the
    district court judge’s express assessment, which my colleagues
    ignore, that the sentences were an appropriate response to the
    human carnage for which these defendants were convicted by
    a jury.
    I.
    Concurring in the judgment in Part VII. I agree that the
    district court’s exclusion of certain statements by a co-
    defendant as inadmissible hearsay requires reversal of Slatten’s
    conviction. Op. 67–68. In my view, however, the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in finding the co-defendant’s
    compelled statements untrustworthy to the extent they offered
    an exculpatory narrative of self-defense. Rather, the district
    court abused its discretion by failing, as a matter of law, to
    isolate certain inculpatory statements within that broader
    narrative to consider whether they were sufficiently trustworthy
    to be admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule. See
    Williamson v. United States, 
    512 U.S. 594
    , 600 (1994); Koon v.
    United States, 
    518 U.S. 81
    , 100 (1996). The co-defendant’s
    inculpatory statements were admissible in Slatten’s defense
    1
    See Kastigar v. United States, 
    406 U.S. 441
     (1972);
    United States v. Slough, 
    641 F.3d 544
    , 549 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
    Gov’t’s Resp. to Order to Show Cause, filed under seal (Jul. 24,
    2017).
    2
    under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3),2 and because they
    concerned the single most important issue underlying Slatten’s
    conviction — who fired the first shots that day — their
    exclusion implicated Slatten’s due process right to present a
    complete defense and was not harmless beyond a reasonable
    doubt. See United States v. Whitmore, 
    359 F.3d 609
    , 616 (D.C.
    Cir. 2004). Indeed, even if the statements’ exclusion did not
    impinge on Slatten’s constitutional right to present a complete
    defense, see Appellee Br. 128, the exclusion was not harmless
    because it had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the jury’s
    consideration of this close question. See United States v.
    Mahdi, 
    598 F.3d 883
    , 892 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Kotteakos
    v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 750
    , 776 (1946)).
    A.
    In the immediate aftermath of the Nisur Square massacre,
    a co-defendant of Slatten’s offered statements on four different
    days to State Department investigators, one on a written
    departmental form and three oral. The oral statements, which
    2
    Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) provides an
    exception to the Rule against Hearsay for a statement against
    interest that:
    (A) a reasonable person in the declarant’s position
    would have made only if the person believed it to be
    true because, when made, it was so contrary to the
    declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had
    so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant’s
    claim against someone else or to expose the
    declarant to civil or criminal liability; and
    (B) is supported by corroborating circumstances that
    clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered in
    a criminal case as one that tends to expose the
    declarant to criminal liability.
    3
    were incorporated into written reports by State Department
    investigators, constitute hearsay within hearsay. Op. 57 n.7;
    Fed. R. Evid. 805. As a preliminary matter, the investigators’
    contemporaneous recounting in their reports of what the co-
    defendant said falls within the business records exception under
    FRE 803(6). See United States v. Smith, 
    521 F.2d 957
    , 962–65
    (D.C. Cir. 1975); Michael H. Graham & Kenneth W. Graham,
    30C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 7047 & n.29 (2017 ed.); see also
    United States v. Warren, 
    42 F.3d 647
    , 657 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
    At this second level of hearsay, the question is whether the co-
    defendant said what he is reported to have said, not whether he
    was being truthful. See Smith, 
    521 F.2d at 965
    . The
    investigators personally witnessed the co-defendant making
    these statements. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(A). Furthermore,
    testimony established that State Department investigators
    regularly took such statements any time a contractor was
    involved in a shooting incident, see Fed. R. Evid.
    803(6)(B)–(C); 11/2/09 Hearing Tr. 48:23–49:14, and it is
    “presumed that [the investigators] accurately transcribed and
    reported” the co-defendant’s statements. Smith, 
    521 F.2d at 965
    .
    The difficulty with relying on the evaluative reports prong
    of the public records exception, see Op. 57 n.7, is that the
    records reflect only unverified witness statements about the
    Nisur Square massacre, rather than the investigators’ own
    “factual findings” about what occurred. See Fed. R. Evid.
    803(8)(A)(iii). A “factual finding[]” in this context means a
    public official’s “conclusion by way of reasonable inference
    from the evidence,” not a piece of evidence gathered in aid of
    a potential conclusion down the road. See Beech Aircraft Corp.
    v. Rainey, 
    488 U.S. 153
    , 164 (1988) (quoting BLACK’S LAW
    DICTIONARY 569 (5th ed. 1979)). For this reason, the relevant
    factors identified by Advisory Committee under this exception
    focus on the trustworthiness of the investigator’s conclusions
    4
    (e.g., the skill or experience of the investigator, the
    investigator’s potential bias).     See Notes of Advisory
    Committee on Proposed Rules, Fed. R. Evid. 803. Had State
    Department investigators concluded that the co-defendant’s
    version of events was credible and adopted it as their own, then
    FRE 803(8)(A)(iii) would likely come into play. See Beech
    Aircraft Corp., 
    488 U.S. at 169
    . Nothing in the reports,
    however, indicates that the investigators found any facts to be
    as the co-defendant portrayed them, and FRE 803(8)(A)(iii)
    “bars the admission of statements not based on factual
    investigation,” such as an eyewitness’s unverified statements to
    investigators. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
    488 U.S. at 169
    .
    That leaves only the second level of hearsay, the co-
    defendant’s statements themselves. Although he was informed
    that the statements, if truthful, could not be used directly or
    indirectly against him in a criminal proceeding, he was also
    informed that they could be used in the course of a disciplinary
    proceeding and could result in termination of his employment.
    A statement that jeopardizes the declarant’s employment can be
    sufficient to trigger FRE 803's pecuniary interest exception,
    provided it is so contrary to that interest that a reasonable
    person would not have made it unless it were true. Gichner v.
    Antonio Troiano Tile & Marble Co., 
    410 F.2d 238
    , 242 (D.C.
    Cir. 1969).
    Taken together, the co-defendant’s statements offered a
    generally exculpatory version of events, in which the white Kia
    sped dangerously toward the convoy and ignored repeated
    warnings to stop, until it became necessary to fire upon and
    disable the Kia in order to protect the Raven 23 convoy. Within
    his narrative of self-defense, however, he offered details that
    had the potential to jeopardize his employment. Namely, he
    admitted that he “engaged and hit the driver,” Mem. Report of
    Interview at 1 (Sept. 16, 2007), “fir[ing] two rounds at the
    5
    driver from his M-4 rifle . . . [that] impacted the driver’s area of
    the windshield,” Mem. Report of Interview at 1 (Sept. 23,
    2007). Most crucially, he acknowledged that he was “not aware
    of any shots being fired before his,” Mem. Report of Interview
    at 2 (Sept. 20, 2007), and that he made eye contact with the
    driver just before firing, which further suggests that he was the
    first to fire. That is, following an incident in which multiple
    Raven 23 members were seen firing into the Kia, the co-
    defendant voluntarily singled himself out as the first shooter —
    the one likely responsible for the death of Al-Rubia’y and, in
    the government’s words, “the one who lit the match that ignited
    the firestorm.” 8/27/14 (AM) Tr. 27:1-4. Thus, if investigators
    doubted the claim that the Kia represented a threat, then the co-
    defendant’s statements all but ensured that he would lose his
    job.
    The district court ruled that the co-defendant’s statements
    constituted inadmissible hearsay because their lack of
    trustworthiness disqualified them from the statement against
    interest exception, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), the business records
    exception, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), and the residual hearsay
    exception, Fed. R. Evid. 807. In particular, it found that the co-
    defendant, “facing the threat of job loss or worse, had great
    incentive to provide a story of self-defense rather than a
    statement against his interest.” United States v. Slatten, Crim.
    No. 14-107, at 6 (D.D.C. June 16, 2014). This is true as a
    general matter, but it only answers part of the question. The co-
    defendant’s incentive to keep his job indicates why he might
    invent a self-defense scenario, and it illustrates why self-
    serving, exculpatory statements are inadmissible under FRE
    804(b)(3). See Williamson, 
    512 U.S. at
    599–600. On the other
    hand, the co-defendant’s incentive to keep his job does little to
    explain why he would falsely claim to have shot first and hit the
    driver, admissions that had the potential to single him out for
    greater scrutiny and punishment. To the contrary, the threat of
    6
    job loss magnifies the likelihood that the co-defendant was
    telling the truth as to those details. See id.; Gichner, 
    410 F.2d at 242
    .
    This failure to distinguish between inculpatory and
    exculpatory statements within this co-defendant’s larger
    narrative, and instead treating the entire four-part narrative as a
    single “statement” to be admitted or excluded as a whole, was
    legal error. Williamson, 
    512 U.S. at
    599–600; United States v.
    Smalls, 
    605 F.3d 765
    , 780–87 (10th Cir. 2010). A statement,
    within the meaning of FRE 804(b)(3), is a “single declaration or
    remark” rather than a “report or narrative,” Williamson, 
    512 U.S. at 599
     (quoting Webster’s THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
    DICTIONARY 2229 (1961)), and thus it was incumbent upon the
    district court to isolate and admit any “declarations or remarks
    within the [narrative] that are individually self-inculpatory.” 
    Id.
    As the Supreme Court has noted, the fact that the narrative was
    generally exculpatory and untrustworthy does not mean it was
    entirely untrue: “One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix
    falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly
    persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature.” 
    Id.
     at
    599–600.
    To determine whether the error was harmless requires
    consideration of the antecedent question whether any statements
    within the co-defendant’s narrative were sufficiently self-
    inculpatory to be admissible as statements against interest. See
    Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(A). If so, then in light of the numerous
    other pieces of evidence suggesting that the co-defendant fired
    first, the error could not possibly have been harmless. Although
    the jury could have reasonably credited Jimmy Watson’s
    testimony that Slatten fired first over the traffic officers’
    testimony that someone in the co-defendant’s position did so,
    the officers’ testimony would take on new significance if
    buttressed by the co-defendant’s own admission to firing first.
    7
    The co-defendant’s claim to have fired first and hit the Kia
    driver was admissible because no reasonable person would have
    falsely so claimed, thereby setting the day’s tragic events in
    motion, especially given the near-certainty that such statements
    would cost him his job if the self-defense claim were
    disbelieved. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(A).
    The government maintains that the “I shot first and hit the
    driver” statement cannot be separated from the self-defense
    statement, i.e., “I shot first and hit the driver in order to protect
    my team from an imminent threat.” See Appellee Br. 121. The
    government is correct that a statement’s context must be
    carefully considered in determining whether the statement is
    truly self-inculpatory, Williamson, 
    512 U.S. at 603
    , but to the
    extent the government suggests that the court can only consider
    for admission the conjoined self-defense statement in his
    narrative, rather than considering for admission only the “I shot
    first and hit the driver” statement, Williamson instructs to the
    contrary. The Supreme Court made clear that courts must
    narrowly parse statements submitted under FRE 804(b)(3) and
    independently analyze each “declaration[] or remark” within
    such a statement for admissibility; parts of statements that are
    not self-inculpatory may not be admitted solely based on their
    proximity to other self-inculpatory declarations. 
    Id.
     at 599–601.
    Here, the inverse is true — the district court erred in excluding
    self-inculpatory declarations solely based on their proximity to
    other self-exculpatory declarations.
    The relevant self-inculpatory “declarations or remarks”
    within the co-defendant’s narrative statement, 
    id. at 599
    , are:
    “[I] engaged and hit the driver,” Mem. Report of Interview
    at 1 (Sept. 16, 2007);
    “[I] made eye contact with the driver of the white sedan[,]
    8
    . . . an Arabic male in his late 20's with a beard . . . . [I]
    fir[ed] two rounds at the driver from [my] M-4 rifle. [I]
    believe[] these rounds impacted the driver’s area of the
    windshield,” Mem. Report of Interview at 1 (Sept. 23,
    2007); and
    “[I am] not sure whether [I] was the first one to fire during
    this incident. [I am] not aware of any shots being fired
    before [mine],” Mem. Report of Interview at 2 (Sept. 20,
    2007).
    Certainly, the reliability of those statements must be considered
    in light of the broader self-defense context, but the context is not
    actually a part of those inculpatory statements. On the other
    hand, the co-defendant’s statement “Fearing for my life and the
    lives of my teammates, I engaged the driver and stopped the
    threat” is generally self-exculpatory and therefore inadmissible.
    Sworn Statement at 2 (Sept. 18, 2007).
    The government makes the related point that an assertion
    of self-defense automatically removes the underlying admission
    from the statement against interest exception. In its view, a
    self-defense claim can never be sufficiently contrary to self-
    interest under FRE 804(b)(3) because, if true, it would wholly
    exonerate the declarant. See also Op. 59–60 (citing United
    States v. Henley, 
    766 F.3d 893
    , 915 (8th Cir. 2014); United
    States v. Shryock, 
    342 F.3d 948
    , 981 (9th Cir. 2003)). Once
    again, Williamson controls: any such generalization is
    inappropriate because determining whether a statement is self-
    inculpatory is a “fact-intensive inquiry, which . . . require[s]
    careful examination of all the circumstances surrounding the
    criminal activity involved.” Williamson, 
    512 U.S. at 604
    .
    In Shryock, 
    342 F.3d at
    966–67, for instance, the police
    already had multiple pieces of evidence showing that the
    9
    declarant shot the victims, and thus the declarant’s self-defense
    statement to police was much more obviously exculpatory —
    the admission “I shot the victims” provided the police with
    nothing they did not already know or strongly suspect. Here, on
    the other hand, the record indicates that in the immediate
    aftermath of the Nisur Square massacre, the co-defendant
    provided investigators with the very first evidence that he fired
    before anyone else in the convoy and that he also hit the driver.
    One can imagine circumstances in which a self-defense claim
    would be even more devastating, e.g., a person walking into a
    police station and claiming self-defense in a long-forgotten
    murder, leading police to reopen the case and immediately find
    evidence disproving the implausible self-defense claim.
    Invoking a blanket rule to the contrary seems to suggest that a
    statement can only be sufficiently damaging to self-interest if,
    standing alone, it is enough to support a conviction, a civil
    judgment, or termination. See Op. [59-60]. Thus, an admission
    to four elements of a crime (but not the fifth) would not qualify
    as a statement against interest, nor, as here, would an admission
    to a killing so long as self-defense is also claimed. This court
    has rejected that notion: “[T]he mere fact that the statements
    alone do not create an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt does not remove them from the ambit of Rule 804(b)(3).”
    United States v. Wilson, 
    160 F.3d 732
    , 739 & n.4 (D.C. Cir.
    1998).
    Turning to the statements at issue, the question is whether
    a reasonable person in the co-defendant’s position would falsely
    claim to have shot first and hit the driver, even in the context of
    a self-defense narrative. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(A). As the
    government points out, State Department investigators likely
    knew (or would soon learn) that this co-defendant fired at the
    Kia, so he would have been ill-advised to deny he had. That
    said, investigators also knew (or would soon learn) that
    numerous other Blackwater guards fired at the Kia around the
    10
    same time. Thus, with investigators facing the daunting task of
    piecing together who did what in the midst of a melee, would a
    reasonable person in the co-defendant’s position claim (1)
    ignorance as to who shot when and where, essentially hiding
    behind the “fog of war;” (2) to have fired defensive shots into
    the Kia’s engine block only after other Raven 23 members had
    opened fire engaging the driver; or (3) affirmatively admit that
    he was the first, and likely fatal, shooter? In other words, if in
    reality this co-defendant had fired fourth and hit only the engine
    block, then why would he falsely claim responsibility for shots
    that likely killed a man?
    The government suggests that because State Department
    protocol required guards to shoot occupants of cars that refused
    to stop despite warnings, the co-defendant could have falsely
    claimed to have shot first and hit the driver in order to portray
    himself as having “done precisely the right thing (the heroic
    thing, even).” Appellee Br. 122. Such an implausible high-risk
    high-reward strategy would only make sense if one were
    absolutely confident the self-defense claim would hold up; if
    not, the heroic narrative would give way to something far more
    troubling, with devastating consequences for the co-defendant.
    On the other hand, if at all concerned about the self-defense
    narrative being rejected, a reasonable person in the co-
    defendant’s position would have claimed to have fired fourth
    and hit the engine block because such shots would ultimately be
    of little consequence even if fired without justification. Based
    on the evidence adduced at trial showing that the Kia had come
    to a stop before any shots were fired, the co-defendant would
    have had little reason to feel so confident in the self-defense
    claim. Instead, it is far more likely that the co-defendant
    offered these inculpatory details because they were true, in
    order to lend credence to his flimsy self-defense narrative. See
    Williamson, 
    512 U.S. at
    599–600. Indeed, even the co-
    defendant’s expression of uncertainty as to shooting first (“[I
    11
    am] not aware of any shots being fired before [mine]”) indicates
    that he was being truthful in that he would be unlikely to
    undercut his own lie by expressing doubt about it. As such, the
    co-defendant’s     inculpatory statements were sufficiently
    trustworthy and contrary to his pecuniary interest to qualify for
    admission under FRE 804(b)(3).
    The requirement to show “corroborating circumstances
    that clearly indicate . . . trustworthiness” does not apply to
    statements against pecuniary interest, Fed. R. Evid.
    804(b)(3)(B), but the existence of such corroborating
    circumstances here further demonstrates the admissibility of the
    inculpatory portion of the co-defendant’s statements. Not only
    did multiple witnesses similarly describe the first shots as
    hitting the driver’s side windshield, and multiple others
    similarly described two initial shots, but Officer Monem
    testified that a specifically-located gunner fired the first shots,
    and, crucially, Officer Al-Hamidi testified he was “100 percent
    certain” that the first shots came from “the [same location] of [a
    particular] vehicle,” 7/2/14 (PM) Tr. 35:4–15, which was the
    co-defendant’s position that day. Moreover, Jeremy Krueger,
    in the second convoy vehicle, testified that the first shots
    sounded like the 5.56 ammunition used by the co-defendant,
    rather than the 7.62 ammunition used by Slatten, while Jeremy
    Ridgeway testified that a few days after the massacre the co-
    defendant said to him “I feel like this is my fault.” 8/4/14 (PM)
    Tr. 13:15–14:16. It is difficult to imagine why the co-defendant
    would seem to accept such responsibility, especially to someone
    like Ridgeway who would later confess to multiple killings,
    unless the co-defendant believed he was the one who started the
    shooting.
    That the co-defendant’s inculpatory statements are
    sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under an exception to the
    hearsay rule does not necessarily mean they are true. Nor does
    12
    it mean that, even if the co-defendant believed they were true,
    he was correct in thinking he fired first. Rather, it simply means
    that the statements are trustworthy enough to be presented to a
    jury, which on retrial can consider all of the available evidence
    in determining whether or not Slatten fired the first shots that
    day. The government’s position that any error was harmless
    because of the strength of the evidence that Slatten fired first,
    see Appellee Br. 128–29, highlights the importance of a jury
    making this determination. On remand, the government can
    make its argument to the jury that the co-defendant’s “equivocal
    out-of-court response to an investigator,” given the falsity of
    other aspects of his statement, “surely, [should not] turn[] the
    tide” and prevent a second conviction of Slatten. Id. at 129.
    In sum, because the co-defendant’s inculpatory statements
    are admissible as statements contrary to pecuniary interest and
    thus “specifically covered,” see Fed. R. Evid. 807, FRE
    804(b)(3) is properly relied upon rather than FRE 807's residual
    exception to the hearsay rule. See United States v. Earles, 
    113 F.3d 796
    , 800 (8th Cir. 1997).
    B.
    In any event, there appears good reason not to rely on FRE
    807 here. Not only is the district court is “vested with
    considerable discretion” to apply the residual hearsay exception,
    United States v. Kim, 
    595 F.2d 755
    , 766 (D.C. Cir. 1979), this
    court has repeatedly emphasized that FRE 807 “was intended to
    be a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, applied only in
    exceptional cases,” when the district court would otherwise be
    forced to exclude evidence that is “very important and very
    reliable.” 
    Id.
     FRE 807 requires “circumstantial guarantees of
    trustworthiness” equivalent to those ensured by FRE 803 and
    FRE 804, and if my colleagues do not trust the veracity of self-
    serving statements under FRE 804(b)(3), see Op. 59–60, then it
    seems illogical to admit those same statements under FRE 807
    13
    merely because the co-defendant was under oath, immunized
    from criminal liability except for the remote possibility of
    prosecution for making false statements under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    , and repeated his statements several times. But see Op.
    63–65. Underscoring this point, the investigators’ reports
    reflect a certain skepticism about the co-defendant’s
    trustworthiness, at one point noting that he had failed to
    mention firing his M-203 grenade launcher in prior statements,
    which the co-defendant “claimed that he had not documented
    firing . . . because he ‘didn’t think it was important.’” Mem.
    Report of Interview at 3 (Sept. 23, 2007).
    Further, the evidence identified as corroborating the self-
    defense narrative — which the jury necessarily rejected in
    reaching its verdict — is misconstrued by my colleagues. See
    Op. 65–66. The co-defendant told the State Department
    investigators that traffic in Nisur Square came to a stop upon the
    convoy’s command, but when the white Kia then approached
    the convoy at a high rate of speed, he threw a water bottle as a
    warning prior to firing the first shots. By contrast, Officer Al-
    Hamidi testified that when Raven 23 members threw water
    bottles, he turned to see that all traffic was stopped, then he
    turned back to the convoy as the first shots were fired. Al-
    Hamidi’s testimony thus in no way corroborates the co-
    defendant’s self-serving claim that he threw a water bottle at a
    speeding Kia as a warning, and to construe it otherwise only
    amplifies the error in deeming the self-defense portions of the
    narrative admissible.
    Finally, reliance on FRE 807 for admission of the co-
    defendant’s statements as a whole generally ignores both
    Williamson, 
    512 U.S. at
    599–600, and Slatten’s clarification that
    he is not seeking admission of the portions of the co-defendant’s
    statements that the government claims are self-serving, such as
    that the Kia approached at high speed, did not stop despite the
    14
    co-defendant’s attempts to stop it, or that the co-defendant
    feared for his life. See Slatten Br. 40. But see Op. 54, 68–69.
    Although I too conclude that the district court abused its
    discretion, Slatten’s challenge to the denial of his motion for
    severance does not require the Court to reach FRE 807 in order
    to grant him the relief he seeks (or, indeed, relief he expressly
    does not seek), and therefore I would not do so.
    Accordingly, I concur in the judgment that the district court
    abused its discretion in denying admission of the co-defendant’s
    statements, to the extent I have identified in view of the analysis
    Williamson requires.
    II.
    Dissenting from Part VIII. Paul Slough was convicted by
    a jury of killing thirteen (13) people and attempting to kill
    seventeen (17) others. Evan Liberty was convicted by a jury of
    killing eight (8) people and attempting to kill twelve (12) others.
    Dustin Heard was convicted by a jury of killing six (6) people
    and attempting to kill eleven (11) others. Even leaving aside
    their firearms convictions under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c), the
    maximum sentences on their remaining convictions were 249
    years for Slough, 164 years for Liberty, and 137 years for
    Heard. Especially in light of that congressionally determined
    exposure, the thirty-year-and-one-day sentences imposed by the
    district court were not unconstitutionally “grossly
    disproportionate to the crime[s].” Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    , 60 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Today my colleagues hold that the mandatory sentence of
    thirty years under Section 924(c), as applied to these three
    private security guards for using government-issued weapons in
    a war zone, is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
    Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Op. 86–87. In so
    15
    doing, they have failed to account, as they must, for “all of the
    circumstances of the case.” Graham, 
    560 U.S. at 59
    . Most
    crucially, my colleagues make no mention of the fact that the
    district court judge, who presided at the months-long trial,
    imposed sentencing packages that the judge concluded
    “achieved an overall appropriate sentence [for each of these
    defendants] rather than calculating individual sentences for each
    component.” Sent. Tr. 150:18–25 (Apr. 13, 2015) (citing
    United States v. Townsend, 
    178 F.3d 558
    , 567 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
    That is, in consideration of the mandatory minimum under
    Section 924(c), the district court imposed only a one-day
    sentence for all of these defendants’ many manslaughter and
    attempted manslaughter convictions. The Supreme Court has
    affirmed the district court’s discretionary authority to impose
    such a sentencing package in Dean v. United States, 
    137 S. Ct. 1170
     (2017), holding that nothing in Section 924(c) prevents a
    district court from, as here, mitigating the harshness of a
    mandatory thirty-year minimum by imposing a one-day
    sentence for the predicate convictions. See 
    id.
     at 1176–77.
    My colleagues’ conclusion that there has been a
    constitutional violation, by contrast, rests on the mistaken
    premise that the thirty years allocated to the Section 924(c)
    convictions represent freestanding sentences distinct from the
    one-day sentences on the remaining manslaughter and
    attempted manslaughter convictions. See Op. 72; Townsend,
    
    178 F.3d at 567
    . In disregarding the basic structure of these
    defendants’ sentences, my colleagues fail to recognize that the
    district court already mitigated any disproportionality. Indeed,
    the district court judge stated on the record that he was “very
    satisfied” with the thirty-year sentences in light of the “many
    killings and woundings” for which these defendants were
    responsible. Sent. Tr. 154:9–22. My colleagues ignore this fact
    too, particularly when they suggest that the district court judge
    felt constrained to impose an unduly harsh sentence. See Op.
    16
    76–77. And whatever their concern with the “one-size-fits-all
    nature of these sentences,” see id. at 77, that is not an Eighth
    Amendment concern because none of the sentences are
    disproportionate to the enormity of the crimes that the jury
    found the defendants had committed. Graham, 
    560 U.S. at 60
    .
    Again, Congress has determined that the least culpable
    defendant here — who was convicted of killing six people and
    wounding eleven others — should be subject to a maximum of
    167 years in prison, in addition to the thirty years under Section
    924(c).
    Although it is possible to imagine circumstances in which
    a thirty-year minimum sentence for a private security guard
    working in a war zone would approach the outer bounds of
    constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, this is not that
    case. The jury rejected these defendants’ claim that they fired
    in self-defense, and far more of their fellow security guards
    chose not to fire their weapons at all that day. Yet as my
    colleagues apparently see it, Congress should have included an
    exception for all such military contractor employees, or, rather,
    it would have included such an exception if it had only
    considered the issue. See Op. 72–74. Perhaps so, but that is not
    the question before us. The district court judge made an
    individualized assessment of an appropriate sentencing package
    for each of these defendants, and the result is not
    disproportionate to the defendants’ crimes, let alone grossly,
    unconstitutionally disproportionate.
    Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part VIII.
    BROWN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
    in part from Part II: While the Court’s ultimate conclusions
    follow inexorably from its broad reading of the Military
    Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”), 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3261
    et seq., the Court’s initial premise seems faulty. MEJA was
    amended in 2004 to close a loophole that allowed non-
    Department of Defense (“DOD”) contractors to escape
    criminal liability for crimes committed overseas. I agree
    Congress used “deliberately expansive” language in MEJA so
    contractors working to support the DOD in its mission would
    not escape prosecution for crimes committed while
    performing their duties, regardless of which federal agency
    was their employer. See Part II Op. at 4. However, I am not
    convinced that any federal contractor whose employment
    relates—even minimally—to the DOD’s mission is
    automatically subject to MEJA. The Court’s interpretation
    unnecessarily broadens that which the statutory language
    seems designed to limit.
    I.
    A.
    When interpreting a statute, the analysis begins—and
    often ends—with its text. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
    Jacobson, 
    525 U.S. 432
    , 438 (1999). Here, the text of MEJA
    extends the jurisdiction of federal courts to crimes committed
    in foreign countries if the crime was committed while the
    defendant was “employed by . . . the Armed Forces outside
    the United States.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3261
    (a)(1). The statute
    further defines the time period of being “employed by the
    Armed Forces outside the United States” to include acts
    committed while a person is the employee of a contractor of
    “(I) the [DOD]. . . ; or (II) any other Federal agency . . . to the
    extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of
    the [DOD] overseas . . . .” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3267
    (1)(A)(iii). Thus,
    by MEJA’s plain terms, the employee of a DOD contractor is
    2
    automatically subject to prosecution under MEJA for any
    offense committed while working overseas without any
    qualifications. See 
    id.
     § 3267(1)(A)(iii)(I). This suggests
    DOD contractors and their employees are subject to MEJA
    for crimes committed while on or off duty. The same is not
    true for non-DOD contractors though. If the perpetrator of a
    crime is an employee or contractor of any federal agency
    other than the DOD, he is subject to MEJA only “to the extent
    [his] employment relates to supporting the [DOD’s] mission.”
    Id. § 3267(1)(A)(iii)(II) (emphasis added). The phrase “to the
    extent” does no work unless it implies the criminal liability of
    non-DOD contractors is more limited than DOD contractors.
    After all, the word “extent” is defined as “the range (as of
    inclusiveness or application) over which something extends.”
    WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
    UNABRIDGED 805 (1993). Moreover, the Supreme Court has
    taken a similar view of this phrase when interpreting its
    statutory meaning. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
    Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 
    510 U.S. 86
    , 104–05 (1993)
    (describing “to the extent” as “words of limitation” in a
    statute).
    Accordingly, if MEJA targets contractors (or their
    employees) performing specific military roles, it makes little
    sense to turn our inquiry into an essentially all-or-nothing
    analysis. However, this is precisely the effect of concluding
    that MEJA applies to all of a federal contractor’s conduct for
    the duration of the time that some aspect of that contractor’s
    employment supports the DOD’s mission. In situations such
    as this case—where the mission of the DOD is characterized
    to broadly encompass all activities related to nation-
    building—the limitation the Court purports to create is
    virtually boundless. Instead, the more logical reading of the
    statute is that a non-DOD contractor is subject to MEJA only
    when a specific task being performed by that contractor is
    3
    integral to the DOD’s mission. Had Congress wished MEJA
    to apply more broadly to non-DOD contractors, it could have
    substituted the word “if” for the phrase “to the extent” to give
    MEJA the expansive wording necessary to achieve such a
    result. See 
    id.
     (contrasting the word “if” with the phrase “to
    the extent”); see also In re Silveira, 
    141 F.3d 34
    , 36 (1st Cir.
    1998) (“If Congress intended for [the statute at issue] to be an
    ‘all-or-nothing’ matter, one might wonder why the provisions’
    drafters chose to use the connective phrase ‘to the extent that,’
    in lieu of the word ‘if,’ which obviously would have been a
    simpler construction.”). To hold this difference of language is
    nothing more than a “temporal limitation,” Part II Op. 4,
    ignores the distinction Congress made between those who
    work directly for the DOD and those who do not.
    Moreover, the Court’s interpretation goes beyond the
    problem Congress was attempting to solve when it amended
    MEJA in 2004. As noted by the Court, Congress sought to
    amend MEJA in response to the atrocities committed by
    Interior Department contractors at the Abu Ghraib prison in
    Baghdad. Part II Op. 2. These contractors working in Abu
    Gharib were soldiers in all but name, and they were directly
    assisting the DOD in running a prison for detained enemy
    combatants. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 
    580 F.3d 1
    , 6–7 (D.C.
    Cir. 2009) (stating the Abu Ghraib contractors were
    “integrated [with the military] and performing a common
    mission with the military under ultimate military command”).
    Viewed with this context in mind, it is clear that what
    Congress sought to do when it amended MEJA was to assure
    that contractors of any federal agency who were performing
    tasks conventionally done by soldiers could not elude U.S.
    jurisdiction.   Creating criminal liability for all federal
    employees or contractors whose employment relates—even
    tangentially so—to the DOD’s mission goes beyond a plain
    reading of the text. Because we are to “scrupulously confine
    4
    [our] own jurisdiction to the precise limits which (a federal)
    statute has defined,” Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 
    404 U.S. 202
    , 212 (1971) (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 
    292 U.S. 263
    , 270
    (1934)), we must use extreme caution when expanding our
    jurisdiction—particularly when doing so results in our
    criminal law applying extraterritorially.
    Here, I believe Congress said what it meant and meant
    what it said, see Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 
    503 U.S. 249
    ,
    253–54 (1992), and I would not dismiss the distinctions made
    in the text in favor of aspirational goals set forth by the
    statute’s sponsors. See Part II Op. at 2 (citing Senator
    Schumer’s floor statement declaring MEJA was amended to
    address “a dangerous loophole in our criminal law that would
    have allowed civilian contractors who do the crime to escape
    doing the time”). The Court may be correct that Congress
    intended for MEJA’s 2004 amendment to treat DOD and non-
    DOD contractors and their employees exactly the same when
    a non-DOD contractor’s employment relates to the DOD’s
    mission, but “[i]t is not for us to rewrite the statute so that it
    covers . . . what we think is necessary to achieve what we
    think Congress really intended.” Lewis v. City of Chicago,
    
    560 U.S. 205
    , 215 (2010). If the government truly desires this
    result, the proper course of action is to petition Congress to
    amend the statute, not advocate for courts to read problematic
    language out of its text.
    Because MEJA’s text compels the conclusion that
    Congress meant to treat DOD and non-DOD employees and
    contractors differently, the next inquiry is to determine which
    actions of non-DOD contractors are subject to MEJA and
    which are not. The text once again provides a clear answer:
    only crimes committed while “employed by . . . the Armed
    Forces outside the United States” falls within MEJA’s
    purview.     
    18 U.S.C. § 3261
    (a)(1).        MEJA specifically
    5
    provides non-DOD contractors are only “employed by . . . the
    Armed Forces” for the purposes of the statute when, though
    acting within the scope of their employment, they are
    “supporting the mission of the [DOD].” 
    Id.
     §§ 3261, 3267.
    The phrase “relating to” is “deliberately expansive” and must
    be given broad scope. Part II Op. at 4. However, its broad
    scope is not so expansive as to swallow up the “words of
    limitation” immediately preceding them. See John Hancock
    Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
    510 U.S. at
    104–05. Instead, these
    competing phrases must be balanced in ways that give both
    full meaning. Therefore, MEJA logically encompasses those
    actions taken by non-DOD employees pursuant to their
    employment that either directly or indirectly support the
    DOD’s mission. The statutory framework focuses on military
    employment and thus limits the scope of jurisdiction not just
    temporally but factually. This interpretation gives full
    meaning to the broad language of the text without making
    virtually all potential crimes committed by a non-DOD
    employee subject to the federal criminal law. The proper
    question is whether the Defendants were either directly or
    indirectly supporting the DOD when they entered Nisur
    Square on the day of the incident.
    B.
    Under this Court’s precedent, we examine the jury
    findings for each element of MEJA under the deferential
    sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard.          United States v.
    Williams, 
    836 F.3d 1
    , 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In doing so, we
    determine “whether the evidence, considered in the light most
    favorable to the government, was sufficient to permit a
    rational trier of fact to find all of the essential elements of the
    [statute were met] beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States
    v. Wilson, 
    240 F.3d 39
    , 43 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Here, the
    government has arguably met its burden. I do not join the
    6
    Court in holding that any actions deemed to facilitate
    rebuilding the war-torn nation of Iraq automatically relates to
    the DOD’s mission based on the text and history discussed
    above. For this reason, I also find the evidence of the
    Defendants performing other tasks to support the DOD—such
    as assisting distressed military units and training Army
    escorts, Part II Op. at 7—to be of doubtful relevance in
    determining whether the Defendants were supporting the
    DOD on the day of the Nisur Square incident.
    However, neither of these pieces of evidence are
    necessary to uphold the jury’s finding under the deferential
    sufficiency of the evidence standard, and we need not decide
    whether they would be sufficient on their own to meet
    MEJA’s criteria. As posited by the Court, the Defendants’
    employment—providing diplomatic security for the
    Department of State—indirectly supported the DOD’s
    mission by allowing military personnel previously responsible
    for providing State Department security to concentrate
    exclusively on the DOD’s rebuilding mission. Part II Op. at
    8. The relatively small size of America’s active, volunteer
    military and the breadth of its commitments may blur the
    lines, but it does not erase them. Although statements from
    Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England unequivocally
    stating that the Defendants were not supporting DOD’s
    mission contradicted the prosecution’s narrative, JA 2919–20,
    2932, 2936, contrary evidence is not enough to overcome this
    deferential standard. While I would interpret MEJA more
    narrowly and find the question close, arguably sufficient
    evidence existed for a rational juror to conclude that MEJA
    applied to the Defendants.
    7
    II.
    One question remains. Did the district court properly
    instruct the jury on MEJA’s application to this case? When
    examining a challenge to jury instructions, we must determine
    “whether, taken as a whole, the [district court’s] instructions
    accurately state the governing law and provide the jury with
    sufficient understanding of the issues and applicable
    standards.” United States v. DeFries, 
    129 F.3d 1293
    , 1304
    (D.C. Cir. 1997). Because an “improper instruction on an
    element of the offense violates the Sixth Amendment’s jury
    trial guarantee,” it is a reversible error requiring a new trial
    unless the error was harmless. Neder v. United States, 
    527 U.S. 1
    , 12, 15 (1999). The burden is on the government to
    prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Wilson, 
    240 F.3d at 44
    .
    Here, the district court interpreted MEJA as an all-or-
    nothing proposition. When explaining how MEJA should
    apply to the case, the court emphasized the broad nature of
    certain words in the text by defining the word “relates” to
    mean “a connection with” and defining “supporting” to mean
    “to promote the interest or cause of something or someone.”
    JA 3293. After giving these definitions, the culmination of
    the instruction advised that employment relating to supporting
    the DOD’s mission included a contractor of “any federal
    agency whose employment in the Republic of Iraq bears some
    relationship to supporting the mission of the Department of
    Defense in that country.” 
    Ibid.
     While the instruction did
    contain the phrase “to the extent,” the presence of this phrase
    does little work because the overall framing of the issue is
    erroneous. By describing MEJA in this manner, the district
    court, essentially read the limiting effect of the phrase “to the
    extent” right out of the statute and instead substituted “if” in
    its place.     Moreover, this expansive view effectively
    8
    eliminates the connection to military employment. As
    discussed above, this is a dubious interpretation of the statute.
    At the jury instruction stage, the imprecision inherent in a
    sweeping view of the DOD’s mission becomes apparent. The
    jury instruction, if erroneous, was prejudicial because it
    affected a central issue in a close case where persuasive
    evidence was presented by both the prosecution and the
    defense. See Williams, 836 F.3d at 16 (reversing a murder
    conviction under MEJA because a misstatement of the law by
    the prosecution during its closing statement involved a
    “central and close issue in the case” that was “insufficiently
    cured”). Because the question of whether MEJA applied to
    the Defendants was a threshold issue for each conviction,
    there is no issue more central to the entire case than this.
    Furthermore, even if sufficient evidence existed to find
    jurisdiction under MEJA in this case, the same would be true
    if the jury had reached the opposite conclusion based upon
    Deputy Secretary England’s testimony and the representations
    he made that the Defendants were not supporting the DOD’s
    mission, see JA 2953, 3843, 3858. Thus, the importance of an
    accurate statement of the law cannot be gainsaid.
    However, given the district court’s instructions, it was
    entirely possible for the jurors to begin deliberations believing
    that if any aspect of the Defendants’ employment related to
    supporting the DOD’s mission, then any supporting action
    taken during the course of that employment made the
    Defendants subject to MEJA. Accordingly, the jurors could
    find MEJA applied solely on the basis of actions taken during
    the course of the Defendants’ employment—even actions
    completely unrelated to the events that transpired in Nisur
    Square, such as providing assistance to distressed military
    units or training Army security escorts. This is a significantly
    different calculus than attempting to determine if the
    9
    Defendants’ action on the day of the Nisur Square incident
    related to supporting the DOD’s mission. The difference is
    stark. The jury conceivably could have reached a different
    conclusion had it been correctly instructed. At a minimum,
    the government cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
    erroneous jury instruction was harmless error. See Wilson,
    
    240 F.3d at 44
    . Therefore, I would have reversed the
    Defendants’ convictions and remanded the case for a new
    trial.
    III.
    The question of how our criminal justice system should
    treat private contractors who commit crimes overseas in war
    time is a difficult one. However, Congress has made the
    determination that such individuals should be held responsible
    for their actions in federal courts if they either work for the
    military or commit a crime during the performance of a task
    related to supporting the military, such as the atrocities
    committed at Abu Ghraib. Today’s opinion expands MEJA
    beyond the limits defined by this history and clearly laid out
    in the text. Because it is not possible to conclude, beyond a
    reasonable doubt, that the erroneous instruction did not
    improperly influence the ultimate outcome of the case, I
    respectfully dissent from this portion of the Court’s decision.