Richard America v. Karen Mills ( 2011 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued May 10, 2011                    Decided July 8, 2011
    No. 10-5244
    RICHARD AMERICA,
    APPELLANT
    v.
    KAREN G. MILLS, ADMINISTRATOR, SMALL BUSINESS
    ADMINISTRATION,
    APPELLEE
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:03-cv-01807)
    Richard A. Salzman argued the cause for appellant.
    With him on the briefs was Douglas B. Huron. Elizabeth A.
    Grdina entered an appearance.
    Alan Burch, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause
    for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen,
    Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.
    Attorney.
    Before: HENDERSON, BROWN, and KAVANAUGH,
    Circuit Judges.
    2
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge
    KAVANAUGH, with whom Circuit Judge HENDERSON joins.
    Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.
    KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Richard America charged
    his former employer, the Small Business Administration, with
    discrimination. America and the SBA then settled. Under the
    settlement agreement, America received $92,500 from the
    SBA. The settlement agreement also required the SBA to
    provide neutral references when potential employers inquired
    about America. America claims that the SBA materially
    breached that requirement of the settlement agreement.
    America sued the SBA in the United States District Court.
    After a bench trial, the District Court found no material
    breach and granted judgment for the SBA. We affirm.
    ***
    Richard America worked in Rural Affairs for the Small
    Business Administration. In 1995, the SBA decided to re-
    assign his position from Washington, D.C., to Kansas City,
    Missouri. America resisted the transfer and eventually
    accepted an early retirement in 1997, three days before he
    would have been fired for failing to report to Kansas City.
    America then filed several administrative complaints
    alleging that the SBA engaged in race, sex, and age
    discrimination with respect to the attempted transfer. In 1998,
    America and the SBA settled their dispute. America dropped
    his claims in return for $92,500. As part of the settlement
    agreement, the SBA expunged references to America’s
    retirement from his personnel file. The SBA also agreed to
    refer all inquiries about America from prospective employers
    to Human Resources; the purpose of that requirement was “to
    3
    ensure that the SBA provided only neutral references about
    him.” America v. Mills, 
    714 F. Supp. 2d 88
    , 101 (D.D.C.
    2010).
    After signing the settlement agreement, America
    expected to find quick success on the job market. He didn’t.
    He came to suspect the SBA was saying negative things about
    him to potential employers, in violation of the settlement
    agreement.
    In 2000 and 2002, America hired a reference-checking
    company known as Documented Reference Check to contact
    three individuals at the SBA and pretend to be a potential
    employer asking about America. America believed that the
    subsequent reports of Documented Reference Check’s
    conversations with those SBA employees showed a material
    breach of the settlement agreement. America therefore sued
    the SBA in District Court.
    After a bench trial, the District Court found that America
    failed to prove that the reports from Documented Reference
    Check were “a totally accurate transcription of [the] phone
    calls.” 
    Id. at 99
    . The District Court reached that conclusion
    in part because Documented Reference Check’s chief service
    officer gave testimony that the court found “completely
    incredible.” According to the District Court, this key witness
    was “evasive and belligerent.” He “made unreasonable
    assertions of privacy and trade secrets regarding such
    straightforward facts as the company’s size and corporate
    structure.” He was “in a position to change a report without
    the knowledge of the person who created the report” and may
    have had an incentive to satisfy clients by altering reports to
    contain negative references. 
    Id. at 98
    .
    4
    There was only one relevant exception to the District
    Court’s broad factual conclusion that SBA employees did not
    make the allegedly negative statements. The District Court
    found that SBA employee Arnold Rosenthal told Documented
    Reference Check that there was “an internal battle going on
    with [America’s] transfer.” See 
    id. at 97, 99
    . But the District
    Court concluded that this one statement did not constitute a
    material breach of the settlement agreement. We agree. It is
    undisputed on appeal that Rosenthal made numerous
    unequivocally positive statements to Documented Reference
    Check. Rosenthal’s overall description of America was quite
    positive, and at worst neutral. Rosenthal’s (at worst) neutral
    reference about America thus does not constitute a material
    breach of the settlement agreement, the purpose of which was
    to ensure neutral references about America. Even under the
    materiality standard proposed by America, a breach is
    material only if it “relates to a matter of vital importance.”
    Thomas v. HUD, 
    124 F.3d 1439
    , 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
    America has not met that standard.
    In short, although Rosenthal’s comments may have
    constituted a breach because he did not simply refer the caller
    to Human Resources, we agree with the District Court that the
    breach was not material because Rosenthal’s description of
    America was positive or, at worst, neutral. 1
    1
    In proceedings before the Equal Employment Opportunity
    Commission, the SBA conceded breach but retracted that
    concession about three weeks later. America argues that the SBA
    should be bound to that original concession. But the SBA’s
    withdrawal is reasonable even under the standard proposed by
    America because the concession was withdrawn within “weeks, not
    years.” Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 
    562 F.2d 701
    , 720 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
    5
    ***
    We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    So ordered.
    BROWN, J., dissenting. The district court’s unchallenged
    findings of fact are incompatible with its conclusion that the
    Small Business Administration did not materially breach its
    settlement agreement with Richard America. Therefore, I
    respectfully dissent.
    To get America to drop his discrimination and retaliation
    claims, SBA agreed to refer “all inquiries from prospective
    employers” to Human Resources. The purpose of this
    agreement was, the district court found, “to ensure that the
    SBA provided only neutral references.” America v. Mills, 
    714 F. Supp. 2d 88
    , 101 (D.D.C. 2010). An SBA employee
    therefore materially breaches the agreement when he
    responds to a reference inquiry in a way that casts America in
    a negative light. As the district court put it, SBA’s breach was
    material if it “led to the provision of reference information
    that was not neutral and prejudiced [America] in his search
    for employment.” 
    Id.
    The district court made a series of findings that lead
    inevitably to the conclusion that SBA’s breach was material.
    First, the district court explicitly credited a reference
    checker’s transcription of SBA comments concerning “the
    circumstances surrounding Mr. America’s proposed transfer
    to Kansas City, the fact that he did not report there, [and] the
    internal battle over Mr. America’s proposed transfer.” 
    Id. at 99
    . Among other comments to that effect were those of SBA
    executive Arnold Rosenthal. Rosenthal told the caller that
    “[t]here was an internal battle going on with [America’s]
    transfer” and that this “was a difficult experience for him.”
    The district court found such comments “had to have
    occurred,” because they involve “significant details about the
    SBA and Mr. America’s employment there that no one at [the
    reference-checking company] could have known without
    speaking to people at SBA.” 
    Id.
     The district court further
    2
    found these specific comments by Rosenthal to be “negative
    statements.” 
    Id. at 97
    . America had been forced to retire when
    he refused to accept the transfer, so he had good reason to
    keep that information from prospective employers.
    These findings of fact are irreconcilable with the district
    court’s conclusion that SBA’s breach was immaterial. The
    district court tried to make sense of that conclusion by
    holding, “Rosenthal’s reference to the ‘difficult experience’
    that [sic—should read “of”?] the ‘internal battle’ over Mr.
    America’s possible transfer to Kansas City was not a matter
    of ‘vital importance,’ and did not ‘frustrate substantially’ the
    purpose of the contract.” 
    Id. at 102
     (citation and alteration
    omitted). This reasoning is flawed. Given the district court’s
    own findings that these statements were negative, 
    id. at 97
    ,
    and that the purpose of the contract was to prevent negative
    references, 
    id. at 101
    , SBA’s breach necessarily “[went] to the
    essence and frustrate[d] substantially the purpose for which
    the [settlement] was agreed to.” Draim v. Virtual Geosatellite
    Holdings, Inc., 
    522 F.3d 452
    , 454–55 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
    My colleagues agree with the district court that SBA’s
    breach was immaterial, because they find Rosenthal’s positive
    statements were more “numerous” than his negative ones.
    Maj. Op. at 4. This reasoning undermines the purpose of the
    settlement agreement. The requirement that a former
    employer refer all employment inquiries to Human Resources
    is a dead letter if he may avoid material breach by simply
    pairing every negative statement he utters with a positive one.
    As anyone with hiring experience can attest, employment
    references—especially references for the management-level
    positions America sought—are more art than science. Just a
    hint of negativity may be all it takes to warn a savvy
    employer away from a prospective employee. America
    reasonably hoped to avoid the risk of such value judgments
    3
    by insisting that all inquiries be directed to Human Resources,
    which could make only objective statements about his
    employment history. “The judicial task in construing a
    contract is to give effect to the mutual intentions of the
    parties.” Mesa Air Group v. DOT, 
    87 F.3d 498
    , 503 (D.C. Cir.
    1996); see Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 
    235 U.S. 461
    ,
    488 (1915). The court’s interpretation violates this principle
    and renders SBA’s agreement with America practically
    unenforceable.
    This case illustrates the pitfalls of including a non-
    disparagement clause in a settlement agreement between a
    government agency and its former employee. Memories fade,
    and the difficulty of ensuring the agency’s personnel abide by
    the agreement grows with every passing year. There are good
    reasons not to enter into such contracts in the first place. But a
    deal’s a deal. Because I believe SBA materially breached its
    settlement agreement with America, I would reverse the
    judgment of the district court with instructions to reinstate
    America’s Title VII suit.