Crawford v. Federal Communications Commission , 417 F.3d 1289 ( 2005 )


Menu:
  •   United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued January 10, 2005                 Decided August 5, 2005
    No. 04-1031
    CHARLES CRAWFORD,
    PETITIONER
    v.
    FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    RESPONDENTS
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Federal Communications Commission
    Gene A. Bechtel argued the cause and filed the briefs for
    petitioner.
    Stanley R. Scheiner, Attorney, Federal Communications
    Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the
    brief were Robert H. Pate, Assistant Attorney General,
    Catherine G. O'Sullivan and Andrea Limmer, Attorneys, John
    A. Rogovin, General Counsel, Austin C. Schlick, Deputy General
    Counsel, and Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General Counsel.
    Gregory M. Christopher, Counsel, entered an appearance.
    Before: RANDOLPH, TATEL, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.
    2
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.
    GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Charles Crawford petitions for
    review of the Federal Communications Commission’s dismissal
    of two proposals he filed to amend the Commission’s Table of
    Allotments for FM radio channels.          Crawford’s principal
    contention is that he lacked notice that his proposals could be
    precluded by another applicant’s earlier-filed submission. With
    respect to one of Crawford’s proposals, we dismiss his petition
    as moot. With respect to the other, we conclude that Crawford
    received adequate notice and therefore deny the petition.
    I
    The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) uses a
    two-stage process to allocate commercial FM radio frequencies
    to broadcasters. First, a frequency must be allocated to a
    particular community in the FM Table of Allotments. Second,
    a prospective broadcaster may then apply for a license or
    construction permit for that frequency in that community.
    The Table of Allotments can be amended only by rule. See
    Amendment of Part 1, Subpart C (Rulemaking Proceedings),
    Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
    39 Fed. Reg. 44,020
    , 44,020
    (Dec. 20, 1974); see also 
    47 C.F.R. § 1.420
    . The process begins
    with an FCC notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), often in
    response to a broadcaster’s petition. The notice sets forth the
    proposed change -- for instance, “allot channel 229C at
    Houston” -- and announces periods for initial comments and
    reply comments.1 During the initial comment period, the FCC
    1
    In the Table of Allotments, each channel allocated to a particular
    community is identified by a number between 221 and 300, which
    designates the frequency. This number is followed by the station’s
    class; possible classes are A, B1, B, C3, C2, C1, C0, and C, with each
    3
    accepts comments on the initial proposal. It also accepts
    counterproposals that are “mutually exclusive” with the initial
    proposal. 2    See 
    47 C.F.R. § 1.420
    (d); see also, e.g.,
    Implementation of BC Docket No. 80-90 to Increase the
    Availability of FM Broadcast Assignments, 5 F.C.C.R. 931, ¶ 4
    n.5 (1990) (“Implementation of BC Docket No. 80-90”).
    Because one amendment to the Table of Allotments may be
    possible only if another amendment is made, broadcasters
    commonly submit proposals or counterproposals that include
    multiple amendments. In a given docket, the FCC considers the
    initial proposal and any counterproposals that are filed during
    the initial comment period. Also treated as counterproposals are
    any ostensibly freestanding proposals that conflict with the
    initial proposal or with other counterproposals -- as long as they
    are filed before the end of the initial comment period. See, e.g.,
    Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Amendment of Section
    73.202(b), Table of Allotments, FM Broadcast Stations, 17
    F.C.C.R. 5944, 5948 (2002); Amendment of Section 73.202(b),
    Table of Allotments, FM Broadcast Stations, 16 F.C.C.R.
    14,085, 14,085-86 (2001); see also 
    47 C.F.R. § 1.420
    (d).
    After the initial comment period, any proposals that are
    mutually exclusive with those considered in the proceeding are
    “cut off” from consideration pursuant to 
    47 C.F.R. § 1.420
    (d),
    class designation signifying maximum and minimum signal strengths
    and antenna heights. Thus, channel 229C designates frequency 93.7,
    class C. See 
    47 C.F.R. §§ 73.201
    -.202, .211(a)-(b).
    2
    Generally, two proposals are mutually exclusive if channels that
    they propose would violate the FCC’s prescribed minimum distances
    between stations of given classes and separations on the FM spectrum.
    See 
    47 C.F.R. §§ 73.207
    (a)-(b). The purpose of these prescriptions is
    to limit signal interference.
    4
    which states: “Counterproposals shall be advanced in initial
    comments only and will not be considered if they are advanced
    in reply comments.” This means that during the reply comment
    period, comments can be filed on counterproposals submitted
    during the initial comment period -- but further counterproposals
    cannot be filed. See 
    id.
    The impetus for this kind of cutoff rule derives from
    Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 
    326 U.S. 327
     (1945), which
    held that mutually exclusive broadcast applications must receive
    a comparative hearing. See 
    id. at 330-31
    . As this Circuit
    explained in Ranger v. FCC, 
    294 F.2d 240
     (D.C. Cir. 1961):
    Obviously, if all valid conflicting pending applications
    must receive a comparative hearing, late filings create
    procedural difficulties. Particularly is this so in view
    of what is described in this litigation as a chain
    reaction. Let us assume three towns, A, B and C, fifty
    miles apart in a straight geographical line. Application
    for a broadcast station at A is made. Grant of that
    application would preclude a station at B on the same
    or an adjacent channel; it would not affect the
    possibility of a station at C. Before the application for
    A has been acted upon, an applicant files for a license
    at B and asks for a comparative hearing with A. A
    grant in B would preclude a station at C. Therefore
    potential applicants for C must file in the A-B case in
    order to protect their rights. Theoretically this reaction
    could go on indefinitely and could eventually involve
    every potential broadcast-station situs in the United
    States.
    
    Id. at 243
    . And as we further noted in Florida Institute of
    Technology v. FCC, “[i]f the filing deadline for each link of a
    daisy chain” of applications like that described above “were
    5
    based on the filing date of the previous link rather than that of
    the lead application, ‘[i]n theory, at least the chain might never
    end.’” 
    952 F.2d 549
    , 550 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Kittyhawk
    Broadcasting Corp., 
    7 F.C.C.2d 153
    , 155 (1967)) (second
    alteration in original).
    By setting a firm deadline for the filing of conflicting
    proposals, the FCC’s cutoff rule prevents this kind of daisy
    chain of applications from going on indefinitely. This circuit
    has repeatedly invoked the daisy-chain rationale in upholding
    the FCC’s application of cutoff rules in different broadcast
    contexts. See, e.g., Florida Inst. of Technology, 
    952 F.2d at
    549-
    52; Ranger, 
    294 F.2d at 243-44
    . We have not, however,
    previously addressed such rules in the context of an FM
    allotment rulemaking proceeding.
    On July 13, 2000, NationWide Radio Stations petitioned the
    FCC to allot FM channel 233C3 at Quanah, Texas. On August
    18, the FCC issued an NPRM proposing this change and setting
    October 10, 2000 as the deadline for initial comments and
    October 25, 2000 as the reply comment deadline. See Notice of
    Proposed Rule Making, Amendment of Section 73.202(b), Table
    of Allotments, FM Broadcast Stations, 15 F.C.C.R. 15,809,
    15,812-13 (2000) (“Quanah NPRM”). It also set out the FCC’s
    rules for counterproposals, including the cutoff rule. Id. at
    15,813.
    On October 10, 2000, the last day of the initial comment
    period and thus the last day to submit a counterproposal, a group
    of broadcasters (the “Joint Parties”) filed a counterproposal that
    included twenty-two changes to the Table of Allotments. This
    counterproposal conflicted with NationWide’s proposal for
    Quanah because it proposed allotting the same channel at a
    nearby location. Due to a clerical error, the FCC did not place
    the Joint Parties’ counterproposal in its database or otherwise
    6
    make it public.3
    On May 18, 2001, Charles Crawford -- the petitioner in this
    case -- asked the FCC to allot channel 257C2 at Benjamin,
    Texas. One week later, Crawford filed a second proposal,
    seeking to allot channel 249C3 at Mason, Texas. Each of these
    proposals conflicted with a piece of the Joint Parties’
    counterproposal in the Quanah proceeding, and so should have
    been precluded under the FCC’s cutoff rule. The FCC, however,
    mistakenly docketed Crawford’s proposals and issued an NPRM
    for each.
    During the initial comment period for Crawford’s
    proposals, the FCC realized that it had not given notice of the
    Joint Parties’ counterproposal. Thereafter, it issued such notice.
    The notice stated that the FCC would consider the
    counterproposal as part of the Quanah proceeding, and it set a
    deadline for reply comments.
    On June 14, 2002, the FCC Media Bureau’s Audio Division
    dismissed both of Crawford’s petitions as precluded by the Joint
    Parties’ counterproposal. The Bureau explained that even
    though the counterproposal had not been publicized
    immediately, it had been submitted before the end of the initial
    3
    In the counterproposal, the Joint Parties observed that the FCC
    could resolve the conflict by allotting channel 255C3 at Quanah,
    instead of channel 233C3. NationWide, having been served with the
    Joint Parties’ counterproposal, agreed to that resolution. When it later
    bec ame clear that channel 255C3 was not actually available for
    Quanah, however, NationWide withdrew its expression of interest in
    any channel, stating that it “did not wish to be placed in an
    advers[a]rial position in such a complex proceeding with so many
    larger interests at stake.” NationWide Withdrawal of Expression of
    Interest at 1-2 (J.A. 88-89).
    7
    comment period for the Quanah proposal, and it therefore
    precluded late-filed conflicting proposals. Crawford petitioned
    for reconsideration, claiming principally that the Quanah NPRM
    provided him with insufficient notice that his proposals could be
    precluded by a proposal as complex as that of the Joint Parties.
    After this petition was denied, Amendment of Section 73.202(b),
    Table of Allotments, FM Broadcast Stations, 18 F.C.C.R. 103,
    106 (2003) (“Media Bureau Reconsid. Mem. Op. & Order”),
    Crawford submitted an application for review by the full
    Commission. The FCC denied that petition, Amendment of
    Section 73.202(b), Table of Allotments, FM Broadcast Stations,
    19 F.C.C.R. 470, 470-71 (2004) (“Commission Mem. Op. &
    Order”), and Crawford petitioned for review in this court.
    II
    Before confronting the merits of Crawford’s petition for
    review, we must consider whether this case is moot. As
    Crawford notes, the Joint Parties have withdrawn the piece of
    their proposal that conflicts with his proposed Benjamin
    allotment. See Pet’r Reply Br. at 7-8. For this reason,
    Crawford’s brief acknowledged that “there is no longer an active
    controversy” with respect to the Benjamin proposal. Id. at 8; see
    also id. at 8-9 (arguing for jurisdiction only with respect to the
    Mason proposal). Although Crawford sought to resurrect his
    Benjamin claim at oral argument, his initial position was correct.
    Crawford’s claim regarding the Mason proposal may also
    soon become moot. For reasons unrelated to the issues before
    this court, the Media Bureau has dismissed the Joint Parties’
    counterproposal and denied the Joint Parties’ petition for
    reconsideration of that decision. See Resp’t Br. at 7 & n.15.
    But the decision has not yet become final, and Crawford’s
    Mason proposal remains precluded. Id. The controversy as to
    Mason thus remains a live one. We proceed, then, to consider
    8
    the merits of Crawford’s petition only with respect to the Mason
    proposal.
    III
    Crawford’s principal contention is that he lacked notice
    that his proposal could be precluded by the Joint Parties’
    submission. He also contends that the FCC failed to adequately
    set forth its rationale for denying his petition, and that the FCC
    should have rejected the Joint Parties’ counterproposal as the
    product of impermissible collusion between the Joint Parties and
    NationWide. We consider these challenges below.
    A
    The Administrative Procedure Act provides that an agency
    that conducts an informal rulemaking typically must publish
    “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making . . . in the Federal
    Register.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 553
    (b). The same section further provides
    that, “[a]fter notice required by this section, the agency shall
    give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule
    making through submission of written data, views, or arguments
    with or without opportunity for oral presentation.” 
    Id.
     § 553(c).
    The parties agree that these requirements apply to FCC
    rulemaking proceedings to amend the FM Table of Allotments.
    The notice-and-comment requirements presume that the
    contours of the agency’s final rule may differ from those of the
    rule it initially proposes in an NPRM. It is well-settled that an
    agency need not initiate a new notice-and-comment period as
    long as the rule it ultimately adopts is a “logical outgrowth” of
    the initial notice. E.g., First Am. Discount Corp. v. Commodity
    Futures Trading Comm’n, 
    222 F.3d 1008
    , 1015 (D.C. Cir.
    2000); Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 
    935 F.2d 1303
    , 1311 (D.C. Cir.
    1991); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 
    590 F.2d 1011
    , 1031 (D.C.
    9
    Cir. 1978). Whether the “logical outgrowth” test is satisfied
    depends, in turn, on whether the affected party “should have
    anticipated” the agency’s final course in light of the initial
    notice. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA,
    
    705 F.2d 506
    , 549 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
    Here, Crawford claims that the preclusive effect of the Joint
    Parties’ counterproposal on his Mason petition was not a logical
    outgrowth of the Quanah NPRM.                 The Joint Parties’
    counterproposal, he argues, was simply too complex for
    preclusion of the Mason proposal to have been “reasonably
    foreseeable,” Pet’r Br. at 17, by virtue of that NPRM. How did
    that counterproposal conflict both with the Quanah proposal (so
    as to receive cutoff protection in the Quanah proceeding) and
    with the Mason proposal (so as to preclude it)? The Joint Parties
    proposed a change at Keller, Texas; this change necessitated a
    “chain reaction” of amendments, the third of which conflicted
    with the Quanah proposal. The Keller change also spurred an
    additional chain reaction of amendments, the sixth of which
    conflicted with the Mason proposal.
    Despite the complexity of this “Texas Nine-Step,” we reject
    Crawford’s contention that he lacked adequate notice, for two
    reasons. First, Crawford presumes that the logical-outgrowth
    test requires that an affected party be able to anticipate the
    specific preclusive outcome of an allotment proceeding. But the
    Quanah NPRM, as well as the FCC’s regulations, made clear
    that the proceeding would encompass mutually exclusive
    counterproposals and that late-filed conflicting proposals would
    be cut off. See Quanah NPRM, 15 F.C.C.R. at 15,814; 
    47 C.F.R. § 1.420
    (d). This put all interested parties on notice that
    their proposals could be precluded by any counterproposal --
    whether foreseeable or not -- that was filed by the deadline,
    mutually exclusive with the Quanah proposal, and mutually
    exclusive with their own. See Commission Mem. Op. & Order,
    10
    19 F.C.C.R. at 471 & n.6. Thus, when the FCC deemed
    Crawford’s proposal precluded, that was more than just a
    “logical outgrowth” of the Quanah NPRM. Rather, the FCC
    was “merely doing that which [it] announced” it would do.
    Media Bureau Reconsid. Mem. Op. & Order, 18 F.C.C.R. at
    104. The FCC’s cutoff rule puts prospective broadcasters on
    notice that they should file their proposals as soon as they are
    ready -- or risk being precluded by an earlier-filed proposal or
    counterproposal that has received cutoff protection. Indeed, the
    FCC has made this point on several previous occasions.4
    Second, even if the logical-outgrowth test did require that
    an affected party be able to anticipate a preclusive outcome in a
    particular allotment proceeding, that test would be satisfied here.
    In light of the FCC’s minimum distance separation
    requirements, Crawford should at least have known that
    NationWide’s initial proposal to allot channel 233C3 at Quanah
    could conflict with a counterproposal that included only a single
    channel up to 147 miles away. 5 Such a channel, in turn, could
    4
    See Conflicts Between Applications and Petitions for
    Rulemaking to Amend the FM Table of Allotments, 8 F.C.C.R. 4743,
    4745 (1993) (noting that the risk of preclusion “could in large part be
    minimized by filing a counterproposal at the earliest possible time”);
    Amendment of Section 73.202(b), Table of Allotments, FM Broadcast
    Stations, 5 F.C.C.R. 7609, ¶ 10 (1990) (“Pinewood”) (holding that, to
    “avoid possible preclusion . . . , other applicants must file by the
    comment deadline stated in the notice of proposed rule making in the
    allotment proceeding”); see also 
    id. ¶ 8
     (“The fact that we may allot
    an alternate channel to . . . any community in [the] proceeding, which
    in turn, would cause the exclusion of the [applicant’s] proposal as an
    untimely conflicting proposal from the proceeding, is merely doing
    that which we announced that we could do.”).
    5
    See 
    47 C.F.R. § 73.207
    (b)(1) tbl.A (providing that, absent
    exceptions not relevant here, the minimum permissible distance
    11
    have conflicted with another class C3 channel -- the same class
    as the channel Crawford proposed for Mason -- as far away as
    another 147 miles. Thus, the foreseeable radius of conflict
    arising from even such a simple proposal was 294 miles from
    Quanah.6
    Mason is just 192 miles from Quanah, well within this 294-
    mile radius. See Pet’r Br. at 16. Thus, far from having to follow
    the “labyrinthine trail” of the Joint Parties’ counterproposal, 
    id. at 5
    , Crawford could reasonably have anticipated the preclusive
    effect of the Quanah proposal simply by postulating a single-
    channel counterproposal between the two cities. And had he
    done so, he could have safeguarded his own proposal from
    preclusion by filing it during the initial comment period.
    Our conclusion that notice was adequate is unaffected by
    the FCC’s delay in entering the Joint Parties’ counterproposal
    into its database or otherwise making it public. Under the
    between a class C3 station and a class C station -- the class with the
    largest signal contour -- on the same channel is 147 miles).
    6
    Even if the stations proposed for Mason and Quanah were too
    far apart on the spectrum for any third station to conflict with both of
    them, the FCC has long made clear that it may resolve a conflict
    between two proposals by giving one community a different channel
    than the one proposed for it. See, e.g., Quanah NPRM, 15 F.C.C.R.
    at 15,814 (“The filing of a counterproposal may lead the Commission
    to allot a different channel than was requested for any of the
    communities involved.”); Pinewood, 5 F.C.C.R. ¶ 8 (“Because a
    notice of proposed rule making in a channel allotment proceeding
    specifically elicits counterproposals and alerts all interested parties
    that alternate channels may be substituted for either the original
    proposal or the counterproposal, both the actual counterproposal
    advanced by the proponent and any alternate channel are within the
    scope of the notice.”).
    12
    FCC’s cutoff rule, Crawford was precluded from filing his
    Mason proposal after the close of the Quanah initial comment
    period because the Joint Parties had filed their counterproposal
    during that period. Preclusion did not depend upon public
    notice of the counterproposal. Nor would notice have helped
    Crawford, since the Joint Parties did not file their
    counterproposal until the last day of the period (as the rule
    permitted), after which it was too late for Crawford to take
    effective action -- even if he had received notice of the
    counterproposal. The notice that truly mattered in this case was
    the Quanah NPRM, which the FCC filed on August 18, 2000.
    As discussed above, that notice apprised Crawford that the only
    way he could reliably protect himself was to file his Mason
    proposal within the initial comment period that followed the
    NPRM. It was Crawford’s failure to act during that period that
    doomed his proposal. Cf. Kittyhawk, 7 F.C.C.2d ¶ 4 (holding
    that, because the “Commission’s interpretation of the cutoff rule
    has remained constant since its inception,” the applicant “knew
    or should have known that an intervening proposal filed on the
    last possible day could act to deny him consolidation”).
    Crawford’s position is not improved by the FCC’s
    mistaken, but short-lived, docketing of his Mason proposal. As
    we have held in a similar factual setting, “an agency’s failure to
    follow its own regulations is fatal to the deviant action.”
    Florida Inst. of Technology, 
    952 F.2d at 553
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Thus, the FCC’s erroneous docketing of the
    Mason proposal did not give Crawford any “rights he would not
    otherwise enjoy.” Id.; see also 21st Century Telesis Joint
    Venture v. FCC, 
    318 F.3d 192
    , 202 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding
    that the petitioner may not “turn a clerical error into a windfall
    of rights it would not otherwise enjoy” (internal quotation marks
    omitted)). Nor did Crawford detrimentally rely on the agency’s
    failure to follow its own regulations. Rather, we agree with the
    FCC that “[a]t most, Mr. Crawford was misled into thinking he
    13
    could file his proposals when he subsequently thought of them,
    whereas they had long since been precluded.” Resp’t Br. at 18-
    19.
    B
    Crawford next argues that the Commission’s Order failed
    to adequately set forth its reasoning for upholding the dismissal
    of his proposal. He insists that the daisy-chain rationale
    discussed in Part I above and relied upon in the FCC’s brief is
    merely a post hoc rationalization by the agency. This contention
    also fails.
    First, the Commission’s order made clear that the dismissal
    of Crawford’s proposal was dictated by application of the cutoff
    rule. See Commission Mem. Op. & Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 470-
    71 & n.3. It was the cutoff rule, not the rationale for the rule,
    that was the basis for the preclusion of the Mason proposal. The
    cutoff rule specifically applicable to amendment of the FM
    Table of Allotments has been in effect since 1974. See
    Amendment of Part 1, Subpart C (Rulemaking Proceedings), 39
    Fed. Reg. at 44,021. And as discussed in Part I, the underlying
    rationale for the FCC’s cutoff rules is well-recognized and oft-
    repeated.7
    Second, even if the FCC were required to explain the basis
    7
    See Florida Inst. of Technology, 
    952 F.2d at 549-52
    ; Ranger,
    
    294 F.2d at 243-44
    ; see also Conflicts Between Applications and
    Petitions for Rulemaking to Amend the FM Table of Allotments, 8
    F.C.C.R. at 4744-45; Conflicts Between Applications and Petitions for
    Rulemaking to Amend the FM Table of Allotments, 7 F.C.C.R. 4917,
    ¶¶ 1, 3-4, 8, 17 (1992); Pinewood, 5 F.C.C.R. ¶ 12; Implementation of
    BC Docket No. 80-90, 5 F.C.C.R. ¶ 4 & n.6; Kittyhawk, 7 F.C.C.2d ¶
    4.
    14
    for the cutoff rule itself, we think it adequately did so. The
    decision under review in this case stated that “[a]llotment cut-off
    procedures and the need for these procedures are clear and well
    established.” Commission Mem. Op. & Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at
    471 (emphasis added). In support of that proposition, it cited
    (inter alia) an earlier Commission decision, see 
    id.
     at 471 n.5
    (citing Pinewood), which itself cited Ashbacker and discussed
    the need for a cutoff rule to prevent “the continuous filing of
    proposals,” Pinewood, 5 F.C.C.R. ¶ 12. Given this circuit’s
    repeated recognition of the daisy-chain rationale, we have no
    difficulty apprehending the shorthand reference. And as we
    have previously observed, “[i]f the necessary articulation of
    basis for agency action can be discerned by reference to clearly
    relevant sources other than a formal statement of reasons, we
    will make the reference.” Committee to Save WEAM v. FCC,
    
    808 F.2d 113
    , 118 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks
    omitted); see Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita
    Bd. of Trade, 
    412 U.S. 800
    , 807 (1973) (“An agency may
    articulate the basis of its order by reference to other decisions.”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).8
    C
    Finally,   Crawford     contends     that   the   Joint   Parties’
    8
    Relatedly, Crawford cites a footnote in Florida Institute of
    Technology for the proposition that the cutoff rule is inapplicable
    “where allocation tables virtually eliminate the possibility of daisy
    chain situations.” 
    952 F.2d at
    552 n.2 (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Closer examination makes clear, however, that the quotation
    refers only to applications for channels that already have been allotted
    to particular communities (so that there is no daisy-chain problem),
    and not to petitions to amend the table of allotments in the first
    instance. See id.; Pinewood, 5 F.C.C.R. ¶¶ 8, 12; Implementation of
    BC Docket No. 80-90 to Increase Availability of FM Broadcast
    Assignments, 2 F.C.C.R. 1290, ¶¶ 8-9 (1987).
    15
    counterproposal had “suspect bona fides,” such that the FCC
    should have treated it as the product of impermissible collusion
    between the Joint Parties and NationWide. Pet’r Br. at 22;
    see id. at 11-13, 22-23. But Crawford offers nothing to support
    these allegations, other than speculation based on NationWide’s
    subsequent withdrawal of its expression of interest. See supra
    note 3. In rejecting that speculation, the FCC relied on a
    certification filed by the Joint Parties, under oath, denying that
    there were any agreements made or consideration exchanged
    between the Joint Parties and NationWide. Certifications of No
    Consideration (J.A. 97-102); see Commission Mem. Op. &
    Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 471; Media Bureau Reconsid. Mem. Op.
    & Order, 18 F.C.C.R. at 105. We have no grounds for second-
    guessing the FCC’s decision to accept that denial.
    IV
    For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Crawford’s petition
    for review as moot with respect to the Benjamin proposal.
    Although the petition is not moot with respect to the Mason
    proposal, we deny that aspect of the petition on the merits
    because Crawford received adequate notice that the proposal
    could be precluded.
    So ordered.