US Tele Assn v. FCC ( 1999 )


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  •                         United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued January 20, 1999      Decided May 21, 1999
    No. 97-1469
    United States Telephone Association, et al.,
    Petitioners
    v.
    Federal Communications Commission and
    United States of America,
    Respondents
    AT&T Corporation, et al.,
    Intervenors
    Consolidated with
    Nos. 97-1471, 97-1475, 97-1479, 97-1494, 97-1495,
    97-1496, 97-1497, 97-1498, 97-1500, 97-1501, 97-1645
    On Petitions for Review of an Order of the
    Federal Communications Commission
    Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for Local Exchange
    Carrier petitioners.  With him on the briefs were Mark L.
    Evans, William P. Barr, M. Edward Whelan, R. Michael
    Senkowski, Robert J. Butler, Daniel E. Troy, James R.
    Young, Michael E. Glover, Edward Shakin, James D. Ellis,
    Robert M. Lynch, Liam S. Coonan, Durward D. Dupre,
    Michael J. Zpevak, Thomas A. Pajda, Charles R. Morgan,
    William B. Barfield, M. Robert Sutherland, Robert B.
    McKenna, William T. Lake, John H. Harwood, II, Lawrence
    Sarjeant and Linda Kent. Henk J. Brands, Betsy L.
    Anderson and David W. Ogburn, Jr., entered appearances.
    Carl S. Nadler argued the cause for petitioners MCI
    Telecommunications Corporation and Ad Hoc Telecommuni-
    cations Users Committee.  With him on the briefs were
    Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Anthony C. Epstein, Maria L. Wood-
    bridge, James S. Blaszak and Kevin S. DiLallo.
    Laurence N. Bourne, Counsel, Federal Communications
    Commission, argued the cause for respondents.  On the brief
    were Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Depart-
    ment of Justice, Catherine G. O'Sullivan and Robert J.
    Wiggers, Attorneys, Christopher J. Wright, General Counsel,
    Federal Communications Commission, John E. Ingle, Deputy
    Associate General Counsel, and Brian M. Hoffstadt, Special
    Counsel.  Robert B. Nicholson, Attorney, U.S. Department of
    Justice, entered an appearance.
    Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for Local Exchange
    Carrier intervenors.  With him on the brief were Mark L.
    Evans, Michael S. Pabian, Donald M. Falk, James R.
    Young, Michael E. Glover, Edward Shakin, Charles R. Mor-
    gan, William B. Barfield, M. Robert Sutherland, James D.
    Ellis, Robert M. Lynch, Liam S. Coonan, Durward D.
    Dupre, Michael J. Zpevak, Thomas J. Pajda, Robert B.
    McKenna, William T. Lake and John H. Harwood, II.  Henk
    J. Brands, Betsy L. Anderson and David W. Ogburn, Jr.,
    entered appearances.
    Gene C. Schaerr argued the cause for intervenor AT&T
    Corporation.  With him on the brief were Jules M. Perlberg,
    Mark C. Rosenblum, and Peter H. Jacoby.  Richard P. Bress
    entered an appearance.
    Douglas E. Hart was on the briefs for intervenor Indepen-
    dent Telephone and Telecommunications Alliance on Behalf of
    Small and Mid-Size Carriers.
    Before:  Edwards, Chief Judge, Williams and Randolph,
    Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Williams.
    Williams, Circuit Judge:  Long-distance telephone traffic is
    ordinarily transmitted by a local exchange carrier ("LEC")
    from its origin to a long-distance carrier (or interexchange
    carrier or "IXC").  The IXC carries the traffic to its region of
    destination and hands it off to the LEC there.  The IXC
    charges the customer for the call and pays "access charges"
    to the LECs at either end.  In a 1997 rulemaking the Federal
    Communications Commission amended its methodology for
    limiting these charges, as applied to the largest IXCs.  The
    rule is challenged on one side by a group of LECs, and on the
    other by one IXC, namely MCI, and an Ad Hoc Telecommu-
    nications Users Committee (collectively referred to here as
    MCI).
    In regulating access charges the FCC currently uses a
    "price cap" method--mandatory for the largest LECs (the
    regional Bell operating companies and GTE) and optional for
    others.  Under traditional rate-of-return regulation an agency
    sets rates calculated to allow the utility to recover its costs,
    including a reasonable rate of return on investment, with
    adjustment as needed to reflect cost changes;  here, however,
    it sets rate ceilings and, with some qualifications, allows the
    utilities to keep whatever profits they can make while charg-
    ing rates at or under the cap.  (A LEC may also file rates
    above the caps, but for these the review process is cumber-
    some and the substantive standards stringent.)  The price
    cap system is intended (among other things) to improve the
    utility's incentives to cut costs and refrain from overinvest-
    ment, incentives that are more blunted under the traditional
    method.  See generally National Rural Telecom Ass'n v.
    FCC, 
    988 F.2d 174
    , 177-79 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
    The price caps were initially set at the levels of each
    carrier's rates on July 1, 1990.  From the outset they have
    been subject to various annual adjustments, including reduc-
    tion by a "productivity offset," or "X-Factor."  See 47 CFR
    s 61.45.  In the order under review, the agency revised the
    method for determining the X-Factor, eliminated a "sharing"
    mechanism that forced LECs to return some or all of the
    profits above specified levels to ratepayers, and required
    "reinitialization," i.e., a reduction in the price caps applicable
    after July 1, 1997 so that they would be calculated as if the
    new X-Factor had been in effect for the LECs' 1996 tariff
    filings.  In the Matter of Price Cap Performance Review for
    Local Exchange Carriers, Fourth Report & Order, 
    12 FCC Rcd 16
    ,642 (1997) ("1997 Order").  Because the access
    charges are in the aggregate so enormous, even small
    changes in the X-Factor have a large monetary value;  the
    LECs claim (without dispute) that each 0.1% change in the
    factor represents a $23 million change in the industry-wide
    access charge.
    I.  The historic productivity component of the X-Factor
    The X-Factor is aimed at capturing a portion of expected
    increases in carrier productivity, so that these improvements,
    as under competition, will result in lower prices for consum-
    ers.  In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
    Dominant Carriers, 
    3 FCC Rcd 3195
    , 3394 (1988).  Apart
    from a "consumer productivity dividend" ("CPD") described
    below, it is based on an assumption that historic productivity
    increases will be matched in the future.  The agency resolved
    in the 1997 Order that the X-Factor (apart from the CPD)
    should be calculated as the sum of the difference in productiv-
    ity growth and the difference in input price growth between
    the LECs and the economy as a whole.  See 12 FCC Rcd at
    16,680, p 95.  It can thus be expressed as follows:  X = ( %
    LEC TFP -  % TFP) + ( % U.S. input prices -  % LEC
    input prices), where TFP = total factor productivity.  See 12
    FCC Rcd at 16,785.1  The formula may be more readily
    conceptualized as X = ( % LEC TFP - LEC input prices) -
    ( % U.S. TFP -  % U.S. input prices).
    Several parties submitted estimates of historical X-Fac-
    tors. In a determination unchallenged here, the FCC accord-
    ed the greatest weight to its own estimates, although it also
    gave "some weight" to AT&T's estimates (we discuss this
    decision below).  See 1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,695, p 37.
    The estimates the FCC considered, and the averages of those
    estimates over specified periods, are the following:
    Table 1
    Year     FCC       AT&T
    1986 -0.5%          0.2%
    1987      5.0       4.1
    1988      5.0       6.4
    1989      7.9       8.8
    1990      8.8       11.0
    1991      5.8              6.0
    __________
    1  This equation is apparently derived as follows from the FCC's
    general rule that the X-Factor is to "provide a reliable measure of
    the extent to which changes in the LECs' unit costs have been less
    than the change in level of inflation," see 1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd
    at 16,647, p 5:  The general rule yields X = U - L, where U is the
    "change in level of inflation," and L is the change in the LECs' unit
    costs.  The FCC then observes that "changes in a firm's unit costs
    come from two sources:  (1) changes in productivity, and (2) changes
    in input prices," id. at n.16.  Thus, L =   % LEC input price -  %
    LEC productivity.  Reading "change in level of inflation" as
    "change in unit costs in the economy as a whole," we get the similar
    expression:  U =  % U.S. input price -  % U.S. productivity.
    Substituting these values into the equation X = U - L, using
    "TFP" for productivity, and performing a little algebraic manipu-
    lation yields the equation in the text.
    As the Commission also increases the cap by general price
    inflation, see 12 FCC Rcd at 16,646, p 3, the net effect of these
    adjustments is (roughly, subject to effects of the use of different
    indices) to increase the cap by the LECs' estimated change in unit
    costs.  It is somewhat as if the overall adjustment ("A") were (using
    the terms of the prior paragraph) A = U - X = U - (U - L) = L.
    1992       3.4       4.1
    1993            4.7           6.0
    1994           5.4       5.9
    1995           6.8       9.4
    Specified periods (averaged)
    1986-95   5.2       6.2
    1987-95   5.9       6.9
    1988-95   6.0       7.2
    1989-95   6.1       7.3
    1990-95   5.8       7.1
    1991-95   5.2       6.3
    Range of Averages:  5.2-6.1   6.2-7.3
    1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,696, p 137.
    The FCC consulted the moving averages to establish a
    range of reasonableness from 5.2% to 6.3% and then selected
    6.0% as the historical (i.e., non-CPD) component of the X-
    Factor.  See id. at 16,697, p 141.  The LECs argue that the
    FCC did not give a rational explanation of that choice, and we
    agree.  None of the reasons given for choosing 6.0% holds
    water.
    A.Devaluation of 1986-95 and 1991-95 averages
    First, in choosing a point within the range of reasonable-
    ness, the FCC determined that it was "reasonable to place
    less weight" on two lowest averages, the ones for 1986-95 and
    1991-95.  It said that the first, 1986-95, "is heavily influenced
    by the improbably low 1986 estimate of-0.5 percent."  Id. at
    16,697, p 139.  But the Commission gave no reason for con-
    demning the 1986 estimate as "improbable," and mere diver-
    gence from the other numbers does not justify such a conclu-
    sion.  See Thomas H. Wonnacott & Ronald J. Wonnacott,
    Introductory Statistics for Business and Economics 497 (2d
    ed. 1977).  The FCC invokes our cases upholding the elimina-
    tion of outlying data points, but in them the agency explained
    why the outliers were unreliable or their use inappropriate.
    See Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 
    79 F.3d 1195
    , 1202 (D.C.
    Cir. 1996) (study indicated outlier erroneous);  Association of
    Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC, 
    83 F.3d 1424
    , 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
    (skewed data distribution required outlier elimination to avoid
    windfall profits to many oil pipelines).
    As to the 1991-95 average, the Commission said it was the
    one "most affected by the low 1992 estimate," which it in turn
    diagnosed as "an artifact of a one-year jump in the measured
    productivity of the national economy as economic activity
    increased, rather than a change in the growth rate of LEC
    productivity or input prices."  1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at
    16,697, p 139.  This is mystifying.  If the productivity compo-
    nent of the X-Factor is to reflect the difference between LEC
    and overall productivity growth, a proposition that is built
    into the Commission's formula, see 1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd
    at 16,785, there seems no reason to slight a datum because its
    anomalous character stems from the unusual magnitude of
    the second term rather than of the first.
    B.Alleged upward trend
    In justification of its choice of 6.0% the FCC also cites an
    upward trend in the X-Factor during the last years it sur-
    veyed.  See 1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,697, p 139
    ("[F]rom 1993 onward there has been an upward trend in the
    X-Factor");  id. at p 141 ("[T]here appears to be a strong
    upward trend in productivity growth from 1992 to 1995").2
    The FCC's reliance on the upward trend necessarily reflects
    the (unexplained) assumption that the trend will continue, at
    least in the immediate future.  Explanation might be reason-
    ably omitted if there were no obvious reason to doubt contin-
    uation of an observed trend.  But two such reasons exist.
    First, the trend appears to be part of a cyclical pattern.
    Although the X-Factor did increase steadily in the 1992-95
    period, it also decreased from 1990 to 1992, after rising from
    1986 to 1990.  See Table 1, supra.  Perhaps there was reason
    __________
    2  The parties dispute whether the trend in question covers
    1992-95 or 1993-95, with the FCC calling the reference to 1992-95
    at p 141 a "typographical error," FCC Br. at 34, and the LECs
    arguing that any typographical error should have been corrected in
    FCC's errata, LEC Reply Br. at 10.  The answer makes no
    difference to our analysis.
    to believe that there would be no cyclical downturn during the
    expected life of this X-Factor determination, which was to be
    reviewed about two years after being made.  See 1997 Order,
    12 FCC Rcd at 16,707, p 166.  But the FCC offered no such
    reason.
    Second, the X-Factor is calculated as the sum of two
    components, neither of which followed a trend during the
    period in question.  In fact, their year-to-year fluctuations
    swamped the trend increments:
    Table 2
    Year Difference between       Difference between
    LEC & US changes in     LEC and US changes
    total factor            in input prices
    productivity
    1992            0.21                3.21
    1993            1.44                3.26
    1994            3.69            1.71
    1995                1.78                  5.04
    1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,785.  Where's the trend?  As
    the underlying variables appear to be thrashing about wildly,
    the FCC's conclusion that the trend in the difference between
    the two had some predictive value requires explanation.
    C.Partial reliance on AT&T estimates
    Finally, the LECs argue that in its treatment of AT&T's
    X-Factor estimates the FCC "implicitly endorsed methodolo-
    gies that it had earlier discredited."  LEC Br. at 27.  The
    FCC incorporated the aspects of AT&T's method that it
    deemed reasonable into its own method, see 1997 Order, 12
    FCC Rcd at 16,658, p 33, and then gave independent weight
    to AT&T's X-Factor estimates in deciding to extend the
    range of reasonableness upward, see 1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd
    at 16,697, p 140, and to select a value near the top of the
    range.  Id. at p 141.  We agree that both these uses of
    AT&T's estimates appear irrational;  any differences between
    the FCC's and AT&T's estimates presumably resulted from
    elements of AT&T's analysis that the FCC specifically reject-
    ed.  The FCC's argument that AT&T's estimates were "help-
    ful" because AT&T's methodology was "similar," FCC Br. at
    37, fails to overcome that logic.  If there is an explanation--
    for example, conceivably the Commission gave some weight to
    AT&T's conclusions out of concern for the risk that it had
    erred in rejecting specific elements of AT&T's analysis--the
    FCC has failed to mention it.
    The Commission having failed to state a coherent theory
    supporting its choice of 6.0%, we remand for further explana-
    tion.
    II. Consumer productivity dividend
    The second component of the X-Factor is a "consumer
    productivity dividend" ("CPD") of 0.5%.  At the time of the
    1990 order instituting price-cap regulation, the FCC "expect-
    ed ... that incentive regulation would result in greater
    productivity gains than rate of return regulation," Bell Atlan-
    tic, 
    79 F.3d at 1198
    , and instituted the CPD, as it said, to
    "assure that the first benefits of price caps flow to customers
    in the form of reduced rates," In the Matter of Policy and
    Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 
    5 FCC Rcd 6786
    , 6799, p 100 (1990) ("Price Cap Order").  It retained the
    0.5% CPD without specific explanation in a 1995 interim rule,
    Bell Atlantic, 
    79 F.3d at 1204
    , and retained it again in the
    current rule.  See 1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,690, p 123.
    The LECs challenge the 0.5% CPD as based on an "obso-
    lete" justification.  The Commission's earlier data on historic
    productivity improvement derived from the rate-of-return
    era, so an adjustment to reflect the expected incentive effects
    of price caps was in order;  but the post-1990 data presum-
    ably reflect those effects.
    FCC counsel responds that the agency believes that an
    innovation in the current rule--the Commission's elimination
    of the "sharing" of profits exceeding certain benchmarks--
    will give the LECs still further productivity incentives, and
    that the FCC relied on that in retaining the CPD.  Even if
    the agency relied on this justification (which the LECs dis-
    pute), it never explained retention of the old percentage, a
    retention that required some comparison of the current
    change with the initial one in terms of their likely impacts on
    productivity.  Thus we must remand for an explanation of the
    Commission's choice of the amount--0.5%.
    The LECs claim that the FCC did not rely on the expected
    effects of sharing elimination and that it gave no other reason
    justifying the retention of any CPD.  We do not reach these
    arguments because the FCC will be able to give a clearer
    statement of its reasons in the remand on the amount and
    since the LECs do not dispute the argument FCC's counsel is
    presently making--that it is defensible to include a CPD
    corresponding to whatever productivity increase may be ex-
    pected from the elimination of sharing.
    III. Elimination of sharing
    Before the rule at issue in this case, the FCC's price cap
    regime included a "sharing" mechanism, which mandated
    LEC rate reductions sufficient to return profits above speci-
    fied levels to their customers, the IXCs.  The most recent
    sharing regime, enacted in the 1995 interim order, made the
    sharing obligation dependent on the X-Factor, imposing no
    obligation of firms choosing a 5.3% X-Factor, and the follow-
    ing on ones choosing 4.7% and 4.0%:
    Table 3
    Chosen X-      50% Give-back       100% Give-back
    Factor         required for             required for
    rate-of-return           rate-of-return
    over                over
    4.7%           13.25%                   17.25%
    4.0%            12.25%                  16.25%
    In the Matter of Price Cap Performance Review for Local
    Exchange Carriers, 
    10 FCC Rcd 8961
    , 9058, p 222 ("Perfor-
    mance Review Order") (1995).  Attacking the Commission's
    elimination of the "sharing" mechanism, MCI first claims that
    the statutory mandate of "just and reasonable" rates, 47
    U.S.C. s 201(b), requires the FCC to impose a mechanism to
    prevent "unreasonable" returns.  In the absence of any indi-
    cation that Congress directly addressed the issue, we defer to
    the FCC's interpretation of the Communications Act unless it
    is unreasonable.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 
    467 U.S. 837
     (1984).  MCI cites no authority rejecting an FCC inter-
    pretation of the statute contrary to the one MCI advances,
    and in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 
    56 F.3d 151
    (D.C. Cir. 1995), we endorsed a pure price cap regime with no
    sharing provision in the face of a statutory mandate to ensure
    "reasonable" basic cable rates.  See 
    id. at 162, 164-74
    .
    Next, MCI argues that elimination of sharing was arbitrary
    and capricious.  But the agency advanced two sound ratio-
    nales for its decision.  First, it found that "sharing severely
    blunts the efficiency incentives of price cap regulation by
    reducing the rewards of LEC efforts and decisions."  1997
    Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,700, p 148.  When all profits are
    taken away, a firm has no incentive to make them;  when
    some proportion is taken away, firms will avoid at least some
    otherwise desirable choices with a prospect of enhancing
    profit but a risk of loss.  Second, the FCC found that
    eliminating sharing would remove the incentive to shift costs
    to services that are subject to sharing and away from services
    that are not, thus cross-subsidizing the latter.  1997 Order, 12
    FCC Rcd at 16,700, p 148;  id. at 16,701, p 151.  MCI does not
    contest these effects, nor does it question the Commission's
    argument that monitoring to catch them would be administra-
    tively burdensome and would increase its reliance on obsolete
    embedded accounting costs.  Id. at 16,701-02, pp 151-52.
    Finally, MCI contends that it was arbitrary and capricious
    for the FCC to scuttle sharing but at the same time retain its
    "low-end adjustment," which gives the LECs some pricing
    leeway to prevent their returns from falling below a given
    level.  There is clearly a literal asymmetry in protecting
    LECs in lean conditions while not constraining them in
    unexpectedly fat ones.  But the FCC gave a good reason for
    creating this asymmetry--the Constitution's takings clause,
    which forbids the imposition of confiscatory rates without just
    compensation.  See 1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,704, p 157;
    Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 
    488 U.S. 299
    , 307-08 (1989).
    The Commission thus avoided raising a non-trivial constitu-
    tional question, one that has no analogy at the upper end of
    the range of allowable rates.  See Time Warner, 
    56 F.3d at 170
    .
    IV. Interstate v. total-company productivity
    MCI argues that in calculating the X-Factor the FCC
    arbitrarily used the LECs' productivity in all their telecom-
    munications business rather than productivity only in their
    interstate operations.  Again, we disagree.  The FCC reason-
    ably concluded that "the record before us does not allow us to
    quantify the extent, if any, to which interstate productivity
    growth may differ significantly from total company productiv-
    ity growth," 1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,686, p 110, and
    this determination was enough to justify using the total
    company data.
    In the first place, it is not clear that "interstate productivi-
    ty," as opposed to total company productivity, is measurable,
    or even economically well-defined.  This is so because direct
    productivity measurement requires measurement of inputs,
    and there is no obviously meaningful way to segregate LEC
    interstate and intrastate inputs because, as is undisputed,
    "interstate and intrastate services are usually provided over
    common facilities."  1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,685, p 107.
    The Commission had previously recognized this analytical
    difficulty, questioning "whether it would be possible to devel-
    op separate production functions for interstate and intrastate
    services," id., and it never unambiguously declared the issue
    resolved.
    The Commission nonetheless declared itself ready to con-
    sider some adjustment if it were shown that inclusion of
    intrastate data systematically biased the X-Factor estimate
    downward.  1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,686, p 109.  AT&T
    offered claims of faster interstate productivity growth.  It
    based these on an assumption of equal growth rates for
    interstate and intrastate inputs, but it offered no explanation
    why that assumption was economically justified, much less
    one so compelling that it would be error for the FCC to reject
    it.  See AT&T Comments, CC Docket No. 94-1, App. A at
    23-30, 72-78;  1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,686-87, p 110.
    MCI argues that in the original 1990 LEC price cap order
    the Commission inferred faster productivity growth in inter-
    state services from the undisputed fact of faster output
    increase in that sector.  See Price Cap Order, 5 FCC Rcd at
    6798, p 92 ("[T]he more rapid growth in interstate usage
    results in higher apparent interstate productivity growth.").
    This assumption should have continued, it says.  But the 1990
    method of measuring productivity had not depended on the
    measurement of inputs at all;  the Commission had simply
    inferred productivity growth from prior trends in rate reduc-
    tions.  1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,648, p 8.  Given the
    shift to direct focus on input changes (a move that no one
    questions) and the uncertainty over interstate input trends,
    we do not see why the agency should have been bound to
    retain the assumption of faster interstate productivity growth.
    On this record, therefore, we do not find it unreasonable for
    the agency to have relied on total company productivity
    despite its theoretical shortcomings.
    V. Reinitialization
    "Reinitialization" is the name for the Commission's setting
    a current price cap at what it would have been if past X-
    Factors had been different.  For instance, if the price cap
    starts at 100 and the X-Factor is 1% for the first three years,
    the cap would stand at approximately 97 at the end of those
    years.  100 - (3 x 1) = 97.  (The figure is only approximate
    because of compounding.)  If the regulator then changes the
    X-Factor to 2% and imposes full reinitialization, it would
    revise the cap to about 94 for the year immediately following.
    100 - (3 x 2) = 94.  In the 1997 Order, the FCC ordered
    reinitialization for one year, 1996.  See 12 FCC Rcd at 16,714,
    p 179.  Under our simple example, then, the cap would fall to
    approximately 96.  100 - (2 x 1) [two years' reduction of
    1%] - (1 x 2) [one year's reduction of 2%] = 96.
    Both the LECs and MCI challenge this decision, seeking to
    have it modified to favor their respective interests.
    A.Reinitialization based on CPD
    The LECs challenge the FCC's requirement that they
    include the CPD in the X-Factor used for reinitialization.  In
    Part II, we explained the need to remand the case for further
    explanation of size of the CPD.  We agree with the LECs
    that if the FCC retains the CPD because of the productivity
    benefits expected from the elimination of sharing, no element
    of reinitialization based on the CPD will be appropriate in the
    absence of evidence linking productivity gains to the anticipa-
    tion of sharing's elimination;  the companies could not have
    responded to that incentive before its creation.
    B.Disparate impact of uniform reinitialization
    The LECs argue that reinitialization fell more harshly on
    carriers that chose low X-Factors with high sharing obli-
    gations for 1996 than on ones that chose high X-Factors.  As
    a result of reinitialization, the low X-Factor carriers lost
    some of the future benefits of that choice, but were not in a
    position to recover any of sharing costs that they may have
    borne because of it.  Reinitialization imposed no such asym-
    metry on companies that had elected a high X-Factor.  The
    LECs' specific complaint is that this was "an important
    aspect of the problem" before the Commission, which it was
    obliged to discuss.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
    Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983).
    The Commission argues that it failed to discuss the dispari-
    ty because the LECs never brought the subject up.  It cites
    s 405 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. s 405, which
    bars review of an issue on "which the Commission ... has
    been afforded no opportunity to pass," see also United States
    v. FCC, 
    707 F.2d 610
    , 619 (D.C. Cir. 1983), unless the
    petitioners sought rehearing before the Commission--which
    the LECs did not.  The LECs in turn say they couldn't have
    afforded the Commission a chance to pass on it;  the Commis-
    sion had never given notice of any intent to order reinitializa-
    tion.
    Section 405's "no opportunity to pass" clause does not in
    terms exclude instances where the lack of opportunity is due
    to some fault of the Commission--such as its springing a
    novelty at the last minute.  But we need not sort that out
    here, because we find no fault in the Commission's procedure.
    Reinitialization may not have been a subject on which the
    Commission explicitly elicited comment in its notices for this
    rulemaking, but the prospect surely brooded over the pro-
    ceeding.  In its 1995 mid-course correction of the price caps it
    had ordered reinitialization--in a form, in fact, that fell only
    on those LECs that had chosen a low X-Factor in exchange
    for greater risk of sharing, and not at all on those that had
    chosen a high one.  Performance Review Order, 10 FCC Rcd
    at 9069-73, pp 245-54.  If the perceived asymmetry was as
    serious as the LECs now make out, we should have expected
    them to alert the Commission in this proceeding in advance:
    "If you do a reinitialization, at least avoid the dreadful
    asymmetry of the 1995 order."  No such alert was sounded.
    C.Reinitialization for only one year
    MCI claims that the FCC should have reinitialized the X-
    Factor all the way back to 1991 (the first year of the price-cap
    regime).  It says the agency has a policy of correcting errors
    in X-Factor determinations and that it decided in the current
    rule that prior determinations were in error.  In the alterna-
    tive, MCI argues that the FCC should reinitialize back to
    1995, the year in which the previous X-Factor was adopted.
    In the 1995 interim price cap review, the FCC determined
    that a single year's productivity estimate generated by its
    former method was understated, based in large part on the
    estimate's discrepancy with the results of a TFP study.  See
    Performance Review Order, 10 FCC Rcd at 9053, p 208.  It
    then calculated a new X-Factor designed to eliminate the
    effects of the understatement and required LECs to set their
    price caps as though the new X-Factor had been in effect
    since the advent of price cap regulation.  See id. at 9069,
    p 245.  In 1997 the Commission determined that its former
    method had systematically understated productivity relative
    to the TFP method, but required reinitialization for one year
    only.  See 1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,713-14, pp 178-79.
    The situations are somewhat similar, but the FCC ade-
    quately distinguished them.  It rested its 1997 decision to
    limit reinitialization on the need to "limit harm to LEC
    productivity incentives that could result from the perception
    that our regulatory policies unnecessarily lack constancy."
    1997 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,714, p 179.  It seems clear that
    a second extensive reinitialization would considerably aggra-
    vate such a perception.  Universal, complete reinitialization
    would impair the supposed incentive advantages of price
    caps--which derive from firms' supposing that their efficien-
    cies will not come back to haunt them.
    VI. The rule's effects on small and mid-size LECs
    The Independent Telephone and Telecommunications Alli-
    ance, an intervenor, argues that the FCC acted arbitrarily
    and capriciously in establishing a uniform X-Factor for all
    LECs, regardless of size and economic characteristics, and in
    failing to consider the disparate impact of its reinitialization
    requirement on small and mid-size LECs.  Because the peti-
    tioners here have not raised these issues, ITTA is procedural-
    ly barred from arguing them.  See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v.
    FCC, 
    911 F.2d 776
    , 785-86 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
    It is true, as ITTA points out, that this court in Synovus
    Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 
    952 F.2d 426
    , 434 (D.C. Cir.
    1991), characterized the rule against consideration of issues
    raised by intervenors and not by petitioners as "a prudential
    restraint rather than a jurisdictional bar."  But in deciding to
    consider the intervenor's issue there, the court relied on the
    fact that the relevant issue was "an essential predicate" to an
    issue raised by a petitioner.  
    Id.
      That circumstance is cer-
    tainly not present here.  The Synovus court offered a second
    reason to hear the claim--that the intervenor was not "the
    losing party in the administrative proceeding," and thus did
    not have "every incentive to petition for review."  
    Id.
      Here,
    ITTA itself claims that it "through its members, participated
    fully in the proceedings below," ITTA Reply Br. at 3, and that
    its "members raised the issue of the necessity of multiple X-
    Factors," the very issue it seeks to raise in this court.
    Thus, neither of the special circumstances cited in Synovus
    is present.  Furthermore, ITTA presents no reason why it
    could not have petitioned in its own right.  We decline to
    consider its arguments.
    Conclusion
    The FCC's decisions to select 6.0% as the first component
    of the X-Factor and to retain the 0.5% CPD are reversed and
    remanded to the agency for further explanation;  the FCC
    may of course request a stay of this order pending its
    reconsideration.  The petitions for review are otherwise de-
    nied.
    So ordered.