Hugh Kaufman v. Thomas Perez ( 2014 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued September 18, 2013            Decided March 14, 2014
    No. 12-1036
    HUGH B. KAUFMAN,
    PETITIONER
    v.
    THOMAS E. PEREZ, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
    DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
    RESPONDENT
    On Petition for Review of the Final Decision and Order of
    the United States Department of Labor’s Administrative
    Review Board
    Regina M. Markey argued the cause and filed the briefs
    for petitioner.
    Dean A. Romhilt, Attorney, U.S. Department of Labor,
    argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was
    Megan E. Guenther, Attorney.          Heather R. Phillips,
    Attorney, U.S. Department of Labor, entered an appearance.
    Before: HENDERSON and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges,
    and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.
    2
    Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    SENTELLE.
    Opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit
    Judge SRINIVASAN.
    SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Hugh Kaufman, an
    employee of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”),
    brought several claims against his employer for allegedly
    retaliating against him in violation of several environmental
    whistleblowing provisions. An administrative law judge
    (“ALJ”) denied his claims, and the Administrative Review
    Board (“ARB”) affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Kaufman now
    petitions this court for review of the dismissal of seven
    claims. Because we conclude that the Board committed no
    error in its conclusion that the claims were barred by the
    relevant statutes of limitation, we deny Kaufman’s petition for
    review.
    I.      BACKGROUND
    A. Factual History
    Kaufman is a program analyst at the headquarters of the
    EPA in Washington, DC. He has been employed by the EPA
    since its creation in 1971. At all times relevant to this
    proceeding, he was employed in the Office of Solid Waste
    and Emergency Response (“OSWER”). In 1999, Kaufman
    was assigned to the OSWER Assistant Administrator’s
    Office, his position description was changed from
    Environmental Protection Specialist to Program Analyst, and
    his job description was expanded to include responsibilities
    assisting the OSWER Ombudsman, Robert Martin. The
    Ombudsman investigated public complaints, mediated
    disputes, and convened hearings regarding OSWER’s
    3
    administration of the hazardous substance and solid waste
    programs. Though Martin assigned Kaufman work, Michael
    Shapiro was Kaufman’s immediate supervisor and Timothy
    Fields served as his second-level supervisor. Fields, a
    Presidential appointee, was the Acting Assistant
    Administrator of OSWER at the time and Shapiro was the
    Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator.
    Kaufman’s conduct at OSWER hearings became a matter
    of controversy early in his tenure with the Ombudsman. His
    pattern of behavior culminated in an extraordinary incident at
    a Town Hall meeting concerning a Superfund site in Tarpon
    Springs, Florida, in June of 2000. The June meeting followed
    two earlier Tarpon Springs sessions in which Kaufman had,
    according to EPA officials, ridiculed personnel and failed to
    conduct impartial and professional hearings.           Kaufman
    chaired the June 5, 2000 meeting. Two EPA representatives
    appeared: Joanne Benante, Chief of the North Florida Section
    of EPA’s Region IV, and Michelle Staes, Assistant Regional
    Counsel and the Region IV attorney assigned to the site.
    Kaufman conducted the hearing, not as an impartial
    ombudsman proceeding, but in a confrontational fashion
    belittling and demeaning the EPA representatives, especially
    attorney Staes. He set the tone of his behavior from the
    outset, reading Benante and Staes Miranda warnings as if they
    were in-custody criminals. He went on to allege that the EPA
    in the Region was stonewalling Congress and the Justice
    Department. He further demeaned attorney Staes, lamenting
    that “all these big shot men and big shot women [in the EPA]
    who have been in it for 20, 30 years have to hide behind the
    skirts of a little black girl just out of law school.”
    As the ALJ noted, “[r]esponse to Kaufman’s performance
    was swift.” Stephen Luftig, Director of the Office of
    Emergency and Remedial Response, wrote a letter to the
    4
    Ombudsman dated June 12, 2000 to express concern over
    reports of the “abusive, bullying tactics and the lack of
    impartiality” shown by Kaufman at the hearing one week
    earlier. The letter also characterized the Miranda-rights
    incident as part of a pattern of inappropriate behavior, and
    requested an explanation. In response to Luftig’s letter,
    Kaufman accelerated the confrontation. His written response,
    among other things, demanded that Luftig either present
    substantiating evidence or apologize, and suggested that
    Luftig’s memorandum to him “was a knowingly reckless,
    false, misleading, and inaccurate document intended to thwart
    and obstruct an ongoing federal investigation, and a knowing
    attempt to harm the federal officials performing the
    investigation.” Shapiro issued an Official Reprimand dated
    September 29, 2000, chastising Kaufman for his conduct at
    the June 5, 2000 meeting.
    Fields testified before the ALJ that these and other
    incidents led him to conclude that Kaufman’s support of the
    Ombudsman was not working. On December 14, 2000,
    Fields met with Kaufman and informed him that he would no
    longer be performing Ombudsman duties. Fields embodied
    this message in a memo that set forth Kaufman’s behavior at
    the Tarpon Springs hearing and other hearings, characterizing
    that behavior as “inappropriate, unprofessional, and lacking in
    impartiality.” The memo advised Kaufman that “examples of
    your lack of impartiality and professionalism are numerous.”
    In addition to the Miranda warnings and the demeaning
    treatment of Staes set forth above, the memo recited other
    examples of similar behavior by Kaufman, including other
    occurrences at Tarpon Springs and hearings in Ohio and
    Idaho.
    The memo stated that at the Idaho hearings Kaufman
    “asked at least three different hearing participants the same
    5
    inappropriate question: ‘Do you believe there was and/or is
    evidence of a cover-up related to the [industrial excess
    landfill] activities?’” Fields described this type questioning as
    “aimed at inciting public angst, rather than objective fact-
    finding” and as reflecting “[Kaufman’s] lack of impartiality in
    the performance of [his] Ombudsman-related duties.”
    The memo referred to Kaufman’s having “used language
    and made statements which were inappropriate for an
    objective federal official in Idaho.” By way of example, he
    stated that the public had been “used as pawns” and that “the
    Department of Justice has asked EPA to, basically, kill the
    Ombudsman program.” The memo related Kaufman’s having
    stated at the same hearing that he thought the EPA was
    “raping” the people of the Idaho Valley.
    After reciting the examples of Kaufman’s lack of
    impartiality and professionalism, the Fields memorandum
    informed Kaufman that he would no longer be performing
    Ombudsman’s duties and that the reference to such duties
    would be removed from his position description. Without
    doubt, Kaufman understood the import of Fields’s
    memorandum. In a January 8, 2001 Environment News
    Service article, Kaufman claimed that he had been “ousted
    from the Ombudsman’s Office because he exposed EPA
    wrongdoing at a number of agency-managed hazardous waste
    clean-up sites.” He further characterized his “ouster” as being
    “‘political revenge’ for his office’s damning revelations about
    failed Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore.”
    On January 20, 2001, a new administration took office.
    On January 29, 2001, Martin issued a memo stating he was
    unable to perform substantial Ombudsman tasks, due in part
    to Kaufman’s reassignment. On January 30, 2001, Christine
    Todd Whitman was confirmed as the new EPA Administrator.
    6
    The next day, Shapiro met with Kaufman to discuss
    Kaufman’s job performance. Kaufman asked Shapiro if he
    was withdrawing Fields’s memo—as a Presidential appointee,
    Fields had exited with the previous administration. Shapiro
    confirmed that he was not.
    In early February, Martin requested Kaufman’s help with
    Ombudsman tasks. Shapiro rejected his request. On
    February 13 and 21, Shapiro addressed the matter again with
    Martin, reaffirming that Kaufman would not be assigned
    Ombudsman work. Nonetheless, on February 15, Kaufman
    submitted a travel request to attend an Ombudsman hearing,
    which Shapiro denied. On February 22, Shapiro issued a
    memo to Martin summarizing his previous conversations and
    again affirmed that Kaufman would not be available to
    support the Ombudsman. Finally, on February 23, after
    Shapiro again received reports of Kaufman’s participation in
    Ombudsman functions, he orally informed Kaufman again
    that Kaufman was prohibited from performing Ombudsman
    duties. Kaufman asked Shapiro to put that prohibition in
    writing.
    Before Shapiro could do so, Kaufman sent him a memo
    dated March 6, asserting, among other things, the “fact” that
    his prohibition expired when Fields left the EPA.
    Accordingly, he asked Shapiro to provide “unequivocal
    clarification . . . as to whether [Shapiro was] going to take an
    adverse action against” Kaufman. Around the same time,
    Kaufman discovered what he perceived as a conflict of
    interest on Administrator Whitman’s part at one of the
    cleanup sites. He reported this possible conflict to the
    Inspector General, and spoke to the press about it as well,
    accusing Whitman of stopping the Ombudsman from giving
    him assignments to reduce the chances that the site would be
    forced to comply with environmental laws. The Inspector
    7
    General investigated Kaufman’s allegations and found them
    to be unsubstantiated.
    On March 14, 2001, Shapiro responded to Kaufman’s
    March 6 memo with one of his own in which he reiterated
    Kaufman’s prohibition, expressed shock at the assertion that
    Fields’s memo expired with the change of administration, and
    attached a copy of the memo. Shapiro also attached a copy of
    Kaufman’s position description with Ombudsman-related
    duties removed. Kaufman responded by alleging that Shapiro
    was making false statements, and intimating that Shapiro’s
    memo was motivated by Kaufman’s recent whistleblowing
    activity regarding Administrator Whitman. Kaufman also
    threatened “to make a criminal referral of this matter to the
    Department of Justice,” if Shapiro did not let him perform
    Ombudsman duties. Shapiro responded on March 16, 2001,
    again reiterating the prohibition, and again noting Kaufman’s
    mischaracterization of the effects of the Fields memo.
    On the same date, Shapiro sent a memorandum to Martin
    advising him that Kaufman had apparently transmitted a
    round of “interrogatories” and requests for production of
    documents in connection with a Superfund site inquiry in
    Colorado, requesting that responses be sent to Martin. In the
    memorandum to Martin, Shapiro reiterated that Kaufman had
    been officially and verbally terminated from all Ombudsman
    functions. The memorandum further advised explicitly: “As
    we have discussed previously, unless otherwise directed by
    me, you should not involve Mr. Kaufman in any national
    Ombudsman-related activities as part of his EPA
    responsibilities.”
    Around the same time, another EPA employee, Barry
    Stolls, was detailed to assist the Ombudsman, and the EPA
    exempted several new full-time Ombudsman staff positions
    8
    from a hiring freeze then in effect. On April 6, Shapiro
    encouraged Martin to actively recruit for those new vacant
    staff positions. Martin continued to request that Kaufman be
    reassigned Ombudsman duties, and Shapiro denied his
    requests on April 16 and May 22.
    On November 27, 2001, Administrator Whitman
    announced her decision to move the Ombudsman function to
    the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) in response to
    concerns voiced by Congress and the General Accounting
    Office. The Ombudsman was ultimately moved to OIG on
    April 13, 2002.
    B. Procedural History
    Kaufman first complained to the Department of Labor on
    April 3, 2001, alleging violations of the employee protection
    provisions in various environmental statutes.            The
    Occupational Safety and Health Administration determined
    that the EPA had unlawfully retaliated against Kaufman for
    doing his job “too effective[ly].” The EPA appealed the
    ruling, and after years of discovery disputes an ALJ
    conducted a 14-day hearing on Kaufman’s claims.
    Kaufman’s amended complaint before the ALJ requested
    relief under the whistleblower provisions of seven
    environmental protection statutes: the Clean Air Act, 
    42 U.S.C. § 7622
    ; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.
    § 300j-9; the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 
    42 U.S.C. § 6971
    ; the
    Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
    33 U.S.C. § 1367
    ; the
    Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
    Liability Act, 
    42 U.S.C. § 9610
    ; the Toxic Substances Control
    Act, 
    15 U.S.C. § 2622
    ; and the Energy Reorganization Act,
    
    42 U.S.C. § 5851
    .
    9
    Kaufman’s complaint set out nine claims relating to the
    following events:
       Claim 1: The December 14, 2000 removal of
    Kaufman’s Ombudsman duties;
       Claim 2: The March 5, 2001 decision to assign
    Stolls to the Ombudsman;
       Claim 3: The refusal to assign Ombudsman duties
    to Kaufman after the removal of the hiring freeze
    in March 2001;
       Claim 4: The issuance of the March 16, 2001
    memo stating Kaufman was prohibited from
    performing Ombudsman work;
       Claim 5: The issuance of the April 6, 2001 memo
    to Martin inquiring about recruitment actions;
       Claim 6: The issuance of the April 16, 2001 and
    May 22 memos to Martin denying his request to
    assign Kaufman Ombudsman duties;
       Claim 7: The November 27, 2001 announcement
    to transfer the EPA Ombudsman to the OIG;
       Claim 8: The April 12, 2002 transfer of the
    Ombudsman to the OIG;
       Claim 9: The creation of a hostile work
    environment for Kaufman from June 2000 to April
    2002.
    10
    The ALJ dismissed all of Kaufman’s claims. First, the
    ALJ dismissed Kaufman’s claims under the Toxic Substances
    Control Act and the Energy Reorganization Act for lack of
    jurisdiction. Second, the ALJ found Claim 1 untimely; the
    statutes of limitations in the whistleblower provisions of the
    remaining environmental protection statutes require a
    petitioner to file a complaint within thirty days after a
    “violation occurs.” Kaufman complained on April 3, 2001.
    Thus any allegedly unlawful activity must have occurred on
    or after March 5 to be timely. Third, the ALJ dismissed
    Kaufman’s hostile work environment claim (Claim 9).
    Finally, as to Claims 2–8, the ALJ rejected Kaufman’s
    argument that they represented discrete retaliatory acts,
    finding that they were “not adverse acts [to Kaufman] but
    rather the consequences of Fields’[s] December memo . . . .”
    After December 14, 2000, Kaufman “was in no position to be
    considered for assignment of Ombudsman functions,” and the
    ALJ found nothing in the record to support Kaufman’s claim
    that a change in administration would nullify the memo.
    Specifically, the ALJ concluded that
    Kaufman could not have any uncertainty about the
    Fields memo. The memo is unambiguous, and Fields
    met with him personally to deliver the memo and to
    explain that he was no longer to do Ombudsman-
    related work. Both Fields and Kaufman testified that
    Kaufman understood the decision, and both testified
    that Kaufman responded that he would stop doing
    Ombudsman work.
    Ultimately, the ALJ found that “Kaufman’s argument
    that he was . . . uncertain about whether he could perform
    Ombudsman related duties strain[ed] credibility.” Because
    Kaufman was permanently prohibited from assisting the
    11
    Ombudsman, the EPA’s actions in staffing the Ombudsman
    office—and its repeated affirmations of Kaufman’s
    prohibition from Ombudsman-related duties—had no effect
    on him. Moreover, the ALJ reasoned, allowing these actions
    to restart the filing clock would make “mincemeat out of the
    requirement to timely file,” because “[a]ll employer adverse
    actions would be subject to reopening merely by continuing to
    request reinstatement, and then counting the time to file from
    each denial.”
    As to the decisions to transfer the Ombudsman to the
    OIG (Claims 7–8), the ALJ found them non-adverse to
    Kaufman as well. Kaufman had not shown that any of his
    Ombudsman duties would have been reinstated after a transfer
    in light of the December 14 memo: “[t]hus, the transfer of the
    Ombudsman had no effect on the future employment of
    Kaufman.”
    On November 30, 2011, the ARB affirmed the ALJ’s
    decision. It found that substantial evidence supported the
    ALJ’s determination that the EPA expressly removed
    Kaufman’s Ombudsman-related duties pursuant to Fields’s
    memo. It also affirmed the ALJ’s legal determination that
    Fields’s memo—as the final, definitive, and unequivocal
    notice of the EPA’s adverse action—marked the moment the
    limitations period began to run, and not the later
    consequences embodied in Claims 2–8. Thus, Kaufman’s
    claims were untimely.
    In his appeal to this Court, Kaufman challenges the
    portion of the ARB’s decision finding Claims 2–8 untimely.
    12
    II.    ANALYSIS
    A. Jurisdiction
    Four of the environmental statutes upon which Kaufman
    relies provide for judicial review in the circuit court in which
    either the complainant resides or transacts business or the
    environmental violation occurred.             See 
    42 U.S.C. § 7622
    (c)(1); 
    33 U.S.C. § 1367
    (b); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-
    9(i)(3)(A); 
    42 U.S.C. § 6971
    (b), 6976(b).            The fifth,
    CERCLA, designates district courts as the forum for
    reviewing Board decisions. See 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 9610
    (b),
    9613(b). However, courts of appeal may, for “judicial
    economy and consistency,” assume jurisdiction over a
    CERCLA retaliation claim as long as there is also jurisdiction
    under other environmental statutes. 29 C.F.R. 24.112(d),
    24.100(a). Kaufman is employed by the EPA in the District
    of Columbia, and his CERCLA retaliation claim stems from
    the same factual and legal background as his claims under the
    other statutes. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over
    Kaufman’s appeal.
    B. Standard of Review
    The Secretary rendered the decision under review
    pursuant to the employee protection provisions of the
    environmental statutes.        We review such decisions in
    accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),
    
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    . See 
    42 U.S.C. § 7622
    (c)(1); 42 U.S.C.
    § 300j-9(i)(3)(A); 
    42 U.S.C. § 6976
    (b); see also Carus Chem.
    Co. v. U.S. Envtl Prot. Agency, 
    395 F.3d 434
    , 441 (D.C. Cir.
    2005) (applying the APA to CERCLA claim in the absence of
    a specified standard of review). We overturn the Agency’s
    decision if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
    or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.
    13
    § 706(2)(A). We set aside the ARB’s factual findings “only if
    unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a
    whole.” Chippewa Dialysis Servs. v. Leavitt, 
    511 F.3d 172
    ,
    176 (D.C. Cir. 2007). It is an open question in this Circuit
    whether we afford Chevron deference to agency
    interpretations of statutes of limitations. See AKM LLC v.
    Sec’y of Labor, 
    675 F.3d 752
    , 754 (D.C. Cir. 2012). We need
    not resolve that question here. Substantial evidence supports
    the ARB’s factual findings, and given its factual findings, its
    legal conclusions follow under any standard.
    C. Disposition
    To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under the
    whistleblower statutes, Kaufman was required to prove: (1)
    that he engaged in protected activity; (2) that he suffered an
    adverse action; and (3) that the protected activity was a
    motivating factor in the adverse action. See, e.g., McGrath v.
    Clinton, 
    666 F.3d 1377
    , 1380 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 
    29 C.F.R. § 24.109
    . Critically, given that the ALJ and the Board
    dismissed the claims as being outside the statute of
    limitations, Kaufman was required to show that at least one of
    Claims 2–8 evidenced all the elements of a prima facie case
    on or after March 5, 2001. As the ALJ concluded, and we
    agree, none of the acts raised in Claims 2–8 alleged any
    adverse action suffered by Kaufman after that critical date.
    The original adverse action argued by Kaufman is the
    removal of his Ombudsman-related duties in Fields’s letter of
    December 14, 2000. We note at the outset that it is not crystal
    clear that the change of duties constitutes an adverse
    employment action within the meaning of whistleblower and
    other employment discrimination statutes. Cf. Brown v.
    Brody, 
    199 F.3d 446
    , 455 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (even when there
    is a “significant change in duties or responsibilities . . . there
    14
    must still be some kind of injury for a federal employee to
    state a claim”). Nonetheless, assuming for purposes of this
    decision that Kaufman’s allegation of the original charge
    raises such an adverse action, the ALJ, and the Board in
    affirming the ALJ, correctly determined that Kaufman
    suffered no adverse action by any of the subsequent responses
    from the EPA to his pleas for restoration of the duties.
    Kaufman couches his challenges to the ARB’s decision
    as two issues: first, that the Board did not analyze whether
    Claims 2–8 were motivated by independent retaliatory intent,
    and second, that the ARB applied the wrong standard for
    determining whether there was an adverse action. Logically,
    however, one determination governs both. If there was no
    adverse action evidenced in Claims 2–8, then the ALJ
    correctly dismissed those claims and the Board correctly
    affirmed. Substantial evidence supports the decision to
    dismiss those claims.
    The ARB concluded that Claims 2–8 set forth no adverse
    action on the finding that the EPA unequivocally barred
    Kaufman from performing Ombudsman duties on December
    14, 2000, and that neither Kaufman nor Martin was confused
    about the effect of that action. Substantial evidence supports
    this conclusion. On December 14, 2000, Fields met with
    Kaufman, and told Kaufman he would no longer be
    performing Ombudsman duties. He issued Kaufman a memo
    which could not have been clearer about its effect: “you will
    no longer perform any Ombdusman-related duties, effective
    immediately.” Shortly after this meeting, Kaufman spoke to
    the press about his removal, describing his “ouster” as
    “‘political revenge’ for his office’s damning revelations about
    failed Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore.”
    15
    If that were not enough, Shapiro reiterated time and again
    the finality of the EPA’s actions to both Kaufman and Martin.
    On January 31, 2001—after the change of administration—
    Kaufman asked Shapiro if he would be withdrawing Fields’s
    memo. Shapiro confirmed he would not. In early February,
    Martin requested Kaufman’s help to assist him with
    Ombudsman duties.         Shapiro rejected his request and
    readdressed the matter twice more on February 13 and
    February 21, reaffirming that Kaufman would not be assigned
    Ombudsman work. Finally, on February 23, 2001, Shapiro
    again reminded Kaufman that he was prohibited from
    performing Ombudsman duties.
    This review demonstrates the more than substantial
    evidence the ALJ had at hand to conclude that after the
    December 14 memo Kaufman “was in no position to be
    considered for assignment of Ombudsman functions.”
    Fields’s memo was clear and Shapiro never wavered in his
    commitment to its effect.
    Because Kaufman was barred from performing
    Ombudsman duties as of December 14, he could not have
    suffered adverse action through the EPA’s direct and indirect
    failure to subsequently assign him such work. The EPA’s
    decision to assign Stolls to the Ombudsman, its inquiries
    about recruiting efforts, its continuing refusal to assign
    Ombudsman work to Kaufman, and its memos to this effect
    (Claims 2–6) were not adverse to Kaufman. Thus the
    motivation behind these actions is immaterial.
    Moreover, the ARB correctly identified these subsequent
    actions as “delayed, but inevitable, consequence[s]” of the
    decision embodied in the Fields memo, and thus not
    themselves actionable. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 
    449 U.S. 250
    , 257–58 (1980). The ALJ likened Kaufman’s case to
    16
    Ricks in which the Supreme Court held that the allegedly
    discriminatory denial of tenure triggered the limitations
    period, not the eventual end of a professor’s employment as a
    result. 
    Id.
     In Ricks, “the only alleged discrimination
    occurred—and the filing limitations periods therefore
    commenced—at the time the tenure decision was made and
    communicated to Ricks.” 
    Id. at 258
    . This was so “even
    though one of the effects of the denial of tenure—the eventual
    loss of a teaching position—did not occur until later.” 
    Id.
    (emphasis in original).
    As the ALJ noted, the “proper focus is upon the time of
    the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the
    consequences of the acts became most painful.” 
    Id. at 258
    (emphasis in original, quotations omitted). Because the EPA
    actions underlying Claims 2–6 were no more than
    consequences of the December 14 memo, they were not
    themselves actionable. See also Jarmon v. Powell, 
    208 F. Supp. 2d 21
    , 30 (D.D.C. 2002) (employee’s claim that he was
    denied a promotion to a GS-15 position—for which he was
    ineligible due to an earlier allegedly discriminatory promotion
    denial—was “not an actionable violation in its own right”
    because the employee’s “subsequent ineligibility for the GS-
    15 promotion . . . [was] just ‘a delayed, but inevitable
    consequence’ of the non-promotion to GS-14”) (quoting
    Ricks, 
    449 U.S. at
    257–58).
    Kaufman’s Claims 7–8 fare no better. These two claims
    do not concern any employment action taken toward Kaufman
    at all. Kaufman bases these claims on the policy decision of
    the agency to transfer the EPA Ombudsman to the Office of
    the Inspector General, which Kaufman breaks into two parts:
    Claim 7, referring to the announcement to transfer the
    Ombudsman, and Claim 8, the eventual transfer. Again,
    assuming that such a reorganization could ever constitute an
    17
    employment action for purposes of a whistleblower claim,
    Kaufman has not established such a case here. Kaufman has
    not shown that any of his Ombudsman duties would have
    been reinstated after a transfer in light of the December 14
    memo. Even Kaufman concedes that he was prohibited from
    performing Ombudsman duties as of Shapiro’s March 16,
    2001 memorandum to him. Thus there is no way the
    reorganization could have been adverse action toward him.
    Perhaps a failure to reinstate might in some
    circumstances constitute an independent discriminatory act,
    but Kaufman’s case does not present such a scenario. True,
    courts have found failures to reinstate actionable in the face of
    uncertainty regarding the initial adverse action. Cf. Rich v.
    Associated Brands, Inc., 379 F. App’x 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2010)
    (suggesting failure to rehire can be independently actionable
    if employee does not receive “definite notice” that original
    termination foreclosed employment for foreseeable future).
    Similarly, courts have found failures to reinstate actionable
    given an intermediate change in the substantive policy that
    produced the initial firing. See, e.g., Inda v. United Air Lines,
    Inc., 
    565 F.2d 554
    , 557–58 (9th Cir. 1977). Finally, courts
    have found failures to reinstate actionable where a
    complainant can show disparate treatment or bias in the
    reinstatement process. See E.E.O.C. v. City of Norfolk Police
    Dep’t, 
    45 F.3d 80
    , 84 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[Plaintiff] asserts that
    . . . while similarly suspended white officers were
    immediately reinstated after criminal charges against them
    were dismissed, because of his race, Black, he was denied
    immediate reinstatement after the criminal charges against
    him were dismissed.”) (alterations and quotations omitted);
    Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 
    934 F.2d 388
    , 391 (1st Cir. 1991)
    (“Were Samuels able to establish the existence of unlawful
    bias in . . . hearing process or . . . decision, . . . refusal to
    reinstate . . . might provide a separate, actionable event under
    18
    title VII.”); E.E.O.C. v. Hall’s Motor Transit Co., 
    789 F.2d 1011
    , 1015 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Sharpe contended not that he had
    been denied an appeal nor that his appeal was not processed
    through the usual procedure, but that it was resolved on less
    favorable terms than those of younger employees.”).
    All of those cases evince features absent in Kaufman’s.
    Initial or subsequent uncertainty, or a defect in the
    reinstatement process, rendered the failure to reinstate
    independently adverse to the claimant. All of the employees
    in those cases could claim that, but for the later retaliatory
    action, they may have resumed the employment that was
    earlier terminated. Kaufman has failed to demonstrate any
    uncertainty about his prohibition. Since there was never in
    this case a termination, there was no reinstatement process,
    nor indeed any other process, let alone a defective process.
    Because his prohibition was clear from the beginning, and
    that clarity never abated, Kaufman has failed to demonstrate
    that any later actions were adverse. The ARB did not err in
    ending its analysis with this conclusion.
    Kaufman’s arguments that the acts complained of in
    Claims 2–8 commence the rerunning of the statute of
    limitations would effectively write the statutes of limitations
    out of the law. Congress cannot have intended in setting
    periods of limitation that claimants could begin the clock
    running anew simply by demanding the undoing of a time-
    barred employment action. Under Kaufman’s interpretation,
    the statute would never run. A terminated employee, whether
    or not he had a valid claim in his termination, cannot come
    back later and revive a barred claim simply by asking, “Am I
    still fired?” Neither can Kaufman recommence his period of
    limitations by declaring that the employing administration
    should reinvest him with his divested duties.
    19
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    denied.
    So ordered.
    1
    SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: I
    concur in the court’s decision to deny Kaufman’s petition for
    review. I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s
    reasons for rejecting Kaufman’s claims. I write separately to
    clarify the circumstances in which, as I see it, an employer’s
    refusal to reinstate an employee to his former position might be
    independently actionable.
    To state a claim under federal antiretaliation laws, an
    employee must show that he suffered a materially adverse action
    by his employer that was causally linked to his statutorily
    protected activity. Ante, at 13; accord Howard R.L. Cook &
    Tommy Shaw Found. for Black Emps. of the Library of Cong.,
    Inc. v. Billington, 
    737 F.3d 767
    , 772 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also
    Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 
    133 S. Ct. 2517
    , 2532-33
    (2013). If the employer articulates a “legitimate nonretaliatory
    reason” for the adverse action, the employee must establish that
    the employer’s proffered reason for the action is “pretext.”
    Holcomb v. Powell, 
    433 F.3d 889
    , 901 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The
    requirements for a retaliation claim largely track the
    requirements for a discrimination claim, although in the
    discrimination context, the employee must show that the adverse
    action was connected to his membership in a statutorily
    protected class rather than to his statutorily protected activity.
    See Gilbert v. Napolitano, 
    670 F.3d 258
    , 261-62 (D.C. Cir.
    2012).
    The majority assumes that EPA’s original decision to
    prohibit Kaufman from performing Ombudsman-related duties
    was “adverse” to Kaufman. Ante, at 14.* The majority then goes
    * The majority suggests that it is “not crystal clear” that EPA’s
    original decision to bar Kaufman from performing Ombudsman-
    related work would constitute an “adverse” action under federal
    antiretaliation laws. Ante, at 13. But the case that the majority cites
    2
    on to conclude that EPA’s later actions denying reinstatement of
    Kaufman’s Ombudsman duties failed to constitute adverse
    actions and that any claims arising from those subsequent
    actions were therefore untimely. Although I agree that
    Kaufman’s claims concerning those subsequent actions are
    deficient and that the ARB’s rejection of those claims should be
    affirmed, I part ways with the majority on the rationale by which
    to reach that conclusion.
    This case began when Kaufman initially filed his
    whistleblower complaint on April 3, 2001. The limitations
    for this claim, Brown v. Brody, 
    199 F.3d 446
     (D.C. Cir. 1999),
    appears to have been superseded on that point by a later Supreme
    Court decision. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 
    548 U.S. 53
    , 68 (2006) (action is “adverse” under Title VII antiretaliation
    provision if “it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
    making or supporting a charge of discrimination”) (internal quotation
    marks omitted); see also Steele v. Schafer, 
    535 F.3d 689
    , 695-96 (D.C.
    Cir. 2008) (district court erred by relying on Brody standard rather
    than Burlington Northern standard). The Secretary of Labor, the
    respondent in this case, acknowledges that “Kaufman suffered an
    actionable harm when the EPA barred him from performing
    Ombudsman duties.” Resp’t Br. 43. The Secretary’s recognition is
    unsurprising, as EPA’s decision to prohibit Kaufman from performing
    Ombudsman-related work falls squarely within the now-settled
    understanding of an “adverse action” in the retaliation context. See
    generally Baird v. Gotbaum, 
    662 F.3d 1246
    , 1248-50 (D.C. Cir.
    2011). And while transfer to a materially less favorable set of
    responsibilities would itself suffice to constitute an adverse action,
    Kaufman also contends that EPA’s decision to bar him from
    performing Ombudsman work had the effect of preventing his
    promotion from a GS-14 salary level to a GS-15 level. A forced
    transfer resulting in denial of a salary increase readily qualifies as
    “adverse” under any definition. See Burlington Northern, 
    548 U.S. at 68
    ; Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 
    536 U.S. 101
    , 114 (2002).
    3
    period under federal antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws
    starts to run when the challenged action is made and the
    employee is notified. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 
    449 U.S. 250
    ,
    259 (1980). Here, Kaufman had been informed on December
    14, 2000, in the Fields memorandum, that he could no longer
    perform Ombudsman work. The 30-day limitations period for
    any claim based on the original decision to remove Kaufman’s
    Ombudsman duties thus expired on January 13, 2001, well
    before Kaufman filed his complaint. Kaufman nevertheless
    initially asserted such a claim, but the ARB found it untimely,
    and Kaufman does not appeal that determination.
    His appeal instead concerns seven claims (Claims 2-8)
    arising from later actions by EPA that, as Kaufman sees it,
    manifest EPA’s subsequent refusal to reinstate him to his
    Ombudsman responsibilities. Ante, at 9. Two of the claims
    (Claims 7 and 8) pertain to EPA’s decision to transfer
    Ombudsman functions to the Office of Inspector General. The
    ALJ found that “the transfer of the Ombudsman had no effect on
    the future employment of Kaufman,” ALJ’s Decision & Order
    at 43, and I see no reason to reject that factual determination.
    The remaining claims (Claims 2-6) concern actions taken by
    EPA in March, April, and May 2001, declining to reinstate
    Kaufman’s Ombudsman duties and assigning those
    responsibilities elsewhere. Kaufman alleges that, in refusing to
    reinstate him to his former role, EPA retaliated against him for
    his protected whistleblower activities.
    The majority allows that “[p]erhaps a failure to reinstate
    might in some circumstances constitute an independent
    discriminatory act.” Ante, at 17. That is undoubtedly the case.
    See Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 
    443 F.3d 1050
    , 1060 (9th Cir. 2006)
    (“[W]e join the First, Third, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh
    Circuits and expressly recognize discriminatory failure to
    reinstate as a separately actionable claim.” (collecting cases)).
    4
    Even if an employer’s original decision to transfer or terminate
    an employee is entirely legitimate—or, as here, is immune from
    challenge because of the running of the limitations period—the
    employer’s subsequent refusal to reinstate the employee to his
    former position or responsibilities, if itself motivated by
    discriminatory or retaliatory animus, is actionable in its own
    right. The employer’s invulnerability for its original adverse
    action affords no free pass to engage in discrimination or
    retaliation when asked to reverse that action. The majority thus
    correctly includes, in its nonexhaustive list of situations in which
    a failure to reinstate might be independently actionable,
    circumstances “where a complainant can show disparate
    treatment or bias in the reinstatement” decision. Ante, at 17.
    Kaufman’s allegations fit in that category because they
    allege retaliatory bias in the EPA’s denial of reinstatement.
    Those claims fail, but, respectfully, not for the reasons cited by
    the majority. In the course of explaining its rejection of
    Kaufman’s claims, the majority observes that, “[s]ince there was
    never in this case a termination, there was no reinstatement
    process, nor indeed any other process, let alone a defective
    process.” Id. at 18. But the majority ultimately does not—and
    could not—rest on the absence of a “termination.” While
    Kaufman was never fired from his position, he was divested of
    his Ombudsman-related duties. And the Supreme Court draws
    no distinction for discrimination or retaliation purposes between
    “termination” and other adverse actions such as “failure to
    promote” or “denial of transfer.” See Morgan, 
    536 U.S. at 114
    .
    Nor does—or could—the majority ultimately hinge its decision
    on the absence of any formal “reinstatement process.” The
    denial of reinstatement can give rise to a claim if grounded in
    discriminatory or retaliatory bias, regardless of whether any
    formal process attends the denial. Indeed, one of the cases cited
    by the majority in setting out when reinstatement claims might
    be made, EEOC v. City of Norfolk Police Department, 
    45 F.3d
                                    5
    80 (4th Cir. 1995) (cited ante, at 17), establishes that refusal of
    reinstatement through informal means can be actionable. See
    Norfolk Police, 
    45 F.3d at 84-85
     (holding that where white
    police officers were customarily reinstated immediately after
    criminal charges against them were dropped, while an African-
    American officer was required to complete a formal
    administrative appeal process, EEOC can pursue a
    discrimination claim against the police department for failing to
    reinstate the African-American officer through informal
    procedures).
    The majority ultimately rests its decision on the conclusion
    that EPA’s actions denying reinstatement to Kaufman do not
    constitute adverse actions, and that the “motivation behind these
    actions” is thus “immaterial.” Ante, at 15. I fail to see how that
    could be the case. Indeed, the majority—correctly—assumes
    that EPA’s original removal of Kaufman’s Ombudsman
    functions qualifies as an adverse action. Id. at 14. If so, the later
    refusal to reinstate precisely the same functions should equally
    count as an adverse action, no less than a refusal to rehire a
    previously terminated employee surely constitutes an adverse
    action. The question, then, is whether the adverse action was
    undertaken for an illicit reason. The motivation behind the
    EPA’s denial of reinstatement here, consequently, is very much
    material. Considering the question of motivation to be
    “immaterial,” in my respectful view, unduly complicates the
    resolution of reinstatement cases and deflects attention away
    from what should be the central issue: whether the denial of
    reinstatement was motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory
    bias.
    I believe Kaufman’s claims run aground on that issue. In
    certain cases, an employer’s refusal to reinstate an employee to
    his former role may be motivated by the employer’s adherence
    to its prior decision. And an employer’s policy of declining to
    6
    revisit previous personnel decisions could constitute a
    legitimate, nonretaliatory, and non-pretextual reason for refusing
    to reinstate the employee. See, e.g., Collins v. Henderson, 
    180 F.3d 988
    , 989-90 (8th Cir. 1999) (where plant manager said that,
    “‘[i]n the interest of fairness and consistent treatment of all
    employees,’” the plant “‘does not entertain reinstatements or
    transfers of personnel who have previously been released,’” the
    plant manager’s explanation qualified as a “legitimate
    nondiscriminatory reason” for his decision). Moreover, an
    employer’s refusal to reinstate an employee “cannot resurrect the
    old discriminatory act.” Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 
    755 F.2d 893
    , 894 (11th Cir. 1985). For the failure to reinstate to be
    actionable in its own right, there must be “a new and discrete act
    of discrimination in the refusal to [reinstate] itself.” Id.; see also
    Poolaw v. City of Anadarko, 
    660 F.2d 459
    , 465 (10th Cir. 1981)
    (employee’s “allegation that his post-termination treatment was
    discriminatory is a claim separate and distinct from his
    allegation of discriminatory discharge”).
    Applying those principles to Kaufman’s case, I believe
    Kaufman would be able to assert a viable retaliation claim based
    on EPA’s denial of reinstatement if he could establish that the
    refusal was itself motivated by retaliatory intent. For instance,
    if Kaufman could show that the new EPA Administrator had
    reversed other personnel decisions made under her predecessor,
    and if Kaufman could further show that the Administrator
    refused to reinstate Kaufman because of his whistleblowing
    activities, Kaufman’s retaliation claim might well succeed. By
    contrast, if EPA declined to reconsider the merits of the
    December 2000 Fields memorandum because it adhered to prior
    personnel decisions as a matter of policy, the refusal to reinstate
    Kaufman in the spring of 2001 presumably would not be a
    discrete retaliatory act. As I see it, this case therefore comes
    down to whether the Department of Labor, as the agency that
    adjudicated Kaufman’s claims, afforded adequate consideration
    7
    to Kaufman’s argument that EPA refused to reinstate him for
    retaliatory reasons.
    In the proceedings before the ALJ, Kaufman alleged that
    EPA did reconsider the merits of the December 2000 decision
    and that its refusal to reinstate him was retaliatory in its own
    right. EPA, for its part, argued that it “simply reiterated” the
    December 2000 decision without ever revisiting it. Resp’t Post-
    Hr’g Br. 3. The ALJ considered these arguments and credited
    EPA’s version of events. See ALJ’s Decision & Order at 43
    (finding that EPA’s actions with respect to Kaufman in March
    2001 and thereafter were “the consequences of Fields’ December
    memo precluding Kaufman from performing the Ombudsman
    duties”). The ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial
    evidence and provides a sufficient basis for upholding the
    Department of Labor’s decision.
    At times, however, the ALJ suggested that EPA’s refusal to
    reinstate Kaufman in the spring of 2001 was not “adverse” to
    him, and the ARB affirmed the ALJ with little independent
    analysis. While those references, for the reasons explained,
    introduced unnecessary confusion into the case, “we will uphold
    a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may
    reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-
    Best Freight Sys., Inc., 
    419 U.S. 281
    , 286 (1974); accord Wis.
    Pub. Power, Inc. v. FERC, 
    493 F.3d 239
    , 273 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
    (per curiam) (“Although FERC’s wording may have been less
    than precise on this point, the agency’s path may reasonably be
    discerned . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Nat’l
    Treasury Emps. Union v. FLRA, 
    835 F.2d 1446
    , 1450 n.4 (D.C.
    Cir. 1987) (denying petition for review where “the substantive
    thrust of our reasoning accords with that of the [agency]”).
    Accordingly, my own view is that, with respect to the claims
    concerning EPA’s refusal to reinstate Kaufman in the spring of
    2001, the petition for review should be denied because Kaufman
    8
    has failed to show that EPA’s proffered reason for its
    refusal—adherence to the prior personnel decision—was pretext
    for retaliatory animus. I would not hold, however, that Kaufman
    “failed to demonstrate that [the refusals to reinstate him] were
    adverse.” Ante, at 18.
    Nor, finally, would I hold that Claims 2 through 6,
    concerning EPA’s challenged March-May 2001 actions, “were
    barred by the relevant statutes of limitation.” Id. at 2. There is
    no contention that Kaufman filed (or amended) his complaint
    more than 30 days after the allegedly retaliatory actions about
    which he complains. Claims 2 through 6 all refer to events on
    or after March 5, 2001, and Kaufman filed his first complaint on
    April 3. As a matter of straightforward arithmetic, Kaufman’s
    claims face no limitations bar.            His claims may be
    unmeritorious, but they are not untimely. And those two
    questions should be kept distinct in light of the particular interest
    in maintaining a straightforward approach when addressing
    statutes-of-limitations questions at the threshold. See, e.g.,
    Gonzalez v. Thaler, 
    132 S. Ct. 641
    , 655 (2012); Wilson v.
    Garcia, 
    471 U.S. 261
    , 275 (1985).
    The majority states that, if a refusal to reinstate can
    “commence the rerunning of the statute of limitations” in the
    circumstances of this case, that “would effectively write the
    statutes of limitations out of the law.” Ante, at 18. I respectfully
    disagree.      Many circuits recognize that the denial of
    reinstatement is independently actionable if motivated by
    discriminatory or retaliatory bias, see Josephs, 
    443 F.3d at 1060
    ,
    and there is no indication that courts in those circuits have been
    deluged with claims concerning long-ago events. It is true that
    a terminated employee cannot “revive a barred claim simply by
    asking, ‘Am I still fired?’” Ante, at 18. An employee could not
    get past the limitations bar by attempting to “revive a barred
    claim,” but instead would need to raise a new claim alleging new
    9
    discrimination connected to a new action (that of denying
    reinstatement). An employee who can do so should be permitted
    to proceed. If his employer refused to reinstate him for reasons
    proscribed by Congress, the fact that he had already suffered an
    adverse action at some previous point should pose no limitations
    bar against his bringing a new claim based on the new
    discriminatory or retaliatory act. That is what Kaufman attempts
    to do here. His claims fail on the merits for the reasons
    explained, but not for failure to bring them on time.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-1036

Filed Date: 3/14/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014

Authorities (21)

Gonzalez v. Thaler , 132 S. Ct. 641 ( 2012 )

University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar , 133 S. Ct. 2517 ( 2013 )

Edwina SAMUELS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. RAYTHEON ... , 934 F.2d 388 ( 1991 )

national-treasury-employees-union-v-federal-labor-relations-authority , 835 F.2d 1446 ( 1987 )

16-fair-emplpraccas-251-15-empl-prac-dec-p-7956-kathleen-c-inda , 565 F.2d 554 ( 1977 )

27-fair-emplpraccas-1022-27-empl-prac-dec-p-32123-bruce-poolaw-v , 660 F.2d 459 ( 1981 )

Wilson v. Garcia , 105 S. Ct. 1938 ( 1985 )

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White , 126 S. Ct. 2405 ( 2006 )

Baird v. Gotbaum , 662 F.3d 1246 ( 2011 )

Steele v. Schafer , 535 F.3d 689 ( 2008 )

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hall's Motor ... , 789 F.2d 1011 ( 1986 )

Jarmon v. Powell , 208 F. Supp. 2d 21 ( 2002 )

Brown, Regina C. v. Brody, Kenneth D. , 199 F.3d 446 ( 1999 )

Delaware State College v. Ricks , 101 S. Ct. 498 ( 1980 )

Mable Y. BURNAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMOCO CONTAINER ... , 755 F.2d 893 ( 1985 )

Wisconsin Public Power Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory ... , 493 F.3d 239 ( 2007 )

No. 98-4009 , 180 F.3d 988 ( 1999 )

Carus Chemical Co. v. United States Environmental ... , 395 F.3d 434 ( 2005 )

Holcomb, Christine v. Powell, Donald , 433 F.3d 889 ( 2006 )

Akm LLC v. Secretary of Labor, Dept. of Labor , 675 F.3d 752 ( 2012 )

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