Save Jobs USA v. DHS ( 2019 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued September 27, 2019         Decided November 8, 2019
    No. 16-5287
    SAVE JOBS USA,
    APPELLANT
    v.
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
    OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,
    APPELLEE
    ANUJKUMAR DHAMIJA, ET AL.,
    INTERVENORS
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:15-cv-00615)
    John M. Miano argued the cause for appellant. With him
    on the briefs were Dale Wilcox and Michael Hethmon.
    Matthew J. Glover, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for appellee. On the brief were Glenn M.
    Girdharry, Assistant Director, and Joshua S. Press, Trial
    Attorney. Erez Reuveni, Assistant Director, entered an
    appearance.
    2
    Carl E. Goldfarb argued the cause and filed the brief for
    intervenors.
    Paul W. Hughes, Michael B. Kimberly, Jason Oxman,
    Steven P. Lehotsky, Michael B. Schon, and Peter C. Tolsdorf
    were on the brief for amici curiae The Chamber of Commerce
    of the United States, et al. in support of appellees.
    Before: TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and
    SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
    TATEL, Circuit Judge: Save Jobs USA, an association
    representing Southern California Edison workers, challenges a
    Department of Homeland Security rule that permits certain visa
    holders to seek lawful employment. The district court found
    that Save Jobs lacked Article III standing and granted summary
    judgment in the Department’s favor. We reverse. For the
    reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude that Save Jobs
    has demonstrated that the rule will subject its members to an
    actual or imminent increase in competition and that it therefore
    has standing to pursue its challenge.
    I.
    Our nation’s immigration laws distinguish between two
    categories of foreign nationals seeking admission to the United
    States: “nonimmigrants,” who plan to stay in the country only
    temporarily, and “immigrants,” who plan to stay permanently.
    See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (“Every alien . . . shall be presumed to
    be an immigrant until he establishes . . . that he is entitled to a
    nonimmigrant status . . . .”); 
    id. § 1101(a)(15)
    (setting forth
    nonimmigrant classifications). The rule challenged here
    3
    attempts to ease the burdens faced by certain nonimmigrants
    during their often-lengthy transition to immigrant status.
    The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the
    admission of nonimmigrants “to perform services . . . in a
    specialty occupation,” 
    id. § 1101(a)(15)
    (H)(i)(b), and those
    specialty workers’ spouses, 
    id. § 1101(a)(15)
    (H). Specialty
    workers admitted under this provision receive H–1B visas,
    which permit them to work in the occupation for which they
    were admitted. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(i), (ii)(B). The specialty
    workers’ spouses receive H–4 visas, which permit the spouses
    to reside in the United States but do not authorize them to work.
    
    Id. § 214.2(h)(9)(iv).
    Generally, H–1B visa holders and their
    H–4 spouses may reside in the country for a maximum of six
    years, after which time they must depart and remain abroad for
    at least one year before seeking to reenter in the same status.
    8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(A).
    Although the H–1B visa permits its holder to remain in the
    United States only temporarily, an H–1B nonimmigrant may
    obtain a permanent resident visa—better known as a green
    card—through the employer-sponsored immigration process.
    Getting a green card takes a long time. An employer must first
    identify a job for which the H–1B visa holder will be
    permanently hired and then certify to the Secretary of Labor
    that (1) “there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing,
    qualified[,] . . . and available” to fill the position; and (2) that
    the alien’s employment “will not adversely affect the wages
    and working conditions” of “similarly employed” workers in
    the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i). If the Secretary
    approves the certification, the employer then submits a so-
    called Form I–140 petition, which must be approved by the
    Department before the H–1B visa holder can change status. See
    
    id. § 1154(a)(1)(F),
    (b); 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a). But even H–1B
    visa holders with approved Form I–140 petitions may be
    4
    unable to adjust status because the Act limits the total number
    of available employment-based green cards. See 8 U.S.C.
    § 1151(d). The Act also specifies a per-country cap, further
    limiting the number of green cards available to individuals
    from the same country. See 
    id. § 1152(a)(2).
    Once a country’s
    cap is reached, applicants from that country must wait until
    more employment-based green cards become available.
    Recognizing the potential for delay in adjustment,
    Congress amended the Act to permit H–1B visa holders who
    have begun the employer-based immigration process to remain
    and work in the United States while awaiting decisions on their
    applications for lawful permanent residence. Under the
    amended Act and its implementing regulations, H–1B
    nonimmigrants with approved Form I–140 petitions who are
    unable to adjust status because of per-country visa limits may
    extend their H–1B stay in three-year increments until their
    adjustment of status applications have been adjudicated. See
    American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of
    2000, Pub. L. No. 106-313, § 104(c), 114 Stat. 1251, 1253
    (codified     at    8 U.S.C.       § 1184     note);     8 C.F.R.
    § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(E). In addition, H–1B visa holders who are
    the beneficiaries of labor certification applications or Form I–
    140 petitions are eligible for recurring one-year extensions of
    H–1B status if 365 days have elapsed since the application or
    petition was filed. See American Competitiveness in the
    Twenty-first Century Act § 106(a)–(b), 114 Stat. at 1253–54,
    as amended by 21st Century Department of Justice
    Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273,
    § 11030A, 116 Stat. 1762, 1836–37 (2002) (codified at
    8 U.S.C. § 1184 note); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D).
    Against this background, the Department issued a rule
    permitting H–4 visa holders to obtain work authorization if
    their H–1B visa-holding spouses have been granted an
    5
    extension of status under the Act or are the beneficiaries of
    approved Form I–140 petitions but cannot adjust status due to
    visa oversubscription. Employment Authorization for Certain
    H–4 Dependent Spouses, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,284, 10,285 (Feb. 25,
    2015) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2, 274a) (“H–4 Rule”). By
    making H–4 visa holders eligible for lawful employment, the
    Department sought to “ameliorate certain disincentives that
    currently lead H–1B nonimmigrants to abandon efforts to
    remain in the United States while seeking [lawful permanent
    resident] status, thereby minimizing disruptions to U.S.
    businesses employing such workers.” 
    Id. Specifically, the
    Department explained that H–1B nonimmigrants and their
    families often face long delays in the process of obtaining
    permanent residence, and that H–4 visa holders’ inability to
    work during these delays leads to “personal and economic
    hardships” that worsen over time, “increas[ing] the
    disincentives for H–1B nonimmigrants to pursue [lawful
    permanent resident] status and thus increas[ing] the difficulties
    that U.S. employers have in retaining highly educated and
    highly skilled nonimmigrant workers.” 
    Id. at 10,284.
    Appellant Save Jobs, an association formed to “address the
    problems American workers face from foreign labor entering
    the United States job market through visa programs,” Compl.
    ¶ 8, challenged the rule in the district court, arguing that it
    exceeded the Department’s statutory authority, and that, in
    adopting it, the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
    The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on standing
    and the merits. The district court, finding that Save Jobs failed
    to demonstrate that the rule would cause its members any injury
    and thus lacked Article III standing, granted summary
    judgment in the Department’s favor. See Save Jobs USA v.
    Department of Homeland Security, 
    210 F. Supp. 3d 1
    , 5, 8–11
    (D.D.C. 2016).
    6
    Save Jobs appealed. Following the early 2017 change of
    presidential administrations, we held the case in abeyance,
    initially to allow the incoming administration time to consider
    the case and later because the Department expected to begin
    the process of rescinding the rule. In December 2018, we
    removed the case from abeyance and granted Immigration
    Voice and two of its members permission to intervene in order
    to defend the rule. “Our review is de novo.” American Institute
    of Certified Public Accountants v. IRS, 
    804 F.3d 1193
    , 1196
    (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
    II.
    “The ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing
    consists of three elements’: ‘[t]he plaintiff must have
    (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
    challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
    redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Air Line Pilots
    Ass’n, International v. Chao, 
    889 F.3d 785
    , 788 (D.C. Cir.
    2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
    
    136 S. Ct. 1540
    , 1547 (2016)). As an association claiming
    representational standing, Save Jobs has standing to sue if
    “‘(1) at least one of [its] members has standing to sue in her or
    his own right, (2) the interests [it] seeks to protect are germane
    to its purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
    requested requires the participation of an individual member in
    the lawsuit.’” American 
    Institute, 804 F.3d at 1197
    (quoting
    American Library Ass’n v. FCC, 
    401 F.3d 489
    , 492 (D.C. Cir.
    2005)). The Department challenges only the first of these three
    requirements. Because the district court disposed of this case at
    summary judgment, Save Jobs “may not rest on ‘mere
    allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence
    specific facts’ demonstrating standing.” Shays v. Federal
    Election Commission, 
    414 F.3d 76
    , 84 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
    (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 561
    7
    (1992)). “For purposes of the standing inquiry, we assume
    [Save Jobs] would succeed on the merits of [its] claim.” Barker
    v. Conroy, 
    921 F.3d 1118
    , 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
    Save Jobs argues, as it did in the district court, that the rule
    harms its members in several ways, including by increasing
    competition for jobs from H–1B visa holders. The doctrine of
    competitor standing recognizes that “when regulations illegally
    structure a competitive environment—whether an agency
    proceeding, a market, or a reelection race—parties defending
    concrete interests in that environment suffer legal harm under
    Article III.” American 
    Institute, 804 F.3d at 1197
    (internal
    quotation marks and alteration omitted). Relying on this “well-
    established principle,” Air Line 
    Pilots, 889 F.3d at 788
    , our
    court has repeatedly held that an individual who competes in a
    labor market has standing to challenge allegedly unlawful
    government action that is likely to lead to an increased supply
    of labor—and thus competition—in that market. See, e.g.,
    Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. Department of
    Homeland Security, 
    892 F.3d 332
    , 339–40 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
    (labor market for science, technology, engineering, and
    mathematics jobs); Mendoza v. Perez, 
    754 F.3d 1002
    , 1011
    (D.C. Cir. 2014) (labor market for open-range herding jobs). In
    Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. Department of
    Homeland Security, for example, we held that a science,
    technology, engineering, and mathematics workers’ union had
    standing to challenge a Department rule allowing student visa
    holders to remain in the United States and work after finishing
    their 
    degrees. 892 F.3d at 339
    –40, 342. The union alleged that
    its members had applied to jobs at companies that employed
    the student visa holders and that those companies had applied
    for the extension on behalf of the student-employees. 
    Id. at 339–40.
    We found that the union had standing to pursue its
    challenge, 
    id. at 342,
    explaining that “‘the basic requirement’”
    of a competitor standing claim is “‘an actual or imminent
    8
    increase in competition, which increase we recognize will
    almost certainly cause an injury in fact,’” 
    id. at 339
    (quoting
    Sherley v. Sebelius, 
    610 F.3d 69
    , 73 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
    Save Jobs contends that, like the regulation challenged in
    Washington Alliance, the rule at issue here will cause its
    members to face increased competition for jobs. Absent the
    rule, argues Save Jobs, at least some H–1B visa holders
    awaiting permanent residence would leave the United States—
    exiting the labor pool—because their spouses are unable to
    work. By authorizing H–4 visa holders to seek employment,
    Save Jobs continues, the rule removes a key obstacle to H–1B
    visa holders remaining in the United States throughout the
    immigration process, meaning that more H–1B visa holders
    will stay and compete with Save Jobs’ members than otherwise
    would have.
    The administrative record demonstrates as much. Cf.
    Competitive Enterprise Institute v. National Highway Traffic
    Safety Administration, 
    901 F.2d 107
    , 114–15 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
    (relying on the “agency’s own experience and sound market
    analysis” and the “public comments” contained in the
    administrative record as evidence of standing). In promulgating
    the rule, the Department sought to “incentivize H–1B
    nonimmigrants and their families to continue to wait and
    contribute to the United States”—that is, by working—
    “through an often lengthy waiting period for an immigrant visa
    to become available.” H–4 Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 10,296. The
    Department expected the rule would “benefit U.S. employers
    by decreasing the labor disruptions that occur when H–1B
    nonimmigrants abandon the permanent resident process.” 
    Id. The record
    contains evidence confirming the Department’s
    expectation: more than sixty commenters wrote that they had
    planned to move out of the United States, but will instead
    remain and pursue lawful permanent resident status as a result
    9
    of the new rule; two dozen reported that they had already left
    the country due to the prohibition on H–4 visa holder
    employment; and several warned that they would soon leave
    because H–4 visa holders cannot work under current (now
    former) law. 
    Id. at 10,288,
    10,293. Indeed, the Department
    expressly “disagree[d]” with one commenter’s concern that the
    record “failed to indicate that potential immigrants have
    abandoned the immigration process, or have decided against
    coming to the United States in the first place, because their
    spouses would not be authorized to work,” explaining that it
    “believes that this rule will fulfill its intended purpose”—
    namely, “encourag[ing] certain highly skilled H–1B
    nonimmigrants to remain in the United States.” 
    Id. at 10,293.
    Given that Save Jobs has offered sufficient evidence to
    show an “actual or imminent increase in competition,” 
    Sherley, 610 F.3d at 73
    , all that remains is for it to demonstrate that its
    members compete with H–1B visa holders in the labor market.
    It has done so through its members’ affidavits. Two members
    declare that they worked as information technology specialists
    at Southern California Edison for more than fifteen years until
    they were fired and replaced by H–1B visa holders. Bradley
    Aff. ¶¶ 5, 8; Buchanan Aff. ¶¶ 7, 9. A third worked as a system
    analyst at Southern California Edison for twenty years until
    she, like the other two, was fired and replaced by an H–1B visa
    holder. Gutierrez Aff. ¶ 5, 10. All three have been actively
    looking for new jobs in the technology sector, including by
    attending job fairs, participating in job placement programs,
    and submitting job applications. See Bradley Aff. ¶ 13;
    Buchanan Aff. ¶ 14; Gutierrez Aff. ¶¶ 12–13. Although Save
    Jobs “has offered no evidence that the competitive harm” it
    claims from the rule “has yet occurred”—indeed, the members
    lost their jobs, and Save Jobs filed suit, before the rule went
    into effect—“our precedent imposes no such requirement.”
    American 
    Institute, 804 F.3d at 1198
    . In short, the affidavits
    10
    establish that Save Jobs’ members compete with H–1B workers
    for technology jobs, and the rulemaking record itself
    demonstrates that the rule will increase competition for jobs.
    The Department insists that any injury to Save Jobs is
    caused by the H–1B visa program, not by the rule. See
    Appellee’s Br. 24–26. We disagree. Save Jobs has shown that
    the rule will cause more H–1B visa holders to remain in the
    United States than otherwise would—an effect that is distinct
    from that of the H–1B visa holders’ initial admission to the
    country.
    The Department also contends that Save Jobs has failed to
    demonstrate that its members are “direct and current
    competitor[s],” 
    Mendoza, 754 F.3d at 1013
    (emphasis omitted)
    (quoting KERM, Inc. v. FCC, 
    353 F.3d 57
    , 60 (D.C. Cir.
    2004)), of H–1B visa holders. See Appellee’s Br. 26–28. But
    the Department overreads our “direct and current competitor”
    formulation, which simply distinguishes an existing market
    participant from a potential—and unduly speculative—
    participant. Our court first used the term in New World Radio,
    Inc. v. FCC, where a licensee of a Washington, D.C. radio
    station challenged a Federal Communications Commission
    order granting a Maryland-based station’s license renewal
    application. 
    294 F.3d 164
    , 166, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
    Explaining that injury to the Washington station could occur
    “only if” the Maryland station “subsequently seeks and secures
    the relocation of its [Maryland] broadcast license to the
    Washington, D.C. programming area,” we held that the
    Washington station lacked competitor standing to challenge the
    license. 
    Id. at 171–72;
    see also DEK Energy Co. v. FERC, 
    248 F.3d 1192
    , 1194 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that a petitioner who
    sold gas in the Northern California market lacked standing
    where it failed to claim that its alleged competitor “ha[d] yet
    exploited [its] capacity to sell a single molecule of gas in
    11
    Northern California”); El Paso Natural Gas Company v.
    FERC, 
    50 F.3d 23
    , 27 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting argument that
    El Paso was a “potential competitor” of suppliers to the Baja
    California market because it had not satisfied the pre-
    conditions to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s
    approval of its entry into that market). By contrast, in this case
    we know that H–1B visa holders have competed with Save
    Jobs’ members in the past, and, as far as we know, nothing
    prevents them from doing so in the future.
    Making a related point, the Department argues that
    because H–1B visa holders “by definition are already
    employed,” Save Jobs must provide “more evidence that [H–
    1B visa holders] are seeking new jobs in the same market as
    Save Jobs’ members.” Appellee’s Br. 26–27 (emphasis
    omitted). Again, we disagree. The supply side of a labor market
    is made up of those individuals who are employed and those
    actively looking for work. Indeed, in Washington Alliance, we
    never questioned that technology job seekers competed in the
    same labor market as student visa holders employed at
    technology firms. 
    See 892 F.3d at 339
    –40.
    Next, the Department claims that any H–1B visa holders
    affected by the rule “are by definition . . . staying to apply for
    permanent residence,” making them “part of the domestic labor
    pool of U.S. workers—not alien competitors.” Appellee’s Br.
    27 (internal quotation marks omitted). We cannot see how this
    defeats Save Jobs’ claim of increased competition, and the
    Department never tells us.
    At oral argument, Department counsel insisted that no H–
    1B visa holder who will benefit from the rule will compete with
    any Save Jobs members because eligibility for the rule depends
    on the H–1B visa holder first having been offered a job for
    which the Department of Labor has certified “no U.S. worker
    12
    is available.” Oral Arg. Tr. 21:17–18. In effect, counsel invites
    us to distinguish between H–1B visa holders generally, with
    whom Save Jobs’ members are quite clearly in competition,
    and H–1B visa holders who have begun the process of applying
    for lawful permanent residence, who the Department contends
    can only take jobs for which there is no American competition.
    See 
    id. at 28:11–19
    (“They have not pled that they are seeking
    employment at companies for which H–1B workers who would
    receive a benefit from the H–4 Rule are currently employed,
    but even if they did, . . . [that] would require . . . the prospect
    that . . . the H–1B visa holder was in a job for which no U.S.
    worker was available, but instead they were available.”).
    The Department neither raised this argument before the
    district court nor briefed it on appeal. “Generally, arguments
    raised for the first time at oral argument are forfeited.” United
    States ex rel. Davis v. District of Columbia, 
    793 F.3d 120
    , 127
    (D.C. Cir. 2015). Given the Department’s insistence that the
    certification procedure “goes to our jurisdiction,” however, we
    shall consider it—“though we are disappointed in the
    [Department] for raising this issue so late that [Save Jobs] had
    no adequate opportunity to respond.” Shays v. Federal Election
    Commission, 
    528 F.3d 914
    , 923 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
    The argument lacks merit in any event. The rule, as well
    as the Department’s own briefing here and before the district
    court, explains that for H–1B visa holders’ spouses to qualify
    for employment authorization, the H–1B visa holders need
    only be the beneficiaries of pending labor certification
    applications. See Appellee’s Br. 5–8; Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of
    its Mot. for Summ. J. 3–4. While the application remains
    pending, H–1B visa holders compete in the labor market
    against Save Jobs’ members. Even more, after the labor
    certification is issued, in certain circumstances H–1B visa
    holders may change jobs without obtaining new certifications.
    13
    See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(iv) (explaining that a labor
    certification for a nonimmigrant “covered by section
    1154(j)”—which pertains to nonimmigrants whose permanent
    residence applications remain pending for 180 days or more—
    “shall remain valid with respect to a new job . . . if the new job
    is in the same or a similar occupational classification as the job
    for which the certification was issued”). The Department’s last-
    second effort therefore does nothing to change our
    understanding of the case.
    One additional matter remains: Save Jobs challenges the
    standing of Immigration Voice, Anujkumar Dhamija, and
    Sudarshana Sengupta to intervene in this appeal. But a motions
    panel has already ruled that the intervenors have standing, and
    we are bound by that decision. See Petties v. District of
    Columbia, 
    227 F.3d 469
    , 472 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Under this
    court’s practice, a decision of the motions panel is the law of
    the case; a later panel considering the merits is bound by that
    law.”).
    14
    III.
    Given that the merits here involve complex questions
    about the scope of the Department’s authority, which the
    Department did not brief on appeal, and recognizing the
    substantial possibility this case will be mooted by the
    Department’s promised rescission of the rule, we think it best
    to remand to give the district court an opportunity to thoroughly
    assess and finally determine the merits in the first instance. Cf.
    Save 
    Jobs, 210 F. Supp. 3d at 12
    –13 (“briefly discuss[ing] the
    merits of Plaintiff’s APA claim” but “mak[ing] no final
    determination”). Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment and remand for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    So ordered.