Judicial Watch Inc v. FEC ( 1999 )

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued April 26, 1999 Decided May 7, 1999
No. 98-5355
Judicial Watch, Inc.,
Appellee
v.
Federal Election Commission,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 98cv00386)
Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Rogers, Circuit Judge, and
Buckley, Senior Circuit Judge.
J U D G M E N T
This cause came to be heard on appeal from an opinion and
judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia and was briefed and argued by counsel. The
issues have been accorded full consideration by the Court,
and occasion no need for a published opinion. See D.C. Cir.
R. 36(b).
It is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that, for the reasons
indicated in the attached memorandum opinion, the decision
of the District Court is reversed and the matter is dismissed
for lack of standing.
The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate
herein until seven days after disposition of any timely petition
for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R.
App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41.
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer
Clerk
M E M O R A N D U M
Judicial review in this case is predicated on the Federal
Election Campaign Act ("FECA"), which permits any party
aggrieved by the Federal Election Commission's ("FEC" or
"Commission") dismissal of, or failure to act on, a complaint
filed by that party to seek review in district court. See 2
U.S.C. s 437g(a)(8)(A). Judicial Watch's standing to sue
therefore must be based upon an injury stemming from the
FEC's dismissal of Judicial Watch's administrative complaint.
That complaint, filed in August 1996, alleged that various
parties affiliated with the Clinton Administration sold seats
on foreign trade missions in exchange for large campaign
contributions. Judicial Watch now contends that the com-
plaint must be read to allege FECA reporting violations, such
that the FEC's dismissal of the complaint deprived Judicial
Watch and its members of information to which they are
entitled.
In Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
we recognized the availability of standing under a theory of
informational injury, but emphasized that the relevant analy-
sis must turn on the nature of the information allegedly
denied. See 108 F.3d at 417. If an organization has simply
been "deprived of the knowledge as to whether a violation of
the law has occurred," that "injury" is no more than a
generalized "interest in enforcement of the law," and does not
support standing. Id. at 418. Where the plaintiff's complaint
only nominally alleged a reporting violation, we concluded
that what the plaintiff desired was "for the Commission to
'get the bad guys,' rather than disclose information," id., and
we found no standing to sue.
Here, Judicial Watch has not even made a nominal allega-
tion of reporting violations. Nowhere in its administrative or
civil complaint did Judicial Watch mention disclosure require-
ments or suggest that it desired documents that the alleged
violators were required to disclose. Thus, under this circuit's
precedent, there is no doubt that Judicial Watch lacks stand-
ing to bring this action. If Judicial Watch has a viable claim
of reporting violations, the organization remains free to file a
new complaint with the FEC asserting those violations.
The FEC also argues that, even if Judicial Watch has
standing, the District Court's sua sponte grant of summary
judgment for Judicial Watch on the merits was improper,
where the only issue before the court at the time of its ruling
was the agency's jurisdictional challenge, and the agency had
not yet answered Judicial Watch's complaint. The Commis-
sion's position appears to be indisputably correct. Cf. Single-
ton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1976) (holding that it was
improper for court to resolve merits where petitioner, in
answering respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of stand-
ing, had not yet filed answer or other pleading as to merits,
and had not yet had opportunity to present evidence or legal
arguments supporting its position). However, in light of our
dismissal of this case for want of standing, the District
Court's judgment on the merits has been eradicated. Thus,
this second issue raised by the FEC is now moot.