Kornitzky Group, LLC v. Daniel Elwell ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                                
    United States Court of Appeals
    )257+(',675,&72)&2/80%,$&,5&8,7
    
    BBBBBBB
    
    ),/('-DQXDU\
    
    1R
    
    .251,7=.<*5283//&'%$$(52%($5,1*6//&
    3(7,7,21(5
    
    Y
    
    '$1,(/.(/:(//$&7,1*$'0,1,675$725)('(5$/
    $9,$7,21$'0,1,675$7,21$1'1$7,21$/
    75$163257$7,216$)(7<%2$5'
    5(6321'(176
    
    BBBBBBB
    
    2Q0RWLRQIRU6WD\RI2UDO$UJXPHQW
    'XHWR/DSVHLQ$SSURSULDWLRQVDQG
    0RWLRQIRU([SHGLWHG&RQVLGHUDWLRQ
    
    BBBBBBB
    
        %HIRUH65,1,9$6$1
    Circuit JudgeDQG(':$5'6
    DQG
    5$1'2/3+
    Senior Circuit Judges
           
    25'(5
    
        8SRQFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHPRWLRQRIUHVSRQGHQW)$$IRU
    VWD\RIRUDODUJXPHQWGXHWRODSVHLQDSSURSULDWLRQVDQGWKH
    RSSRVLWLRQWKHUHWRDQGWKHPRWLRQRISHWLWLRQHUIRUH[SHGLWHG
    FRQVLGHUDWLRQLWLV
    
    
    
        25'(5('WKDWWKHPRWLRQIRUVWD\RIRUDODUJXPHQWEH
    GHQLHG,WLV
    
        )857+(5 25'(5(' WKDW WKH PRWLRQ IRU H[SHGLWHG
    FRQVLGHUDWLRQEHGLVPLVVHGDVPRRW
    
    3HU&XULDP
    
                              )257+(&2857
                              0DUN-/DQJHU&OHUN
    
                          %<V.HQ0HDGRZV-U
                              'HSXW\&OHUN
    
    $VWDWHPHQWE\&LUFXLW-XGJH6ULQLYDVDQDQG6HQLRU&LUFXLW
    -XGJH(GZDUGVFRQFXUULQJLQWKHGHQLDORIWKHPRWLRQIRUVWD\
    RIRUDODUJXPHQWLVDWWDFKHG
    
    6HQLRU&LUFXLW-XGJH5DQGROSKZRXOGJUDQWWKHPRWLRQ$
    VWDWHPHQWE\6HQLRU&LUFXLW-XGJH5DQGROSKGLVVHQWLQJIURP
    WKHGHQLDORIWKHPRWLRQIRUVWD\RIRUDODUJXPHQWLVDWWDFKHG
    
    BBBBBBB
    
    
        65,1,9$6$1Circuit JudgeDQG(':$5'6Senior Circuit
    JudgeFRQFXUULQJLQWKHGHQLDORIWKHPRWLRQ
    
        7KH $QWLGHILFLHQF\ $FW SURYLGHV WKDW ³>D@Q RIILFHU RU
    HPSOR\HHRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV*RYHUQPHQWRURIWKH'LVWULFWRI
    &ROXPELD JRYHUQPHQW PD\ QRW DFFHSW YROXQWDU\ VHUYLFHV IRU
    HLWKHUJRYHUQPHQWRUHPSOR\SHUVRQDOVHUYLFHVH[FHHGLQJWKDW
    DXWKRUL]HGE\ODZH[FHSWIRUHPHUJHQFLHVLQYROYLQJWKHVDIHW\
    RIKXPDQOLIHRUWKHSURWHFWLRQRISURSHUW\´86&†
    
        7KH'HSDUWPHQWRI-XVWLFHKDVLVVXHGDFRQWLQJHQF\SODQ
    VHWWLQJ IRUWK WKH 'HSDUWPHQW¶V SODQQHG RSHUDWLRQV GXULQJ D
    ODSVH LQ DSSURSULDWLRQV LQ )LVFDO 31 U.S.C. § 1342
    ,1 its attorneys “are prohibited from working,
    even on a voluntary basis, except in very limited circumstances,
    including ‘emergencies involving the safety of human life or the
    protection of property.’” Mot. Stay Oral Arg. 2 (quoting id.).
    What then is the rationale for denying the FAA’s motion?
    It cannot be that having oral argument in this case on
    January 11, 2019, will avert some emergency within the
    meaning of § 1342. An opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel
    concludes, correctly I believe, that “the emergencies exception
    applies only to cases of threat to human life or property where
    the threat can be reasonably said to be near at hand and
    demanding of immediate response.” Government Operations in
    the Event of a Lapse in Appropriations, 
    1995 WL 17216091
    , at
    *7 (O.L.C. Aug. 16, 1995). Holding oral argument January 11
    is not a necessary response to some imminent threat to human
    life or property. (There may have been an emergency at the
    1
    Section 1342 states, in relevant part: “An officer or employee
    of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia
    government may not accept voluntary services for either government
    or employ personal services exceeding that authorized by law except
    for emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection
    of property.”
    2
    administrative stage of this case regarding the safety of
    equipment petitioner repaired, but that emergency passed when
    the FAA revoked petitioner’s certificate.)
    Perhaps the idea is that the Judiciary is free to disregard the
    restrictions of § 1342. But it seems to me that a federal court
    may refuse to comply with this statute only if it is
    unconstitutional. Given the Appropriations Clause of the
    Constitution, the constitutionality of § 1342 is beyond doubt.
    Or perhaps the idea is that because § 1342 contains the
    clause “exceeding that authorized by law,” judges may
    circumvent the statutory restriction by authorizing federal
    officers and employees to show up in court. This, of course, is
    blatant bootstrapping. A court order requiring or authorizing a
    government attorney’s presence may immunize the attorney
    from the sanctions for violating § 1342. See 
    31 U.S.C. § 1349
    .
    But it does not relieve the court from its responsibility to comply
    with the law. The “authorized-by-law” clause has been on the
    statute books for nearly 200 years, and it has a settled meaning.
    Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During
    a Temporary Lapse in Appropriations, 43 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen.
    293, 296 & n.5 (1981). It does not confer a license on the
    Judiciary. Instead, the clause requires legal authority for the
    obligation of public funds, either from appropriations or other
    relevant statutes, or – in the case of Executive authority – from
    the Constitution itself. 
    Id.
     at 295–301.2
    2
    The Department of Justice “construe[d] the ‘authorized by law’
    exception contained within 31 U.S.C. § [1342] as exempting from the
    prohibition enacted by the second clause of that section not only those
    obligations in advance of appropriations for which express or implied
    authority may be found in the enactments of Congress, but also those
    obligations necessarily incident to presidential intiatives [sic]
    undertaken within his constitutional powers.” Id. at 301.
    3
    The majority opinion, which itself contains no legal
    analysis, relies on orders denying stays during shutdowns.3 But
    those orders also contain no legal analysis. The majority’s
    argument must be that because we have denied these stay
    motions in the past we should do so again. Charles Dickens had
    a few words about this form of argumentation: “‘Whatever is is
    right’; an aphorism that would be as final as it is lazy, did it not
    include the troublesome consequence, that nothing that ever
    was, was wrong.” Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities 65
    (Signet Classics) (1859).
    3
    On the other hand, the Administrative Office of United States
    Courts, in a press release on January 7, 2019, reported that federal
    courts, in response to motions of the Department of Justice, “have
    issued orders suspending, postponing, or holding in abeyance civil
    cases in which the government is a party for a limited period, subject
    to further consideration, or until appropriated funds become
    available.” Press Release, United States Courts, Judiciary Operating
    on Limited Funds During Shutdown (Jan. 7, 2019). See also Estate of
    Klieman v. Palestinian Authority, No. 15-7034 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 3, 2019)
    (per curiam order), granting the Justice Department’s § 1342 motion
    for a stay of a briefing deadline in light of the government shutdown.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-1160

Filed Date: 1/9/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/9/2019