United States v. Christian Borda , 848 F.3d 1044 ( 2017 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued November 8, 2016          Decided February 21, 2017
    No. 13-3074
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    APPELLEE
    v.
    CHRISTIAN FERNANDO BORDA, ALSO KNOWN AS TONY,
    APPELLANT
    Consolidated with 13-3101
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:07-cr-00065-1)
    (No. 1:07-cr-00065-2)
    Elizabeth A. Brandenburg argued the cause for appellant
    Borda. With her on the briefs was Marcia G. Shein.
    Carmen D. Hernandez, appointed by the court, argued the
    cause and filed the briefs for appellant Alvaran-Velez.
    Kirby A. Heller, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause and filed the brief for appellee.
    2
    Before: TATEL and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and
    GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.
    WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Appellants Christian Fernando
    Borda and Alvaro Alvaran-Velez challenge the outcome of a
    jury trial finding them guilty under 21 U.S.C. §§ 959, 960, 963
    of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine
    knowing and intending that the cocaine would be unlawfully
    imported into the United States. In support of their challenge,
    Appellants allege that the District Court committed numerous
    procedural errors, including improper evidentiary admissions
    and exclusions, insufficient jury instructions, Brady and Napue
    violations, improper closing arguments, and sentencing errors.
    Appellants further maintain that there was insufficient
    evidence to permit a rational juror to find guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt. For the following reasons, we affirm
    Appellants’ convictions but remand for the District Court to
    resentence Mr. Alvaran. 1
    I.
    On December 9, 2010, Appellants Borda and Alvaran
    were convicted of conspiracy to distribute at least five
    kilograms of cocaine with the intent or knowledge that the
    cocaine would be unlawfully imported into the United States.
    At trial, Appellants did not contest that they engaged in drug
    trafficking, but argued that they lacked the knowledge or intent
    to import the drugs into the United States. The conspiracy at
    issue in this case involved three separate transactions: (1) Palm
    Oil #1; (2) Palm Oil #2; and (3) the El Chino Load. The
    evidence presented at trial, taken in the light most favorable to
    1
    Mr. Borda’s sentence was not challenged on appeal and, therefore,
    is not before this Court.
    3
    the government, see United States v. Bryant, 
    523 F.3d 349
    , 353
    (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Washington, 
    12 F.3d 1128
    ,
    1135-36 (D.C. Cir. 1994), is as follows.
    A.
    The first Palm Oil deal occurred between January 2005
    and May 2005 and involved the transportation of
    approximately 1,553 kilograms of cocaine hidden in drums of
    palm oil from Cartagena, Colombia to Puerto Progreso,
    Mexico. A Mexican drug trafficker named Raul Valladares
    (“Junior”) received the cocaine in Puerto Progreso, a small
    Mexican port on the eastern side of the country, in mid-2005.
    Junior transported the cocaine from Puerto Progreso to
    Monterrey, an inland city located approximately one hour and
    forty-five minutes (200 kilometers) by car from the United
    States border. According to the evidence, Monterrey lacked
    sufficient demand for a load of cocaine as large as the Palm Oil
    #1 deal. Beginning in August 2005, Junior began working as
    an informant for the United States Drug Enforcement
    Administration (“DEA”).
    In exchange for transporting the cocaine to Monterrey,
    Junior charged Appellants an 18% fee. The transportation fee
    was calculated based on the quantity of cocaine, not the total
    price (i.e., Junior received payment in kilograms of cocaine,
    not money). The usual transportation fee for moving cocaine
    across the United States border is 40-45%. After selling the
    cocaine, Junior was responsible for paying Appellants $9,100
    per kilogram of cocaine, which is the typical price for cocaine
    in Monterrey. For cocaine sold in the United States, the usual
    price increases to $14,000 or $15,000 per kilogram. Appellants
    expected Junior to pay for the cocaine within ten days of
    receipt.
    4
    Junior, however, was unable to reimburse Appellants
    within the specified time period. In light of this development,
    Mr. Alvaran met with Camilo Suarez, another confidential
    informant, on June 15, 2005, to discuss Junior’s failure to pay.
    At this meeting, Mr. Alvaran noted that Junior had started to
    send “partials” across the border. Despite the successful sale of
    cocaine, Appellants still had not received payment. Mr.
    Alvaran commented that Monterrey was full of merchandise
    (i.e., cocaine), but it was not selling as fast as they had
    predicted. Junior later explained that he had already begun
    selling the cocaine at market price and would be able to start
    delivering money in Monterrey.
    Subsequently, on July 20, 2005, Mr. Borda met with Mr.
    Alvaran and Mr. Suarez to discuss Junior’s outstanding
    payments. Mr. Suarez defended Junior’s payment delay by
    explaining that the “market went bad because the border got
    harder” for Junior. Appellants then discussed the conditions at
    the border in greater detail, including new police officers and
    increased inspections. Mr. Borda admitted that he understood
    Junior’s difficulties because he had previously been a drug
    dealer in the United States. In particular, Mr. Borda acquired
    first-hand knowledge of the U.S. drug market while living in
    New York and Florida, and was previously convicted in the
    Southern District of Florida for conspiracy to possess with the
    intent to distribute cocaine back in August 1998. Nonetheless,
    Mr. Borda expressed frustration at Junior’s untimely payments
    and complained that Junior was not paying the negotiated price.
    Mr. Borda referred to the fact that Junior had taken the cocaine
    across the border, sold it at the higher U.S. price, brought the
    money back to Monterrey, and paid Appellants the Monterrey
    price for cocaine.
    At trial, Mr. Suarez testified that all 1,553 kilograms of the
    Palm Oil #1 deal were eventually transported into the United
    5
    States, with at least 200 kilograms trafficked to New York.
    However, a substantial period of time existed when Mr. Suarez
    did not know what Junior had done with the cocaine.
    Additionally, Mr. Suarez noted that Mr. Borda previously
    refused on two occasions to transport cocaine into the United
    States because he did not want the “responsibility” or
    “headache.”
    By October 2005, Junior had paid Mr. Borda
    approximately $6 million. Junior’s payments were all in United
    States currency, mostly in $20 bills. However, the testimony at
    trial established that the money received for the cocaine was
    laundered through a money exchange house before being
    distributed to Appellants. Once the proceeds were received in
    Monterrey, Mr. Alvaran arranged for the cash to be transported
    to Mexico City. Mr. Alvaran’s secretary, Mr. Lucas, would
    pick the money up in Mexico City and deliver it to Juan Jaime
    Montoya-Estrada, another co-conspirator. The money was then
    moved to either Mr. Alvaran’s apartment or Mr. Montoya’s
    apartment, where Mauricio Cruz counted the proceeds. The
    ledgers kept by Appellants and Mr. Montoya show that Junior
    paid between $153,000 and $1,020,000 every couple of weeks
    between June 17, 2005 and August 4, 2005.
    B.
    Following the shipment of the first Palm Oil load, but
    before Junior successfully paid for all of the cocaine,
    Appellants and Mr. Suarez initiated negotiations for a second
    Palm Oil deal. The parties discussed shipping additional
    cocaine from Colombia to Mexico, and Mr. Suarez
    recommended using Junior on this transaction since the parties
    had already completed “one run” with him. Although
    Appellants ordered the palm oil, and Junior invested money in
    6
    the new deal, the transaction never materialized due to Junior’s
    late payments on the first Palm Oil load.
    C.
    Finally, the third transaction, termed the El Chino Load,
    occurred in approximately September 2005. In this deal,
    Appellants and a drug trafficker named El Chino agreed to
    transport 3,000 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia to Mexico
    City. The cocaine would be transported in two “go-fast boats,”
    and subsequently transferred to a Venezuelan-registered
    fishing vessel. The fishing vessel would meet a boat sent by El
    Chino off the coast of Honduras, and El Chino’s associates
    would then transport the cocaine to Mexico City.
    During the initial shipment of cocaine, one of the “go-fast”
    boats broke down. As a result, only 1,500 kilograms of cocaine
    made it to the Venezuelan fishing vessel. While the fishing
    vessel was supposed to meet El Chino’s associates
    approximately sixty miles off the coast of Honduras, the crew
    spotted a U.S. plane above the vessel and threw the cocaine into
    the Caribbean Sea before being intercepted by the U.S. Coast
    Guard. Accordingly, when the Coast Guard searched the
    vessel, no contraband was discovered.
    D.
    Following the presentation of evidence in this case, the
    jury returned a guilty verdict for both Mr. Borda and Mr.
    Alvaran. While the District Court noted that the Government’s
    evidence was “not overwhelming,” United States v. Borda, 
    786 F. Supp. 2d 25
    , 36, 44 (D.D.C. 2011), it upheld the jury’s
    verdict and denied Appellants’ request for a new trial.
    At the sentencing hearing, the District Court found
    Appellants responsible for 200 kilograms of cocaine, in
    7
    accordance with Mr. Suarez’s testimony that Junior delivered
    200 kilograms of cocaine to New York. The District Court
    further determined that Mr. Alvaran was “a manager or
    supervisor” of a conspiracy that included at least five
    participants. Given this finding, the District Court added three
    extra points to Mr. Alvaran’s offense level, bringing his total
    level to 41. The Sentencing Guidelines range for this offense
    level is 324 months to 505 months, and the Probation Office
    recommended 360 months. The District Court, however, noted
    that it was not bound by the Guidelines range, and engaged in
    an analysis of the § 3553 factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
    Following this evaluation, the District Court imposed a below-
    Guidelines sentence of 180 months for Mr. Alvaran, which was
    substantially less than Mr. Borda’s sentence of 300 months.
    After sentencing, Mr. Borda and Mr. Alvaran filed timely
    appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
    18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
    II.
    Appellants first argue that the Government’s evidence at
    trial was insufficient to permit a rational juror to find that
    Appellants knew or intended that the cocaine would be
    transported into the United States. Borda Br. 13, 19-25;
    Alvaran Br. 6-7, 9-13. In their briefing, however, Appellants
    ignore the Government’s presentation of evidence on the intent
    element, and erroneously draw all reasonable inferences in
    favor of themselves. See Gov’t Br. 18-19; see generally Borda
    Br. 20-25; Alvaran Br. 9-13. For the reasons discussed below,
    we reject Appellants’ sufficiency of the evidence challenge.
    A.
    In reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence,
    we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the
    8
    light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational juror could
    have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); United
    States v. Thompson, 
    279 F.3d 1043
    , 1050-51 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
    United States v. Washington, 
    12 F.3d 1128
    , 1135-36 (D.C. Cir.
    1994). This standard seeks to preserve the jury’s role as fact-
    finder. 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    ; United States v. Glover, 
    681 F.3d 411
    , 423 (D.C. Cir. 2012). A defendant “faces a high
    threshold” and bears a “heavy burden” when seeking to
    overturn a guilty verdict on this ground. 
    Washington, 12 F.3d at 1135
    ; United States v. Branham, 
    97 F.3d 835
    , 853 (6th Cir.
    1996).
    B.
    When viewed in the light most favorable to the
    Government, the evidence is sufficient to allow a rational juror
    to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At trial, witness
    testimony suggested that Appellants knew Junior was sending
    cocaine across the border. Specifically, Mr. Suarez testified
    that Junior had started to send “partials” to the border and
    “[t]hey were waiting for the money to come back from there.”
    Appellants then conversed about Junior’s difficulties at the
    border, and Mr. Borda sympathized with Junior’s hardships
    because Mr. Borda had previously been a drug dealer in the
    United States. Mr. Suarez further testified that all 1,553
    kilograms of the Palm Oil cocaine were transported into the
    United States, and at least 200 kilograms were sold in New
    York.
    The jury’s decision to credit Mr. Suarez’s testimony was
    not unreasonable in light of the circumstantial facts presented
    by the Government. First, the Government introduced
    evidence regarding the geographic location of Mexico and the
    United States, focusing particularly on the distance from
    9
    Monterrey to the U.S. border. Through witness testimony, the
    Government established that Appellants knew the Palm Oil
    cocaine would be transported by Junior from Puerto Progreso
    to Monterrey. Puerto Progreso is a small port, and Monterrey
    is an inland city with no direct access to the ocean. Although
    Appellants argued that they intended to sell the cocaine in
    either Mexico or Europe, a reasonable juror could find that
    moving the merchandise inland contradicted this theory.
    Further, Monterrey is located only 200 kilometers from the
    U.S. border, and the evidence showed that Monterrey had an
    insufficient demand for the amount of cocaine contained in the
    Palm Oil load. A rational juror could infer that Appellants did
    not intend to sell the cocaine in Mexico, but rather intended for
    the cocaine to be distributed within the United States.
    Second, Appellants received payment for the Palm Oil
    cocaine in U.S. currency. At no point in time did Appellants
    receive payment in European or Mexican currency, refuting
    Appellants’ contentions that they intended to sell the drugs in
    Europe or Mexico. To the contrary, Appellants kept ledgers
    that showed the receipt of U.S. currency – mostly in $20 bills.
    Although the profits passed through a money exchange house
    before distribution, a reasonable juror could nonetheless infer
    that the receipt of U.S. currency meant that the drugs were sold
    in the United States. Thus, Mr. Suarez’s testimony, combined
    with the circumstantial evidence of geographic location and
    receipt of U.S. currency, could enable a rational juror to find
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
    While Appellants cite numerous examples of evidence
    they believe to be exculpatory or contradicting, see Borda Br.
    20-25; Alvaran Br. 9-13, much of that evidence is also
    consistent with the jury’s guilty verdict, and the Court must
    view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    prosecution. See 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    ; Thompson, 
    279 F.3d 10
    at 1050-51. A reasonable juror could examine the evidence
    and, taking all inferences in favor of the Government, conclude
    that Appellants knew or intended that the cocaine would be
    transported into the United States. Accordingly, Appellants
    have not met their high burden to show that no rational juror
    could find for the Government, and the evidence is sufficient
    to support the jury’s guilty verdict.
    III.
    Appellants next challenge four specific evidentiary rulings
    made by the District Court. First, Appellants contend that the
    District Court erred by denying Mr. Borda’s motion to admit a
    2006 e-mail from Junior to the DEA. Borda Br. 34-40; Alvaran
    Br. 17-19. Second, Mr. Borda argues that the admission of his
    New York property records and Florida driver’s license were
    irrelevant to the case and prejudicial. Borda Br. 40-42. Third,
    Mr. Borda asserts that the District Court erred by admitting his
    prior federal drug conviction. 
    Id. at 42-48.
    Fourth, Mr. Borda
    contends that the District Court erroneously admitted co-
    conspirator testimony that was unrelated to the charged
    conspiracy. 
    Id. at 48-52.
    We decline to reach the merits of these
    arguments because, for the reasons that follow, we find that,
    even assuming error, any such error was not prejudicial.
    A.
    This Court reviews the District Court’s evidentiary
    rulings, particularly the admission or exclusion of evidence, for
    abuse of discretion. United States v. Vega, 
    826 F.3d 514
    , 537
    (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam); United States v. Mitchell, 
    816 F.3d 865
    , 870 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the trial court’s
    admissibility rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion if a
    timely objection is made, and plain error if an objection is not
    preserved). Even if this Court determines that an evidentiary
    error occurred, it will not reverse an otherwise valid judgment
    11
    unless the error affected the appellant’s “substantial rights.”
    FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity or
    variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
    disregarded.”); United States v. Russo, 
    104 F.3d 431
    , 434 (D.C.
    Cir. 1997); United States v. Baker, 
    693 F.2d 183
    , 188-89 (D.C.
    Cir. 1982). An error affects the appellant’s substantial rights if
    it influenced or tainted the outcome of the district court
    proceedings. United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 734 (1993);
    United States v. Smith, 
    232 F.3d 236
    , 243 (D.C. Cir. 2000). As
    the Supreme Court noted in Kotteakos v. United States, “[t]he
    inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support
    the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather,
    even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so,
    or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.”
    
    328 U.S. 750
    , 765 (1946). Where the Court is sure “that the
    error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect,
    the verdict and the judgment should stand.” 
    Id. Thus, a
    reversal
    is usually only warranted where the error was prejudicial.
    
    Olano, 507 U.S. at 734
    ; see 
    Baker, 693 F.2d at 188-89
    .
    B.
    First, Appellants contend that the District Court erred by
    denying Mr. Borda’s motion to admit a 2006 e-mail from
    confidential informant Junior to the DEA. See Borda Br. 16,
    34-40; Alvaran Br. 17-19. Appellants argue that the e-mail,
    which conveyed Mr. Borda’s interest in sending drugs to
    Europe, was relevant to the issue of intent and did not contain
    impermissible hearsay. Borda Br. 35-40; Alvaran Br. 17-19.
    Even assuming that the District Court’s decision to exclude this
    e-mail was error, it was not prejudicial.
    1.
    On March 6, 2006, Junior sent an e-mail to the DEA titled
    “Tony-Mexico-Saturday 4 March.” The e-mail included a
    12
    description of Junior’s meeting with Mr. Borda in which Mr.
    Borda offered Junior a new deal to settle Junior’s account.
    Most relevantly, the e-mail stated that “[h]e is not interested in
    sending anything to the United States. Nothing. He is interested
    in Spain, (Valencia) and Mex.” Appellants sought to admit this
    e-mail to negate the element of intent.
    The Government opposed admission of the e-mail and
    argued that if the District Court admitted Junior’s March 6,
    2006 e-mail, it would need to admit another e-mail by Junior
    sent later in the day regarding a meeting with a Mexican drug
    trafficker named Esteban Olivera (referred to as Estevan). In
    this second e-mail, Junior explained that he told Estevan “about
    the business with [Borda]” and that Estevan agreed to receive
    the containers. The e-mail further reported that “[o]n the trip
    we receive from [Mr. Borda], he wants to send to New York.”
    The Government argued that the pronoun “he” in the prior
    sentence referred to Mr. Borda, and suggested Mr. Borda
    intended to distribute cocaine in the United States.
    The District Court was faced with dueling e-mails rather
    than Junior’s testimony because Junior had disappeared by the
    time of trial and was feared to have been kidnapped and
    murdered. Ultimately, the District Court declined to admit the
    March 6, 2006 e-mail. First, the District Court explained that
    the e-mail did not relate to the charged conspiracy because it
    occurred six months after the Palm Oil and El Chino deals
    concluded. Second, the District Court noted that the use of
    ambiguous pronouns in the e-mail rendered it vague and
    confusing. Third, the District Court stated that even if the e-
    mail had been relevant (i.e., within the scope of the
    conspiracy), it constituted hearsay. Finally, the District Court
    acknowledged that if Junior’s 2006 e-mail were introduced, the
    Government would be permitted to admit the second e-mail on
    redirect.
    13
    2.
    Without deciding whether the District Court erred, we find
    that the exclusion of Junior’s March 6, 2006 e-mail was not
    prejudicial. First, Junior’s 2006 e-mail occurred outside the
    scope of the conspiracy and was contradicted by another e-mail
    later that day. It therefore had little probative value on the issue
    of Mr. Borda’s intent to sell drugs in the United States from
    January 2005 to September 2005. Second, Appellants
    introduced more probative evidence of their intent at trial,
    rendering Junior’s 2006 e-mail duplicative. For example, Mr.
    Suarez testified on cross-examination that Mr. Borda rejected
    several offers to send cocaine to the United States. Mr. Suarez
    further acknowledged that Mr. Borda maintained an interest in
    transporting cocaine to Europe, particularly Holland, Italy,
    Spain, Switzerland, and Portugal, and that Mr. Borda had
    strong connections to ship the cocaine from Mexico to Europe.
    Accordingly, Junior’s March 6, 2006 e-mail stating that Mr.
    Borda was interested in shipping drugs to Spain and Mexico,
    not the United States, was cumulative of other evidence
    presented at trial. Exclusion of this e-mail was not prejudicial.
    C.
    Second, Mr. Borda argues that the District Court erred by
    admitting his New York property records and Florida driver’s
    license. The District Court deemed this evidence relevant on
    the issue of intent. As discussed below, we do not find the
    admission of this evidence to be prejudicial.
    1.
    On August 29, 1994, Mr. Borda and his wife, Martha
    Borda, purchased property in New York and recorded the deed
    on September 12, 1994. Land records indicate that Martha
    Borda has been the owner and occupant of that property since
    14
    1996. After leaving New York, Mr. Borda obtained a driver’s
    license in Florida on November 13, 1996. Witnesses from the
    Nassau County Clerk’s office in New York and the Florida
    Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles testified to
    these facts at trial. Mr. Borda objected to the introduction of
    this evidence on relevance grounds.
    The District Court overruled Mr. Borda’s objections and
    allowed the Government to admit evidence of his U.S. driver’s
    license and property ownership. The District Court found the
    Government’s argument “perfectly reasonable” that by living
    in the United States Mr. Borda possessed knowledge that the
    United States is a “major consumer of drugs.” Such knowledge
    could inform the jury of Mr. Borda’s intent to distribute drugs
    in the United States. Moreover, the District Court explained
    that there was nothing prejudicial about the introduction of this
    evidence. According to the District Court, the evidence is
    actually the opposite of prejudicial, in that it “shows a stable
    person who is buying a home and riding a car legally.” The jury
    should be free to “accept or reject the connections that the
    government is trying to make and the inferences that the
    government is asking the jury to accept.”
    2.
    We agree with the District Court that Mr. Borda was not
    prejudiced by the introduction of his property records and
    driver’s license. The evidence merely demonstrates that Mr.
    Borda legally owned property and obtained a driver’s license
    in the United States for a period of time before his deportation
    to Colombia. A jury is not likely to leap to the conclusion that
    Mr. Borda was guilty from the mere mention of his ties to the
    United States some ten years before the conspiracy, as he
    argues. Rather, the evidence reflects positively on Mr. Borda,
    showcasing an individual with a stable livelihood. Further, to
    15
    the extent the Government used this evidence to show Mr.
    Borda’s knowledge of the U.S. drug market, it was merely
    duplicative of other testimony and exhibits already in the
    record. Mr. Borda admitted in tape recorded conversations
    introduced at trial that he had a prior conviction in the United
    States for conspiracy to sell drugs, which implies a strong
    knowledge of the U.S. drug market. Thus, the District Court’s
    admission of Mr. Borda’s property records and driver’s license
    cannot be deemed prejudicial.
    D.
    Third, Mr. Borda asserts that the District Court erred by
    admitting evidence of his 1998 drug trafficking conviction and
    incarceration with Mr. Montoya. See Borda Br. 42-48. In
    particular, Mr. Borda claims that the prejudicial effect of his
    prior conviction outweighed its probative value and his
    conviction had no bearing on his specific intent to distribute
    narcotics in this case. 
    Id. at 44-45.
    While his prior drug
    trafficking conviction involved distributing drugs that were
    already in the United States, the present conspiracy involves
    importing drugs into the United States. 
    Id. at 46.
    Thus, Mr.
    Borda argues that his prior conviction did not involve a same
    or similar offense and should not have been presented to the
    jury. Similarly, Mr. Borda argues that Mr. Montoya should not
    have been allowed to reference his incarceration with Mr.
    Borda during his testimony. 
    Id. at 17,
    47-48. For the reasons
    discussed below, we find that any error caused by the
    admission of Mr. Borda’s prior drug conviction was not
    prejudicial.
    1.
    Mr. Borda and Mr. Montoya have prior drug convictions
    for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine
    in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The Southern District of New
    16
    York sentenced Mr. Montoya to 87 months’ imprisonment on
    September 5, 1997, and the Southern District of Florida
    sentenced Mr. Borda to 70 months’ imprisonment on August 4,
    1998. Although Mr. Borda and Mr. Montoya were
    unacquainted at the time of their convictions, they served their
    sentences together at the Fort Dix Federal Correctional
    Institution and developed a close friendship.
    Following their release from prison, both Mr. Borda and
    Mr. Montoya were deported to Colombia. Based on their
    friendship, Mr. Borda hired Mr. Montoya in early 2005 to be
    his personal representative in Mexico City for drug trafficking.
    In particular, Mr. Montoya would be responsible for facilitating
    the transfer of millions of dollars in U.S. currency, which
    represented drug proceeds, from Mexico to Colombia.
    On July 15, 2010, the District Court entered an order
    prohibiting the Government from introducing the prior
    convictions of Mr. Montoya and Mr. Borda. The District Court
    reasoned that the “extreme age of these convictions” and “the
    fact that the convictions were for significantly different
    offenses” rendered the evidence irrelevant to the conspiracy
    charged in this case and improper Rule 404(b) evidence.
    Alternatively, the District Court explained that the risk of
    unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value
    of the convictions under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
    Subsequent to this ruling, Mr. Montoya appeared before the
    District Court and pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute at least
    five kilograms of cocaine with the intent and knowledge that
    the cocaine would be imported into the United States. As part
    of this plea arrangement, Mr. Montoya agreed to cooperate
    with the Government and serve as a witness against Appellants.
    The Government explained that Mr. Montoya would be asked
    to describe the origin of his relationship with Mr. Borda, which
    17
    would inevitably reference Mr. Montoya’s and Mr. Borda’s
    prior convictions. Such testimony would be necessary to give
    context to Mr. Montoya’s explanations regarding how he
    became involved in drug trafficking with Mr. Borda. The
    Government further stated that Mr. Borda himself referenced
    his prior conviction in several recordings and conversations
    related to the present conspiracy.
    On October 28, 2010, the District Court altered its stance
    on Mr. Borda’s prior conviction and denied Mr. Borda’s
    Motion in Limine to Exclude Reference to Prior Conviction.
    The District Court found that the Government’s evidence was
    relevant and would not be used for the purpose of establishing
    Mr. Borda’s character or propensity. As such, the evidence
    would be admissible under Rule 404(b), and its probative value
    would no longer be outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
    At trial, Mr. Montoya testified about meeting Mr. Borda at
    the Fort Dix Federal Correctional Institution where both men
    had served sentences for drug trafficking. The Government
    additionally introduced a certified copy of Mr. Borda’s prior
    conviction. Defense counsel objected both to the witness
    testimony and documentary evidence of the prior conviction.
    The District Court overruled the objection.
    2.
    The District Court’s admission of testimonial and
    documentary evidence of Mr. Borda’s prior conviction was not
    prejudicial. The evidence was used to illustrate the closeness of
    the relationship between Mr. Borda and Mr. Montoya.
    Admission of this evidence was not prejudicial because (1) Mr.
    Borda himself admitted in tape-recorded conversations that he
    had a prior drug conviction, (2) the prior conviction was over a
    decade old, and (3) the conviction was being used solely to
    18
    provide context regarding Mr. Montoya’s and Mr. Borda’s
    relationship, and was not used to establish propensity.
    Further, the District Court adequately instructed the jury
    regarding the proper and limited use of Mr. Borda’s prior
    conviction, mitigating any prejudice. The District Court told
    the jury that the evidence was admitted “solely for your
    consideration in evaluating [Mr. Borda’s] intent and
    knowledge.” The District Court articulated that conviction of a
    past crime “is not evidence” that the defendant is guilty of the
    offense in this case, and the jury “must not draw any inference
    of guilt” based on the prior conviction. Under these specific
    and limited circumstances, the witness testimony and
    documentary evidence on this issue were thus harmless.
    E.
    Finally, Mr. Borda maintains that the District Court erred
    by admitting co-conspirator statements regarding transactions
    outside the scope of the charged conspiracy. See Borda Br. 18,
    48-52. In particular, Mr. Borda complains about the District
    Court permitting Mr. Suarez and Mr. Montoya to testify about
    drug deals or other conversations unrelated to the Palm Oil #1,
    Palm Oil #2, and El Chino deals. 
    Id. at 50.
    For the reasons that
    follow, we do not believe that these co-conspirator statements
    unduly prejudiced Mr. Borda.
    1.
    During the trial, the Government questioned Mr. Suarez
    and Mr. Montoya about their relationship with Appellants,
    including how the co-conspirators met. Mr. Suarez stated that
    he met Mr. Alvaran through a pilot named Tato and that he later
    learned from Mr. Alvaran that Mr. Borda was “doing a run”
    with one of Mr. Alvaran’s family members, El Rey Zambada.
    Mr. Suarez then stated that he accompanied Mr. Alvaran to a
    19
    meeting with Mr. Borda where he was asked to do a run with a
    plane. No further details were given about this meeting, and
    Mr. Suarez proceeded to describe the mechanics of recording
    his conversations with Appellants. The District Court
    overruled Appellants’ objections to Mr. Suarez’s testimony on
    these issues.
    Similarly, Mr. Montoya began his testimony by explaining
    his prior drug trafficking activities in the United States, and
    describing how he met Mr. Borda while both men were serving
    prison sentences for prior drug trafficking conspiracies. Mr.
    Montoya proceeded to explain that his organization was
    arrested in 1996 for distributing cocaine, and that the
    authorities discovered the group after they arrested a Mexican
    national in Houston with 400 kilograms of cocaine and allowed
    him to travel to New York. Mr. Montoya explained that “Jorge
    Lamos and all of the others in the group” provided him with
    this information. The District Court provisionally overruled
    Appellants’ objection to this testimony “subject to the
    government’s tying it up appropriately.” The parties, however,
    never revisited this testimony. Gov’t Br. 48.
    2.
    Mr. Borda argues that these statements by Mr. Suarez and
    Mr. Montoya constitute impermissible hearsay that occurred
    outside the scope of the conspiracy and should have been
    excluded from the trial. Borda Br. 49-52. Regardless of
    whether the District Court erred by permitting these statements,
    we find that the admission of this testimony was not
    prejudicial. Mr. Suarez’s and Mr. Montoya’s testimony did not
    directly implicate Mr. Borda in criminal activity, and was very
    brief. Mr. Montoya later clarified that he did not even meet Mr.
    Borda until his prison term began at the Fort Dix Federal
    Correctional Institution. Thus, regardless of whether the
    20
    testimony related to the charged conspiracy, it did not affect
    Mr. Borda’s substantial rights.
    IV.
    Appellants next argue that the District Court erred during
    closing argument. See 
    id. at 59-60;
    Alvaran Br. 20-35. In
    particular, Appellants advance two contentions. First,
    Appellants maintain that the Government misstated evidence
    about the transportation fees associated with moving the
    cocaine, mischaracterized the identity of the money exchange
    house, and improperly analogized the case to bees flying over
    the U.S. border. Second, Mr. Alvaran argues that the District
    Court erred by precluding him from calling into question the
    sufficiency of the Government’s evidence during his closing
    remarks. See Alvaran Br. 25-35. This purported error, Mr.
    Alvaran contends, prevented the closing arguments from being
    “well balanced.” 
    Id. at 32.
    As explained below, we do not
    believe the District Court abused its discretion on either issue.
    A.
    We first address Appellants’ contention that a new trial
    was warranted due to prosecutorial misstatements during
    closing argument.
    1.
    This Court reviews improper prosecutorial statements for
    “substantial prejudice,” and reviews the District Court’s denial
    of a motion for new trial based on this objection for abuse of
    discretion. United States v. Straker, 
    800 F.3d 570
    , 628 (D.C.
    Cir. 2015) (per curiam); United States v. Alexander, 
    331 F.3d 116
    , 128-29 (D.C. Cir. 2003). While it is error for counsel to
    rely on any evidence not introduced during the trial, United
    States v. Maddox, 
    156 F.3d 1280
    , 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998), a
    21
    prosecutor’s statements in closing argument “will rarely
    warrant a new trial,” United States v. Watson, 
    171 F.3d 695
    ,
    699 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The question this Court must ask is
    “whether the prosecutors’ comments ‘so infected the trial with
    unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
    process.’” Darden v. Wainwright, 
    477 U.S. 168
    , 181 (1986)
    (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 
    416 U.S. 637
    , 643
    (1974)). The prosecutorial misconduct must have affected the
    jury’s ability to view the evidence fairly. United States v.
    Thomas, 
    114 F.3d 228
    , 246 (D.C. Cir. 1997). To determine the
    prejudicial effect of a closing argument error, this Court
    examines three factors: (1) the centrality of the issue affected
    by the error; (2) the steps taken to mitigate the error; and (3)
    the closeness of the case. 
    Watson, 171 F.3d at 700
    ; see United
    States v. Moore, 
    651 F.3d 30
    , 50 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
    2.
    At the conclusion of the trial, the Government presented
    closing arguments that involved two alleged misstatements of
    evidence and an inapt metaphor. First, the Government
    erroneously summarized Mr. Suarez’s testimony regarding the
    transportation fee Junior received for the Palm Oil #1 deal.
    During trial, the parties presented evidence that Junior only
    charged Mr. Borda an 18% transportation fee to move the
    cocaine from Puerto Progreso to Monterrey. In its closing
    argument, however, the Government erroneously summarized
    Mr. Suarez’s testimony regarding how the transportation fee
    was calculated. While Mr. Suarez’s testimony was that the
    transportation fee was based on drug quantity, the Government
    alleged that the fee was calculated based on the total price.
    Defense counsel objected to this characterization.
    Second, the Government argued in summation that
    Appellants received payment for the Palm Oil cocaine in U.S.
    22
    currency. Mr. Montoya testified at trial that Mr. Alvaran
    arranged to transport the proceeds of the transaction in armored
    trucks from Monterrey to a currency exchange house in Mexico
    City. In its closing argument, the Government erroneously
    described the money exchange house as “an armored car
    company.” Mr. Alvaran further maintains that the Government
    failed to identify the currency as U.S. dollars until the proceeds
    passed through the money exchange house. See Alvaran Br. 21.
    As a result, Mr. Alvaran claims that the fact that the proceeds
    “passed through a money exchange house negated any logical
    inference that it had originated as dollars.” 
    Id. at 21.
    Finally, the Government analogized transportation of the
    cocaine into the United States to bees flying across the U.S.-
    Mexico border. Specifically, the Government argued that if
    Appellants had opened a box of bees at the U.S. border and
    instructed the bees not to fly north, some of the bees would
    inevitably disobey instructions and cross the border. Similarly,
    by transporting cocaine close to the border, Appellants knew
    that some of the cocaine would be imported into the United
    States. Appellants objected to the metaphor, arguing that
    cocaine lacks the ability to self-locomote.
    Despite the alleged errors, the District Court denied
    Appellants’ request for a new trial. The District Court found
    that while the Government misstated evidence relating to the
    transportation fees and money exchange house, these errors did
    not impact the jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly.
    Although the transportation fee was a central issue in the case,
    the jury heard “a great deal of evidence” on this topic, and had
    a substantial opportunity to judge the accuracy of the evidence.
    It is unlikely that the jury would disregard its own recollection
    of the evidence for a brief misstatement in the Government’s
    closing argument. Regarding the money exchange house, the
    23
    District Court noted that the identity of this institution was a
    minor point that had no bearing on Appellants’ intent.
    3.
    The Government’s alleged closing argument errors did not
    prejudice Appellants. As a result, the District Court did not
    abuse its discretion by denying the motion for new trial on this
    ground.
    First, as the District Court explained, the case was close
    but the jury heard substantial evidence on the issue of the
    transportation fees, which was largely uncontested. As the
    Government pointed out in its brief, Gov’t Br. 72-73, the
    prosecutor’s misstatement did not materially misrepresent the
    evidence because the evidence showed that Mr. Borda made
    roughly the same profit whether Junior purchased the cocaine
    from him at the Monterrey price or at the Houston price, which
    was the point of the closing argument. Although the
    Government’s calculation was not entirely accurate, neither
    Appellant disputed this point in his reply brief. Moreover, the
    Government’s position remains consistent with its theory of the
    case, namely that the Appellants accepted lower prices in
    exchange for avoiding responsibility for importing the cocaine
    into the United States. Thus, the misstatement was ultimately
    not prejudicial.
    Second, the Government’s mischaracterization of the
    money exchange house was not prejudicial. The identity of the
    money exchange house was not central to the trial. The
    Government did not deny or misrepresent that Appellants
    laundered the money through an exchange house; rather, the
    Government erred only in its brief description of the money
    exchange house as an armored car company instead of saying
    that the armored car company transported the money to the
    24
    exchange house. This misstatement did not weigh on the issue
    of Appellants’ intent, and thus, was not prejudicial.
    Third, the Government’s metaphor comparing cocaine
    trafficking to bees does not amount to reversible error. Many
    decades ago, the Eighth Circuit explained that when closing
    arguments do not go beyond the evidence in the case, “the trial
    court is not required to judge with too great nicety the
    appropriateness of the comparisons, metaphors, and other
    figures of speech with which they may seek to point the
    argument or adorn the peroration.” Green v. United States, 
    266 F. 779
    , 784 (8th Cir. 1920). The Ninth Circuit recently
    espoused similar reasoning, stating that the protections
    afforded to defendants under the due process clause do “not
    mean that every jarring or badly selected metaphor renders a
    trial fundamentally unfair.” United States v. Del Toro-Barboza,
    
    673 F.3d 1136
    , 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2012).
    For instance, the Seventh Circuit held that the
    prosecution’s use of a metaphor comparing the growth of a
    conspiracy to that of cancer was appropriate. United States v.
    Caliendo, 
    910 F.2d 429
    , 436-37 (7th Cir. 1990). The Fourth
    Circuit similarly upheld the prosecution’s use of a metaphor in
    which the defendant hypothetically played a role in
    unknowingly funding a terrorist act. United States v. Baptiste,
    
    596 F.3d 214
    , 226 (4th Cir. 2010). The prosecution’s purpose
    in posing this hypothetical was to provide the jurors with an
    example of unforeseeable criminal activity so that they could
    determine that the defendant’s distribution of drugs was in fact
    foreseeable. 
    Id. at 227.
    Additionally, the metaphor constituted
    only a minor part of the closing argument – approximately
    fourteen lines in a thirty-six page transcript. 
    Id. Thus, the
    metaphor did not prejudice the defendant. See also United
    States v. Ross, 
    703 F.3d 856
    , 879 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that
    25
    the prosecutor’s use of a metaphor to summarize his case
    theory was appropriate).
    Here, the Government’s use of the bees metaphor did not
    prejudice Appellants. The Government used the metaphor to
    show that Appellants could not have been blind to the fact that
    the cocaine would be transported into the United States, just as
    a reasonable person would not have believed that bees released
    near the border would obey an instruction not to travel north.
    Appellants are correct that bees self-locomote while cocaine
    does not, but the metaphor is not so inapt as to raise due process
    concerns. Further, as in Baptiste, the use of the bees metaphor
    constituted only a small part of the Government’s closing
    argument. It is unlikely that the jury would have been unduly
    influenced by this metaphor, which comprised a small portion
    of a lengthy closing argument. Therefore, the Government’s
    metaphor is not reversible error.
    B.
    Mr. Alvaran additionally contends that the District Court
    erred by precluding him from calling into question the
    sufficiency of the Government’s evidence during his closing
    remarks. Alvaran Br. 25-35. This characterization of the
    District Court’s ruling, however, is inaccurate. The District
    Court properly sustained the Government’s objection when
    Mr. Alvaran tried to reference material that was outside the
    record. Thus, the District Court did not abuse its broad
    discretion by limiting Mr. Alvaran’s closing argument to the
    evidence presented at trial.
    1.
    The District Court’s decision to limit the scope of closing
    argument is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States
    v. Stubblefield, 
    643 F.3d 291
    , 295 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United
    26
    States v. Hoffman, 
    964 F.2d 21
    , 24 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per
    curiam). Abuse of discretion will only be found where the
    District Court’s ruling prevented defense counsel from making
    an essential point. 
    Hoffman, 964 F.2d at 24
    . Defense counsel
    “must be permitted to argue all reasonable inferences from the
    facts in the record,” including negative inferences that arise
    when a party fails to call an important witness or introduce
    relevant evidence “and it is shown that the party has some
    special ability to produce such witness or other evidence.” 
    Id. Counsel may
    not, however, premise an argument on evidence
    that has not been admitted. Id.; Johnson v. United States, 
    347 F.2d 803
    , 805 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
    2.
    During Mr. Alvaran’s closing argument, defense counsel
    asked the jury to speculate about the questions the DEA must
    have asked Junior after his arrest in Houston. The Government
    objected, and the District Court sustained the objection. At a
    sidebar, defense counsel explained that the jury would be asked
    “to infer from the evidence that is in, which is that DEA agents
    debrief informants, that they would have asked Junior about
    what he had shipped, and if he had given them a name, an
    address, a time, they could have investigated.” The
    Government argued that any debriefing of Junior where he told
    the DEA agents about the Palm Oil load would have been
    hearsay and inadmissible if the Government had tried to
    introduce that evidence. According to the Government, Mr.
    Alvaran “cannot stand here and tell the jury that the
    government did not bring in inadmissible evidence.”
    Additionally, the Government stated that Mr. Alvaran should
    not be permitted to argue hearsay that is not in the record. The
    District Court agreed and noted that “[t]here is nothing to
    support [Mr. Alvaran’s argument] in the evidence.”
    27
    3.
    We agree with the District Court that the record did not
    support Mr. Alvaran’s closing argument. Accordingly, the
    District Court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Mr.
    Alvaran’s closing argument to evidence contained in the
    record. While the record established that Junior cooperated
    with the DEA, Mr. Alvaran requested that the jury infer that
    Junior did not provide inculpatory information to the DEA
    because the Government would have introduced that evidence
    at trial. Gov’t Br. 77. Mr. Alvaran takes this argument a step
    too far.
    In Hoffman, this Court found it permissible for defense
    counsel to argue at closing that the Government failed to
    introduce any fingerprint evidence. 
    Hoffman, 964 F.2d at 24
    .
    The Government conceded that the absence of such evidence
    constitutes a relevant “fact” that can be argued before the jury.
    
    Id. The defense
    counsel in Hoffman, however, “attempted to go
    far beyond merely pointing out the lack of fingerprint evidence
    and arguing that its absence weakened the Government’s case.”
    
    Id. Defense counsel
    instead argued that the lack of fingerprint
    evidence meant that the police did not try to obtain fingerprint
    evidence from the plastic bags containing the narcotics, that
    this violated police procedures, and that if fingerprint evidence
    had been obtained, it would have been favorable to the defense.
    
    Id. at 24-25.
    This Court concluded that the defense attorney
    “moved from arguing fair inferences from the record to arguing
    the existence of facts not in the record.” 
    Id. at 25.
    Thus, this
    Court held that the District Court did not err or abuse its
    discretion by precluding these arguments during closing. 
    Id. Similar to
    Hoffman, Mr. Alvaran exceeded the permissible
    bounds of using negative inferences. At closing, Mr. Alvaran
    was permitted to argue that the Government failed to introduce
    28
    any evidence that drugs had been seized in the United States.
    Gov’t Br. 78. This was a logical inference from the record.
    However, Mr. Alvaran’s additional argument – i.e., that
    because the Government did not produce the cocaine, Junior
    must not have been able to tell the Government how the cocaine
    was sold in the United States – was an improper expansion of
    the record. Further, Mr. Alvaran’s contention that the closing
    argument phase “was not well balanced” because of this
    restriction misses the mark. See Alvaran Br. 32-35. The
    arguments made by the Government were logical extensions of
    the evidence contained in the record, unlike Mr. Alvaran’s
    statements. See Gov’t Br. 79-81. Therefore, the District Court
    did not abuse its discretion.
    V.
    The next theory Mr. Borda advances is that the District
    Court failed to properly identify for the jury which portion of
    the testimony and exhibits were being struck from the record.
    See Borda Br. 52-57. Although the District Court instructed the
    jury to remove specific exhibits from their evidence packet and
    to disregard any testimony associated with those exhibits, the
    District Court did not specifically identify the content of the
    dialogue being struck. Mr. Borda maintains that this constitutes
    reversible error because the District Court’s decision to strike
    this information occurred approximately one to two weeks after
    the evidence was introduced. We hold that the District Court
    did not abuse its discretion.
    A.
    This Court reviews the denial of a requested jury
    instruction de novo. United States v. Kayode, 
    254 F.3d 204
    , 214
    (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Court, however, defers to the District
    Court’s choice of language in the jury instructions unless it
    constitutes an abuse of discretion. United States v. White, 116
    
    29 F.3d 903
    , 924 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam). When evaluating
    an alleged error in jury instructions, the Court examines the
    charges as a whole and must determine whether “there was a
    likelihood of misleading the jury to the extent that it is more
    probable than not that an improper verdict was rendered.”
    United States v. Thurman, 
    417 F.2d 752
    , 753 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
    (per curiam). “An error in a jury instruction does not require
    reversal if the error was harmless.” United States v. Cicero, 
    22 F.3d 1156
    , 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
    B.
    The evidence of the conspiracy introduced at trial extended
    from January 2005 to September 2005, and included the Palm
    Oil #1 deal, Palm Oil #2 deal, and El Chino load. At one point
    during the trial, the Government referenced a side deal with Mr.
    Alvaran’s nephew. Specifically, Mr. Suarez testified that he
    conversed with Mr. Alvaran regarding a drug deal that would
    take place in Juarez, Mexico, which is located on the border of
    the United States. The English translation of this conversation
    was provided to the jury as Government Exhibit 35B.
    Appellants objected to this testimony as outside the scope of
    the conspiracy. See Borda Br. 52. Additionally, Mr. Borda
    further argued that the conversation did not involve him, but
    rather referenced a side deal between Mr. Alvaran and Mr.
    Suarez. See 
    id. at 52-53.
    The District Court overruled the
    objections and conditionally allowed the Government to
    present this evidence subject to appropriately tying it up later.
    Further, the District Court permitted the Government to
    introduce Exhibit 77B, which comprised four clips from
    conversations Mr. Suarez had with Chivo, Junior’s assistant.
    Mr. Borda was present during these conversations, but was on
    the phone with another individual for part of the time. See 
    id. at 53.
    The conversations concerned Chivo’s transportation of
    30
    money through an account in Florida, and Mr. Borda’s interest
    in moving cocaine to Juarez and Atlanta. On redirect, Mr.
    Suarez testified that he had a conversation with Mr. Borda on
    this subject, and a recording of this conversation was played
    for the jury. 
    Id. At the
    end of the Government’s evidentiary presentation –
    which was approximately two weeks after the admission of
    Government Exhibit 35B, and one week after the admission of
    Government Exhibit 77B – the District Court reviewed all of
    the co-conspirator statements. See 
    id. at 54.
    The District Court
    found that Mr. Suarez’s statements regarding Juarez, Florida,
    and Atlanta were not made in furtherance of the charged
    conspiracy. Rather, a substantial period of time had passed
    between the Palm Oil #1 deal and the conversation with Chivo.
    Accordingly, the statements were inadmissible hearsay and not
    properly connected to the present charges. The District Court,
    therefore, struck the testimony and corresponding exhibits.
    In striking the exhibits, the District Court instructed the jury
    as follows: “Those exhibits have been struck from the record
    and I’d like to take a minute or two for you to find them in your
    folders and I’ll take them back from you. It’s 35 A and B, clips
    5 and 6.” Defense counsel then requested that the District Court
    further instruct the jury that the actual testimony regarding
    those exhibits be stricken as well. While the District Court
    initially declined this request, saying that the jury would not
    understand the difference, it nonetheless provided a brief
    explanation to the jury: “Ladies and gentlemen, I’m sure you
    all understand. The testimony, the actual testimony in court
    regarding those particular exhibits and clips, that testimony is
    struck from the record as well.” The District Court noted that
    its decision to strike this evidence would only require “one
    paragraph or so” to come out. The District Court denied
    Appellants’ request to specify exactly what content was being
    31
    struck – i.e., to refer directly to Juarez, Florida, and Atlanta.
    Additionally, at the end of the trial, the District Court instructed
    the jury to disregard questions, answers, and exhibits that were
    stricken from the record. Mr. Borda maintains that the two-
    week delay in striking this evidence, along with the District
    Court’s failure to tell the jury exactly what portions of the
    testimony were to be disregarded, was error.
    C.
    Mr. Borda’s argument on this issue is a nonstarter. As a
    preliminary matter, Mr. Borda cannot point to any case law –
    and we have been unable to identify any precedent – that
    requires the District Court to provide a detailed explanation and
    summary of all testimony and exhibits being struck from the
    record. The District Court instructed the jury as to which
    exhibits should be removed, and informed the jury that the oral
    testimony concerning those exhibits was also struck from the
    record. The jurors physically removed the offending exhibits
    from their packets, and were unable to view those exhibits
    during deliberations. Nothing mandates a more specific jury
    instruction whereby the judge must identify the exact content
    of the testimony being struck.
    Moreover, it would not have been feasible or realistic for
    the District Court to accurately summarize the testimony being
    struck from the record because the evidence was confusing and
    references in the struck conversations were unclear. When
    requesting a more specific instruction, defense counsel even
    conceded that he had no idea how a more specific instruction
    would be done. For these reasons we decline to find prejudice
    or an abuse of discretion.
    32
    VI.
    The next argument raised by Appellants is that the
    Government violated its obligation to produce exculpatory
    documents under Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963). See
    Borda Br. 26-31; Alvaran Br. 13-16. In particular, Appellants
    identify two instances of alleged Brady violations. First,
    Appellants argue that the Government delayed disclosing DEA
    reports in which Junior specified Mr. Borda’s interest in
    transporting drugs to Europe and Canada. See Borda Br. 31-34.
    For purposes of this appeal, Appellants have concentrated their
    argument on a 2005 e-mail written by Junior to the DEA. This
    e-mail was disclosed before trial. Second, Appellants maintain
    that the Government withheld a draft report by DEA agent
    Patricia Skidmore, in which Ms. Skidmore documented an
    interview she conducted with Junior in January 2006. See 
    id. at 28;
    Alvaran Br. 13-15. The District Court examined these
    allegations and concluded that no Brady violations occurred.
    As a result, the District Court denied Appellants’ request for a
    new trial on this basis. We agree with the District Court that
    the Government did not violate Brady.
    A.
    Generally, this Court reviews the District Court’s refusal to
    grant a new trial for abuse of discretion; however, Brady claims
    “present something of a special situation.” United States v.
    Oruche, 
    484 F.3d 590
    , 595 (D.C. Cir. 2007). On appeal,
    whether the Government has breached its obligations under
    Brady is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. United
    States v. Emor, 
    573 F.3d 778
    , 782 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United
    States v. Johnson, 
    519 F.3d 478
    , 488 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Thus,
    the issue is not whether the District Court properly exercised
    its discretion by refusing to order a new trial, but whether the
    District Court properly determined whether a Brady violation
    33
    existed. 
    Oruche, 484 F.3d at 596
    . Once a Brady violation is
    established, a new trial is the prescribed remedy and is not
    subject to discretion. 
    Id. at 595.
    B.
    The Supreme Court has imposed upon the prosecution an
    affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
    defense, even if no request has been made by the accused.
    Strickler v. Greene, 
    527 U.S. 263
    , 280 (1999); 
    Brady, 373 U.S. at 87
    . To prove a Brady violation, the movant must demonstrate
    three elements. First, the movant must show that the evidence
    at issue is favorable to the accused, either as impeachment or
    exculpatory evidence. 
    Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82
    ; see also
    Kyles v. Whitley, 
    514 U.S. 419
    , 433 (1995); United States v.
    Bagley, 
    473 U.S. 667
    , 676 (1985). Second, the movant must
    prove that the evidence was suppressed by the State, either
    willfully or inadvertently. 
    Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82
    .
    Third, the movant must demonstrate prejudice. 
    Id. To satisfy
    the prejudice element, the evidence must be material.
    United States v. Brodie, 
    524 F.3d 259
    , 268 (D.C. Cir. 2008);
    United States v. Bowie, 
    198 F.3d 905
    , 908 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
    Evidence is “material” if there is a “reasonable probability”
    that the result of the trial would have been different had the
    evidence been admitted and used appropriately. 
    Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34
    ; 
    Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676
    ; 
    Bowie, 198 F.3d at 908
    . The term “reasonable probability” means that the chances
    of reversal must be high enough to “undermine confidence in
    the outcome” of the trial. 
    Bowie, 198 F.3d at 908
    ; see United
    States v. Bailey, 
    622 F.3d 1
    , 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010). When
    examining reasonable probability, the Court must not view the
    evidence in isolation, but rather must consider the non-
    disclosure “dynamically” and take into account the numerous
    predictable impacts the evidence could have on trial strategy.
    34
    United States v. Pettiford, 
    627 F.3d 1223
    , 1229 (D.C. Cir.
    2010); 
    Johnson, 519 F.3d at 489
    ; 
    Bowie, 198 F.3d at 912
    .
    Cumulative evidence is not considered material as long as it is
    “the same kind of evidence” as that introduced at trial. 
    Brodie, 524 F.3d at 269
    ; see 
    Emor, 573 F.3d at 782
    . Thus, the movant’s
    burden is to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different
    trial result. 
    Strickler, 527 U.S. at 291
    .
    C.
    Appellants first maintain that the Government violated
    Brady by delaying its disclosure of a 2005 e-mail from Junior
    stating that Mr. Borda was interested in sending drugs to
    Europe and Canada. As an initial matter, this evidence was
    disclosed before the trial. A new trial will rarely be warranted
    based on a Brady claim where the defendant obtains the
    information in time to use it at the trial. United States v.
    Andrews, 
    532 F.3d 900
    , 907 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Where evidence
    is disclosed late but before trial, the defendant must show a
    reasonable probability that an earlier disclosure would have
    altered the trial’s result. 
    Id. Here, Appellants
    have failed to
    demonstrate prejudice, which is the cornerstone of Brady.
    1.
    From August 2005 until his kidnapping and suspected
    death in March 2006, Junior worked as an informant for the
    DEA. Throughout the course of this relationship, Junior
    identified suspected drug trafficking operations. In September
    2005, Junior disclosed that Mr. Borda “is discussing a new
    route from Colombia to Europe and Canada.”
    On October 18, 2010, before commencement of the trial in
    early November, the Government disclosed redacted versions
    of DEA-6 forms and summaries of Junior’s debriefings by
    DEA special agents between August 2005 and March 2006.
    35
    Junior’s September 2005 e-mail was identified as part of this
    discovery. On October 19, 2010, Mr. Borda filed a motion for
    disclosure of Brady evidence, arguing that the Government
    withheld material exculpatory evidence (including the
    September 2005 e-mail) until a few days before trial. The
    District Court denied Mr. Borda’s motion and concluded “that
    evidence pertaining to Defendant Borda’s involvement in
    selling drugs to other countries outside of the United States is
    not Brady evidence.” Appellants contest this ruling and argue
    that Junior’s e-mail constituted admissible Brady evidence.
    2.
    Appellants’ Brady argument is unpersuasive, as it fails to
    demonstrate materiality or prejudice. Even assuming that
    Junior’s 2005 e-mail contained exculpatory evidence and that
    the Government inadvertently suppressed this evidence,
    Appellants were not prejudiced. Appellants received this e-
    mail in time to use it at trial, and they introduced other evidence
    that showcased Mr. Borda’s interest in selling cocaine in
    Europe. Appellants make no claim that an earlier disclosure
    would have altered the result at trial. Rather, the jury heard
    similar evidence at trial and nonetheless found Appellants
    guilty. Thus, the Government’s delay in producing the e-mail
    did not prejudice Appellants. Accordingly, a Brady claim is not
    viable.
    D.
    Appellants next contend that the Government’s failure to
    reveal a draft report written by Ms. Skidmore during an
    interview with Junior constitutes a Brady violation. See Borda
    Br. 26-31; Alvaran Br. 13-15. Similar to the prior Brady claim,
    Appellants’ argument fails because they cannot demonstrate
    prejudice.
    36
    1.
    After the jury returned a verdict, Appellants alleged that the
    Government withheld exculpatory evidence demonstrating that
    they did not know or intend for the Palm Oil cocaine to be
    transported to the United States. Appellants made this
    allegation based on a written statement by Raphael Mejia, who
    was incarcerated with Mr. Borda and co-conspirator H.B. at
    Northern Neck Regional Jail in Warsaw, Virginia. Mr. Mejia
    alleged that H.B. informed him that Mr. Borda “made it very
    clear to him (H.B.) and [Junior] that he (Borda) did not want
    any cocaine sent to the United States.”
    The District Court found that Appellants had raised a
    “colorable claim” and required the Government to disclose all
    DEA reports and rough notes relating to H.B. and Junior.
    Following the Government’s disclosures, Appellants raised
    nine additional Brady claims, including an allegation that the
    Government failed to disclose a draft report by Ms. Skidmore
    of a January 2006 interview with Junior. According to the
    report, Junior mentioned that Mr. Borda “advanced” 100
    kilograms of cocaine to Junior and H.B. individually, and that
    “[u]nbeknownst to Borda,” several co-conspirators, including
    Junior, “took an additional 100 kilograms of cocaine believing
    they could sell it in Houston for a larger profit.”
    In light of this evidence, the District Court convened a post-
    trial hearing at which Ms. Skidmore testified. Ms. Skidmore
    explained that her notes regarding this conversation with Junior
    were only in draft form and had never been finalized due to
    Junior’s disappearance. When questioned regarding what facts
    were “unbeknownst” to Mr. Borda, Ms. Skidmore explained
    that Mr. Borda was unaware that Junior and H.B. had each
    taken an extra 100 kilograms of cocaine to sell in Houston. Mr.
    Borda was not necessarily unaware that the original 200
    37
    kilograms of cocaine were to be sold in the United States. Ms.
    Skidmore further testified that Junior never indicated to her or
    any other agent that Mr. Borda did not know the cocaine was
    going to the United States. Following the evidentiary hearing,
    the District Court denied Appellants’ motion for a new trial.
    See United States v. Borda, 
    941 F. Supp. 2d 16
    (D.D.C. 2013).
    Specifically, the District Court found that Ms. Skidmore’s
    testimony “directly contradicts Defendants’ interpretation of
    the draft report she wrote.”
    2.
    Similar to the first Brady allegation, Appellants have failed
    to show that the exclusion of the DEA report was prejudicial.
    To satisfy the prejudice prong, Appellants were required to
    show a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would
    have been different if the evidence had been admitted. 
    Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34
    ; 
    Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676
    . No such showing
    of prejudice has been made in this case. If the District Court
    had admitted Ms. Skidmore’s draft report, it is extremely likely
    that Ms. Skidmore would have given the same testimony she
    provided at the post-trial hearing. This testimony would have
    clarified Junior’s statements in a manner at odds with
    Appellants’ interpretation. See Gov’t Br. 66-67. In any event,
    the report says nothing about the disposition of the remaining
    cocaine from the Palm Oil load, including the 200 kilograms
    Junior testified he brought to New York. See 
    id. at 65-66.
    Thus,
    it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have arrived
    at a judgment of acquittal based on this evidence. As such,
    Appellants have failed to establish a Brady violation.
    Appellants, however, argue that admission of Ms.
    Skidmore’s report would have altered their cross-examination
    techniques and trial strategy, particularly with regard to the
    amount of cocaine trafficked into the United States. See Oral
    38
    Arg. at 15:00-16:00, 16:45-17:25, United States v. Borda (Nov.
    8, 2016) (13-3074). This argument is unpersuasive. Mr. Suarez
    testified at trial that at least 200 kilograms of cocaine from the
    Palm Oil load were transported into the United States. Thus,
    Ms. Skidmore’s report did not introduce any new or different
    information regarding the volume of cocaine trafficked into the
    United States. Appellants possessed notice of these facts before
    trial, and were not prejudiced by the exclusion of this report.
    VII.
    Mr. Alvaran separately argues that in addition to the second
    Brady violation discussed in Part VI, the Government violated
    Napue v. Illinois, 
    360 U.S. 264
    (1959) by failing to alert the
    District Court to Mr. Suarez’s false testimony. See Alvaran Br.
    16. Specifically, Mr. Alvaran claims that Mr. Suarez’s
    testimony about the Palm Oil cocaine being shipped to the
    United States was false because Junior told the Government
    that it was “unbeknownst” to Mr. Borda that the cocaine was
    transported across the border. 
    Id. Mr. Alvaran’s
    argument,
    however, misses the mark. The touchstone of a Napue violation
    is that the testimony must be false. 
    Napue, 360 U.S. at 269
    . Ms.
    Skidmore clarified in her post-trial hearing that what was
    “unbeknownst” to Mr. Borda was that Junior and H.B. took
    additional cocaine to sell in the United States; not that the
    original 200 kilograms of cocaine would be sold in New York.
    Therefore, Mr. Suarez’s testimony about the Palm Oil cocaine
    being shipped to the United States does not directly contradict
    Ms. Skidmore’s report. While the 200 kilograms of cocaine
    described by Mr. Suarez may not be the same 200 kilograms of
    cocaine identified by Ms. Skidmore, nothing in Ms.
    Skidmore’s report or her testimony gives rise to an inference
    that Mr. Suarez lied on the stand. Thus, this claim is without
    merit.
    39
    VIII.
    Mr. Alvaran’s final argument is that the District Court erred
    during the sentencing phase. In particular, Mr. Alvaran argues
    that the District Court improperly calculated the quantity of
    cocaine for which he was responsible and thus, erroneously
    applied a three-level sentencing enhancement. Alvaran Br. 35-
    43. Mr. Alvaran additionally suggests that the District Court
    did not consider mitigating circumstances and that the case
    should be remanded for resentencing because he will be older
    than Mr. Borda upon his release from prison. 
    Id. at 43-45.
    For
    the reasons that follow, we reject Mr. Alvaran’s contentions of
    error but remand for resentencing in light of the retroactive
    amendment to the cocaine sentencing guidelines. See generally
    18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
    § 1B1.10 App’x C Supplement, Amendment 782 (Nov. 1,
    2014) [hereinafter Amendment 782].
    A.
    This Court reviews the District Court’s factual findings
    during the sentencing hearing for clear error. United States v.
    Foster, 
    19 F.3d 1452
    , 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The District
    Court’s inferences from the facts are accorded the same
    deferential standard of review as the actual findings. 
    Id. Pursuant to
    the clear error standard, this Court will affirm the
    District Court’s decision unless it has a “definite and firm
    conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States
    v. Brockenborrugh, 
    575 F.3d 726
    , 738 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
    (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
    333 U.S. 364
    , 395
    (1948)). The Court further gives “due deference” to a District
    Court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts.
    United States v. Henry, 
    557 F.3d 642
    , 645 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
    40
    B.
    During the sentencing hearing, the District Court found Mr.
    Alvaran responsible for 200 kilograms of cocaine, in
    accordance with Mr. Suarez’s testimony that Junior delivered
    200 kilograms of cocaine to New York. The District Court
    deemed this amount reasonably foreseeable to both Mr.
    Alvaran and Mr. Borda “given the scope of the agreement or
    the conspiracy into which they had all entered.” The District
    Court further found that “there is absolutely no question that
    Mr. Alvaran was neither a minimal nor a minor participant” in
    the conspiracy. Rather, “he was indeed a manager or
    supervisor.” In support of this finding, the District Court
    elaborated on the following facts: (1) Mr. Alvaran introduced
    Mr. Suarez to Mr. Borda; (2) Mr. Alvaran went to Monterrey
    with Junior to make sure that the cocaine had arrived; (3) Mr.
    Alvaran arranged for the drug proceeds to be transported to a
    money exchange house in Mexico City; (4) Mr. Alvaran
    directed Mr. Lucas to bring drug proceeds to Mr. Alvaran’s
    apartment for safekeeping; and (5) Junior called Mr. Alvaran
    once the cocaine arrived in Puerto Progreso for permission to
    move the cocaine to Monterrey. Thus, the District Court could
    properly infer that Mr. Alvaran was aware that 200 kilograms
    of cocaine would be sent to New York.
    Further, the District Court concluded that Mr. Alvaran
    “supervised” his secretary, Mr. Lucas, and that the conspiracy
    involved at least five people: Mr. Borda, Junior, Mr. Montoya,
    Mr. Cruz, and Mr. Lucas. Accordingly, the District Court
    determined that Mr. Alvaran “clearly fits within § 3B1.1 of the
    guidelines” and that “there is no way that he could be viewed
    as a minimal or a minor participant in criminal activity under
    § 3B1.2 of the guidelines.”
    41
    Given that Mr. Alvaran had a criminal history category of
    1 and a base offense level of 38, the District Court imposed 3
    extra points because Mr. Alvaran served as a manager or
    supervisor. This brought Mr. Alvaran’s total offense level to
    41. The Sentencing Guidelines range for this offense level is
    324 months to 505 months, and the Probation Office
    recommended 360 months. The District Court, however, noted
    that it was not bound by this range, and engaged in an analysis
    of the § 3553 factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
    In evaluating the § 3553 factors, the District Court noted
    that Mr. Alvaran had no prior criminal record, which was
    “certainly a strong factor on his behalf.” Additionally, the
    District Court recognized Mr. Alvaran’s health problems, but
    explained that his health concerns were not imminently
    threatening and were not an excuse for criminal conduct. The
    District Court then proceeded to describe Mr. Alvaran’s
    personal history and characteristics, and weighed this history
    against the seriousness of the offense and the need for
    punishment and deterrence. Following this analysis, the
    District Court imposed a sentence of only 180 months, which
    was substantially less than Mr. Borda’s sentence of 300
    months.
    C.
    The District Court did not err, much less clearly err, by
    awarding a below-Guidelines range sentence to Mr. Alvaran
    for his involvement in the Palm Oil drug conspiracy. When
    calculating a defendant’s base offense level, the District Court
    must analyze “all relevant conduct.” United States v. Seiler,
    
    348 F.3d 265
    , 268 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The term “relevant
    conduct” refers to “all reasonably foreseeable acts and
    omissions [committed by] others in furtherance of the jointly
    undertaken activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); Seiler, 
    348 42 F.3d at 268
    ; see also United States v. Wyche, 
    741 F.3d 1284
    ,
    1292-93 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Here, the District Court explained
    that the scope of the conspiracy was not limited to shipping
    cocaine from Colombia to Mexico, but rather extended to
    Junior’s transportation of the cocaine to Monterrey and his sale
    of the cocaine in the United States. The District Court
    explained that it was reasonably foreseeable to Appellants that
    Junior would sell cocaine in the United States after he
    transported it to an inland city near the U.S. border. Mr.
    Alvaran was aware that Junior would not be able to sell 1,553
    kilograms of cocaine in Monterrey given the low demand for
    drugs in that city, and knew Junior had started sending
    “partials” to the border by June 15, 2005. Additionally, Mr.
    Alvaran was aware that Junior’s delayed payment for the
    cocaine was a result of his difficulties at the border. Further,
    the District Court found Mr. Suarez’s testimony credible on the
    issue that at least 200 kilograms of cocaine had been delivered
    to New York. Thus, the District Court did not clearly err by
    establishing Mr. Alvaran’s base offense level as 38.
    Moreover, the District Court properly applied a three-point
    enhancement to the base offense level because Mr. Alvaran
    acted as a manager or supervisor of the drug conspiracy, and
    the conspiracy involved more than five participants. See
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. Sufficient evidence establishes that Mr.
    Alvaran participated in planning the Palm Oil transaction from
    the beginning, and that he supervised numerous aspects of the
    illegal enterprise, including Mr. Lucas’s activities. Mr. Alvaran
    not only recruited Mr. Suarez, but he also monitored Junior.
    Mr. Alvaran further organized the transportation of the drug
    proceeds from Monterrey to Mexico City and safeguarded the
    money. When the money was distributed, Mr. Alvaran received
    a return on his investment and provided input on how to
    allocate Junior’s proceeds. Thus, the three-point enhancement
    was not error.
    43
    Additionally, the District Court offered a reasoned basis
    for its decision and did not fail to consider mitigating and non-
    frivolous arguments for a lower sentence. Where a defendant
    provides a non-frivolous argument for mitigation, the district
    court must consider this argument when pronouncing a
    sentence. United States v. Bigley, 
    786 F.3d 11
    , 12, 14 (D.C. Cir.
    2015) (per curiam). In addition to considering these arguments,
    the court must provide a “reasoned basis” for its sentencing
    decision. United States v. Locke, 
    664 F.3d 353
    , 357 (D.C. Cir.
    2011). These standards, however, do not require the court to
    expressly address every argument advanced by a defendant. 
    Id. Rather, “so
    long as the judge provides a ‘reasoned basis for
    exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority,’ we
    generally presume that he adequately considered the arguments
    and will uphold the sentence if it is otherwise reasonable.” 
    Id. at 358
    (quoting Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356
    (2007)). Where the record makes clear that the judge evaluated
    a defendant’s arguments, the presumption of reasonableness
    will be upheld. 
    Id. In particular,
    Mr. Alvaran contends that the District Court
    erred by failing to impose a term of imprisonment that would
    result in his release by age sixty-five (as the District Court had
    in Mr. Borda’s case). Alvaran Br. 43. This argument is
    unpersuasive. The District Court adequately considered Mr.
    Alvaran’s personal history and health problems when
    pronouncing its sentence. The fact that Mr. Alvaran did not
    have a prior criminal history, combined with his age and health
    concerns made it unlikely that he would commit additional
    crimes. The District Court weighed these factors and imposed
    a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment – well below the
    Guidelines range of 324 months to 505 months. Moreover, this
    imprisonment term was almost half of the sentence imposed on
    Mr. Borda, who received 300 months’ imprisonment. The fact
    that Mr. Alvaran will be older than Mr. Borda upon his release
    44
    from prison is irrelevant. Thus, the District Court did not err in
    its sentencing determination.
    D.
    While we reject Mr. Alvaran’s contentions of error, we
    nonetheless remand the case to the District Court for
    resentencing. After Mr. Alvaran was sentenced, the U.S.
    Sentencing Commission lowered the Guidelines range for
    certain offenses involving cocaine, and permitted district courts
    to apply these lower ranges retroactively. See U.S.S.G. §
    2D1.1; Amendment 
    782, supra
    ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)
    (explaining that a district court can modify a term of
    imprisonment if the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range
    has been retroactively lowered by the Sentencing
    Commission). The Government agrees to Mr. Alvaran’s
    request for resentencing on this basis. See Gov’t Br. 92 n.18
    (stating that the Court “should remand” the case to allow Mr.
    Alvaran to file a motion for a reduced sentence). Thus, the case
    is remanded to provide Mr. Alvaran with an opportunity to
    request a reduced sentence. 2 We, of course, express no view on
    the merits of any such request.
    ***
    For the reasons previously discussed, we affirm
    Appellants’ convictions and remand the case to the District
    Court for resentencing Mr. Alvaran.
    So ordered.
    2
    Mr. Borda did not challenge his sentence on appeal. Therefore, our
    remand is limited to Mr. Alvaran.