Blue Man Vegas, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board ( 2008 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued October 18, 2007              Decided June 10, 2008
    No. 06-1328
    BLUE MAN VEGAS, LLC,
    PETITIONER
    v.
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    RESPONDENT
    INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE
    EMPLOYEES, MOVING PICTURE TECHNICIANS, ARTISTS AND
    ALLIED CRAFTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES,
    CANADA, LOCAL 720, AFL-CIO,
    INTERVENOR
    Consolidated with
    06-1341
    On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for
    Enforcement
    of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board
    Lawrence D. Levien argued the cause for petitioner.
    With him on the briefs was Edward P. Lazarus.
    2
    Amy H. Ginn, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board,
    argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were
    Ronald E. Meisburg, General Counsel, John H. Ferguson,
    Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Assistant
    General Counsel, and Jill A. Griffin, Supervisory Attorney.
    Ruth E. Burdick, Attorney, entered an appearance.
    Michael A. Urban argued the cause and filed the brief for
    intervenor.
    Before: GINSBURG, BROWN, and GRIFFITH, Circuit
    Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.
    GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Blue Man Vegas, LLC
    (BMV) petitions for review of the National Labor Relations
    Board’s decision that it engaged in unfair labor practices by
    refusing to bargain with the International Alliance of
    Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians,
    Artists & Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories &
    Canada, AFL-CIO (the Union), elected to represent certain of
    its employees. BMV argues the Board erred in holding the
    bargaining unit proposed by the Union was appropriate. We
    deny Blue Man’s petition and grant the Board’s cross-
    application for enforcement.
    I.   Background
    BMV manages and produces the Las Vegas production
    of the Blue Man Group, a theatrical show in which men
    wearing blue grease paint on their faces and heads and
    dressed entirely in black perform a series of skits and dance
    routines involving music, props, and videos. On stage with
    the “Blue Men” are seven musicians. The Blue Men and the
    3
    musicians are assisted by a stage crew comprising seven
    departments: audio; carpentry; electrics; properties (props);
    video; wardrobe; and musical instrument technicians (MITs),
    who maintain the musical instruments, many of which are
    unique to Blue Man Group productions. There are also a
    handful of so-called “swings,” who BMV explains are
    “trained in numerous departments to provide coverage ... as
    needed due to vacation or illness.” During a performance,
    each of the seven stage crews performs its own “cue tracks,”
    which are series of carefully planned actions. For example, a
    carpentry crew’s cue tracks might involve placing and
    moving scenic backdrops at specified times.
    From 2000 through most of 2005, BMV performed at the
    Luxor Hotel and Casino. During that time, BMV employed
    the MITs directly, but the Luxor employed the members of
    the other stage crews, as to whom it entered into a collective
    bargaining agreement with the Union. As a result, there were
    differences in the terms and conditions of employment of the
    MITs and of the other crews. The MITs reported to BMV’s
    Production Manager, John McInnis, whereas the other stage
    crews reported to the Luxor; the MITs were paid a salary
    whereas the others were paid an hourly wage; and the MITs’
    pre-performance sign-in sheet was separate from the sign-in
    sheet for the others.
    In September 2005, BMV left the Luxor and reopened a
    month later at the Venetian Hotel and Casino. Incident to the
    move, BMV decided to employ the entire stage crew directly.
    To handle its many new stage crew employees, BMV erected
    a new management structure. A department head would
    supervise the employees in each of the six departments that
    previously reported to the Luxor, and the “technical
    supervisor” would supervise the six new department heads
    and report to McInnis.
    4
    Although the employees in all seven stage crew
    departments were now employed directly by BMV, several
    differences between the MITs and the other crews were
    carried over from the Luxor to the Venetian. First, whereas
    the others were separated from McInnis, the production
    manager, by two levels of supervision (a department head and
    the technical supervisor), the MITs continued to report
    directly to McInnis. Second, the two MITs who had been
    with BMV at the Luxor were still paid a salary, whereas the
    members of the other crews were paid a wage, as they had
    been at the Luxor. (The four MITs hired after BMV left the
    Luxor were paid a wage, however.) Finally, the MITs’ sign-
    in sheet remained separate from the sign-in sheet for the other
    crews.
    In March 2006, the Union petitioned the Board for a
    representation election in a unit comprising all stage crew
    employees except the MITs. BMV objected that the MITs
    should be included in the bargaining unit. After a hearing, the
    Board’s Regional Director (RD) determined, pursuant to
    § 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 
    29 U.S.C. § 159
    (b), that the unit proposed by the Union was an
    appropriate unit and ordered a representation election. The
    RD found significant the differences between the MITs and
    the other stage crews that stemmed from the prior unit’s
    bargaining history, namely, those relating to supervision,
    form of payment, and sign-in sheets. He also found
    significant a number of differences that cannot be attributed
    to BMV’s time at the Luxor: The MITs have separate
    substitutes during days off and vacations, “skills separate
    from the other stage crew members,” and different cue tracks;
    they “do not ‘swing’ to other stage crew positions”; and they
    “work in different areas” and “interact[]” primarily “with
    musicians, not stage crew members.” The Board denied
    BMV’s petition for review of the RD’s decision.
    5
    The Union won the ensuing representation election by a
    vote of 20-14 and the RD duly certified the Union as the
    exclusive bargaining representative. About a month later, the
    RD issued a complaint against BMV alleging it had refused to
    bargain with the Union, in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
    NLRA, 
    29 U.S.C. § 158
    (a)(1) & (5). BMV argued it was not
    required to bargain because the exclusion of the MITs
    rendered the unit inappropriate. Finding BMV had raised or
    could have raised all issues relating to representation in the
    prior unit determination hearing and BMV did not proffer any
    previously unavailable evidence, the Board granted summary
    judgment for the General Counsel. BMV then petitioned for
    review in this court and the Board cross-applied for
    enforcement of its decision.
    II. Analysis
    BMV challenges the Board’s decision that its refusal to
    bargain was an unfair labor practice on the ground that the
    unit was not appropriate. See Terrace Gardens Plaza v.
    NLRB, 
    91 F.3d 222
    , 225 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Judicial review
    [of an order directing a representation election] is available
    only if the employer refuses to bargain and is found, in a final
    order of the Board, to have violated § 8(a)(5)” of the NLRA).
    “This court will uphold an NLRB bargaining unit
    determination unless it is arbitrary or not supported by
    substantial evidence in the record.” Country Ford Trucks,
    Inc. v. NLRB, 
    229 F.3d 1184
    , 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
    BMV advances three arguments: The Board applied the
    wrong standard to determine whether the proposed unit was
    appropriate; the unit determination was not supported by
    substantial evidence; and the exclusion of the MITs from the
    proposed unit created a “disfavored residual unit.” None is
    persuasive.
    6
    A.     The Unit Determination Standard
    BMV’s primary argument is that the Board applied a
    standard for the unit determination that conflicts with the
    NLRA and has been, for that reason, rejected by the Fourth
    Circuit. BMV’s position, although superficially plausible, is
    based upon a misapprehension of the framework governing
    unit determinations.
    The Board’s principal concern in evaluating a proposed
    bargaining unit is whether the employees share a “community
    of interest.” NLRB v. Action Auto., Inc., 
    469 U.S. 490
    , 494
    (1985); see also Agri Processor Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    514 F.3d 1
    , 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “There is no hard and fast definition
    or an inclusive or exclusive listing of the factors to consider
    [under the community-of-interest standard]. Rather, unit
    determinations must be made only after weighing all relevant
    factors on a case-by-case basis.” Country Ford Trucks, 
    229 F.3d at 1190-91
     (quotation marks, citations, and ellipsis
    omitted). Those factors include whether, in distinction from
    other employees, the employees in the proposed unit have
    “different methods of compensation, hours of work, benefits,
    supervision, training and skills; if their contact with other
    employees is infrequent; if their work functions are not
    integrated with those of other employees; and if they have
    historically been part of a distinct bargaining unit.” Trident
    Seafoods, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    101 F.3d 111
    , 118 n.11 (D.C. Cir.
    1996); see also Agri Processor, 
    514 F.3d at 9
     (collecting
    factors); NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co. (Lundy II), 
    68 F.3d 1577
    , 1580 (4th Cir. 1995) (listing factors). And, although
    the NLRA provides “the extent to which the employees have
    organized shall not be controlling,” 
    29 U.S.C. § 159
    (c)(5), the
    Supreme Court has held that the extent of their organization
    may be “consider[ed] ... as one factor” in determining
    whether a proposed unit is appropriate. NLRB v. Metro. Life
    Ins. Co., 
    380 U.S. 438
    , 442 (1965).
    7
    Decisions of the Board and of the courts in unit
    determination cases generally conform to a consistent analytic
    framework. If the employees in the proposed unit share a
    community of interest, then the unit is prima facie
    appropriate. In order successfully to challenge that unit, the
    employer must do more than show there is another
    appropriate unit because “more than one appropriate
    bargaining unit logically can be defined in any particular
    factual setting.” Country Ford Trucks, 
    229 F.3d at 1189
    (quotation marks omitted). Rather, as the Board emphasizes,
    the employer’s burden is to show the prima facie appropriate
    unit is “truly inappropriate.” 
    Id. at 1189
    ; Dunbar Armored,
    Inc. v. NLRB, 
    186 F.3d 844
    , 847 (7th Cir. 1999) (“clearly
    inappropriate”) (quotation marks omitted); see also
    Serramonte Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    86 F.3d 227
    , 236
    (D.C. Cir. 1996) (the Board “need only select an appropriate
    unit, not the most appropriate unit”) (quotation marks
    omitted).
    A unit is truly inappropriate if, for example, there is no
    legitimate basis upon which to exclude certain employees
    from it. That the excluded employees share a community of
    interest with the included employees does not, however, mean
    there may be no legitimate basis upon which to exclude them;
    that follows apodictically from the proposition that there may
    be more than one appropriate bargaining unit. If, however,
    the excluded employees share an overwhelming community
    of interest with the included employees, then there is no
    legitimate basis upon which to exclude them from the
    bargaining unit. We held in Trident Seafoods, for example,
    the Board’s unit determination was “irrational” and
    “unsupported by substantial evidence” because the employer
    had adduced unrebutted evidence showing that “the
    functional integration of and the overwhelming similarities
    between the [excluded] and [included employees] are such
    that neither group can be said to have any separate
    8
    community of interest justifying a separate bargaining unit.”
    
    101 F.3d at 120
    ; see also Jewish Hosp. Ass’n, 
    223 N.L.R.B. 614
    , 617 (1976) (unit limited to service employees
    inappropriate because of “overwhelming community of
    interest” with maintenance employees); Lodgian, Inc., 
    332 N.L.R.B. 1246
    , 1255 (2000) (RD required inclusion in unit of
    employees who “share an overwhelming community of
    interest with the employees whom the [union] seeks to
    represent”).
    A Venn diagram may
    clarify these principles. Each
    rectangle represents the interests
    of a group of identically situated
    employees.       The region in
    which two or more rectangles
    overlap represents the degree to
    which those groups have
    common interests. In Figure 1,
    Rectangles A, B, and C all
    overlap because all the groups
    have a community of interest
    with each other. Consequently, any combination of the
    groups – AB, AC, BC, or ABC – is a prima facie appropriate
    bargaining unit. Note, however, that Rectangles A and B
    overlap almost completely; this indicates they have an
    overwhelming community of interest. Any unit that includes
    one but excludes the other is “truly inappropriate.”
    Therefore, the only units that could be deemed appropriate in
    the face of a challenge are AB and ABC.*
    *
    This framework complements the Board’s accretion policy.
    “The term ‘accretion’ ... means the addition of employees into a
    unit without an election.” Frontier Tel. of Rochester, 
    344 N.L.R.B. 1270
    , 1270 n.3 (2005). Typically, an employer seeks an accretion
    9
    BMV contends the Board applied the wrong standard in
    making its unit determination, effectively “accord[ing]
    controlling weight to the Union’s extent of organization,” in
    violation of § 9(c)(5) of the NLRA. According to BMV, the
    Board erred in basing its decision upon Lundy Packing Co.
    (Lundy I), 
    314 N.L.R.B. 1042
    , 1043-44 (1994), in which the
    Board upheld the unit proposed by the union, thereby
    “fail[ing] to heed” the Fourth Circuit’s subsequent refusal to
    enforce that decision, which BMV says rested on the ground
    that the overwhelming-community-of-interest standard
    unlawfully gives controlling weight to the union’s extent of
    organization.
    BMV’s reading of Lundy II and of the Board’s decision
    in this case reflect a misapprehension of the governing
    framework just described, as well as a misreading of the
    when it has added a new department and wants to include the new
    employees in a pre-existing bargaining unit. See 
    id. at 1270-71
    . “It
    is the policy of the Board to find accretions only when the
    additional employees have little or no separate group identity ... and
    when the additional employees share an overwhelming community
    of interest with the preexisting unit to which they are accreted.”
    Giant Eagle Mkts. Co., 
    308 N.L.R.B. 206
    , 206 (1992) (quotation
    marks omitted). The decision to permit an accretion thus reflects “a
    legal conclusion that two groups of employees constitute one
    bargaining unit.” Northland Hub, Inc. & Gen. Teamsters Local
    959, 
    304 N.L.R.B. 665
    , 665 (1991). “In determining ... whether the
    requisite overwhelming community of interest exists to warrant an
    accretion, the Board considers many of the same factors relevant to
    unit determinations in initial representation cases, i.e., integration
    of operations, centralized control of management and labor
    relations, geographic proximity, similarity of terms and conditions
    of employment, similarity of skills and functions, physical contact
    among employees, collective bargaining history, degree of separate
    daily supervision, and degree of employee interchange.” Frontier
    Tel., 344 N.L.R.B. at 1271.
    10
    Fourth Circuit’s opinion. In effect, BMV contends that, as
    long as the MITs had a community of interest to any degree
    with the other stage crews, they could not be excluded from
    the bargaining unit. That view is obviously at odds with the
    principles discussed above.
    Lundy II, on the other hand, is consistent with the
    framework set out above. The Fourth Circuit there objected
    to the combination of the overwhelming-community-of-
    interest standard and the presumption the Board had
    employed in favor of the proposed unit: “By presuming the
    union-proposed unit proper unless there is ‘an overwhelming
    community of interest’ with excluded employees, the Board
    effectively accorded controlling weight to the extent of union
    organization.” Lundy II, 
    68 F.3d at 1581
    . As long as the
    Board applies the overwhelming community-of-interest
    standard only after the proposed unit has been shown to be
    prima facie appropriate, the Board does not run afoul of the
    statutory injunction that the extent of the union’s organization
    not be given controlling weight.
    Here, the Board correctly applied the overwhelming-
    community-of-interest standard; it did not presume the
    Union’s proposed unit was valid, as it had done in Lundy I.
    Rather, the RD first determined “[t]he record ... establishes
    that the petitioned-for unit, which excludes MITs, is an
    appropriate unit for collective bargaining”; indeed, he noted,
    “the parties have never contended” otherwise. The RD then
    went on to apply the overwhelming-community-of-interest
    standard to determine whether BMV had shown the exclusion
    of the MITs rendered the proposed unit truly inappropriate.
    As the Board says, the RD cited Lundy I to support the
    generally correct proposition that “a unit need not be an all-
    inclusive unit in order to be an appropriate unit,” and then
    looked to that decision for guidance as to the “factors” to be
    considered in deciding whether the two groups of employees
    11
    have an overwhelming community of interest. The Board’s
    use of the overwhelming-community-of-interest standard,
    therefore, did not give controlling weight to the extent of the
    Union’s organization.
    B.     Substantial Evidence
    BMV contends the Board’s finding that the proposed
    bargaining unit was appropriate was not supported by
    substantial evidence. As discussed above, the Board based its
    finding upon the many differences between the terms and
    conditions under which the MITs and the other stage crews
    worked. In attempting to refute the Board’s finding, BMV
    contends there are few if any relevant differences between the
    MITs’ terms and conditions of employment and those of the
    other crews. BMV also contends the Board’s finding
    conflicts with precedent. In response, the Board argues the
    differences between the MITs and the employees included in
    the bargaining unit were sufficiently substantial that the unit
    could “constitute a distinct and appropriate unit separate and
    apart from the MITs,” and that its decision was consistent
    with precedent. We agree with the Board.
    BMV launches its challenge to the evidence upon which
    the Board relied by isolating the differences that “are
    holdovers from the Luxor,” namely, the different supervisory
    structure, separate sign-in sheets, and salary versus wage
    compensation. BMV characterizes these differences as
    matters of “bargaining history,” and then ties the bargaining
    history to the “extent of organization,” thus: “The Regional
    Director reache[d] beyond the parties in this case and relie[d]
    on an IATSE contract with a completely different employer
    [i.e., the Luxor]. This bargaining history is not relevant to
    this analysis except to demonstrate the Union’s extent of
    organization.”
    12
    We need not decide whether BMV correctly equates
    bargaining history with extent of organization in the
    circumstances of this case because this line of argument still
    would fail for two reasons. First, the differences between the
    MITs and the other stage crew employees that are “holdovers
    from the Luxor” are not merely of historical interest; they are
    present facts the Board could reasonably conclude
    differentiate the employment interests of the MITs from those
    of the other crews. As the Board rather forcefully puts it, “the
    ... suggestion ... that the Board should have ignored the terms
    and conditions of employment that [BMV] intentionally
    carried over from the Luxor is absurd.” Second, in light of
    the numerous differences that are not “holdovers from the
    Luxor,” the Board cannot be said to have given controlling
    weight to bargaining history nor, if it is the same thing on the
    present facts, to the Union’s extent of organization.
    As for those differences that do not stem from the Luxor
    era, BMV maintains they do not distinguish the MITs from
    the employees in the other stage crews as a group, but rather
    distinguish the employees in each crew from the employees in
    every other crew. For example, BMV observes that, although
    the MITs have separate substitutes, so do the other stage
    crews because “[s]ubs do not work for more than one
    department.” BMV makes a similar point with respect to the
    MITs’ technical skills, cue tracks, use of swings, work space,
    and lack of interaction with other stage crew employees
    during the show. Thus, BMV argues, the Board acted
    arbitrarily by excluding the MITs from the unit on the basis of
    certain differences between the MITs and the other stage
    crews while at the same time ignoring the same types of
    differences among the various crews that were included in the
    unit.
    We need not decide whether that would be an arbitrary or
    otherwise unlawful decision because that is not what the
    13
    Board did. Rather, as discussed above, the Board recognized
    the MITs also differ from the employees in the other crews in
    ways that are “holdovers from the Luxor” and are therefore
    unique to the MITs, namely, in terms of supervision, form of
    payment, and sign-in sheets. The Board did not act arbitrarily
    by treating the MITs differently from the other stage crew
    employees in light of those differences.
    Moreover, the Board’s finding that the proposed unit was
    appropriate without the MITs was certainly reasonable and
    supported by substantial evidence in view of the analytic
    framework set out above. A unit comprising all the non-MIT
    stage crews is prima facie appropriate because,
    notwithstanding the differences among them, those
    employees share a community of interest. It may well be that
    a unit comprising all the stage crews, including the MITs,
    would also be prima facie appropriate because the MITs also
    share a community of interest with the other stage crew
    employees, but that does not necessarily render the unit
    comprising only the non-MIT stage crews “truly
    inappropriate.” Indeed, both the differences that are unique to
    the MITs and the differences that can be found among all the
    stage crews stand in BMV’s way: The MITs lack an
    overwhelming community of interest with the other stage
    crews (just as each of the non-MIT crews may lack an
    overwhelming community of interest with each of the other
    non-MIT crews).
    To illustrate, in Figure 2 Rectangle M represents the
    interests of the MITs, while Rectangles X and Y represent the
    interests of the employees in any two other departments. The
    shaded regions represent interests relating to subs, technical
    skills, cue tracks, swings, work space, and interaction with
    members of other stage crews during the show, that is, factors
    with respect to which each department has (we assume)
    different interests. The spotted regions represent interests
    14
    relating              to
    supervision,    sign-in
    sheets, and form of
    payment,     that    is,
    factors carried over
    from the Luxor, which
    distinguish the MITs
    from the employees in
    all the other stage
    crew      departments.
    The Board in effect
    found     Unit      XY
    appropriate. As the
    diagram shows, the Board was justified in doing so, though it
    could also have found Unit XYM appropriate because all
    three rectangles overlap, reflecting a community of interest
    among them, as represented by the cross-hatched region.
    Unlike Rectangles A and B in Figure 1, however, Rectangle
    M does not have a nearly complete overlap with any other
    rectangle, reflecting the MITs’ lack of an overwhelming
    community of interest with any of the other stage crews.
    Consequently, the exclusion of Rectangle M from a unit
    comprising Rectangles X and Y – that is, the exclusion of the
    MITs from the unit comprising the other stage crew
    employees – does not render that unit “truly inappropriate,”
    notwithstanding the substantial differences among the stage
    crew employees, as represented by the shaded and spotted
    regions.
    Turning from the facts to the law, BMV claims the
    Board’s finding that the MITs do not share an overwhelming
    community of interest with the other stage crews conflicts
    with the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Lundy II and with the
    Board’s analysis in Studio 54, 
    260 N.L.R.B. 1200
     (1982). As
    BMV notes, “the Board cannot ignore its own relevant
    precedent but must explain why it is not controlling.”
    15
    Lemoyne-Owen College v. NLRB, 
    357 F.3d 55
    , 60 (D.C. Cir.
    2004) (quotation marks omitted). We find the Board’s
    decision consistent with both Lundy II and Studio 54 because
    neither case involved differences as extensive as here.
    In Lundy II, the excluded employees differed from the
    included employees “in a few respects: (1) the method for
    calculating their earnings; (2) supervision; and (3) a lack of
    interchangeability with” the included employees. 
    68 F.3d at 1580
    . Rejecting the Board’s approval of the proposed unit,
    the court remarked, “The exclusion of ... employees based on
    such meager differences is, to say the least, problematic.” 
    Id. at 1581
    . Here, according to BMV, “the MITs were excluded
    from the bargaining unit based on nearly the same ‘meager
    differences’ – different second line supervision, partly
    different pay structure, and separate sign-in sheets.” The
    Board responds that, “[i]n contrast [to Lundy II], here, the
    Board did not fragment a traditionally appropriate unit.” We
    think the Board’s decision here was consistent with Lundy II
    for a more basic reason: Even if those differences in
    supervision, pay structure, and sign-in sheet are too “meager”
    on their own to justify the exclusion of the MITs from the
    bargaining unit, they are only a fraction of the differences
    upon which the Board relied. The sum of those differences
    was sufficient to justify the Board’s decision that the MITs do
    not share an overwhelming community of interest with the
    other stage crew employees.
    BMV’s comparison of this case to Studio 54 is similarly
    flawed. Studio 54 strove “to create an ambiance through
    music, lights, props, scenery, and ... the participation of many
    employees in an evening’s festivities.” Studio 54, 260
    N.L.R.B. at 1200. The union had proposed a bargaining unit
    of all employees except “stagehands,” including “disc
    jockeys, house board light operators, disco light board
    operators, flymen, and preset men.” Id. The employer raised
    16
    no threshold question whether the proposed unit was prima
    facie appropriate; the issue it raised was whether the
    exclusion of the stagehands rendered the unit inappropriate.
    Despite a difference in supervision between the stagehands
    and the other employees, the Board concluded that, in light of
    the “interchange of job functions” between them, the
    stagehands did “not possess a community of interest so
    separate and distinct from [that of the included] employees as
    to warrant separate representation.” Id. From this decision
    BMV extracts the rule that “minor supervisory differences
    should not be determinative.”
    Be that as it may, we agree with the Board that Studio 54
    does not conflict with the Board’s decision here because of
    the panoply of other differences that separate the MITs from
    the other stage crew departments. Further, as the Board
    notes, the functional integration of Studio 54’s employees
    “far exceeded anything in BMV’s show.” For example, non-
    stagehands at Studio 54 “occasionally perform[ed] stagehand
    work,” “[a]t least two stagehands ... occasionally work[ed] on
    non-stage electrical equipment and perform[ed] general
    maintenance,” and “[n]on-stagehands and stagehands alike
    often mingle[d] and/or dance[d] with patrons[,] ... help[ing] to
    create the festive atmosphere [Studio 54] desire[d].” Studio
    54, 260 N.L.R.B. at 1200. The only evidence of functional
    interchange BMV offers is that, when the company performs
    at a location other than the Venetian, “[t]he entire crew will
    work together to pack up the needed equipment and gear, load
    it, transport it, and set it up at the outside site ... with little
    differentiation between the segments of the stage crew.” But
    whether BMV performs at the Venetian or offsite, it appears
    that each stage crew department remains solely responsible
    for the technical tasks ordinarily within its domain; nothing
    suggests the MITs perform tasks ordinarily assigned to, say,
    the wardrobe crew. Therefore, though certainly relevant to
    this case, Studio 54 is not “so inconsistent with the [RD’s]
    17
    decision so as to mandate reversal here.” Int’l Union of
    Operating Eng’rs v. NLRB, 
    595 F.2d 844
    , 850 (D.C. Cir.
    1979); see Overnite Transp. Co., 
    325 N.L.R.B. 612
    , 612-13
    (1998) (holding unit need not include mechanics in light of
    their separate work area and supervision, different uniforms,
    special skills, and lack of significant functional interchange).
    In summary, we see no reason to disturb the Board’s
    finding that the proposed unit was not rendered “truly
    inappropriate” by the exclusion of the MITs. The Board was
    justified in considering the ways in which the terms and
    conditions under which the MITs work differed from those
    under which the other stage crews work, including the
    differences that stem from BMV’s time at the Luxor and
    therefore are unique to the MITs. The Board was also
    justified in considering the differences that do not stem from
    the Luxor era but distinguish each crew from every other
    crew. The Board reasonably concluded that whatever
    interests the MITs shared with the employees in the unit were
    not overwhelming in light of those numerous differences.
    C.     Residual Unit
    Finally, BMV contends the Board’s decision is arbitrary
    and capricious because it creates an allegedly “disfavored
    residual unit.” According to BMV, a residual unit consists of
    excluded employees “sharing a community of interest with
    the [included] employees.” Thus, BMV argues, because the
    MITs “shar[e] an obvious community of interest” with the
    other stage crew departments, the Board improperly created a
    residual unit of MITs by excluding them from the unit.
    BMV’s supposed rule against residual units is
    misconceived. It implies that all employees who share a
    community of interest must be included in the same unit,
    which proposition conflicts with the principle that more than
    18
    one bargaining unit may be appropriate in any particular
    setting. See, e.g., Country Ford Trucks, 
    229 F.3d at 1189-91
    (holding that although “broader unit encompassing all parts
    and service department employees at both facilities” may
    have been appropriate, Board not “required” to include all
    such employees in unit in light of differences between
    facilities). In any event, the Board’s residual unit policy has
    no bearing upon this case because it relates only to whether a
    proposed residual unit is appropriate, not to whether a
    proposed initial unit is appropriate. See Carl Buddig & Co.,
    
    328 N.L.R.B. 929
    , 930 (1999).*
    III. Conclusion
    In sum, we hold the Board applied the correct legal
    standard to determine whether the proposed bargaining unit
    was appropriate. The Board’s determination that the MITs
    may be excluded from the bargaining unit because they do not
    share an overwhelming community of interest with the stage
    crew employees included in the unit is supported by
    substantial evidence and does not conflict with precedent or
    the Board’s residual unit policy. We therefore deny BMV’s
    petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-application for
    enforcement.
    So ordered.
    *
    BMV’s other arguments are sufficiently lacking in merit as
    not to warrant consideration in a published opinion. Also, we deny
    BMV’s motion that the court “take judicial notice of several artistic
    reviews of the Blue Man Group show that aptly describe the unique
    and highly unusual experience of attending a Blue Man Group
    performance.” See Pa. Transformer Tech., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    254 F.3d 217
    , 225 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2001).