MO Public Service Commission v. FERC ( 2010 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued February 19, 2010               Decided April 13, 2010
    No. 09-1121
    MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
    PETITIONER
    v.
    FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
    RESPONDENT
    MUNICIPAL GAS COMMISSION OF MISSOURI, ET AL.,
    INTERVENORS
    On Petition for Review of Orders
    of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
    Lera L. Shemwell argued the cause for petitioner. With her
    on the briefs were Samuel D. Ritchie, Kathleen L. Mazure, and
    Jason T. Gray.
    Holly E. Cafer, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory
    Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the
    brief were Thomas R. Sheets, General Counsel, and Robert H.
    Solomon, Solicitor.
    Before: HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and
    EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    2
    Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    EDWARDS.
    EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: In June 2006, Missouri
    Interstate Gas, LLC (“MIG”), along with two state-regulated
    intrastate pipelines, Missouri Gas Company, LLC (“MGC”) and
    Missouri Pipeline Company, LLC (“MPC”), applied to the
    Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or
    “Commission”) for a certificate of public convenience and
    necessity (“certificate”) pursuant to § 7 of the Natural Gas Act
    (“NGA”), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c), to reorganize into one interstate,
    federally regulated natural gas company called MoGas Pipeline,
    LLC (“MoGas”). After approving the merger and issuing the
    certificate, the Commission authorized initial rates for service on
    the combined facilities of the new entity. The Missouri Public
    Service Commission (“MoPSC”) challenged MoGas’s proposed
    initial rates on a number of grounds. These included claims that
    the proposed rates passed on to consumers contained certain
    “acquisition premium” costs associated with asset purchases by
    MIG as well as acquisition premiums associated with MGC and
    MPC. Under established FERC precedent, such premiums are
    disallowed, unless the agency applies the so-called “benefits
    exception.” See Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 
    178 F.3d 533
    , 536-37 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Kan. Pipeline Co., 81 F.E.R.C.
    ¶ 61,005 (1997).
    FERC sustained MoPSC’s objections to the acquisition
    premiums embedded in the costs associated with MGC and
    MPC. However, the Commission initially declined to address
    MoPSC’s challenge to the alleged acquisition premium
    embedded in the costs associated with the MIG pipeline. See
    Mo. Interstate Gas, LLC, 119 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,074 (2007) (“2007
    Order”). Later, upon denying a request for rehearing on this
    issue, see Mo. Interstate Gas, LLC, 122 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,136
    (2008) (“2008 Order”), FERC clarified its intention to allow
    MoGas’s initial rates to stand, relying on an earlier order issued
    3
    in 2002 in which FERC allowed MIG to include the disputed
    costs in its own initial rates, see Mo. Interstate Gas, LLC, 100
    F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,312 (2002) (“2002 Order”).
    In its petition for review before this court, MoPSC argues
    that FERC’s decision regarding the inclusion of acquisition
    premium costs in MoGas’s initial rates is arbitrary and
    capricious. We agree. FERC’s action is plainly inconsistent
    with its own precedents. It is also inconsistent with the agency’s
    treatment of the acquisition premiums embedded in the costs
    associated with MGC and MPC, with respect to which MoPSC’s
    objections were sustained. FERC’s claim that it properly
    deferred consideration of the disputed acquisition premium issue
    to an NGA § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 717c, proceeding is unavailing.
    MoPSC submitted evidence to FERC during the § 7 proceeding
    to demonstrate the existence of an improper acquisition
    premium and MoGas did not contest it or otherwise attempt to
    justify the alleged acquisition premium. “[B]oth the Supreme
    Court and this circuit have made clear that the Commission has
    a duty to use its § 7 power to protect consumers. . . . Indeed, the
    Commission’s ‘usual practice in Section 7 certificate
    proceedings’ is to ‘apply[], to the extent practicable, the same
    ratemaking policies that it applies in Section 4 rate cases.’” Mo.
    Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 
    337 F.3d 1066
    , 1070-71 (D.C. Cir.
    2003) (quoting Kan. Pipeline Co., 97 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,168 at
    61,785 (2001)); see also Maritimes & Ne. Pipeline, LLC, 84
    F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,130 at 61,683 (1998). There is nothing in FERC’s
    decision to suggest that it would have been impracticable to
    address the MIG acquisition premium issue in the § 7
    proceeding, yet FERC failed to do so. Because the agency’s
    decision is the antithesis of “reasoned decisonmaking,”
    Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    522 U.S. 359
    , 375
    (1998), we grant the petition for review, vacate FERC’s order
    with respect to the alleged acquisition premium issue regarding
    MIG, and remand the case for a prompt resolution of the
    question of the alleged acquisition premium.
    4
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
    Under the NGA, 
    15 U.S.C. § 717
     et seq., FERC closely
    supervises the sale and transport of natural gas in interstate
    commerce. Under § 7 of the NGA, natural gas companies must
    obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from
    FERC before constructing, acquiring, or operating interstate
    natural gas pipelines. In the context of granting such a
    certificate, FERC sets initial rates governing the sale price of
    natural gas transported in the pipeline. Initial rates proposed by
    a new pipeline are approved if the agency finds that they are in
    the “‘public interest.’” See Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
    337 F.3d at 1068
     (quoting Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
    360 U.S. 378
    , 390-91 (1959)). “Initial rates ‘offer a temporary
    mechanism to protect the public interest until the regular rate
    setting provisions’ [of the NGA] . . . come into play.”
    
    Id.
     (quoting Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. Fed. Power
    Comm’n, 
    534 F.2d 952
    , 956 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). These regular
    rate setting provisions are codified under § 4 and § 5 of the
    NGA. Section 4 allows pipelines to initiate proceedings to set
    or modify permanent rates, while § 5 allows FERC to do so on
    its own authority. Permanent rates established under § 4 and § 5
    proceedings are governed by the “just and reasonable” standard.
    See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d; see also Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
    
    337 F.3d at 1068
     (comparing “just and reasonable” and “public
    interest” standards).
    B. Creation and Certification of MIG
    MIG was first created in 2002 pursuant to a plan to convert
    a decommissioned oil pipeline into an interstate natural gas
    pipeline. When MIG sought certification from FERC, MoPSC
    challenged the pipeline’s proposed initial rates, arguing that they
    contained an improper acquisition premium. “Generally, when
    establishing the cost of service upon which a pipeline’s
    5
    regulated rates are based, FERC employs ‘original cost’
    principles” to determine what costs should be passed on to
    consumers. Rio Grande Pipeline Co., 
    178 F.3d at 536
    . “Under
    these principles, when a facility is acquired by one regulated
    entity from another, the seller’s depreciated original cost is
    included in the cost-of-service computations, even though the
    price paid by the purchaser may exceed that amount.” 
    Id.
     Any
    cost above the depreciated original cost (a term that is
    alternately referred to as the “net book value”) is known as an
    acquisition premium. Under established FERC precedent, such
    premiums are disallowed, unless the agency applies its so-called
    “benefits exception” to this general rule. See id.; Kan. Pipeline
    Co., 81 F.E.R.C. at ¶ 61,005. As the agency explained in its
    Kansas Pipeline case:
    The Commission has, with limited exception, considered
    amounts in excess of the net book value to be an acquisition
    premium that should be absorbed by the shareholders. The
    original cost policy is an old and accepted concept of public
    utility regulation. The Commission has allowed exceptions
    to this rule but, only when the purchaser has demonstrated
    specific dollar benefits resulting directly from the sale.
    However, the benefits must be tangible, non-speculative,
    and quantifiable in monetary terms. The burden of proof
    for a utility seeking to demonstrate specific dollar amounts
    is heavy.
    Id. at 61,018 (footnotes omitted).
    In 2002, when it approved MIG’s proposed initial rates, see
    2002 Order, 100 F.E.R.C. at 61,312, FERC noted that MIG
    “represent[ed] that the acquisition cost [reported by MIG for use
    in FERC’s initial rate calculation was] the depreciated net book
    value of” the idled oil pipeline and its related assets as charged
    by the pipeline’s seller, UtiliCorp United, Inc., id. at 62,396.
    After highlighting the fact that MoPSC had approved the sale of
    the decommissioned oil pipeline assets to MIG as an “arms-
    6
    length sale transaction between . . . non-affiliated parties” and
    the fact that “the facilities will be devoted to gas utility service
    for the first time,” FERC declined to further evaluate whether
    MIG’s initial rates should be reduced due to the alleged
    acquisition premium. Id. However, FERC directed MIG to file
    a cost and revenue study assuming the burden of proof on a
    number of issues, including the acquisition premium issue,
    related to the permanent rates that would govern MIG’s
    operations going forward. Id. at 62,400. On March 17, 2006,
    after MIG submitted the required study, see 2007 Order, 119
    F.E.R.C. at 61,474-75 (describing MIG’s 2006 filing under
    FERC Docket No. RP06-274-000 (“2006 Docket Entry”)),
    MoPSC filed a protest, contesting, among other things, the
    continuation of the alleged acquisition premium.
    C. Creation and Certification of MoGas
    In June 2006, before the contested issues relating to the
    2006 Docket Entry could be resolved, MIG applied – along with
    two state-regulated intrastate pipelines, MGC and MPC – to
    reorganize into MoGas, a single, new federally regulated
    interstate natural gas company. MoPSC filed an opposition to
    MoGas’s application in the § 7 proceeding, challenging
    MoGas’s proposed initial rates on a number of grounds.
    MoPSC’s objections included, inter alia, claims that MoGas’s
    proposed initial rates included an improper acquisition premium
    carried over from the initial MIG rates established in 2002.
    MoPSC further claimed that the proposed initial rates also
    included improper acquisition premiums embedded in the costs
    associated with MGC and MPC.
    In 2007, FERC approved initial rates for MoGas. See 2007
    Order, 119 F.E.R.C. at 61,074. The agency sustained MoPSC’s
    objections to the acquisition premiums embedded in the costs
    associated with MGC and MPC. In rejecting these acquisition
    premiums, FERC noted that, under the benefits exception, “the
    pipeline has the burden of establishing the dollar amount of the
    7
    benefits alleged to have been conferred upon the consumers,”
    and that MoGas “provided no evidence in support of the benefits
    of the[se two] acquisition premium[s].” Id. at 61,467 (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    FERC, however, declined to direct MoGas to remove the
    alleged acquisition premium embedded in the costs associated
    with the MIG pipeline. The agency asserted that the issues
    regarding MIG which had been raised by MoPSC in the context
    of the 2006 Docket Entry were now “moot.” Id. at 61,474. In
    other words, FERC noted that, with the issuance of a certificate
    to the merged entity, “Missouri Interstate will cease to exist as
    a separate interstate pipeline and will no longer charge separate
    rates.” Id. Thus, the Commission saw no imperative to resolve
    the MIG acquisition premium issue pending in the 2006 Docket
    Entry in the context of MoGas’s § 7 proceeding. FERC said
    nothing else regarding this issue in its 2007 Order, though it did
    direct MoGas to file a § 4 rate case proceeding within 18 months
    to finalize its rates. Id. at 61,471-72.
    On May 21, 2007, MoPSC filed a request for rehearing,
    asking FERC to reconsider several issues, including the alleged
    acquisition premium embedded in the MIG component of the
    new pipeline’s initial rates. Request for Rehearing, or, in the
    Alternative, Clarification of the Missouri Public Service
    Commission (May 21, 2007), reprinted in Joint Appendix
    (“J.A.”) 197-236. In its rehearing order of February 19, 2008,
    FERC granted rehearing with respect to certain issues but denied
    rehearing on the MIG acquisition premium issue. See 2008
    Order, 122 F.E.R.C. at 61,136. The Commission contended that
    (1) addressing the issue would “turn this certificate proceeding
    into a rate proceeding” requiring more time-consuming
    procedures; (2) that MoPSC wanted FERC to “cherry pick one
    issue from [MIG]’s cost and revenue study and expend
    resources here to scrutinize” it; and (3) that initial rates are
    approved “based on estimates.” Id. at 61,704. The agency
    8
    further relied on its 2002 Order, which had addressed the
    inclusion of MIG’s cost estimates in the initial rates for MIG.
    Id. MoPSC then petitioned this court for review, and also
    petitioned FERC for rehearing on the 2008 Order. Because of
    the ongoing FERC filing, the appeal before this court was
    dismissed as premature. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, No.
    08-1160, slip op. at 1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 10, 2008) (per curiam).
    On April 3, 2009, FERC issued an order denying rehearing of
    the 2008 Order. See Mo. Interstate Gas, LLC, 127 F.E.R.C.
    ¶ 61,011 (2009) (“2009 Order”). The April 3 order did not
    address the acquisition premium issue. After issuance of the
    2009 Order, MoPSC timely petitioned this court again for
    review of the acquisition premium issue.
    On appeal to this court, MoPSC raises a single issue:
    Whether FERC violated 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
     or improperly denied
    due process to MoPSC when it included the alleged acquisition
    premium from MIG in the initial rates of the MoGas pipeline,
    deferring resolution of that issue to a future § 4 rate proceeding.
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. Standard of Review
    Under the APA, agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious,
    an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”
    cannot survive judicial review. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A).
    FERC’s orders are reviewed under this standard. See Am. Gas
    Ass’n v. FERC, 
    593 F.3d 14
    , 19 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Rio Grande
    Pipeline Co., 
    178 F.3d at 541
    . FERC’s action upholding the
    inclusion of an alleged acquisition premium in the initial rates
    of the MoGas pipeline, as well as its decision to defer the
    ultimate resolution of the acquisition premium’s validity to a
    future § 4 rate proceeding, are both subject to arbitrary and
    capricious review pursuant to 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    .
    9
    In a case such as this, the court’s role is “‘limited to
    assuring that the Commission’s decisionmaking is reasoned,
    principled, and based on the record.’” Rio Grande Pipeline Co.,
    
    178 F.3d at 541
     (quoting Pa. Office of Consumer Advocate
    v. FERC, 
    131 F.3d 182
    , 185 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). This court has
    noted, however, that FERC must “‘fully articulate the basis for
    its decision,’” and that a “‘passing reference to relevant factors
    . . . is not sufficient to satisfy the Commission’s obligation to
    carry out reasoned and principled decisionmaking.’” Am. Gas
    Ass’n, 
    593 F.3d at 19
     (quoting Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC,
    
    234 F.3d 36
    , 41 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks
    omitted)).
    B. Alleged MIG Acquisition Premium
    FERC’s treatment of the MIG acquisition premium issue is
    arbitrary and capricious. The benefits exception to the rule
    disallowing acquisition premiums takes into account (1) whether
    the acquired facility is being put to a new use, see Rio Grande
    Pipeline Co., 
    178 F.3d at 536
    ; Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., 110
    F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,211 at 61,796 (2005); Longhorn Partners
    Pipeline, 73 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,355 at 62,112-13 (1995); and (2)
    whether “the purchaser has demonstrated specific dollar benefits
    resulting directly from the sale.” Kan. Pipeline Co., 81 F.E.R.C.
    at 61,018; see also Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., 110 F.E.R.C. at
    61,796. FERC has also considered (3) whether the transaction
    at issue is an “arms length” sale between unaffiliated parties,
    see, e.g., Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., 110 F.E.R.C. at 61,796; and
    (4) whether the purchase price of the asset at issue is less than
    the cost of constructing a comparable facility, see, e.g., Rio
    Grande Pipeline Co., 
    178 F.3d at 536-37
    ; Enbridge Pipelines
    (Southern Lights) LLC, F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,310 at 62,688 (2007).
    FERC has been clear that the pipeline carries the burden of
    proof of showing a benefits exception to justify the allowance of
    an acquisition premium. In order to meet this “heavy” burden,
    a pipeline must prove the existence of benefits to consumers that
    10
    are “tangible, non-speculative, and quantifiable in monetary
    terms.” Kan. Pipeline Co., 81 F.E.R.C. at 61,018.
    There is no question that FERC did not apply the “specific
    dollar benefits” requirement in allowing the alleged acquisition
    premium from MIG to be included in the initial rates of the
    MoGas pipeline. Indeed, FERC did not directly evaluate the
    MIG premium according to any of the elements of the benefits
    exception test. Instead, the agency relied on its 2002 Order,
    which noted (1) MIG’s original assertion that its costs reflected
    net book value; (2) that the assets, which had been used as an oil
    pipeline, would be converted to gas utility service for the first
    time; and (3) that MoPSC had approved the underlying sales
    transaction “as an arms-length sale . . . between non-affiliated
    parties.” 2002 Order, 100 F.E.R.C. at 62,396. Reliance on the
    2002 Order is entirely inadequate to justify the Commission’s
    action in this case.
    First, as noted below, MoPSC submitted uncontested
    evidence showing that the assertions made by the pipeline in the
    proceedings leading to the 2002 Order were suspect. This
    evidence included reference to testimony from the then-
    president of both MPC and MGC that the piece of pipeline that
    ultimately became MIG contained an acquisition premium.
    Second, FERC’s analysis in this case unequivocally does not
    include any assessment of “tangible, non-speculative, and
    quantifiable” benefits to consumers. Kan. Pipeline Co., 81
    F.E.R.C. at 61,018. And, finally, MoGas offered nothing to
    meet its burden of justifying any acquisition premium carried
    over from the initial MIG rates. Indeed, during arguments
    before this court, FERC’s counsel forthrightly acknowledged
    that the Commission never determined that MoGas had met its
    burden of establishing the dollar amount of benefits alleged to
    have been conferred upon the consumers, as required by the
    benefits exception test.
    11
    It is also highly noteworthy that FERC explicitly conducted
    a benefits exception inquiry with respect to the acquisition
    premiums embedded in the costs associated with MGC and
    MPC. The Commission rejected the inclusion of those
    premiums because MoGas “provided no evidence in support of
    the benefits” of the premiums. 2007 Order, 119 F.E.R.C. at
    61,467.
    Apparently recognizing the frailty of its position, FERC
    argues in the alternative that, even if it did not apply the benefits
    exception test as articulated in Kansas Pipeline, it did no less
    than is required in a § 7 proceeding. Relatedly, FERC claims
    that it can defer a more detailed evaluation of the alleged
    acquisition premium to a § 4 rate proceeding. We reject these
    claims.
    It is true that the public interest standard governing the
    establishment of initial rates in § 7 proceedings is not
    coterminous with the just and reasonable standard governing the
    establishment of permanent rates in a § 4 proceeding. See, e.g.,
    Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
    337 F.3d at 1070
     (describing the public
    interest standard as “less exacting”); 2007 Order, 119 F.E.R.C.
    at 61,472 (describing the public interest standard as “somewhat
    more lenient”). FERC fails, however, to provide a reasoned
    explanation for why the existence of and justification for the
    alleged acquisition premium here could not be evaluated in the
    § 7 proceeding in this case.
    As noted at the outset of this opinion, “both the Supreme
    Court and this circuit have made clear that the Commission has
    a duty to use its § 7 power to protect consumers. . . . Indeed, the
    Commission’s ‘usual practice in Section 7 certificate
    proceedings’ is to ‘apply[], to the extent practicable, the same
    ratemaking policies that it applies in Section 4 rate cases.’” Mo.
    Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
    337 F.3d at 1070-71
     (quoting Kan. Pipeline
    Co., 97 F.E.R.C. at 61,785); see also Maritimes & Ne. Pipeline,
    LLC, 84 F.E.R.C. at 61,683. There is nothing in FERC’s
    12
    decision to suggest that it would have been impracticable to
    address the MIG acquisition premium issue in the § 7
    proceeding. The 2007 Order did not address the MIG
    acquisition premium issue at all. Rather, the Commission
    simply dismissed as “moot” any open issues from the 2006
    Docket Entry due to the dissolution of MIG. 2007 Order, 119
    F.E.R.C. at 61,474. But of course the acquisition premium issue
    was not moot, as evidenced by FERC’s rejection of the
    acquisition premiums embedded in the costs associated with
    MGC and MPC.
    In its 2008 Order, the Commission refused to address the
    acquisition premium issue on the ground that § 7 proceedings
    involve initial rates “approved . . . based on estimates” of how
    pipelines will operate. 2008 Order, 122 F.E.R.C. at 61,704.
    FERC has noted in other cases that, because a pipeline has no
    operating history at the time when it applies for its initial
    certificate, initial rates are often “based only on estimates of
    what an appropriate rate for each service should be.” Maritimes
    & Ne. Pipeline, LLC, 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,166 at 61,726 (1997).
    Therefore, it is sometimes better to defer final judgment on
    certain rate issues until a § 4 proceeding when “the pipeline has
    an operating history.” Id. But this rationale lends no support to
    FERC’s refusal in this case to scrutinize the alleged acquisition
    premium carried over from MIG. The threshold question of
    whether or not an acquisition premium exists, for example,
    appears to be a straightforward accounting question. In any
    event, at least in this case, it seems clear that FERC easily could
    have resolved the threshold issue on the basis of the uncontested
    paper record before it in the § 7 proceeding. Indeed, FERC
    never explains why it could not make such a determination
    based wholly on the operational data from MIG’s cost and
    revenue study submitted as part of the 2006 Docket Entry.
    Furthermore, neither FERC nor MoGas suggest that
    establishing the dollar amount of benefits – the key prong of the
    13
    “benefits exception” test that was ignored by FERC in this case
    – requires prospective data on pipeline operating history in all
    cases. In Kansas Pipeline, for example, FERC disallowed an
    acquisition premium in a § 7 proceeding. Kan. Pipeline Co., 81
    F.E.R.C. at 61,018. The Commission’s decision makes no
    reference to any distinction between § 4 and § 7 proceedings in
    this regard; nor do the cases it cites make any such distinction.
    Kansas Pipeline is also consistent with FERC’s treatment of the
    acquisition premiums associated with MPC and MGC in this
    very case, whose inclusion in MoGas’s initial rates was rejected
    because of a lack of evidence supporting tangible dollar benefits.
    2007 Order, 119 F.E.R.C. at 61,467. FERC’s decision in this
    case offers no meaningful distinction between the MIG
    acquisition premium, on the one hand, and the Kansas Pipeline,
    MPC, and MGC acquisition premiums, on the other.
    In its 2008 Order, FERC claims that if MoPSC’s challenge
    were addressed in the § 7 proceeding, this “potentially would
    have involved procedures associated with trial-type hearings”
    and would “turn th[e] certificate proceeding into a rate
    proceeding.” 2008 Order, 122 F.E.R.C. at 61,704. On the
    record of this case, this is an unpersuasive claim. MoPSC
    submitted undisputed evidence to FERC demonstrating the
    existence of an allegedly improper acquisition premium related
    to MIG. This evidence included both financial data, see
    UtiliCorp Pipeline Systems, Inc. Estimated Purchase Price
    Certificate at 3 (2002), J.A. 250, and 2001 testimony from the
    then-president of both MPC and MGC that the piece of pipeline
    that ultimately became MIG contained an acquisition premium,
    Missouri Public Service Commission Tr. of Hearing (Sept. 5,
    2001), at 121-23, J.A. 244-46. This evidence was properly
    before FERC in the § 7 proceeding, and the evidence was not
    contested by the pipeline. Given this record, the Commission’s
    vague suggestion that it would be inefficient “to cherry pick”
    this “one issue” from the cost and revenue study is hardly
    persuasive. 2008 Order, 122 F.E.R.C. at 61,704.
    14
    Finally, FERC notes that on June 30, 2009, MoGas filed a
    § 4 rate case to establish permanent rates and points out that the
    § 4 proceeding will resolve the acquisition premium issue going
    forward. However, the § 4 proceeding will simply set just and
    reasonable rates prospectively. It will not address the validity of
    the initial rates approved in the § 7 proceeding that are at issue
    in this case.
    III. CONCLUSION
    We hereby grant the petition for review and vacate FERC’s
    order with respect to the alleged acquisition premium issue. The
    case is remanded to the Commission for a prompt resolution of
    the question of the alleged acquisition premium.