Flytenow, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued September 25, 2015         Decided December 18, 2015
    No. 14-1168
    FLYTENOW, INC.,
    PETITIONER
    v.
    FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ADMINISTRATOR,
    RESPONDENT
    On Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Federal Aviation Administration
    Jonathan Riches argued the cause for petitioner. With
    him on the briefs were Gregory S. Winton, Clint Bolick, and
    Aditya Dynar.
    Sydney A. Foster, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were
    Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
    Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was
    filed, and Mark R. Freeman, Attorney.
    Before: PILLARD and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and
    GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD.
    2
    PILLARD, Circuit Judge: Flytenow, Inc., developed a
    web-based service through which private pilots can offer their
    planned itineraries to passengers willing to share the pilots’
    expenses. After starting operations in early 2014, Flytenow
    sought a legal interpretation from the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) regarding its business plan’s
    compliance with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the
    FAA’s regulations. The FAA responded with a Letter
    Interpretation, concluding that pilots offering flight-sharing
    services on Flytenow’s website would be operating as
    “common carriers,” which would require them to have
    commercial pilot licenses. Flytenow’s members, licensed
    only as private pilots, thus would violate FAA regulations if
    they offered their services via Flytenow.com.
    Flytenow asks us to set aside the FAA’s Interpretation as
    arbitrary and capricious and inconsistent with statutory and
    constitutional law. Because we conclude that the FAA’s
    Interpretation is consistent with the relevant statutory and
    regulatory provisions and does not violate Flytenow’s
    constitutional rights, we deny Flytenow’s petition for review.
    I.
    Flytenow.com facilitates connections between pilots and
    “general aviation enthusiasts” who pay a share of the flight’s
    expenses in exchange for passage on a route predetermined by
    the pilot. Enthusiasts must be members of Flytenow to search
    for flights, but anyone may become a member by filling out
    an online form. Pilots using Flytenow’s service “initially and
    unilaterally dictate the time, date, and points of operation” of
    their proposed flights. J.A. 48. After a member-enthusiast
    expresses interest in being a passenger on a particular flight, a
    pilot may “accept or reject an enthusiast’s request . . . for any
    or no reason.” 
    Id. If a
    pilot carries one or more passengers,
    3
    Flytenow facilitates the sharing of expenses on a pro rata
    basis between passengers and pilot. 
    Id. Around the
    same
    time that Flytenow publicly launched its flight-sharing
    website and requested the FAA’s legal opinion, another firm
    proposing a substantially similar service, AirPooler, Inc.,
    submitted a parallel request for a legal interpretation on the
    same issue.
    The FAA is charged with “promot[ing] safe flight of civil
    aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 44701. To that end, the FAA is
    empowered to regulate nearly every aspect of private and
    commercial flight, including licensing and regulation of pilots
    and their operations. See, e.g., 
    id. §§ 44701(a),
    44703, 44705.
    At issue here is whether the FAA permissibly concluded that
    private pilots using Flytenow’s service to offer flights to
    potential passengers hold themselves out as common carriers
    transporting persons from place to place for compensation in
    violation of the terms of their noncommercial licensure.
    The FAA issues several categories of “airman
    certificates” licensing qualified pilots to fly in various
    capacities subject to specified terms. See 
    id. §§ 44702,
    44703; 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.81-95, 61.102-17, 61.121-33.
    Relevant to this petition are “commercial pilot” licenses, 
    id. Part 61,
    subpart F, and “private pilot” licenses, 
    id. subpart E.
    Certified commercial pilots are qualified to transport
    passengers or property for compensation.                See 
    id. § 61.133(a)(1).
    Private pilots, by contrast, are barred from
    receiving compensation. See 
    id. § 61.113(a).
    Seven narrow, enumerated exceptions to the
    compensation bar permit private pilots to receive
    compensation in specified circumstances. 
    Id. § 61.113(b)-(h).
    Those exceptions authorize, for example, private pilots to
    accept compensation for certain charity events, 
    id. 4 §
    61.113(d), search-and-location operations, 
    id. § 61.113(e),
    or airplane-sale-related flights, 
    id. § 61.113(f).
    One of the
    seven exceptions to the compensation bar provides that a
    private pilot may share expenses with passengers, provided
    that the pilot does “not pay less than the pro rata share of the
    operating expenses” and that the expenses “involve only fuel,
    oil, airport expenditures, or rental fees.” 
    Id. § 61.113(c).
    The
    pro rata sharing of expenses is further limited by the FAA’s
    “common-purpose test,” which requires private pilots and
    their expense-sharing passengers to share a “bona fide
    common purpose” for their travel.              See FAA Legal
    Interpretation Letter from Rebecca B. MacPherson, Assistant
    Chief Counsel for Regulations, to Mark Haberkorn (Oct. 3,
    2011) (Haberkorn Interpretation), J.A. 41-44. Private pilots’
    receipt of compensation outside of the seven exceptions is a
    violation of section 61.113 subject to civil penalties under 49
    U.S.C. § 46301.
    In addition to pilot licensing, the FAA regulates the
    conduct of aircraft and pilots in flight. The regulations make
    an important distinction between private carriage and
    common carriage, with the latter subject to more stringent
    operating requirements.
    Part 91 of the FAA’s regulations establishes baselines
    that apply to all aircraft operating in the United States. See 14
    C.F.R. § 91.101; see generally 
    id. §§ 91.101-47.
    Part 91
    governs, for example, the use of seat belts, 
    id. § 91.107,
    minimum safe altitudes, 
    id. § 91.119,
    aircraft speed, 
    id. § 91.117,
    and rights of way among aircraft, 
    id. § 91.113.
    Part 119 of the FAA’s regulations subjects flights
    operating as air carriers to safety requirements beyond what
    Part 91 requires of all flights. See 14 C.F.R. § 119.1. An “air
    carrier” under the Federal Aviation Act is a person
    5
    undertaking to provide “air transportation,” 49 U.S.C.
    § 40102(a)(2), defined to include “foreign air transportation,
    interstate air transportation, or the transportation of mail by
    aircraft,” 
    id. § 40102(a)(5).
    Interstate air transportation, the
    category relevant to this case, “means the transportation of
    passengers or property by aircraft as a common carrier for
    compensation . . . .” 
    Id. § 40102(a)(25).
    Anyone piloting as
    an air carrier must have “an air carrier operating certificate”
    and operate only in compliance with its terms. 49 U.S.C.
    § 44711(a)(4). The term “[a]ir carrier” for purposes of Part
    119 of the regulations tracks the statutory definition. See 14
    C.F.R. § 1.1. Thus, as relevant here, under the statutory and
    regulatory definitions, an “air carrier” is a person engaged in
    transportation of passengers as a “common carrier.”
    The statute does not define “common carrier” or
    “compensation.” See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a). Instead, the FAA
    has relied for nearly thirty years on a definition of common
    carriage it announced in an advisory circular. FAA Advisory
    Circular 120-12A (April 26, 1986) (FAA Advisory Circular),
    J.A. 30-32. That circular noted the common-law heritage of
    “common carriage” and “private carriage” and determined
    that, because the Act left those terms undefined, FAA
    “guidelines giving general explanations” of the terms “would
    be helpful.” 
    Id. ¶ 3,
    J.A. 30.
    The FAA Advisory Circular distinguished “private
    carriage” from “common carriage.”           It explained that
    “[p]rivate carriage for hire is carriage for one or several
    selected customers, generally on a long-term basis.” 
    Id. ¶ 4.d.,
    J.A. 31. As long as she does not hold herself out to the
    public generally, and any compensation she receives does not
    exceed the passenger’s pro rata share of expenses, a private
    pilot may offer private carriage consistently with the
    regulations. See generally FAA Advisory Circular, J.A. 30-
    6
    31. In contrast to private carriage, the FAA’s Advisory
    Circular defined “common carriage” as service meeting four
    elements: “(1) a holding out of a willingness to (2) transport
    persons or property (3) from place to place (4) for
    compensation.” 
    Id. ¶ 4,
    J.A. 30. The two “common carriage”
    definitional factors at issue here are the first and fourth—
    holding oneself out as willing to transport passengers, and
    doing or offering to do so for compensation.
    As noted above, a pilot with a commercial license is
    qualified to offer carriage for compensation; a private pilot
    may only receive compensation pursuant to one of the seven
    exceptions in section 61.113. 14 C.F.R. § 61.113. Under the
    FAA Advisory Circular, a pilot’s receipt of compensation
    may be evidence that a pilot’s operations are “air
    transportation,” meaning common carriage, requiring a higher
    level of pilot qualification. FAA Advisory Circular, J.A. 31.
    For example, notwithstanding the regulatory permission for
    private pilots to carry selected customers and share flight
    costs with them pursuant to the express exception set forth in
    section 61.113(c), even carriers flying members of only “one
    organization may be . . . common carrier[s] if membership in
    the organization and participation in the flights are, in effect,
    open to a significant segment of the public.” 
    Id. ¶ 4.f.,
    J.A.
    31. The FAA also noted that a private pilot’s provision of
    “free transportation” for a hotel or casino that requested
    “nominal charges” for “gifts and gratuities” has been held to
    be “common carriage based on the fact that the passengers
    [we]re drawn from the general public and the nominal charge
    constituted compensation.” 
    Id. ¶ 4.g.,
    J.A. 31.
    The FAA Advisory Circular defined “holding out” as
    making representations “to the public, or to a segment of the
    public” that a carrier is “willing to furnish transportation
    within the limits of its facilities to any person who wants it.”
    7
    
    Id. The FAA
    warned that a private pilot may intend to offer
    only private carriage, but the pilot’s flights could come to be
    treated as common carriage: “The number of contracts must
    not be too great, otherwise it implies a willingness to make a
    contract with anybody.” 
    Id. ¶ 4.d.,
    J.A. 31. The FAA
    emphasized that its definition of “holding out” as a factor in
    the definition of common carriage is broad and flexible:
    “‘holding out’ which makes a person a common carrier can be
    done in many ways and it does not matter how it is done.” 
    Id. ¶ 4,
    J.A. 30. If a carrier were to show that it did not have rate
    schedules, that it offered services only pursuant to separately
    negotiated contracts, or that the carrier occasionally refused
    service to would-be customers, such facts would not
    necessarily be “conclusive proof” that a carrier is a private—
    as opposed to common—carrier. 
    Id. ¶ 4,
    J.A. 30. A carrier
    cannot avoid a “holding out” determination and its regulatory
    implications simply by avoiding advertising on its own
    behalf; “‘holding out’ may be accomplished through the
    actions of agents, agencies, or salesmen who may,
    themselves, procure passenger traffic from the general public
    . . . .” 
    Id. ¶ 4.b.,
    J.A. 31.
    The FAA responded to Air Pooler’s and Flytenow’s
    requests for legal interpretations in separate letters on August
    13 and August 14, respectively. The letter to Flytenow
    incorporated by reference the letter to AirPooler. The letters
    concluded that pilots offering services on Flytenow.com or
    AirPooler.com would be engaged in common carriage as the
    FAA defines it, which would subject them to Part 119, the
    more stringent regulations governing pilots in air commerce.
    First, in its letter to AirPooler, the FAA explained the
    general rule that a private pilot may not act as pilot-in-
    command of an aircraft carrying passengers or property for
    compensation or hire. That general rule admits of a narrow
    8
    exception for private pilots’ “accept[ance] [of] compensation
    in the form of a pro rata share of operating expenses” from
    their passengers. J.A. 58. That expense-sharing provision is
    cast as “an exception to the compensation or hire prohibition,”
    that is, it specifies a circumstance in which compensation is
    permitted. 
    Id. Second, the
    FAA explained that it treats flight-sharing
    services as “common carriage.” Under the FAA’s definition
    of “common carriage,” flight-sharing services meet the
    compensation element of the common-carriage definition
    because expense sharing is compensation. J.A. 59. The
    “holding out” element is met by pilots’ use of the online
    service to “post[] specific flights” to the website. J.A. 60. In
    its letter to Flytenow, the FAA explained that “[h]olding out
    can be accomplished by any ‘means which communicates to
    the public that a transportation service is indiscriminately
    available’ to the members of that segment of the public it is
    designed to attract.” J.A. 62 (quoting Transocean Airlines, 11
    C.A.B. 350 (1950) (enforcement proceeding)). The FAA
    concluded that, “[b]ased on [Flytenow’s] description, the
    website is designed to attract a broad segment of the public
    interested in transportation by air.” J.A. 62. The FAA thus
    concluded that a pilot holding out his services and receiving
    expense-sharing compensation is engaged in “common
    carriage” and requires a Part 119 certificate.
    Flytenow timely filed this petition for review challenging
    the FAA’s Interpretation.
    II.
    We have jurisdiction to review Flytenow’s petition under
    section 46110 of the Federal Aviation Act, whether or not the
    FAA’s interpretation is a final order. Even where no party
    contests jurisdiction, “it is well established that a court of
    9
    appeals must first satisfy itself of its own jurisdiction, sua
    sponte if necessary, before proceeding to the merits.”
    Blackman v. District of Columbia, 
    456 F.3d 167
    , 174 (D.C.
    Cir. 2006) (quoting Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
    Inc. v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 
    917 F.2d 48
    , 53 (D.C.
    Cir. 1990), aff’d, 
    501 U.S. 252
    (1991)). Neither party has
    identified any jurisdictional defect in this appeal, and we
    perceive none.
    The Federal Aviation Act authorizes review in this court
    by any “person disclosing a substantial interest in an order
    issued by” the FAA Administrator. 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a).
    There would perhaps be an obstacle to our review of the
    FAA’s Interpretation if the Administration’s letter were not
    final action, but the FAA has not objected to our reviewing
    the letter as an “order” under section 46110(a) or otherwise
    contended that the Interpretation is unreviewable as non-final.
    See Br. of Respondent 1. At oral argument, the FAA
    disclaimed any non-finality bar to our review. We need not
    address finality sua sponte because finality is not
    jurisdictional under either the Administrative Procedure Act
    or the Federal Aviation Act.
    The APA authorizes judicial review of “final agency
    action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
    court,” as well as “[a]gency action made reviewable by
    statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. After a period of uncertainty in our
    circuit, it is “now firmly established” that finality under the
    APA is non-jurisdictional. Vietnam Veterans of Am. v.
    Shinseki, 
    599 F.3d 654
    , 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
    Like the APA’s section 704, section 46110 of the Federal
    Aviation Act, on which Flytenow relies, authorizes judicial
    review of an “order.” Unlike the APA, however, section
    46110 does not impose any explicit finality requirement.
    10
    Rather, we have incorporated generally applicable finality
    principles into the analysis of what counts as an “order” under
    section 46110. See, e.g., CSI Aviation Servs., Inc. v. U.S.
    Dep’t of Transp., 
    637 F.3d 408
    , 411 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing
    Bennett v. Spear, 
    520 U.S. 154
    , 178 (1997)); Vill. of
    Bensenville v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 
    457 F.3d 52
    , 68 (D.C.
    Cir. 2006) (same); Puget Sound Traffic Ass’n v. Civil
    Aeronautics Bd., 
    536 F.2d 437
    , 438-39 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
    (noting that the Federal Aviation Act’s review provision,
    “which gives this court power to review Board orders, has
    been judicially restricted to review of final agency orders”).
    Because the finality requirement under section 46110(a) is
    judicially imported from the APA, it is no more jurisdictional
    than the APA’s own finality requirement. Our precedent
    confirms that finality under the Federal Aviation Act is a
    matter of judicial creation, allowing us to “avoid premature
    intervention in the administrative process.” 
    CSI, 637 F.3d at 411
    (citing Puget 
    Sound, 536 F.2d at 438-39
    ).
    Because finality is non-jurisdictional, we accept the
    FAA’s decision not to pursue any such defense it might have
    had.     This case presents no exceptional circumstances
    warranting our consideration of the potential finality bar
    despite its forfeiture. See District of Columbia v. Air Fla.,
    Inc., 
    750 F.2d 1077
    , 1084-85 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Government
    litigants may sometimes “want to waive or forfeit certain non-
    jurisdictional, non-merits threshold defenses so as to permit or
    obtain a ruling on the merits.” Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Envtl.
    Prot. Agency, 
    693 F.3d 169
    , 185-86 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
    (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). We do not second-guess the
    FAA’s decision here.
    11
    III.
    Flytenow characterizes the FAA’s Interpretation as a
    significant deviation from the Administration’s prior
    interpretation of its own regulations and asserts that such a
    shift requires notice and comment rulemaking under the
    Administrative Procedure Act. That argument is foreclosed
    by Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, in which the Supreme
    Court expressly abrogated the doctrine of our circuit upon
    which Flytenow relies. 
    135 S. Ct. 1199
    , 1207 (2015)
    (abrogating Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P.,
    
    117 F.3d 579
    (D.C. Cir. 1997)). As the Supreme Court in
    Perez explained, the APA’s “notice-and-comment
    requirement ‘does not apply . . . to interpretative rules.’” 
    Id. at 1206
    (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)) (omission in original).
    Perez tells us that its “exemption of interpretive rules from the
    notice-and-comment process is categorical . . . .” 
    Id. The Interpretation
    at issue here is a quintessential interpretative
    rule, as it was “issued by an agency to advise the public of the
    agency’s construction of the statutes and rules it administers.”
    Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 
    514 U.S. 87
    , 99 (1995)
    (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 
    441 U.S. 281
    , 302 n.31
    (1979)). We thus reject Flytenow’s contention that the
    Interpretation is invalid for want of notice and comment
    rulemaking.
    A.
    On the merits, Flytenow objects that its pilots do not
    engage in “common carriage” and so cannot be required to
    comply with Part 119’s common-carrier licensure
    requirements.      Flytenow argues that the FAA has
    misconstrued the definition of common carriage. When we
    consider a challenge to the FAA’s interpretation of its own
    regulations, the familiar Auer v. Robbins framework requires
    12
    us to treat the agency’s interpretation as controlling unless
    “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” 
    519 U.S. 452
    , 461 (1997). Even without such deference, we have
    no difficulty upholding the FAA’s interpretation of its
    regulations in this case.
    The FAA concluded that pilots offering their services on
    Flytenow.com would be common carriers. That conclusion
    rests on the FAA’s interpretations of “compensation” and
    “holding out” as the FAA uses those two terms in its
    regulations.     Flytenow objects that:         (1) the FAA
    misinterpreted its regulations in finding that expense sharing
    under Flytenow’s service would be “compensation” to
    participating pilots; and (2) the FAA erroneously concluded
    that pilots’ participation on Flytenow.com would amount to
    “holding out” an offer of transportation to the public. Both of
    Flytenow’s objections are unpersuasive.
    1. Compensation. The FAA correctly interpreted its
    regulation prohibiting private pilots from receiving
    compensation. The FAA concluded that the exception from
    the general ban on receipt of compensation—allowing private
    pilots to engage in expense sharing in certain circumstances—
    did not redefine expense sharing as something other than
    compensation. That exception instead narrowly authorized
    some expense sharing notwithstanding the otherwise-
    applicable general ban on private pilots’ receipt of
    compensation. Flytenow argues that the FAA’s reading
    impermissibly treats the “exception to the definition [as] the
    same as the definition”—i.e., that it “contort[s]” the exception
    by treating what Flytenow says the regulation identifies as
    “not compensation” as if it were still compensation. Reply
    Br. 9. Flytenow misapprehends the FAA’s analysis. The
    expense-sharing rule, by excepting certain expense sharing
    13
    from the ban on private pilots’ receipt of compensation,
    creates a category of compensated flight that is permitted.
    The text and structure of the regulation make clear that
    allowable expense sharing is still compensation, albeit an
    authorized subcategory. Under the heading “Private pilot
    privileges and limitations: Pilot in command,” the rule
    explains that, “except as provided in paragraphs (b) through
    (h) of this section, no person who holds a private pilot
    certificate may act as pilot in command of an aircraft that is
    carrying passengers . . . for compensation or hire.” 14 C.F.R.
    § 61.113(a). In other words, section 61.113 defines the only
    circumstances in which private pilots may receive
    compensation. Those are set forth in seven categories of
    compensation, including expense sharing, that are exempted
    from the general bar. 
    Id. § 61.113(b)-(h).
    The most natural
    reading of that rule’s language and structure—and the reading
    the FAA adopted—is that the exempted expense sharing is
    “compensation,” but is nevertheless permitted in the identified
    contexts. The exceptions in paragraphs (b) through (h)—
    including the limited expense-sharing exception—set out
    acceptable forms of compensation; they do not change the
    underlying definition of compensation.
    The FAA’s position that expense sharing can be
    permitted compensation is consistent and well established.
    Since at least the 1980s, the FAA has explained that “any
    payment for a flight, even a partial payment, means that the
    flight is for compensation or hire.” FAA Legal Interpretation
    Letter from John H. Cassady, Assistant Chief Counsel,
    Regulations & Enforcement Div., to Hal Klee, Executive
    Director, Pilots & Passengers (undated, identified by FAA as
    1985), J.A. 26-27. “This is true even if the payment is made
    under the ‘expense sharing’ provisions . . . .” Id.; see also
    FAA Legal Interpretation from John H. Cassady, Assistant
    14
    Chief Counsel, Regulations & Enforcement Div., to Thomas
    Chero, Vice President – Legal, AVEMCO Ins. Co. (Dec. 26,
    1985) (Chero Interpretation), J.A. 28. And as recently as
    2011, the FAA explained that it “construes the term
    compensation very broadly; any reimbursement of expenses,
    including a pro rata share of operating expenses, constitutes
    compensation.” Haberkorn Interpretation, J.A. 42 n.1. The
    FAA correctly concluded here, in keeping with its prior
    interpretation, that expense sharing is always compensation.
    Flytenow argues that, where a pilot and her passengers
    share a common purpose, as Flytenow’s service contemplates,
    expense sharing cannot be compensation within the meaning
    of the “common carrier” definition. Br. of Petitioner 19-21.
    But that analysis confounds two issues. The FAA applies the
    “common-purpose” test to identify the narrow circumstances
    in which admittedly private pilots may share expenses under
    section 61.113. See FAA Legal Interpretation Letter from
    Kenneth E. Geier, Regional Counsel, to Paul D. Ware (Feb.
    13, 1976) (Ware Interpretation), J.A. 23; Chero Interpretation;
    FAA Legal Interpretation from Rebecca MacPherson,
    Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations, to Guy Mangiamele
    (Mar. 4, 2009), J.A. 35-36; Haberkorn Interpretation. Here,
    however, the question is whether Flytenow pilots would be
    acting as private pilots, or instead as common carriers without
    adequate licensure. The common-purpose test has no bearing
    on whether compensation in the form of passengers’ expense
    sharing, together with holding out to the general public, tends
    to show that a private pilot is operating as a common carrier.
    Flytenow invokes an interpretation from a local field
    office that, it claims, read the regulations differently from all
    of the interpretations issued by the FAA’s Office of the Chief
    Counsel. See Br. of Petitioner 20 (citing Legal Interpretation
    Letter from Loretta E. Alkalay, Regional Counsel, to Ron
    15
    Levy (Oct. 25, 2005)). To the extent that the Levy
    Interpretation concluded that, so long as the passenger and
    pilot share a common purpose, a private pilot may generally
    hold herself out as providing flights on an expense-sharing
    basis and remain in compliance with Part 119, it was
    erroneous. An anomalous local field office interpretation
    cannot control. Cf. Paralyzed Veterans of 
    Am., 117 F.3d at 587
    (“A speech of a mid-level official of an agency, however,
    is not the sort of ‘fair and considered judgment’ that can be
    thought of as an authoritative departmental position.”),
    abrogated on other grounds by Perez, 
    135 S. Ct. 1199
    . In
    sum, we reject Flytenow’s effort to recast the common-
    purpose limitation as part of the definition of compensation
    rather than as part of an exception under which the FAA
    permits private pilots to receive compensation.
    2. Holding Out. Flytenow’s argument regarding the
    “holding out” element of common carriage is question-
    begging and incorrect. Flytenow contends that the limitation
    against pilots “holding out” is “codified in” section 119.5(k),
    which bars advertising or offering unauthorized service. Br.
    of Petitioner 24; 14 C.F.R. § 119.5(k). Section 119.5(k)
    states: “No person may advertise or otherwise offer to
    perform an operation subject to this part [governing air
    carriers] unless that person is authorized by the [FAA] to
    conduct that operation.” Flytenow reads that restriction to
    mean that any pilot not subject to Part 119’s stringent rules
    for air carriers may “advertise or otherwise offer” herself or
    himself as willing to provide expense-sharing services,
    without that conduct establishing the “holding out” element of
    the “common carrier” definition. See Brief of Petitioner 24-
    25.
    As the FAA rightly notes, section 119.5(k) is not the
    codification of the “holding out” requirement. Rather, section
    16
    119.5(k) is a prohibition on advertisement of unauthorized
    services. The statute and regulations do not define “holding
    out”; the FAA instead uses “holding out” as that concept is
    defined through the common law, see CSI 
    Aviation, 637 F.3d at 415
    ; FAA Advisory Circular, J.A. 30, and applies it in a
    functionalist, pragmatic manner, see FAA Advisory Circular,
    J.A. 30; Haberkorn Interpretation, J.A. 42-43.
    Flytenow’s reliance on section 119.5(k) has the reasoning
    backwards. The central question in this case is whether
    Flytenow’s pilots are “subject to this part”—i.e. Part 119 on
    commercial operation—and the answer depends on whether
    the pilots are acting as “air carriers,” see 14 C.F.R.
    § 119.1(a)(1) (“This part applies to each person operating or
    intending to operate civil aircraft . . . [a]s an air carrier . . . .”).
    As noted above, an “air carrier” is a “common carrier.” See
    14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (defining “air carrier”). Section 119.5(k) does
    not define, but depends on, whether a pilot is operating as a
    common carrier, which turns in part on whether the pilot is
    “holding out.”
    Under the definition of “holding out” the FAA articulated
    in the 1986 circular, J.A. 30, we have no trouble finding that
    Flytenow’s pilots would be doing so. Flytenow.com is a
    flight-sharing website putatively limited to members, but
    membership requires nothing more than signing up. Any
    prospective passenger searching for flights on the Internet
    could readily arrange for travel via Flytenow.com.
    Flytenow’s statement to its members that its pilots may on a
    case-by-case basis decide not to accept particular passengers
    is not to the contrary. As the FAA noted in its circular, no
    “conclusive proof” that a pilot is not a common carrier can be
    gleaned from the absence of rate schedules, or pilots
    occasionally refusing service or offering it only pursuant to
    17
    separately negotiated contracts. FAA Advisory Circular, J.A.
    30.
    Finding that Flytenow’s pilots are “holding out” does not
    lead to the absurd consequences of which Flytenow warns.
    See Br. of Petitioner 25. It is simply not accurate, as
    Flytenow fears, that “any pilot communicating an expense-
    sharing flight, for the sole purpose of identifying a common
    purpose, will now be considered holding out to provide
    common carriage.” 
    Id. Pilots communicating
    to defined and
    limited groups remain free to invite passengers for common-
    purpose expense-sharing flights. See Br. of Respondent 30.
    As the FAA notes, 
    id., nothing in
    the challenged
    Interpretation calls into question the FAA’s reasoning or
    conclusions in its 1976 Ware Interpretation, in which the FAA
    opined that posting on a bulletin board is permitted in certain
    circumstances. J.A. 23. Nor does the Interpretation call into
    question the continuing vitality of the expense-sharing rule.
    See Br. of Petitioner 33. Private pilots continue to enjoy the
    right to share expenses with their passengers, so long as they
    share a common purpose and do not hold themselves out as
    offering services to the public.
    B.
    In its reply brief, Flytenow raises a new line of attack
    against the Interpretation, contending that it must be set aside
    because the FAA’s definition of common carriage
    contravenes the common-law definition. “Ordinarily, we will
    not entertain arguments or claims raised for the first time in a
    reply brief.” Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 
    84 F.3d 446
    ,
    448 (D.C. Cir. 1996). As we have explained, considering
    such arguments “is not only unfair to an appellee, but also
    entails the risk of an improvident or ill-advised opinion on the
    legal issues tendered.” McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharm.,
    18
    Inc., 
    800 F.2d 1208
    , 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal citations
    omitted).
    In its opening brief to this court, Flytenow did not contest
    the FAA’s definition of common carriage. To the contrary, it
    invoked the FAA Advisory Circular’s articulation of the
    FAA’s understanding of common carriage. See Br. of
    Petitioner 6 n.6, 11, 25. Thus, in its response, the FAA did
    not defend its Interpretation on the ground that its definition
    of common carriage is in keeping with the common law, aside
    from making passing reference to a decision in this court that
    noted the common-law pedigree of “common carriage.” See
    Br. of Respondent 30 (citing 
    CSI, 637 F.3d at 415
    ). We
    therefore do not consider Flytenow’s argument that the FAA’s
    decision contravenes the common law. That argument is
    forfeited.
    IV.
    Flytenow raises several other statutory and constitutional
    claims. The government argues that these claims are barred
    by the Federal Aviation Act’s exhaustion requirement, 49
    U.S.C. §46110(d), because Flytenow did not raise them
    before the agency. The exhaustion requirement does not
    apply here, however, because there was a “reasonable
    ground” for Flytenow’s failure to raise its arguments before
    the agency. 
    Id. The Interpretation
    did not result from the
    type of administrative “proceeding” in which Flytenow was
    notified of an agency proposal and had a chance to raise
    statutory or constitutional objections. See Elec. Privacy Info.
    Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    653 F.3d 1
    , 8 (D.C. Cir.
    2011); cf. Cont’l Air Lines v. Dep’t of Trans., 
    843 F.2d 1444
    ,
    1455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Remand to the FAA in this case
    would not serve the policies that exhaustion is meant to
    protect. The agency has not identified any factual disputes
    19
    relevant to Flytenow’s statutory or constitutional objections,
    nor does it hint that it missed any opportunity to apply its
    expertise or revise its rule to avoid Flytenow’s objections.
    See generally McKart v. United States, 
    395 U.S. 185
    , 194
    (1969). Flytenow was not required to have raised these
    challenges before the FAA.
    A.
    Flytenow argues that the FAA has exceeded its
    jurisdiction under the Federal Aviation Act by regulating
    private communications on a website. That argument
    misreads the statute and misapprehends the role of the FAA.
    The Federal Aviation Act directs the FAA to regulate
    common carriers. 49 U.S.C. § 44705. As noted above, the
    “sine qua non” of a common carrier is “some type of holding
    out to the public.” 
    CSI, 637 F.3d at 415
    .
    The FAA must consider whether air carriers hold
    themselves out to the public to determine which FAA rules
    apply. In considering what information pilots communicate
    via Flytenow.com, and to whom, the FAA relies on the
    communications as evidence of “holding out,” thereby
    reaching conduct the Act indisputably authorizes it to
    regulate. Flytenow’s complaint that the FAA treats “all
    Internet-based communications by a pilot, concerning a
    proposed expense-sharing flight” as “necessarily ‘holding
    out’” is inaccurate. Br. of Petitioner 27. The FAA opined
    only on the type of flight-sharing program described in
    Flytenow’s and AirPooler’s requests for legal interpretation.
    See J.A. 60, 61-62.         Other kinds of internet-based
    communications, such as e-mail among friends, for example,
    seem unlikely to be deemed “holding out” under the FAA’s
    Interpretation.
    20
    If accepted, Flytenow’s argument that the FAA lacks
    statutory authority to consider the evidentiary value of
    Flytenow’s speech would frustrate the FAA’s enforcement of
    the Federal Aviation Act. The Act calls on the FAA to
    regulate certain aspects of the commercial speech of pilots
    and airlines. For example, the FAA regulates in detail airline
    computerized reservation systems, requiring that they display
    particular information, including schedules and fares, in
    particular ways. 14 C.F.R. §§ 255.1-.8. The FAA requires
    that airline websites disclose on-time performance data for
    any domestic flight for which the sites provide schedule
    information. 
    Id. § 234.11(b).
    The FAA also requires
    disclosure of code-sharing arrangements among airlines, and
    bans airlines from holding out code-sharing flights for sale
    without such disclosure. 
    Id. §§ 257.4-.5.
    In each such case,
    the FAA’s speech-related requirement is consistent with its
    statutory mandate.
    B.
    Flytenow’s three constitutional arguments are unavailing.
    1. First Amendment.           Flytenow challenges the
    Interpretation as a First Amendment violation on the grounds
    that: (1) the Interpretation imposes an unconstitutional prior
    restraint on Flytenow’s commercial speech; and (2) the
    Interpretation is an impermissible content-based regulation.
    Flytenow misdescribes the Interpretation as a prior
    restraint. See generally Alexander v. United States, 
    509 U.S. 544
    , 549-54 (1993). The Interpretation does not bar any
    speech in advance, but sets forth the FAA’s view that pilots
    advertising their services on Flytenow.com risk liability if
    they are not licensed for the offered services. Thus, the
    Interpretation explains the possible consequences of speech,
    but does not enjoin it. In any event, the advertising of illegal
    21
    activity has never been protected speech. See, e.g., Pittsburgh
    Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 
    413 U.S. 376
    , 388-89 (1973).
    The FAA’s reliance on Flytenow’s speech as evidence of
    “holding out” is fully compatible with the First Amendment.
    It is well settled that “the First Amendment allows ‘the
    evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime
    or to prove motive or intent.’” Whitaker v. Thompson, 
    353 F.3d 947
    , 953 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Wisconsin v.
    Mitchell, 
    508 U.S. 476
    , 489 (1993)). In Whitaker, the court
    upheld the FDA’s reliance on a drug company’s speech (via
    its drug labeling) to infer that company’s intent to sell a drug
    for purposes for which it was not authorized. 
    Id. In this
    case,
    the FAA is doing much the same thing: it is using speech
    (postings on Flytenow.com) as evidence that pilots are
    offering service that exceeds the limits of their certifications.
    Any incidental burden the FAA’s regulations impose on
    pilots’ speech does not violate the First Amendment because
    the regulations further an important government interest
    unrelated to the suppression of free expression. United States
    v. O’Brien, 
    391 U.S. 367
    , 377 (1968). Barring pilots from
    holding themselves out to the public to provide services for
    which they are not licensed directly advances the
    government’s interest in “promot[ing] safe flight of civil
    aircraft in air commerce.” 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a). Seeking to
    prevent advertising of services by or on behalf of pilots not
    licensed to offer them is a constitutionally permissible way to
    advance the policy that “the general public has a right to
    expect that airlines which solicit their business operate under
    the most searching tests of safety.” Woolsey v. Nat’l Transp.
    Safety Bd., 
    993 F.2d 516
    , 522 (5th Cir. 1993).
    22
    2. Equal Protection. Flytenow’s Equal Protection
    challenge also fails. Flytenow makes no claim that the FAA’s
    classification implicates any fundamental right or categorizes
    on any inherently suspect basis, but contends that the FAA’s
    regulations cannot be sustained under rational basis review.
    See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.,
    
    508 U.S. 307
    , 313-15 (1993). To succeed, Flytenow would
    have to negate “every conceivable basis which might support”
    the challenged classification. 
    Id. at 315
    (quoting Lehnhausen
    v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 
    40 U.S. 356
    , 364 (1973))
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The FAA’s distinction between pilots offering expense-
    sharing services on line to a wide audience and those offering
    expense-sharing services to a limited group is justified:
    holding out to the public creates the risk that unsuspecting
    passengers, under the impression that the service and its pilots
    lawfully offer common carriage, will contract with pilots who
    in fact lack the experience and credentials of commercial
    pilots. Regulators have good reasons to distinguish between
    pilots who are licensed to offer services to the public and
    those who are not, as other courts have recognized. See
    
    Woolsey, 993 F.2d at 522
    .
    3. Vagueness. Finally, there is no credible claim that the
    Interpretation is unconstitutionally vague.          The FAA
    announced that pilots offering expense-sharing flights on
    Flytenow.com are holding themselves out to provide common
    carriage and are therefore subject to Part 119. The Agency
    was clear in its application of its regulation to Flytenow:
    “You suggest there is no holding out . . . . We disagree. . . .
    [Flytenow.com] is designed to attract a broad segment of the
    public interested in transportation by air.” J.A. 62. Flytenow
    is in no position to assert a facial vagueness challenge. “[A]
    plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
    23
    proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
    applied to the conduct of others.” Holder v. Humanitarian
    Law Project, 
    561 U.S. 1
    , 18-19 (2010) (quoting Hoffman
    Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 
    455 U.S. 489
    , 495
    (1982)).
    ***
    For the foregoing reasons, Flytenow’s petition for review
    is denied.
    So ordered.