Ascension Borgess Hospital v. Xavier Becerra ( 2023 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued September 22, 2022             Decided March 10, 2023
    No. 21-5246
    ASCENSION BORGESS HOSPITAL, ET AL.,
    APPELLANTS
    v.
    XAVIER BECERRA, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
    DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
    APPELLEE
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:20-cv-00139)
    Andrew B. Howk argued the cause for appellants. With
    him on the briefs was N. Kent Smith.
    Caroline D. Lopez, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for appellee Xavier Becerra. With her on the
    brief were Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
    Attorney General, Abby C. Wright, Attorney, U.S. Department
    of Health and Human Services, Janice L. Hoffman, Associate
    General Counsel, Susan Maxson Lyons, Deputy Associate
    General Counsel for Litigation, and Jonathan C. Brumer,
    Attorney.
    2
    Before: PILLARD, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and
    ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    ROGERS.
    ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge: Ascension Borgess
    Hospital and forty-four other hospitals appeal the grant of
    summary judgment to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
    Health and Human Services (“HHS”) dismissing challenges of
    certain reimbursements for uncompensated care.               The
    Hospitals challenged the “disproportionate share hospital”
    (“DSH”) payments. The Provider Reimbursement Review
    Board (“PRRB”) dismissed the complaint for lack of
    jurisdiction pursuant to the statutory bar on administrative and
    judicial review of challenges to the methodology for
    calculating those payments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)(3).
    The Hospitals contend that HHS was required to promulgate
    its audit instructions by notice and comment rulemaking
    before using audited data from each hospital’s Worksheet
    S-10 to estimate the Hospitals’ proportionate shares of the
    national total of uncompensated care.                  See id.
    § 1395ww(r)(2)(C). They maintain that they do not challenge
    the Secretary’s estimate, but seek only an order directing
    fulfillment of HHS’s notice and comment obligations. For the
    following reasons, the court affirms the grant of summary
    judgment to the Secretary.
    I.
    In addition to reimbursements that hospitals receive
    pursuant to the Medicare Act, hospitals serving a
    disproportionate share of low-income patients may receive
    additional Medicare payments, known as “DSH payments.” Id.
    § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(i)(I).
    3
    The statutory formula provides that eligible hospitals
    receive an “empirically justified DSH payment” equal to 25%
    of the amount the hospital would have received but for the
    passage of the Affordable Care Act (“the ACA”). Id.
    § 1395ww(r)(1). The remaining portion of the DSH payment is
    referred to as the “uncompensated care” payment, id.
    § 1395ww(r)(2), which is determined based on the Secretary’s
    estimates of three factors: (1) what the DSH payment would
    have been prior to the amendment of the ACA; (2) the decrease
    in the national uninsured rate since 2013 (following enactment
    of the ACA); and (3) each eligible hospital’s pro rata share of
    all nationwide uncompensated care for a fiscal year. See id.
    § 1395ww(r)(2)(A)-(C). That pro rata share of nationwide
    uncompensated care is represented by the Secretary’s estimate
    of the hospital’s provided amount of uncompensated care, “for
    a period selected by the Secretary,” and “based on appropriate
    data,” divided by the Secretary’s estimate of the total amount
    of    uncompensated       care     nationwide.       See    id.
    § 1395ww(r)(2)(C).
    Since 2013, HHS has proposed and adopted the
    methodology for calculating the estimates underlying the
    following year’s uncompensated care through rulemaking.
    See, e.g., 
    78 Fed. Reg. 50,496
     (Aug. 19, 2013); 
    84 Fed. Reg. 42,044
     (Aug. 16, 2019). Notice and comment rulemaking is
    required for any “rule, requirement, or other statement of
    policy” that “establishes or changes a substantive legal
    standard governing . . . the payment for services.” 42 U.S.C.
    § 1395hh(a)(2); see Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 
    139 S. Ct. 1804
    , 1810 (2019).
    To estimate the third factor in the uncompensated care
    payment for fiscal year 2020, HHS relied for the first time on
    data from the 2015 Worksheet S-10 cost reports each Hospital
    was required to submit to HHS. 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,364. By
    4
    notice and comment rulemaking, the Secretary proposed to use
    a subset of Worksheet S-10 data on the volume and value of
    uncompensated care provided to low-income patients as the
    basis for the pro rata share estimates. See id. at 19,158, 19,419
    (proposed May 3, 2019). The Secretary also developed “more
    uniform review protocols” for Medicare contractors to audit
    Worksheet S-10 data for accuracy. 
    81 Fed. Reg. 56,762
    ,
    56,963–64 (Aug. 22, 2016). The Worksheet S-10 data that the
    Secretary proposed to use to calculate the 2020 DSH payments
    included data updated by Medicare contractors as a result of
    these audits, 84 Fed. Reg. at 19,419, and the Secretary noted
    that any audit protocols would remain confidential, 81 Fed.
    Reg. at 56,964.
    In Federal Register notices, the Secretary observed that
    “Worksheet S-10 could potentially provide the most complete
    data for Medicare hospitals” because it was “developed
    specifically to collect information on uncompensated care
    costs” from each Medicare hospital. 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,635;
    see also 84 Fed. Reg. at 19,417–18. Upon considering
    comments on use of Worksheet S-10 data and audit procedures,
    the Secretary concluded that the data subset represented the
    most “appropriate data,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)(2)(C)(ii), on
    which to base the uncompensated care estimates and, in turn,
    the payments for fiscal year 2020, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,364–66.
    By amendment to the Affordable Care Act in 2014, Congress
    specified:
    There shall be no administrative or judicial review
    under section 1395ff of this title, section 1395oo of this
    title, or otherwise of . . . [a]ny estimate of the Secretary
    for purposes of determining the factors described in
    paragraph (2)[; or] [a]ny period selected by the
    Secretary for such purposes.
    5
    42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)(3).
    II.
    Relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Allina Health,
    
    139 S. Ct. 1804
    , the Hospitals contend that the Secretary was
    required to promulgate the audit instructions by notice and
    comment rulemaking before using audited Worksheet S-10
    data to estimate the Hospitals’ proportionate shares of the
    national       total      uncompensated       care       under
    section 1395ww(r)(2)(C). See 
    id. at 1810
    . Although the
    Secretary’s proposed estimation methodology was subject to
    notice and comment, see 84 Fed. Reg. at 19,419; id. at 42,364–
    68, the audit protocol itself was not.
    After the PRRB determined that the statutory bar, 42
    U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)(3), deprived it of jurisdiction over the
    challenge, the district court granted summary judgment to the
    Secretary because the Hospitals’ attempts to evade the statutory
    bar were foreclosed by DCH Regional Medical Center v. Azar,
    
    925 F.3d 503
     (D.C. Cir. 2019), and Florida Health Sciences
    Center, Inc. v. Secretary of HHS, 
    830 F.3d 515
     (D.C. Cir.
    2016). This court conducts a de novo review of the grant of
    summary judgment, Am. Clinical Lab’y Ass’n v. Becerra, 
    40 F.4th 616
    , 621 (D.C. Cir. 2022); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, 
    895 F.3d 822
    , 825 (D.C. Cir. 2018), considering whether the data
    on which the Secretary relied is “inextricably intertwined” with
    the Secretary’s uncompensated care estimates in calculating
    DSH payments, DCH, 
    925 F.3d at
    506–07.
    In Florida Health, 
    830 F.3d 515
    , the court rejected the
    hospital’s position that the Secretary’s use of 2010-2011 data
    to calculate DSH payments for the 2014 fiscal year violated the
    Administrative Procedure Act and the Medicare Act. See 
    id. at 519
    . Looking to the text of section 1395ww(r)(3), the court
    6
    concluded it constituted a “reliable indicator” of Congress’s
    intent to bar such review, see 
    id. at 518
    , reasoning that the
    Secretary’s estimate and the data underlying it were
    indistinguishable because the data was an integral component
    of the estimate itself, review of which was barred. 
    Id.
     at 518–
    19. Because “[t]he data are the entire basis for the estimate,”
    
    id.,
     a challenge to that data would “eviscerate the bar on judicial
    review,” 
    id.
     (citing El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, 
    632 F.3d 1272
    , 1278 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
    Similarly, in DCH Regional, the court rejected the
    challenge to the Secretary’s calculation of a hospital’s DSH
    payment following a merger that did not incorporate data from
    the acquired hospital. The court reiterated that under the
    Medicare Act’s statutory scheme, “a challenge to the
    methodology for estimating uncompensated care is
    unavoidably a challenge to the estimates themselves.” DCH,
    
    925 F.3d at 506
    .
    The Hospitals here similarly would challenge the
    Secretary’s methodology in order to reach the substantive
    estimate barred from review. They seek vacatur and
    recalculation of the DSH payments on the theory that the
    Secretary’s audit protocol was procedurally defective. See
    Ascension Borgess Hosp. v. Becerra, 
    557 F. Supp. 3d 122
    , 127
    (D.D.C. 2021). Yet the Hospitals’ framing of their challenge as
    purely procedural under the Medicare Act’s notice and
    comment requirement does not save their appeal,
    notwithstanding the “strong presumption in favor of judicial
    review of final agency action.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Becerra,
    
    142 S. Ct. 1896
    , 1902 (2022). That presumption “‘may be
    overcome by,’ inter alia, ‘specific language . . . that is a
    reliable indicator of congressional intent’ . . . to preclude
    judicial review.” Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam. Physicians,
    7
    
    476 U.S. 667
    , 673 (1986) (citing Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst.,
    
    467 U.S. 340
    , 349 (1984)).
    Even if, as the Hospitals contend, the alleged procedural
    violation is reviewable, the Hospitals have failed to identify
    any standard required to be set by rule that was not. Although
    neither DCH nor Florida Health addresses whether notice and
    comment rulemaking is required for protocols or procedures
    used to modify providers’ raw uncompensated care data before
    calculating DSH payment estimates, routine audit instructions
    to Medicare contractors ordinarily fall outside of section
    1395hh’s rulemaking requirement. See Clarian Health W.,
    LLC v. Hargan, 
    878 F.3d 346
    , 354–56 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Texas
    All. for Home Care Servs. v. Sebelius, 
    681 F.3d 402
    , 411 (D.C.
    Cir. 2012). The Medicare Act requires notice and comment
    rulemaking for any “rule, requirement, or other statement of
    policy” that “establishes or changes a substantive legal
    standard governing . . . the payment for services.” 42 U.S.C.
    § 1395hh(a)(2) (emphasis added); see also Allina Health, 
    139 S. Ct. at 1810
    . In Clarian, 
    878 F.3d 346
    , the hospital
    challenged Medicare “manual instructions” that had not
    undergone notice and comment prior to promulgation, and the
    court ruled that although the instructions govern the payment
    of services, they did not “establish[] or change[] a substantive
    legal standard.” 
    Id. at 351, 354
     (quoting 42 U.S.C.
    § 1395hh(a)(2)). The Medicare Act did not require HHS to
    promulgate the instructions by regulation. Id. at 356. Likewise,
    here, the Secretary’s audit protocol does not constitute a “rule”
    or “requirement” that changes a substantive legal standard, but
    is a statement of policy regarding the Secretary’s procedural
    methodology. The audit protocol neither alters the Hospitals’
    substantive obligations nor changes the DSH payment
    calculation scheme. It only sets the procedures by which the
    Secretary will determine the third factor of the uncompensated
    8
    care payment, without altering the substance of the DSH
    calculation scheme or other related legal standards.
    Finally, the Hospitals forfeited their argument, raised for
    the first time at oral argument on appeal to this court, that HHS
    inserted a new and unannounced definition of “uncompensated
    costs” into the undisclosed audit protocol that should have been
    subject to notice and comment. Because the Hospitals failed to
    make “timely assertion” of their right to bring that challenge,
    the court cannot now consider it. United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 731, 733 (1993); Nemariam v. Fed. Dem. Rep. Eth.,
    
    491 F.3d 470
    , 483 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
    Accordingly, the court affirms the grant of summary
    judgment to the Secretary.