Amerijet International, Inc. v. John Pistole , 753 F.3d 1343 ( 2014 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued March 27, 2014                 Decided June 13, 2014
    No. 13-1176
    AMERIJET INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
    PETITIONER
    v.
    JOHN S. PISTOLE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
    ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
    ADMINISTRATION,
    RESPONDENT
    Consolidated with 13-1317, 14-1008
    On Petitions for Review of an Agency Decision
    of the Transportation Security Administration
    Joan M. Canny argued the cause and filed the briefs for
    petitioner.
    Sharon Swingle, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for respondent. With her on the briefs were
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C.
    Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Jeffrey E. Sandberg,
    Attorney.
    2
    Before: BROWN and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and
    EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    EDWARDS.
    EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: These consolidated
    petitions concern proposed alternatives to security procedures
    mandated by the Transportation Security Administration
    (“TSA”) and call on us to consider how much TSA must
    explain itself when it denies an aircraft operator’s application
    for such alternate security procedures.
    In two letters to TSA, Petitioner Amerijet International,
    Inc. (“Amerijet”) requested alternative cargo screening
    procedures at various foreign airports it services. TSA largely
    denied its requests, first in a letter sent in May 2013, then in a
    videoconference held in November 2013, and, lastly, in a
    letter sent in January 2014. Amerijet filed three petitions for
    review in this court challenging these three denials. Amerijet
    argues that TSA’s denials fail for want of reasoned
    decisionmaking because TSA offered “no explanation” and
    failed to identify “facts or other support” for its decisions. Br.
    of Pet’r at 40. Amerijet also contends that TSA’s actions
    resulted in a violation of Amerijet’s right to equal protection
    of the law. Id. at 47-48.
    Even under a highly deferential standard of review,
    TSA’s denials were arbitrary and capricious as to most of
    Amerijet’s requests. The record indicates that TSA failed to
    adequately explain most of its denials. And by saying too
    little, TSA has provided “no basis upon which we [can]
    conclude that [its denials were] the product of reasoned
    decisionmaking.” Tourus Records, Inc. v. DEA, 
    259 F.3d 731
    ,
    737 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Because we have no meaningful basis
    3
    upon which to evaluate TSA’s decisionmaking, the “proper
    course . . . is to remand to the agency for additional
    investigation or explanation.” Fla. Power & Light Co. v.
    Lorion, 
    470 U.S. 729
    , 744 (1985).
    Our decision to remand excludes two issues that have
    been raised by Amerijet on appeal. First, in one of its
    requests, Amerijet sought an alternative procedure that
    included removing a TSA requirement that the shipper not
    tender the cargo “at the aircraft operator’s facility.” TSA
    granted this request only for perishable products and only for
    those products tendered at one particular location, not at all
    foreign locations as Amerijet requested. TSA explained that it
    did not have sufficient information about the Amerijet
    locations at issue to make the determination required by its
    regulations. TSA invited Amerijet to submit additional
    information, which agency officials did not receive before
    denying Amerijet’s request. In these circumstances, the
    agency’s action survives arbitrary and capricious review.
    Second, Amerijet sought to amend training protocols set
    forth in an alternate procedure that TSA had approved in
    2011. This alternate procedure expired in October 2013
    during the pendency of Amerijet’s request to amend it.
    Nothing remains at stake in a dispute over a proposed
    amendment to a document that no longer has legal effect. And
    with nothing at stake, we have no power to resolve the
    dispute. “Because the exercise of judicial power under Article
    III depends upon the existence of a case or controversy, a
    federal court may not . . . decide questions that do not affect
    the rights of parties properly before it.” EDWARDS, ELLIOTT &
    LEVY, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 134 (2d ed. 2013)
    (citing North Carolina v. Rice, 
    404 U.S. 244
    , 246 (1971)). We
    therefore dismiss as moot Amerijet’s request to amend
    training protocols.
    4
    Because we are remanding this case for further
    consideration by TSA, Amerijet’s equal protection claim is
    presently unripe for review. We therefore dismiss this claim
    without prejudice.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    A. Regulatory Framework
    Congress has charged TSA with safeguarding the
    country’s civil aviation security. See 
    49 U.S.C. § 114
    (d)(1).
    This responsibility includes regulating the security of all-
    cargo flights. By statute, TSA administers a system “to
    screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of all cargo
    that is to be transported in all-cargo aircraft.” 
    Id.
     § 44901(f).
    Two tools TSA uses to protect the airways are security
    programs and security directives. In its security programs,
    TSA requires all-cargo aircraft operators like Amerijet to
    develop what is called a Full All-Cargo Aircraft Operator
    Standard Security Program. See 
    49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.101
    (h)-(i),
    1544.103, 1544.105. Each aircraft operator’s security program
    must meet certain safety standards and be approved by TSA.
    
    Id.
     § 1544.103(a). And TSA requires that an aircraft operator
    implement the procedures “described in its security program
    to prevent or deter the carriage of . . . any unauthorized
    explosives, incendiaries, and other destructive substances or
    items in cargo onboard an aircraft.” Id. § 1544.205(a).
    On top of these security programs, TSA issues security
    directives. Security directives set forth mandatory security
    measures that, in TSA’s judgment, are “necessary to respond
    to a threat assessment or to a specific threat against civil
    aviation.” Id. § 1544.305(a). Aircraft operators generally must
    5
    implement the security measures prescribed by a security
    directive. Id. § 1544.305(a)-(c).
    TSA regulations allow aircraft operators to seek
    adjustments to their security programs. Such adjustments,
    however, must be approved by TSA, and approval is
    conditioned on TSA’s determining that “safety and the public
    interest will allow [the amendment], and [that] the proposed
    amendment provides the level of security required under this
    part.” Id. § 1544.105(b)(3).
    Aircraft operators can also request alternative measures
    to those mandated in a TSA security directive. TSA
    regulations provide that, “[i]n the event that the aircraft
    operator is unable to implement the measures in the Security
    Directive, the aircraft operator must submit proposed
    alternative measures and the basis for submitting the
    alternative measures to TSA for approval. . . . The aircraft
    operator must implement any alternative measures approved
    by TSA.” Id. § 1544.305(d).
    B. Agency Proceedings and Amerijet’s Petitions
    Amerijet is a shipping company that operates all-cargo
    aircraft to transport cargo from international locations to the
    United States. Amerijet has a TSA-approved security
    program, although the measures outlined therein are generally
    not at issue here. This dispute arises from the procedures
    mandated in a TSA security directive.
    In 2011, TSA issued Security Directive No. 1544-11-04
    (the “Directive”) in response to an October 2010 incident in
    which “terrorists concealed explosives in cargo bound for the
    United States.” Directive at 1, reprinted in Joint Appendix
    (“J.A.”) 1. Reauthorized annually since its issuance, the
    6
    Directive requires specific screening procedures for certain
    categories of U.S.-bound cargo. These procedures are more
    stringent than those mandated by an aircraft operators’ regular
    security program. For some categories of cargo, the Directive
    simply requires that aircraft operators follow their normal
    screening procedures. We need not go into more detail than
    this because the specifics are immaterial to our decision and
    would likely succumb to redaction in any event.
    Shortly after the Directive issued, Amerijet sought – and
    TSA approved – an alternative procedure for screening cargo.
    See Security Directive Alternative Procedures at 1, reprinted
    in J.A. 10. TSA permitted Amerijet to use an enhanced
    physical search in lieu of the Directive’s screening
    requirements at locations where the “inability to screen cargo
    with Explosives Trace Detection . . . would prevent the
    aircraft operator from transporting the cargo.” Id. The
    approved alternative procedure included a requirement that
    Amerijet train its screeners in a manner detailed by TSA’s
    order. Id. at 3-4. TSA’s approval of this alternative expired in
    October 2013, while Amerijet’s request to amend the
    alternative training procedures was pending. As explained
    above, the dispute over this matter is now moot.
    Amerijet’s 2011 request for alternative procedures was
    not its last. In 2012, Amerijet discovered that compliance with
    the Directive was infeasible at certain locations even with the
    “physical search” accommodation that TSA had approved.
    Amerijet concluded this after it learned, in connection with a
    TSA enforcement proceeding against it, that TSA interpreted
    some of the Directive’s provisions differently than it did.
    Amerijet therefore requested additional modifications to the
    procedures required in the Directive, first in February 2013
    and then in August 2013. See Application for Alternate
    Procedures, Feb. 8, 2013, reprinted in J.A. 34-39 (“February
    7
    Application”); Application for Alternate Procedures, Aug. 9,
    2013, reprinted in Supplemental Joint Appendix (“S.J.A.”)
    59-63 (“August Application”); see also 
    49 C.F.R. § 1544.305
    (d). These requests form the basis of the present
    dispute.
    In its February Application, Amerijet requested four
    alternative procedures. February Application at 1-2. Here
    again, we need not discuss specifics. Suffice it to say that the
    four requests sought to broaden the categories of cargo
    exempted from the Directive’s specific screening procedures.
    After a conference with TSA officials in March 2013,
    Amerijet supplemented and clarified its four proposals.
    Supplementation and Clarification of Application for
    Alternate Procedures at 1, reprinted in J.A. 42.
    In May 2013, TSA denied all four proposals in a short
    letter. Letter from Walter Craig to Richard Carpenter & Joan
    Canny (May 6, 2013), reprinted in J.A. 54-55 (“May Letter”).
    The letter states that, “[b]ased on a comprehensive review of
    the proposed [alternative procedures], the request is hereby
    denied.” 
    Id. at 1
    . It then states that the “basis for this denial is
    that TSA has determined that the procedures contained in the
    [proposal] are based on Amerijet’s interpretation of [the
    Directive].” 
    Id.
     The only other statement in the letter that is
    colorably responsive to Amerijet’s application is TSA’s
    assertion that one of the proposals, which concerned
    perishable commodities, was “not in the best interest of safety
    and the public interest” and did not “provide the level of
    security required under 49 C.F.R. Section 1544.205(a), (b),
    and (f).” 
    Id.
     Amerijet timely petitioned for review of the May
    Letter, which is before the court as Petition No. 13-1176.
    With its petition pending before this court, Amerijet
    submitted its August Application to TSA. Amerijet sought
    8
    TSA’s approval of three alternate procedures and asked for
    clarification concerning certain screening requirements.
    August Application at 1. Two of its proposals sought to alter
    the Directive’s requirements. 
    Id. at 2-3
    . The third sought to
    alter the training protocols required in the alternate procedure
    TSA had approved in 2011. 
    Id. at 3-5
    .
    On November 4, 2013, TSA officials held a
    videoconference with representatives of Amerijet. TSA
    offered a counterproposal for one of the three alternative
    procedures Amerijet requested. And a TSA official said that
    Amerijet should consider its August Application denied
    except with respect to the counterproposal. See Pet’r’s
    Supplemental Br. at 8-9. Amerijet sought review of this oral
    denial, filing Petition No. 13-1317. In the meantime, Amerijet
    and TSA reached an agreement concerning TSA’s
    counterproposal, which led to TSA approving in December
    2013 a set of alternative procedures for perishable
    commodities at one of the foreign airports serviced by
    Amerijet.
    In January 2014, TSA issued a “final decision” denying
    the remaining requests for alternate procedures in the August
    Application. Letter from Joni M. Millan to Richard Carpenter
    (Jan. 14, 2014), reprinted in S.J.A. 79-83 (“January Letter”).
    Amerijet filed a third petition for review, Petition No. 14-
    1008, challenging the January Letter.
    The court has consolidated the three petitions for review.
    9
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. Jurisdiction and Finality
    Amerijet’s petition for review was properly filed under
    the Federal Aviation Act, which provides in pertinent part that
    “a person disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued
    [under the Act] . . . may apply for review of the order by
    filing a petition” in this court. 
    49 U.S.C. § 46110
    (a). Amerijet
    undoubtedly has a substantial interest in whether TSA
    approves or denies its request for alternate procedures, and the
    agency does not contest this.
    Nonetheless, judicial review is “restricted to review of
    final agency orders” so as to “avoid premature intervention in
    the administrative process.” CSI Aviation Servs., Inc. v. U.S.
    Dep’t of Transp., 
    637 F.3d 408
    , 411 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Agency action is “final” when it (1)
    marks “the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking
    process,” and (2) is one in which “rights or obligations have
    been determined” or “from which legal consequences will
    flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 
    520 U.S. 154
    , 178 (1997) (citations
    and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Amerijet’s first and third petitions for review (Nos.
    13-1176 and 14-1008) challenge final agency action in the
    form of TSA’s May Letter and January Letter. These letters
    have “legal consequences” and were the “consummation” of
    TSA’s consideration of Amerijet’s requests. Amerijet’s
    second petition (No. 13-1317) is another matter. It challenges
    TSA’s oral denial delivered in a November 2013
    videoconference. The oral denial was, quite obviously, a
    tentative conclusion and not the “consummation” of TSA’s
    decisionmaking, which came two months later in the January
    10
    Letter. Amerijet’s second petition is therefore not properly
    subject to review by this court.
    B. The Standard of Review
    We recently explained the applicable standard of review
    in a related context in Suburban Air Freight, Inc. v. TSA, 
    716 F.3d 679
     (D.C. Cir. 2013):
    Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, we
    must uphold TSA’s decisions unless they are “arbitrary,
    capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
    accordance with law,” or unsupported by “substantial
    evidence.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2); 
    49 U.S.C. § 46110
    (c); see
    Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. TSA, 
    588 F.3d 1116
    , 1120 (D.C.
    Cir. 2009). In addition, “[w]e must give substantial
    deference to [the] agency’s interpretation of its own
    regulations.” Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,
    
    512 U.S. 504
    , 512 (1994). . . . [W]e should afford similar
    deference to TSA’s interpretation of [a security
    program]. . . . [W]e believe [security programs] are
    analogous to other formal, standardized, agency-
    approved documents with respect to which we afford
    agencies deference. Just as we defer to the Federal
    Energy Regulatory Commission’s and the Federal
    Communications Commission’s interpretations of tariffs,
    see e.g., FPL Energy Marcus Hook, L.P. v. FERC, 
    430 F.3d 441
    , 446 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Global NAPs, Inc. v.
    FCC, 
    247 F.3d 252
    , 258 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (FCC), for
    example, so too must we defer to TSA’s reasonable
    interpretation of a [security program].
    Id. at 681-82. The same principles are in play here with
    respect to TSA security directives and agency decisions to
    grant or deny alternative procedures. And in applying this
    11
    standard of review, we remain mindful that, because Congress
    has entrusted TSA with broad authority over “civil aviation
    security,” 
    49 U.S.C. §§ 114
    (d)(1), (f)(10), (l)(1), 44901(f), it
    is “TSA’s job – not [an airline’s] or ours – to strike a balance
    between convenience and security.” Suburban Air, 716 F.3d
    at 683.
    Nevertheless, even pursuant to this deferential standard
    of review, an agency must articulate an explanation for its
    action. We have explained that a “fundamental requirement of
    administrative law is that an agency set forth its reasons for
    decision; an agency’s failure to do so constitutes arbitrary and
    capricious agency action.” Tourus Records, 
    259 F.3d at 737
    (internal quotation marks omitted). This basic principle,
    codified in 
    5 U.S.C. § 555
    (e), is indispensable to sound
    judicial review. See id.; 
    5 U.S.C. § 555
    (e) (requiring that an
    agency provide an interested party with a “brief statement of
    the grounds for denial” of the party’s request except “in
    affirming a prior denial or when the denial is self-
    explanatory”). At bottom, an agency must explain “why it
    chose to do what it did.” Tourus Records, 
    259 F.3d at 737
    (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on
    Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE
    L.J. 199, 222). And to this end, conclusory statements will not
    do; an “agency’s statement must be one of reasoning.” Butte
    Cnty., Cal. v. Hogen, 
    613 F.3d 190
    , 194 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
    (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    C. TSA’s Denials of Amerijet’s Requests
    We now turn to the merits of Amerijet’s first and third
    petitions for review.
    12
    1.   May Letter
    TSA’s May Letter failed to explain why it denied the
    proposals in Amerijet’s February Application. TSA ignored
    one of Amerijet’s four requests entirely, and, with respect to
    two of the other requests, it simply restated the rules from
    which Amerijet sought exceptions. May Letter at 1 (bullet
    points (1) and (2)). Restating a rule from which an exception
    is sought explains nothing about why the agency denied the
    exception; it begs the question. And TSA’s fourth denial is no
    better. TSA merely parroted the language of the standard,
    stating that “TSA has determined that exclusions from
    physical screening for special types of cargo . . . are not in the
    best interest of safety and the public interest . . . [and] do not
    provide the level of security required under [the regulations].”
    Id.; see also 
    49 C.F.R. § 1544.105
    (b)(3). This response, like
    the letter at issue in Tourus Records, is “not a statement of
    reasoning, but of conclusion.” 
    259 F.3d at 737
    . It is arbitrary
    because it says nothing about “why” TSA made the
    determination. See 
    id.
     Simply put, the May Letter had “all the
    explanatory power of the reply of Bart[le]by the Scrivener to
    his employer: ‘I would prefer not to.’” Butte Cnty., 
    613 F.3d at 195
     (quoting HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY, THE
    SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET 10 (Dover 1990)
    (1853)). TSA must say more.
    At oral argument, TSA contended that because Amerijet
    sought discretionary exceptions from the Directive, Amerijet
    bore “some burden to make a showing” that its alternatives
    provided commensurate security. Oral Arg. Tape at 35:43
    (Mar. 27, 2014). This is a sensible position in the abstract.
    Indeed, it seems reasonable and consistent with the
    regulations for TSA to require an aircraft operator requesting
    alternate measures to offer some explanation of why, in its
    view, the requested alternative would be equally safe and to
    13
    provide supporting evidence (to the extent such evidence is in
    the operator’s possession). See 
    49 C.F.R. § 1544.305
    (d)
    (requiring aircraft operator to offer “the basis for submitting
    the alternative measures”). The problem with this argument,
    however, is that TSA did not articulate its denial on such
    terms. Under well-established law, we evaluate an agency’s
    contemporaneous explanation for its actions and not
    “appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations.” Tourus
    Records, 
    259 F.3d at 738
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    TSA’s denials are not “self-explanatory,” see 
    id. at 737
    (quoting 
    5 U.S.C. § 555
    (e)), and, therefore, the agency did not
    afford Amerijet the “grounds for denial” to which it was
    entitled, 
    5 U.S.C. § 555
    (e). And this court is left to evaluate
    the reasons offered by TSA, which are insufficient.
    2.   January Letter
    Whether the January Letter adequately explained why
    TSA denied the requests in the August Application presents a
    closer question. As explained above, one of the requests that
    TSA denied is now moot. That leaves two requests, which we
    consider in turn.
    The first request concerned a requirement in the Directive
    relating to the “Customs-Trade Partnership Against
    Terrorism” (“C-TPAT”) program, which is a voluntary
    partnership between the private sector and U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection. When certain other conditions are met, the
    Directive exempts cargo from additional screening
    requirements so long as the shipper is certified under the
    C-TPAT program. Directive at 4. Because Amerijet believed
    that the other conditions were “adequate to establish the
    consignor as known to Amerijet” and “based upon a
    reasonable risk assessment” for the foreign airports it
    services, Amerijet requested that this C-TPAT condition be
    14
    “removed.” August Application at 3. TSA denied the request,
    stating that eliminating the C-TPAT certification requirement
    would not “provide a level of security commensurate with the
    other screening options provided by the [Directive]” and
    “would not be in the best interest of aviation security.”
    January Letter at 3. TSA then listed three reasons why the
    “C-TPAT certification requirement is important.” 
    Id.
    This response is an improvement on the purported
    explanation TSA offered in its May Letter, but it falls short of
    reasoned decisionmaking. Though TSA does not explicitly
    connect the dots in its explanation, this shortcoming is not
    itself fatal. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State
    Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983) (“We will
    . . . uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s
    path may reasonably be discerned.” (internal quotation marks
    omitted)). By listing three ways in which the C-TPAT
    certification is important, TSA appears to explain that,
    because the C-TPAT requirement is useful, removing it
    entirely would not provide commensurate security. But this
    explanation does not address the main thrust of Amerijet’s
    request – i.e., that, in the locations serviced by Amerijet, the
    other conditions in Section II.C.1 of the Directive ensure
    adequate security and render the C-TPAT requirement
    unnecessary based “upon a reasonable risk assessment” of the
    areas at issue. August Application at 3. Given the impetus of
    Amerijet’s request, listing the general worth of the C-TPAT
    requirement is programmatic boilerplate rather than reasoned
    explanation. We simply cannot tell if TSA considered
    whether, in the areas Amerijet services, the C-TPAT program
    affords security beyond that provided by the other conditions
    in Section II.C.1 of the Directive. Put another way, we cannot
    discern if TSA considered the substance of Amerijet’s request
    and, if so, what reasons it had for denying it.
    15
    In its second request, Amerijet asked for two
    modifications to Section II.C.2 of the Directive. This
    provision exempts cargo from the Directive’s screening
    requirements when the aircraft operator accepts the cargo
    from a direct shipper with an established “business
    relationship with the aircraft operator” and the cargo is not
    tendered “at the aircraft operator’s facility.” Directive at 4.
    Amerijet sought (1) to eliminate the requirement that the
    cargo not be tendered “at the aircraft operator’s facility,” and
    (2) to alter another condition in Section II.C.2. August
    Application at 3. TSA granted this request but only for
    perishable products and only for those products tendered at
    one particular location, not at all foreign locations as Amerijet
    requested. January Letter at 3-4. TSA explained that “local
    government security procedures, business practices and
    commodities . . . vary by location. . . . To ensure that safety
    and the public interest will allow the requested procedures
    . . . , TSA must review requests on a location-by-location
    basis and Amerijet must provide supporting information on a
    location-by-location basis. TSA is sufficiently aware of
    security practices within [the country where it granted the
    alternate procedures] and Amerijet’s security capabilities
    within [that country] to implement the requested [procedures
    there]. Such is not the case in other locations where Amerijet
    operates.” Id. at 4.
    TSA’s response passes muster. It is adequately explained,
    consistent with the regulations, and reasonable. As TSA
    interprets the regulations, it may approve a request for
    alternative procedures only if the “alternative measures
    provide a commensurate level of security and are consistent
    with the public interest.” Supplemental Br. for Resp’t at 10;
    see also Br. for Resp’t at 30 (“TSA ‘may’ approve a proposed
    security program amendment where the ‘designated official
    determines that safety and the public interest will allow it’ and
    16
    where the proposed amendment ‘provides the level of security
    required under this part.’” (quoting 
    49 C.F.R. § 1544.105
    (b)(3)). TSA determined that it did not have
    adequate information about other Amerijet locations to make
    the determination required by the regulations. It therefore
    elected for a phased approach, approving the request as to one
    location and inviting Amerijet to submit additional
    information as to other locations. (We note that it appears
    from the record that Amerijet planned to submit the requested
    information as part of a separate administrative request. See
    Letter from Rosa Fernandez to Joni M. Millan (Dec. 2, 2013)
    at 1, reprinted in S.J.A. 69.)
    D. The Appropriate Remedy
    The Supreme Court has made clear that when an
    agency’s explanation does not permit a court to evaluate the
    agency’s action, “the proper course, except in rare
    circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional
    investigation or explanation.” Lorion, 
    470 U.S. at 744
    . So it is
    here. Neither party has identified a rare circumstance that
    would justify departing from the “usual remedy” of a remand.
    Tourus Records, 
    259 F.3d at 737
    .
    We are not in a position to assess Amerijet’s equal
    protection claim because, as noted above, we have no
    meaningful basis upon which to evaluate TSA’s denials of
    Amerijet’s requests. Amerijet’s equal protection claim is
    premised on TSA denying its requests for alternate
    procedures, together with an allegation that TSA allowed a
    competitor to use these same procedures. There is no way to
    weigh the viability of Amerijet’s equal protection claim
    without a clear understanding of the agency’s position with
    respect to the disputed denials. And with our remand of this
    case, the possibility remains that TSA may reconsider its prior
    17
    denials or offer adequate explanations for the agency’s
    actions, either of which may moot Amerijet’s equal protection
    claim.
    In these circumstances, we find Amerijet’s equal
    protection claim unripe for review. “[I]f a claim challenging
    final agency action is not concrete, it may be unfit for judicial
    review without regard to whether the complaining party has
    standing to pursue the claim.” Marcum v. Salazar, 
    694 F.3d 123
    , 129 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting EDWARDS & ELLIOTT,
    FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 119 (2007)). The courts
    look to “both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and
    the hardship to the parties of withholding court
    consideration.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 
    387 U.S. 136
    , 149
    (1967). The “fitness” of the issue for judicial review turns on
    whether a court’s consideration of the case “would benefit
    from further factual development” and “whether judicial
    intervention would inappropriately interfere with further
    administrative action.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra
    Club, 
    523 U.S. 726
    , 733 (1998). The ripeness doctrine thus
    protects “the agency’s interest in crystallizing its policy
    before that policy is subjected to judicial review and the
    court’s interests in avoiding unnecessary adjudication and in
    deciding issues in a concrete setting.” Eagle–Picher Indus.,
    Inc. v. EPA, 
    759 F.2d 905
    , 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985). These are
    particularly salient considerations in this case because the
    matters in dispute involve sensitive security issues. And it is
    also noteworthy that Amerijet does not contend that it will
    suffer any “hardship” if its equal protection claim is dismissed
    without prejudice pending further consideration by TSA on
    remand. See Marcum, 694 F.3d at 130. Therefore, it would be
    inappropriate for this court to consider the constitutionality of
    TSA’s denials without affording the agency an opportunity to
    more fully address Amerijet’s requests.
    18
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we dismiss Petition No.
    13-1317, grant Petition No. 13-1176, and grant in part and
    deny in part Petition No. 14-1008. TSA’s denials of
    Amerijet’s requests for alternate security procedures are
    hereby remanded for further consideration, with the exception
    of the agency’s partial denial of Requested Alternate
    Procedure 2, see S.J.A. 61, which was adequately explained,
    and its denial of Requested Alternate Procedure 3, see id.,
    which is now moot. Amerijet’s equal protection claim is
    dismissed without prejudice as unripe.
    So ordered.