Jelks, Lorenzo v. FCC ( 1998 )


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  •                         United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued May 18, 1998        Decided June 16, 1998
    No. 97-1544
    Lorenzo Jelks,
    Appellant
    v.
    Federal Communications Commission,
    Appellee
    Gonzales Broadcasting, Inc., et al.,
    Intervenors
    Appeal of an Order of the
    Federal Communications Commission
    Lewis J. Paper argued the cause and filed the briefs for
    appellant.
    Roberta L. Cook, Counsel, Federal Communications Com-
    mission, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Christo-
    pher J. Wright, General Counsel, and Daniel M. Armstrong,
    Associate General Counsel, were on the brief.
    James J. Freeman, Dennis F. Begley, Margaret L. Tobey
    and Curtis T. White were on the brief for intervenors Gon-
    zales Broadcasting, Inc., et al.  Matthew H. McCormick
    entered an appearance.
    Before:  Sentelle, Randolph and Garland, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the court filed Per Curiam.
    Per Curiam:  Lorenzo Jelks appeals from a decision by the
    Federal Communications Commission (FCC) denying his ap-
    plication for a construction permit to build a new FM radio
    station in Mableton, Georgia.  Because Jelks never amended
    his application to indicate that he had the necessary financial
    qualifications, and because such an amendment was necessary
    before Jelks could submit evidence of his qualifications at a
    hearing, we affirm the decision of the Commission.
    Jelks filed his application for a construction permit on July
    10, 1987.  At the time, the application form required each
    applicant to check either a "yes" or "no" box in response to
    the following:
    The applicant certifies that sufficient net liquid assets are
    on hand or that sufficient funds are available from com-
    mitted sources to construct and operate the requested
    facilities for three months without revenue.
    Jelks checked the "no" box, but added:  "Applicant will file an
    amendment relating to his financial qualifications in the near
    future."  Jelks never filed the promised amendment.
    The FCC issued a hearing designation order 1 to consider
    the applications of Jelks and numerous competitors, and
    subsequently added a financial qualifications issue against
    __________
    1  The hearing designation order was issued pursuant to 47
    U.S.C. s 309(e), which provides that the Commission "shall formally
    designate [an] application for hearing" if "a substantial and material
    question of fact is presented" or if the Commission is unable to
    make a finding under s 309(a) "that public interest, convenience,
    and necessity would be served by the granting" of the application.
    Jelks.  Jelks made no effort to amend his application or to
    show good cause for the late filing of an amendment.  In-
    stead, at the March 7, 1989 evidentiary hearing, Jelks prof-
    fered an exhibit to show that he was financially qualified.
    The administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected the exhibit
    because it varied from the "no" certification in Jelks' applica-
    tion and because Jelks had failed to amend the application.
    Thirteen months later, noting that Jelks still had not filed an
    amendment, the ALJ ruled against Jelks on the financial
    qualifications issue and denied his application.  See Mableton
    Broad. Co., 5 F.C.C. Rcd 2474, 2496 (1990).
    Jelks filed exceptions with the FCC's Review Board, which
    affirmed the denial of Jelks' application on the ground that he
    had neither amended his application nor shown good cause
    for filing an amendment late.  See Mableton Broad. Co., 8
    F.C.C. Rcd 7609, 7616 (1993).  Jelks then appealed to the
    FCC.  The Commission denied the petition for review, hold-
    ing it was FCC policy at the time of Jelks' application that, in
    order to make a showing at a hearing contradicting a repre-
    sentation in an application, an amendment supported by good
    cause was required.  See Gonzales Broad., Inc., 12 F.C.C.
    Rcd 12,253, 12,259 (1997).  At the same time, the Commission
    approved a settlement among the remaining applicants and,
    pursuant thereto, granted the application of intervenor Gon-
    zales Broadcasting, Inc.  See id. at 12,260.
    FCC rules provide that an application may be amended as
    of right before the application is designated for hearing, see
    47 C.F.R. s 73.3522(a), and, in comparative broadcasting
    cases, within thirty days after the application has been desig-
    nated for hearing if the amendment relates to issues first
    raised in the designation order, see 47 C.F.R. s 73.3522(b)(2).
    Thereafter, the agency will consider amendments "only upon
    a showing of good cause for late filing."  47 C.F.R.
    s 73.3522(b)(1).2  In an apparent effort to avoid the conse-
    quences of the "good cause" requirement, Jelks contends that
    __________
    2  In Erwin O'Conner, the FCC Review Board identified the
    following factors as relevant to the good cause determination:
    his financial qualifications exhibit should have been allowed
    into evidence without amendment of his application.  Citing
    cases from 1981 and before, he asserts that Commission
    policy permitted applicants to tender financial qualifications
    evidence at variance with their applications without submit-
    ting an amendment supported by good cause.  Moreover, he
    contends, even if there were a change in that policy prior to
    his hearing, the FCC provided insufficient notice of that
    change.
    Jelks is correct in noting that the FCC has not always been
    strict in requiring good cause to amend, or amendment at all,
    in order to introduce evidence at variance with an application.
    See Aspen FM, Inc., 6 F.C.C. Rcd 1602, 1603 (1991) (discuss-
    ing pre-1981 policy);  Neil N. Levitt, 
    33 F.C.C. 720
    , 722 (Rev.
    Bd. 1962).  The FCC has conceded as much.  See Gonzales
    Broad., 12 F.C.C. Rcd at 12,259.  Jelks is also correct that
    the Commission must provide notice of changes in application
    requirements, particularly where the sanction for failure to
    meet those requirements is dismissal without reaching the
    merits.  See Salzer v. FCC, 
    778 F.2d 869
    , 875 (D.C. Cir.
    1985);  see also CHM Broad. Ltd. Partnership v. FCC, 
    24 F.3d 1453
    , 1457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  Jelks is wrong, however,
    in contending that the requirements at issue here had not
    changed by the time of his evidentiary hearing and that the
    agency had not provided adequate notice of that change.
    Prior to 1981, the FCC required broadcast applicants to
    submit detailed documentation demonstrating their financial
    __________
    that [the party seeking to amend] acted with due diligence;
    that the proposed amendment was not required by the volun-
    tary act of the applicant;  that no modification or addition of
    issues or parties would be necessitated;  that the proposed
    amendment would not disrupt the orderly conduct of the
    hearing or necessitate additional hearing;  that the other par-
    ties will not be unfairly prejudiced;  and that the applicant will
    not gain a competitive advantage.
    
    22 F.C.C.2d 140
    , 143 (1970);  see also Royce Int'l Broad. Co. v. FCC,
    
    820 F.2d 1332
    , 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Erwin O'Conner and
    discussing same factors in television licensing context).
    qualifications.  In 1981, the Commission substituted a revised
    application form that, among other things, required only a
    simple "yes" or "no" certification to the financial qualifications
    statement set out above.  See Mission Broad. Corp. v. FCC,
    
    113 F.3d 254
    , 258 (D.C. Cir. 1997);  Revision of Application
    for Construction Permit for Commercial Broadcast Station,
    
    50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 381
    , 382, 397 (1981).  Once it
    adopted this certification policy, the FCC also "generally
    required that an applicant 'demonstrate that it had a reason-
    able assurance of financing at the time that it made its initial
    certification' before it [would] be permitted to amend its
    application."  Mission Broad., 
    113 F.3d at 261
     (quoting
    Pontchartrain Broad. Co. v. FCC, 
    15 F.3d 183
    , 184 (D.C. Cir.
    1994)).  As we explained in Mission Broadcasting, the Com-
    mission "modified its liberal amendment policy ... when it
    eliminated the requirement that each applicant submit de-
    tailed financial documents;  the agency was concerned that an
    applicant would certify to its financial qualifications first and
    secure its financing only later."  
    Id.
     (citing Pontchartrain
    Broad., 
    15 F.3d at 185
    );  see also Aspen FM, 6 F.C.C. Rcd at
    1603.
    The Commission's new policy was reflected in its 1985
    decision in Chudy Broadcasting Corp., 
    58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 133
     (1985).  There, the ALJ refused to permit a post-
    designation amendment, unsupported by good cause, of a
    broadcast application.  On review, the Commission rejected
    the applicant's contention that it should have been permitted
    to continue to prosecute its application without an amend-
    ment.  And since without the amendment the applicant was
    left with a proposal that was not financially viable, the FCC
    upheld the dismissal of the application.  See id. at 135.  The
    Commission explained:
    We have recently undertaken to place greater emphasis
    on providing service to the public in the most efficient,
    expeditious manner possible.  Temporizing with flawed
    proposals has in the past disserved the public interest by
    inordinately delaying the initiation of new service.
    Id. at 134-35 n.7.  Cf. Hillebrand Broad., Inc., 1 F.C.C. Rcd
    419, 419 (1986) (recognizing that procedural deficiencies in
    applications did not always result in dismissal in the past, and
    that "applicants' temporizing activities have been indulged on
    occasion," but emphasizing that "times have changed and so
    has Commission policy").  See also Edwin A. Bernstein, 4
    F.C.C. Rcd 8420 (Rev. Bd. 1989), rev. denied, 5 F.C.C. Rcd
    2843 (1990), aff'd sub nom. Lefebvre v. FCC, 
    926 F.2d 1215
    (D.C. Cir. 1991) (table).
    As against these developments, Jelks principally cites two
    opinions which, he claims, justified his purported ignorance of
    the need to amend his application--a claim belied by his
    representation on that application that he would "file an
    amendment relating to his financial qualifications in the near
    future."  The first is the FCC's 1983 decision in South
    Florida Broadcasting Co., which held that a pre-1981 appli-
    cant that had failed to demonstrate its financial qualifications
    on the old form could not avoid a hearing simply by amending
    its application to add the post-1981 "yes" certification.  See
    
    94 F.C.C.2d 452
    , 455 (1983);  see also Q Prime Inc., FCC
    91M-629 (ALJ Feb. 15, 1991).  But the FCC's decision that
    an amendment is not sufficient to resolve a financial qualifica-
    tions issue hardly establishes that it is not a necessary
    precondition to so doing.
    Jelks also cites a 1989 decision by the FCC's Video Ser-
    vices Division, holding that an application was not necessarily
    "unacceptable for filing" simply because the applicant had
    marked the "no" box regarding financial certification.   See
    Citylight Communications, Inc., 4 F.C.C. Rcd 1676, 1676-77
    (1989).  Although the Division did state in dictum that "[t]he
    remedy for failure to certify is not dismissal, but amendment
    or, failing that, specification of a financial qualifications issue
    against the relevant applicant," id. at 1677, the only question
    at issue was whether the application could be filed.  Hence,
    Citylight simply did not address the question of how an
    applicant who failed to amend could introduce evidence at a
    hearing to meet a financial issue designated against it.  Of
    course, even if Citylight were inconsistent with the policy the
    FCC set for post-designation amendments in Chudy, Jelks
    could hardly take any comfort from it.  As counsel for Jelks
    conceded at oral argument, a subordinate body like the
    Division cannot alter a policy set by the Commission itself.
    See Amor Family Broad. Group v. FCC, 
    918 F.2d 960
    , 962
    (D.C. Cir. 1990).
    We conclude that the FCC provided Jelks with adequate
    notice that if he wanted to submit an exhibit at variance with
    his application, he would have to amend that application and
    show good cause for late filing.  Because he did not do so, the
    ALJ did not err in rejecting the exhibit, and neither the ALJ
    nor the Commission erred in consequently denying Jelks'
    application.  We have considered Jelks' other arguments and
    find that none warrants reversal of the Commission's decision
    or further discussion here.