Pitt, Christopher v. DC ( 2007 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued March 28, 2007                  Decided June 26, 2007
    No. 05-7157
    CHRISTOPHER G. PITT, SR. AND
    TELA HANSOM-PITT,
    APPELLANTS
    v.
    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,
    APPELLEES
    Consolidated with
    05-7163 and 06-7009
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 01cv02225)
    William J. Mertens argued the cause for appellants/cross-
    appellees. With him on the briefs was L. Barrett Boss.
    Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
    Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause
    for appellees/cross-appellants. With him on the briefs were
    Linda Singer, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General,
    and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Solicitor General.
    2
    Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.
    SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: The events giving rise to this
    case are troubling. After a violent robbery, the police arrested
    the wrong person – plaintiff Christopher Pitt – then initiated
    criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt despite overwhelming
    evidence of his innocence. Mr. Pitt and his wife subsequently
    brought suit against the District of Columbia and three
    individual police officers, seeking relief under federal law and
    D.C. common law for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and
    intentional infliction of emotional distress. After trial, the jury
    returned a split verdict and the district court entered judgment
    for the plaintiffs for $153,000. The defendants then moved for
    judgment as a matter of law on all claims, which the district
    court granted in part and denied in part. On appeal both sides
    challenge the district court’s rulings on the motions for
    judgment as a matter of law. We affirm in part, reverse in part,
    and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
    I.
    A.
    At approximately 12:00 p.m. on January 2, 2001, two senior
    citizens – Henry and Gloria Feldman – were violently robbed in
    their apartment building in Northwest Washington. The robber
    had followed the Feldmans into their building and then into the
    elevator. In the hallway outside the Feldmans’ apartment, the
    robber “socked” Mr. Feldman in the face and took his wallet,
    then grabbed Mrs. Feldman’s purse before escaping down a
    nearby staircase. The Feldmans immediately called 911.
    During the 911 call, Mrs. Feldman described the robber as a
    black man around 5’8” tall with a medium complexion and dark
    3
    hair, who was wearing a black leather jacket and a “beige-y”
    shirt. She told the operator that the perpetrator had not used a
    weapon during the robbery.
    Meanwhile, Keith Dade, an employee of the apartment
    building, was notified of the robbery and saw the perpetrator
    leaving the building. Mr. Dade followed the man and attempted
    to ask him a few questions, but the robber told Mr. Dade to
    “back up” and started to run away. Mr. Dade saw the robber
    make a suspicious “gesture” as though he might have had a
    weapon, but did not actually see a weapon. After following the
    perpetrator out of the building and across the street, Mr. Dade
    lost sight of him. Mr. Dade gave a description of the robber to
    the police, who subsequently broadcast a lookout alert to
    officers in the area.
    Responding to the lookout alert, Officers Bryan Adams and
    Steven Baxter arrived at the intersection where Mr. Dade last
    saw the perpetrator. After conferring with other officers at the
    scene, Officer Adams looked down the street and saw an
    individual who matched the description of the perpetrator get
    into a car and begin driving toward Rock Creek Park. The
    individual spotted by Officer Adams was the plaintiff,
    Christopher Pitt. Officers Adams and Baxter returned to their
    vehicle and followed plaintiff through Rock Creek Park and
    onto Calvert Street before pulling him over on the Taft Bridge
    on Connecticut Avenue. During the officers’ pursuit, plaintiff
    failed to fully stop at some of the stop signs, but he was not
    speeding. After stopping the plaintiff, the officers told him that
    he was a suspect in a robbery, asked him to step out of the
    vehicle, and handcuffed him for their protection. The officers
    confirmed that plaintiff’s clothes and physical characteristics
    matched the description of the robber. Plaintiff permitted the
    officers to search his vehicle, and during this search they found
    a hunting knife and a BB gun. Mr. Pitt informed the officers
    4
    that he worked as a courier, and that the knife and BB gun were
    for his protection. Plaintiff also provided the police with a list
    of the pickups and deliveries he had made that day, as well as
    two receipts for recent deliveries to the embassies of Kuwait and
    Qatar.
    After being notified that a suspect had been apprehended,
    other police officers brought the Feldmans and Mr. Dade to the
    Taft Bridge for a “show-up” identification to determine whether
    any of the eyewitnesses could identify plaintiff as the robber.
    Mrs. Feldman told the officers she got a “good look” at the
    robber, and that she was “certain” plaintiff was not the person
    who had robbed them. Mr. Feldman told the police he “wasn’t
    sure” whether plaintiff was the perpetrator, but that he “doesn’t
    think so.” Mr. Dade thought plaintiff looked somewhat like the
    robber, but he “couldn’t make a positive ID” because the
    plaintiff’s hair was “longer and curlier” than the robber’s, and
    the plaintiff – unlike the robber – was wearing a hat.
    Lieutenant Josiah Eaves was at the Feldmans’ apartment
    building reviewing the building’s security videotapes when he
    heard over the radio that a suspect had been arrested.
    Surveillance cameras had captured the robber’s image as he
    entered the building behind the Feldmans. Lt. Eaves went to the
    Taft Bridge to determine whether plaintiff was the person seen
    on the tapes. Lt. Eaves told the officers on the scene that he was
    confident plaintiff was the robber.
    While the show-up identification was being conducted, two
    other officers – Detectives Sean Caine and James Bovino –
    conducted a brief investigation of plaintiff’s alibi that he was
    making deliveries at a nearby embassy at the time of the
    robbery. The two detectives questioned a guard at the Kuwaiti
    Embassy about whether plaintiff had been there earlier that day,
    but the details of this interaction are disputed. Detective Caine
    5
    testified at trial that the guard told him that “he hasn’t seen Chris
    today.” However, the embassy guard testified that he told the
    officers that a “Chris” had been at the embassy on the day of the
    robbery.
    After the show-up, Mr. Pitt was arrested and taken into
    custody. The next day, Officers Adams and Baxter presented
    the case to screening prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s
    Office. Officer Adams gave the prosecutors an affidavit that
    contained a detailed description of the robbery, but did not
    mention the negative identifications or Mr. Pitt’s alibi. It is
    disputed whether the officers’ handwritten notes – which did
    describe the negative identification and alibi – were given to the
    screening prosecutors along with the affidavit. The affidavit
    also stated that a cell phone ear piece cover was found at the
    scene of the robbery, and that Mr. Pitt’s cell phone ear piece was
    “missing its cover.”
    Based on the information contained in this affidavit, on
    January 3, 2001, a Superior Court Magistrate Judge ordered Mr.
    Pitt committed to a halfway house. Mr. Pitt spent ten days
    incarcerated before being released on January 13, 2001. Six
    days later, the government dismissed the criminal case against
    Mr. Pitt.
    B.
    On October 29, 2001, Christopher Pitt and his wife Tela
    Hansom-Pitt (“plaintiffs”) brought suit in U.S. District Court
    against the District of Columbia, Officer Bryan Adams, Officer
    Steven Baxter, and Detective James Bovino. In their complaint,
    plaintiffs sought relief under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     for false arrest
    and malicious prosecution, and under D.C. common law for
    false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of
    emotional distress, and loss of consortium. Plaintiffs argued in
    6
    district court that the defendants committed a laundry list of
    tortious acts, including: (1) arresting Mr. Pitt and initiating
    criminal proceedings against him even though at least two
    eyewitnesses stated that he was not the robber; (2) arresting and
    prosecuting Mr. Pitt even though he was clearly not the person
    seen on the apartment building’s security videotape; (3) ignoring
    the fact that Mr. Pitt could not have been the robber because he
    was making a delivery at a nearby embassy at the time the
    robbery took place; and (4) submitting an affidavit to the U.S.
    Attorney’s Office that contained numerous misstatements and
    omissions about the details of the robbery. As a result of this
    conduct, plaintiffs contended that Mr. Pitt was wrongfully
    incarcerated for ten days, was subjected to a strip-search and
    body cavity search, lost his job, and suffered emotional distress.
    After an eight-day jury trial, the defendants moved for
    judgment as a matter of law on all of the plaintiffs’ claims. The
    district court granted the defendants’ motion with respect to the
    § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, holding that there was not
    a “clearly established” constitutional right to be free from
    malicious prosecution, and thus the defendant officers were
    entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. With respect to the
    rest of the plaintiffs’ claims, the district court denied the motion
    and sent the claims to the jury.
    The jury found all three officers liable for false arrest under
    § 1983. However, the jury returned a defense verdict for the
    three officers and the District on the common law false arrest
    claims – on the special verdict form, the jurors found that the
    officers lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Pitt, but that they
    were not liable for common law false arrest because they
    “reasonably and in good faith” believed that their conduct was
    lawful. On the common law malicious prosecution claims, the
    jury returned a plaintiff’s verdict against the District and all
    three officers. With respect to the common law intentional
    7
    infliction of emotional distress claims, the jury found the
    District liable but the three officers not liable. The jury awarded
    $100,000 to Mr. Pitt and $50,000 to Ms. Hansom-Pitt as
    compensatory damages, and assessed $1,000 in punitive
    damages against each officer.
    After the verdict was received, the defendants renewed their
    motion for judgment as a matter of law. In a memorandum
    opinion and order, the district court granted the defendants’
    motion with respect to the § 1983 false arrest claims, holding
    that the three officers were entitled to qualified immunity. In
    reaching this conclusion, the district court relied in part upon the
    jury verdict on the common law claims, in which the jury found
    that the officers were not liable for false arrest because they had
    a reasonable good faith belief that their conduct was lawful. The
    district court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment as a
    matter of law on the common law malicious prosecution claims
    and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, and
    refused to set aside the punitive damages award. Both sides now
    appeal the district court’s rulings on the defendants’ motion for
    judgment as a matter of law.
    ***
    In Section II, we address the arguments raised by the
    District and the three officers. The defendants argue that there
    was insufficient evidence to hold all four defendants liable for
    common law malicious prosecution, and to hold the District
    liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants
    also argue that the evidence was insufficient to support an award
    of punitive damages against the three officers. We reverse the
    district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for judgment as
    a matter of law with respect to Ms. Hansom-Pitt’s intentional
    infliction of emotional distress claim. We also hold that there
    was insufficient evidence to find Detective Bovino liable for
    8
    malicious prosecution, and thus we reverse the district court on
    this issue. However, we affirm the district court’s denial of the
    defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on each of
    the other common law claims. We affirm the award of $1,000
    in punitive damages against Officers Adams and Baxter, but we
    set aside the punitive damage award against Detective Bovino.
    In Section III, we address the arguments raised on appeal by
    the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by
    holding that the three defendant officers were entitled to
    qualified immunity on the false arrest and malicious prosecution
    claims brought under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . We affirm the district
    court with respect to the malicious prosecution claims, but we
    reverse and remand on the false arrest claims.
    II.
    A. Common Law Malicious Prosecution Claims
    To reiterate, after trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor
    of the plaintiff against the District and each of the three officers
    on the common law malicious prosecution claims. The
    defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, but the
    district court denied the motion. Defendants now appeal,
    arguing that the evidence received at trial was insufficient to
    support the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff on the malicious
    prosecution claims. We affirm the district court’s denial of the
    defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect
    to the District and Officers Adams and Baxter, but we reverse
    with respect to Detective Bovino.
    Under District of Columbia law, there are four elements to
    the tort of malicious prosecution: (1) termination of the
    underlying suit in plaintiff’s favor; (2) malice on the part of the
    defendant; (3) lack of probable cause for the underlying suit; and
    9
    (4) special injury occasioned by plaintiff as a result of the
    original action. Morowitz v. Marvel, 
    423 A.2d 196
    , 198 (D.C.
    1980). The first and fourth elements are not contested on
    appeal, and thus we address only the issues of probable cause
    and malice.
    ***
    To support an action for malicious prosecution in the
    District of Columbia, the plaintiff must show that “the original
    action was instituted . . . without probable cause.” Ammerman
    v. Newman, 
    384 A.2d 637
    , 639 (D.C. 1978). In a civil action for
    malicious prosecution, probable cause is defined as the existence
    of “facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the
    belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are
    legally just and proper.” 
    Id. at 639-40
    . The issue in a malicious
    prosecution case is not whether there was probable cause for the
    initial arrest, but whether there was probable cause for the
    “underlying suit.” Joeckel v. Disabled Am. Veterans, 
    793 A.2d 1279
    , 1282 (D.C. 2002). The existence of probable cause is a
    mixed question of law and fact. Smith v. Tucker, 
    304 A.2d 303
    ,
    306 (D.C. 1973). “The existence of the facts [is] for the jury,
    but their effect when found is a question for the determination
    of the court.” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted). Given that the jury has
    found all four defendants liable for common law malicious
    prosecution, we must view all disputed evidence in the light
    most favorable to the plaintiff and “resolve [] all conflicts in
    [plaintiff’s] favor.” Scott v. District of Columbia, 
    101 F.3d 748
    ,
    752-53 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
    In this case, we agree with the district court’s conclusion
    that the defendants initiated criminal proceedings against Mr.
    Pitt without probable cause. Most importantly, both victims of
    the crime told the police that Mr. Pitt was not the person who
    had robbed them. The perpetrator followed the Feldmans into
    10
    the apartment building, then rode the elevator with them up to
    the eighth floor before committing the robbery. Mrs. Feldman
    got a “good look” at the robber while waiting for the elevator,
    while getting off the elevator, and during the robbery. After
    having observed the robber at close range, she told the police
    “right away” that Mr. Pitt was not the perpetrator, and that she
    was “very certain” of her identification. More specifically, she
    “knew right away from the shape of his head and his physique
    that it was not him.” Mrs. Feldman’s negative identification was
    unqualified, and she emphasized that “I won’t forget that guy’s
    face.” Mr. Feldman did not see the perpetrator as clearly as
    Mrs. Feldman, but he also had doubts about whether Mr. Pitt
    was the robber. He told the police that he “wasn’t sure, 50/50,
    but I don’t think so.” Mr. Feldman also described his
    identification as “more on the negative side than on the positive
    side.” In sum, both victims of the crime provided negative
    identifications of Mr. Pitt – Mrs. Feldman told the police she
    was “certain” that Mr. Pitt was not the robber, and Mr. Feldman
    stated that he “didn’t think so.”
    Why the police chose to initiate criminal proceedings
    against Mr. Pitt despite negative identifications by the victims
    of the crime is somewhat baffling. As we have noted in
    previous cases, show-up identifications are often problematic
    because they are inherently suggestive. See, e.g., United States
    v. Rattler, 
    475 F.3d 408
    , 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The fact that
    both victims provided negative identifications of Mr. Pitt despite
    the inherent suggestiveness of an identification in which only
    one individual is shown to the eyewitness should have been
    strong evidence of Mr. Pitt’s innocence. Defendants cite several
    cases for the proposition that one exculpatory fact – such as a
    negative identification – is insufficient to defeat probable cause.
    However, those cases involved witnesses’ failure to identify a
    suspect rather than an outright negative identification. See
    Wilson v. Russo, 
    212 F.3d 781
    , 785, 791-92 (3d Cir. 2000) (one
    11
    witness “could not say with certainty” that the robber’s picture
    was included in a photo array); Olinger v. Larson, 
    134 F.3d 1362
    , 1365-66 (8th Cir. 1998) (witness was unable to identify
    suspect based on a black-and-white videotape of the robbery).
    The defendants have not cited a single case – from any
    jurisdiction – in which a court held that there was probable
    cause to arrest or prosecute a suspect notwithstanding a victim’s
    unambiguous negative identification of the suspect. Of course,
    it is likely that no such cases can be found because few law
    enforcement agencies would arrest or prosecute a suspect after
    a victim of the crime has stated without qualification that the
    suspect was not the perpetrator.1
    Defendants point to several other facts that purportedly
    supplied probable cause to initiate the prosecution of Mr. Pitt.
    First, they note that Mr. Pitt’s “clothing” and “physical
    description” matched the description of the robber. However,
    this fact has little probative value, given that the persons who
    provided these descriptions – Mr. and Mrs. Feldman – both
    provided negative identifications of Pitt during the show-up
    identification. Second, defendants claim that Mr. Pitt left the
    scene in a direction and manner “consistent with flight.” The
    record does not support this contention. The officers saw Mr.
    Pitt get into his car and drive away from the scene
    approximately eight minutes after the robbery had taken place.
    Had Mr. Pitt been “fleeing” – as the defendants now contend –
    1
    We can envision a scenario in which there may be probable
    cause to arrest or prosecute a suspect despite a negative identification
    from a victim – i.e., if other evidence of the defendant’s guilt is
    overwhelming, or if the witness’s negative identification was based on
    fear or intimidation. However, this is not such an extraordinary case.
    The other evidence against Mr. Pitt was weak, and Mrs. Feldman
    testified that she was composed and calm during the show-up and that
    she was “certain” of her negative identification.
    12
    he might well have been gone from the scene much faster than
    that. Moreover, Officer Adams testified that Mr. Pitt was not
    speeding, and that he pulled over “voluntarily” as soon as one of
    the officers instructed him to stop. Based on the evidence in the
    record, we cannot conclude that Mr. Pitt’s actions were
    “consistent with flight.” Third, the police assert that they found
    “instruments of robbery” – a knife and a BB gun – in Mr. Pitt’s
    car. However, we fail to see the relevance of this evidence,
    given that the victims did not allege that the robber had used a
    weapon. And Mr. Pitt provided a reasonable explanation for
    why he had these items – he was a courier who needed them for
    his protection. Lastly, defendants contend that Mr. Pitt
    resembled the images of the robber captured on security
    videotapes from the Feldmans’ apartment building. Before
    arresting Mr. Pitt, Lt. Eaves watched the tape and concluded that
    Mr. Pitt was the perpetrator. However, there is a significant
    factual dispute over how closely Mr. Pitt resembled the person
    seen on the videotape. Lt. Eaves conceded that when he
    compared a picture of Mr. Pitt to a still-frame photo from the
    video during the trial, he had doubts about whether Mr. Pitt was
    the person seen on the tape. Similarly, in his deposition, Officer
    Baxter stated that when he viewed the tape, he “couldn’t make
    a positive determination” of whether Mr. Pitt was the robber.
    We have independently reviewed a still-frame scene from the
    video, and we see several significant differences between the
    perpetrator and Mr. Pitt – most notably, the perpetrator clearly
    had a receding hairline, while Mr. Pitt has a full head of hair,
    and the perpetrator appears stockier than Mr. Pitt. Drawing all
    reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the video is at
    least ambiguous, and might even be a significant piece of
    exculpatory evidence.
    Overall, in light of the negative identifications of Mr. Pitt
    by the victims of the crime, we do not believe that any of the
    aforementioned facts were probative enough to provide probable
    13
    cause to initiate criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt.
    ***
    Defendants also contend that the evidence offered at trial
    was insufficient to establish malice. The determination of
    malice is “exclusively for the factfinder,” and “the requisite
    malice can be established from the existence of a willful,
    wanton, reckless, or oppressive disregard for the rights of the
    plaintiff.” Tyler v. Cent. Charge Serv., Inc., 
    444 A.2d 965
    , 969
    (D.C. 1982).
    Here, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Officers
    Adams and Baxter acted with malice because the arrest report
    and the affidavit submitted to prosecutors contained several
    material misstatements and omissions. Most significantly, the
    affidavit – which was signed by Officer Adams and largely
    copied from the arrest report prepared by Officer Baxter –
    contained absolutely no mention of the Feldmans’ negative
    identifications. The affidavit contained minute details about the
    robbery and about the stop of Mr. Pitt’s car, but it completely
    omitted the fact that neither victim of the crime believed that
    Mr. Pitt was the perpetrator. Defendants assert that the officers’
    notes – which did describe the show-up identification with the
    Feldmans – were included in the “jacket” of the case file that
    was submitted to prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Office.
    However, during his deposition, Officer Baxter testified that he
    did not recognize the notes, and that he did not know whether
    the notes had been given to the screening prosecutors.
    Similarly, AUSA Richard Tischner testified that “very many
    times,” the officers’ notes are not included in the case jackets.
    At the very least, there is a factual dispute over whether the
    prosecutors actually received these notes, and given that the jury
    returned a plaintiff’s verdict on the malicious prosecution
    claims, we must resolve this factual question in favor of the
    14
    plaintiff.
    The affidavit also contained at least one statement that was
    unambiguously false. According to the affidavit, an officer
    observed Mr. Pitt getting into a car “within seconds” after a
    building employee saw the robber leave the building. However,
    Officer Adams testified that approximately ten minutes had
    passed from the time the building employee lost sight of the
    perpetrator until the officers saw Mr. Pitt. The affidavit gave the
    false impression that the police were hot on the trail of the
    robber when they observed Mr. Pitt getting into his car. On the
    evidence, the perpetrator had been gone for at least eight
    minutes by the time the police spotted Mr. Pitt in the area. In
    sum, we agree with the district court that a reasonable jury could
    have concluded that Officers Adams and Baxter acted with
    malice in initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt.
    Officers Adams and Baxter argue that they are protected
    from liability for malicious prosecution because they acted in
    reliance upon the advice of counsel – namely, the prosecutors in
    the U.S. Attorney’s Office. “Proof that a person who institutes
    a criminal proceeding placed the facts fully and fairly before
    counsel and acted upon his advice is a good defense to the
    charge of want of probable cause.” Jarett v. Walker, 
    201 A.2d 523
    , 526 (D.C. 1964). The burden of proof is on the defendant
    to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to
    an affirmative defense. Cf. District of Columbia v. Sterling, 
    578 A.2d 1163
    , 1165 (D.C. 1990) (holding that defendants bear the
    burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance
    of the evidence). Here, defendants have not met their burden of
    establishing that they are entitled to the “advice of counsel”
    defense. AUSA Richard Tischner typed portions of the officers’
    arrest report, but Mr. Tischner testified that the facts contained
    in the report were based solely upon “what the police officers
    have to tell us.” AUSA Tischner also testified that “every word”
    15
    of a report is read back to the officer in order to ensure that it is
    truthful and accurate. Moreover, the “advice of counsel”
    defense only protects defendants who “place[] the facts fully and
    fairly before counsel.” Jarrett, 
    201 A.2d at 526
    . As explained
    above, there was evidence that the officers failed to tell
    prosecutors several key facts regarding the arrest and show-up
    identification. In light of the omissions and misstatements in the
    affidavit prepared by the defendant officers, we cannot conclude
    that the facts of the case were placed “fully and fairly” before
    the Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Accordingly, we hold that
    Officers Adams and Baxter are not entitled to the “advice of
    counsel” defense, and we affirm the district court’s denial of
    their motion for judgment as a matter of law on the common law
    malicious prosecution claims.
    ***
    Although we affirm with respect to Officers Adams and
    Baxter, we reverse the district court’s denial of the defendants’
    motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to Detective
    Bovino. There is no evidence in the record that Det. Bovino had
    any role in initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt. Det.
    Bovino did participate in the investigation of the robbery – he
    took statements from eyewitnesses, watched the security
    videotape, and investigated Mr. Pitt’s alibi. However, these
    facts are insufficient to establish that Det. Bovino was
    “responsible for the institution of the malicious proceedings.”
    Malicious Prosecution, 52 AM. JUR. 2d § 21, at 154-55 (2000);
    see also Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 
    368 F.3d 1062
    , 1066 (9th
    Cir. 2004) (noting that malicious prosecution actions may only
    be brought against “persons who have wrongfully caused the
    charges to be filed”). Police officers who “sign and swear to a
    criminal complaint on which the public authorities base their
    prosecution of the plaintiff” may be liable. 52 AM. JUR. 2d § 22,
    at 155. For example, Officer Adams – who signed the false and
    16
    misleading affidavit upon which the prosecution was based –
    could be held liable for malicious prosecution. But there is no
    evidence in the record that Det. Bovino had any involvement in
    this case beyond routine investigatory duties. He did not
    prepare or sign the arrest report or the affidavit that was
    presented to the prosecutors, and he did not speak to the
    screening attorneys in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. In sum, based
    on the evidence received at trial, no reasonable jury could find
    Det. Bovino liable for malicious prosecution. Thus, we reverse
    the district court on this issue and remand with instructions to
    enter judgment for Detective Bovino on the common law
    malicious prosecution claims.
    B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
    On the intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”)
    claims, the jury returned a defense verdict for each of the three
    police officers. However, the jury returned a verdict for the
    plaintiffs – both Christopher Pitt and Tela Hansom-Pitt – against
    the District. The District moved for judgment as a matter of law
    on these claims, but the district court denied the motion. The
    District now appeals. We affirm the district court’s denial of the
    District’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to
    Mr. Pitt’s IIED claim, but we reverse with respect to Ms.
    Hansom-Pitt’s claim.
    Under District of Columbia tort law, a plaintiff seeking
    relief for IIED must offer proof of “extreme or outrageous
    conduct” that intentionally or recklessly causes the plaintiff to
    suffer “severe emotional distress.” Joyner v. Sibley Mem. Hosp.,
    
    826 A.2d 362
    , 373 (D.C. 2003) (quoting Kerrigan v. Britches of
    Georgetowne, 
    705 A.2d 624
    , 628 (D.C. 1997)). The only issue
    on appeal is whether a reasonable jury could have found the
    District’s conduct to be “extreme and outrageous.” To establish
    “outrageousness,” the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s
    17
    conduct was “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
    degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
    be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
    community.” 
    Id.
     Given that the jury found the District liable
    for IIED, we must allow the verdict to stand “unless the
    evidence, together with all inferences that can be reasonably
    drawn therefrom is so one-sided [in favor of the moving party]
    that reasonable men could not disagree on the verdict.” Milone
    v. Wash. Met. Area Transit Auth., 
    91 F.3d 229
    , 231 (D.C. Cir.
    1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Here, a reasonable jury could have returned a verdict for
    Mr. Pitt on his IIED claim. As explained in the previous
    section, the plaintiffs offered evidence that the officers’ affidavit
    contained several glaring omissions and at least one false
    statement. Similarly, the jury could have inferred from the
    evidence that at least one officer tampered with evidence in an
    attempt to link Mr. Pitt to the scene of the crime. During their
    investigation, the police found an “ear piece cover for a cell
    phone” at the scene of the robbery. In the affidavit that was
    submitted to prosecutors, Officer Adams stated that Mr. Pitt’s
    “ear piece was missing its cover.” Yet Mr. Pitt testified that his
    cell phone ear piece was “brand new” and that the foam cover
    was intact when the police seized his phone. From these facts,
    a reasonable jury could conclude that an officer may have
    removed the ear piece cover from Mr. Pitt’s cell phone in order
    to link him to the scene of the robbery. Taking the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we agree with the
    district court that a reasonable jury could have found the
    District’s actions sufficiently “outrageous” to support a verdict
    for Mr. Pitt on his IIED claim.
    The District argues that the verdict should be set aside as
    fatally inconsistent because the jury found the District liable for
    IIED while finding the individual officers not liable. We reject
    18
    the District’s arguments. In both the civil and criminal contexts,
    courts have held that inconsistency alone is not a sufficient basis
    for setting aside a jury verdict. See United States v. Dykes, 
    406 F.3d 717
    , 722-23 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that a “criminal
    defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that
    conviction because it was inconsistent with the jury’s verdict of
    acquittal on another count” (citations omitted)); United States v.
    Johnson, 
    440 F.3d 1286
    , 1295 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that
    “consistent verdicts are unrequired in joint trials for conspiracy:
    where all but one of the charged conspirators are acquitted, the
    verdict against the one can stand” (citation omitted)); Mosley v.
    Wilson, 
    102 F.3d 85
    , 89-90 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that it was
    error for a district court to “enter[] judgment as a matter of law
    solely on the basis of inconsistent verdicts”). In any event, the
    verdicts here are not necessarily inconsistent. The jury found
    each individual officer not liable, which means that the jury
    could not conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that any
    individual officer was liable for IIED. However, at the same
    time, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the group of
    police officers as a whole acted sufficiently “outrageously” or
    “recklessly” that the District should be liable. As explained
    above, several different officers were involved in Mr. Pitt’s
    arrest and prosecution, and a reasonable jury could have
    concluded that the department as a whole was liable, even if the
    evidence was insufficient to impose IIED liability on any
    individual officer.
    ***
    Although we affirm the district court with respect to Mr.
    Pitt’s IIED claim, we reverse the district court’s denial of the
    District’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Ms.
    Hansom-Pitt’s IIED claim. The District of Columbia has
    adopted the standard for intentional infliction of emotional
    distress from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Sere v.
    19
    Group Hospitalization, Inc., 
    443 A.2d 33
    , 37 (D.C. 1982)
    (quoting Restatement for the elements of IIED); Abourezk v.
    N.Y. Airlines, Inc., 
    895 F.2d 1456
    , 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per
    curiam) (same). Section 46 of the Restatement states:
    Where such [extreme and outrageous] conduct is directed
    at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he
    intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
    . . . to a member of such person’s immediate family who is
    present at the time, whether or not such distress results in
    bodily harm.
    RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965). Thus, under
    D.C. tort law, a family member can only recover for IIED if she
    was “present” when the extreme or outrageous conduct took
    place.
    As explained above, the “extreme or outrageous” conduct
    in this case was the filing of a false and misleading affidavit and
    possible evidence tampering. Based on the evidence in the
    record, it appears that the affidavit was prepared at the police
    station and then presented to prosecutors from the U.S.
    Attorney’s Office. It cannot be said that Ms. Hansom-Pitt was
    “present at the time” of this conduct. In common parlance, the
    word “present” connotes physical proximity. See WEBSTER’S
    NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1793 (3d ed. 1961) (defining
    “present” as “being in one place and not elsewhere; being within
    reach, sight or call or within contemplated limits; being in view
    or at hand”). We cannot hold that Ms. Hansom-Pitt was in any
    way physically “present” at the location where this affidavit was
    prepared or filed. Were we to allow Ms. Hansom-Pitt to recover
    for IIED, we would be substantially expanding the scope of the
    third-party IIED tort under District of Columbia law. Of course,
    in considering common law claims, federal courts must apply
    existing law – we have no power to alter or expand the scope of
    20
    D.C. tort law. See Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
    851 F.2d 418
    , 424
    (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that a federal court adjudicating state
    law claims “is not free to engraft onto those state rules
    exceptions or modifications which may commend themselves to
    the federal court, but which have not commended themselves to
    the State in which the federal court sits” (quoting Day &
    Zimmerman v. Challoner, 
    423 U.S. 3
    , 4 (1975)). Accordingly,
    we reverse the district court and remand with instructions to
    enter judgment for the District on Ms. Hansom-Pitt’s IIED
    claim.
    C. Punitive Damages
    The jury assessed $1,000 in punitive damages against each
    of the three defendant officers. The defendants moved to set
    aside the punitive damages, arguing that the evidence offered at
    trial did not show that the officers’ conduct was “outrageous or
    egregious.” The district court denied the motion. We affirm
    with respect to Officers Adams and Baxter but set aside the
    punitive damage award against Detective Bovino.
    Under District of Columbia law, “[p]unitive damages are
    warranted only when the defendant commits a tortious act
    accompanied with fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness,
    oppressiveness, wilful disregard of the plaintiff’s right, or other
    circumstances tending to aggravate the injury.” Butera v.
    District of Columbia, 
    235 F.3d 637
    , 657 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
    (quoting Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 
    665 A.2d 929
    , 938
    (D.C. 1995)). In order to impose punitive damages, the jury
    must find by clear and convincing evidence that the tortious act
    “was accompanied by conduct and a state of mind evincing
    malice or its equivalent.” 
    Id.
     The jury may “infer the requisite
    state of mind from the surrounding circumstances.” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Jemison v. Nat’l Baptist Convention, 
    720 A.2d 275
    , 285-86
    (D.C. 1998)).
    21
    In the instant case, a reasonable jury could have concluded
    that Officers Adams and Baxter acted with “recklessness” or
    “wilful disregard” of Mr. Pitt’s rights. As explained in greater
    detail above, there was evidence that these two officers: (1)
    initiated criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt despite negative
    identifications from the two victims; (2) omitted the negative
    identifications from the arrest report and an affidavit submitted
    to prosecutors; and (3) falsely stated in the arrest report and
    affidavit that they saw Mr. Pitt get into his car “within seconds”
    after a building employee saw the robber leaving the apartment
    building. Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could find by
    clear and convincing evidence that Officers Adams and Baxter
    acted recklessly or with wilful disregard of Mr. Pitt’s rights.
    Accordingly, we affirm the jury’s award of $1,000 punitive
    damages against these two defendants.
    However, we set aside the award of punitive damages
    against Detective Bovino. As explained above, the evidence
    offered at trial was insufficient to find Det. Bovino liable for
    malicious prosecution. There was no evidence that Det. Bovino
    was responsible for the prosecution of Mr. Pitt. He did not
    prepare the arrest report or the affidavit, and he did not present
    the case to screening prosecutors. And there was no evidence
    that any of his notes from the investigation were false or
    misleading. It cannot be said that Det. Bovino acted with
    “malice,” “recklessness,” or “wilful disregard” of Mr. Pitt’s
    rights. Thus, we set aside the $1,000 punitive damage award
    against Detective Bovino.
    III.
    A. False Arrest Claims Under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in holding that
    the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the claims
    22
    for false arrest under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . After trial, the jury
    found the three individual officers liable for false arrest under §
    1983, but not liable for common law false arrest. The
    defendants then moved for judgment as a matter of law on the
    § 1983 false arrest claims. The district court granted the motion,
    holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on
    these claims. The court noted that even though a reasonable jury
    could have concluded that plaintiff was arrested without
    probable cause, the defendants were nonetheless entitled to
    qualified immunity. The jury had found that the defendants
    were not liable for common law false arrest because they had a
    reasonable, good faith belief that their conduct was lawful.
    Thus, the court concluded that if the qualified immunity
    question had been presented to the jury, “the jury necessarily
    would have accepted the defendants’ qualified immunity
    defense.” The district court noted that qualified immunity
    depends on a standard of “objective reasonableness” rather than
    “subjective good faith,” but nonetheless held that the qualified
    immunity inquiry was “logically guided” by the jury verdict on
    the common law false arrest claims. Thus, the court granted the
    defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the §
    1983 false arrest claims. We hold that the district court erred by
    considering the jury verdict from the common law false arrest
    claims in its qualified immunity analysis.
    ***
    The Supreme Court has held that “government officials
    performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
    liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
    violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
    which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
    Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 818 (1982); see also Wilson v. Layne,
    
    526 U.S. 603
    , 614 (1999) (holding that qualified immunity turns
    upon the “objective legal reasonableness of the officers’ action,
    23
    assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established
    at the time the action was taken” (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted)).
    Courts have emphasized that whether a § 1983 defendant’s
    conduct violates the “clearly established” constitutional rights
    of the plaintiff is a pure question of law that must be resolved by
    the court. In Hunter v. Bryant, the plaintiff asserted that he had
    been arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth
    Amendment, but the defendant Secret Service agents argued that
    they were entitled to qualified immunity. 
    502 U.S. 224
    , 224-27
    (1991) (per curiam). The Ninth Circuit held that the trier of fact
    must determine whether a reasonable officer could have
    believed he had probable cause to make an arrest, but the
    Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the question of
    qualified immunity “ordinarily should be decided by the court
    long before trial,” and that the Ninth Circuit erroneously
    “place[d] the question of immunity in the hands of the jury.” 
    Id. at 228
    . Similarly, as the Fourth Circuit cogently explained:
    [A]lthough the jury may be suited for making factual
    findings relevant to the question of qualified immunity, we
    believe it far better for the court, not the jury, to answer the
    ultimate legal question of whether a defendant is entitled to
    qualified immunity. The nature of the analysis – requiring
    an examination of current federal law and federal law as it
    existed at the time of the alleged violation – makes for an
    awkward determination by the jury, at best.
    Knussman v. Maryland, 
    272 F.3d 625
    , 634 (4th Cir. 2001)
    (internal citation omitted). See also Phillips v. Hust, 
    477 F.3d 1070
    , 1079 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Whether the right at issue in a
    claim of qualified immunity is clearly established . . . is a pure
    question of law . . . .”); Williams v. Ala. State Univ., 
    102 F.3d 1179
    , 1182 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); Warren v. Dwyer, 
    906 F.2d 24
    70, 76 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The ultimate legal determination
    whether, on the facts found, a reasonable police officer should
    have known he acted unlawfully is a question of law better left
    for the court to decide.”).
    We reverse the district court’s order insofar as it grants the
    defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the
    plaintiff’s claim for arrest without probable cause under § 1983.
    In this case, the district court erred by considering the jury
    verdict from the common law false arrest claims in its qualified
    immunity analysis. As explained above, whether a right is
    “clearly established” – that is, whether an objectively reasonable
    officer would have believed his conduct to be lawful, in light of
    clearly established law – is a question of law that must be
    resolved by the court, not the jury. We reverse the district court
    on this issue and remand for a determination of whether the
    defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 false
    arrest claims. See Harlow, 
    457 U.S. at 820
     (remanding to
    district court for consideration of a qualified immunity issue
    because “[t]he trial court is more familiar with the record so far
    developed and also is better situated to make any such further
    findings as may be necessary”). On remand, the district court
    must determine whether the three officers’ actions in arresting
    Mr. Pitt “violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional
    rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 
    Id. at 818
    .
    B. Malicious Prosecution Claims Under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    Plaintiffs also sought relief for malicious prosecution under
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , asserting that the defendants deprived
    plaintiffs of their constitutional rights by initiating criminal
    proceedings against Mr. Pitt without probable cause. After trial,
    the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the
    defendants on these claims. The court held that it is not “clearly
    25
    established” that malicious prosecution is a violation of
    constitutional rights, and thus the defendants are entitled to
    qualified immunity. We affirm.
    Section 1983 creates a cause of action to remedy certain
    deprivations of federal rights, but it is not a source of substantive
    rights. See Baker v. McCollan, 
    443 U.S. 137
    , 144 n.3 (1979)
    (noting that “[section 1983] is not itself a source of substantive
    rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
    conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and
    federal statutes that it describes”). To determine whether a
    given right may be enforced through section 1983, we must look
    to the underlying constitutional provision that the plaintiff seeks
    to enforce. Here, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant officers
    initiated a criminal prosecution against Mr. Pitt without probable
    cause, in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment.2
    This court has not yet addressed whether malicious
    prosecution can give rise to a violation of the Fourth
    Amendment. However, nearly every other Circuit has held that
    malicious prosecution is actionable under the Fourth
    Amendment to the extent that the defendant’s actions cause the
    plaintiff to be “seized” without probable cause. See Britton v.
    Maloney, 
    196 F.3d 24
    , 28-29 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that “[f]or
    a state actor to violate the Fourth Amendment by initiating a
    2
    Defendants argue that the plaintiffs have only asserted a
    malicious prosecution claim under the Fifth Amendment’s due process
    clause, not under the Fourth Amendment. We disagree. In their
    complaint, plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated Mr. Pitt’s
    Fourth Amendment rights by “seizing and detaining him without
    reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause.” This challenge
    to his “detention” is sufficiently broad to encompass both the initial
    arrest as well as his continued incarceration while the criminal case
    was pending.
    26
    malicious prosecution against someone, the criminal charges at
    issue must have imposed some deprivation of liberty consistent
    with the concept of a seizure” (citation omitted)); Singer v.
    Fulton County Sheriff, 
    63 F.3d 110
    , 116 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
    that “[t]he Fourth Amendment right implicated in a malicious
    prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure
    of the person”); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 
    161 F.3d 217
    , 222
    (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that in a malicious prosecution action
    under the Fourth Amendment, “the constitutional violation is the
    deprivation of liberty accompanying the prosecution”); Brooks
    v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 
    85 F.3d 178
    , 183-84 (4th Cir.
    1996) (holding that “[a plaintiff’s] allegations that [the
    defendant] seized him pursuant to legal process that was not
    supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings
    terminated in his favor are sufficient to state a § 1983 malicious
    prosecution claim alleging a seizure that was violative of the
    Fourth Amendment”); Castellano v. Fragozo, 
    352 F.3d 939
    ,
    953-54 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“The initiation of criminal
    charges without probable cause may set in force events that run
    afoul of explicit constitutional protection–the Fourth
    Amendment if the accused is seized and arrested, for example
    . . . .”); Gregory v. City of Louisville, 
    444 F.3d 725
    , 748 (6th Cir.
    2006) (holding that “traditional claims for ‘malicious
    prosecution’ [must] be pursued and treated as Fourth
    Amendment violations when the gravamen of the complaint is
    continued detention without probable cause”); Smart v. Bd. of
    Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 
    34 F.3d 432
    , 434 (7th Cir. 1994) (“If
    malicious prosecution . . . is committed by state actors and
    results in the arrest or other seizure of the defendant, there is an
    infringement of liberty, but we now know that the defendant’s
    only constitutional remedy is under the Fourth Amendment . . .
    .”); Taylor v. Meacham, 
    82 F.3d 1556
    , 1561 (10th Cir. 1996)
    (noting that “in the § 1983 malicious prosecution context, [the
    relevant] constitutional right is the Fourth Amendment’s right to
    be free from unreasonable seizures”); Uboh v. Reno, 
    141 F.3d 27
    1000, 1003 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that malicious prosecution
    is actionable under § 1983 where “the plaintiff, as part of the
    commencement of a criminal proceeding, has been unlawfully
    and forcibly restrained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
    and injuries, due to that seizure, follow as the prosecution goes
    ahead” (citation omitted)). To the best of our knowledge, only
    one circuit has held that malicious prosecution claims do not
    implicate any constitutional rights. See Kurtz v. City of
    Shrewsbury, 
    245 F.3d 753
    , 758 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining that
    “this court has uniformly held that malicious prosecution by
    itself is not punishable under § 1983 because it does not allege
    a constitutional injury”).
    We join the large majority of circuits in holding that
    malicious prosecution is actionable under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     to
    the extent that the defendant’s actions cause the plaintiff to be
    unreasonably “seized” without probable cause, in violation of
    the Fourth Amendment. As explained above, given the negative
    eyewitness identifications and lack of any reliable evidence
    linking Mr. Pitt to the robbery, there was not probable cause for
    the officers to initiate criminal proceedings against him. And
    there is little doubt that the officers’ actions effected a “seizure”
    of Mr. Pitt. Based on the officers’ affidavit – which contained
    several misstatements and omissions – Mr. Pitt was detained in
    a halfway house for ten days before being released.
    Accordingly, we hold that the evidence received at trial
    sufficiently demonstrates that the defendant officers violated
    Mr. Pitt’s Fourth Amendment rights.3
    3
    At first glance, it may appear unnecessary to reach this issue
    at all, given that – as explained below – we hold that the officers are
    entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution claims
    brought under § 1983. However, the Supreme Court has expressly
    stated that courts must determine whether a constitutional right has
    been violated before moving to the analysis of whether a right was
    28
    ***
    Although prosecution without probable cause can give rise
    to constitutional injury under the Fourth Amendment, the district
    court correctly held that the three defendant officers are entitled
    to qualified immunity on these claims because this right was not
    “clearly established” at the time of the actions at issue in this
    case.
    Government officials being sued under § 1983 are protected
    by qualified immunity unless the contours of the right being
    asserted are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
    understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Wilson v.
    Layne, 
    526 U.S. 603
    , 614-15 (1999). In other words, “in the
    light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” 
    Id. at 615
    . The Supreme Court has not addressed the precise scope
    of a malicious prosecution action under § 1983. The Court has
    held that malicious prosecution does not violate “substantive”
    due process rights, but it left open the question whether such
    claims implicate Fourth Amendment rights. Albright v. Oliver,
    
    510 U.S. 266
    , 275 (1994). Earlier this year, the Court once
    again stated that “[w]e have never explored the contours of a
    Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution suit under § 1983,
    and we do not do so here.” Wallace v. Kato, 
    127 S. Ct. 1091
    ,
    “clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s actions. See
    County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
    523 U.S. 833
    , 841 n.5 (1998) (“[T]he
    better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified
    immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has
    alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all. Normally, it is
    only then that a court should ask whether the right allegedly
    implicated was clearly established at the time of the events in
    question.”). See also Barham v. Ramsey, 
    434 F.3d 565
    , 572 (D.C. Cir.
    2006) (noting that whether the defendant officers have violated a
    constitutional right of the plaintiff is a “threshold question” in the
    qualified immunity analysis).
    29
    1096 n.2 (2007) (citation omitted). Similarly, the last time this
    Court addressed the issue, we noted that “it has not been clearly
    established that malicious prosecution violates any
    constitutional or statutory right.” Moore v. Valder, 
    65 F.3d 189
    ,
    195 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
    Based on the aforementioned cases, we hold that at the time
    of the officers’ actions, it had not been “clearly established” in
    this Circuit that malicious prosecution was a violation of any
    constitutional rights. Accordingly, the defendant officers are
    entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution
    claims brought under § 1983. We affirm the district court’s
    grant of the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law
    on these claims.
    IV.
    The district court’s orders are affirmed in part, reversed in
    part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    So ordered.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-7157

Filed Date: 6/26/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014

Authorities (39)

daniel-s-singer-v-fulton-county-sheriff-stewarts-ice-cream-co-inc , 63 F.3d 110 ( 1995 )

Baker v. McCollan , 99 S. Ct. 2689 ( 1979 )

alfred-castellano-v-chris-fragozo-etc-chris-fragozo-individually-and , 352 F.3d 939 ( 2003 )

Winston I. Smart v. Board of Trustees of the University of ... , 34 F.3d 432 ( 1994 )

Smith v. Tucker , 1973 D.C. App. LEXIS 280 ( 1973 )

Wilson v. Layne , 119 S. Ct. 1692 ( 1999 )

United States v. Paul Johnson , 440 F.3d 1286 ( 2006 )

Barham, Jeffrey v. Ramsey, Charles H. , 434 F.3d 565 ( 2006 )

Morowitz v. Marvel , 1980 D.C. App. LEXIS 403 ( 1980 )

Larry Jerome Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, North ... , 85 F.3d 178 ( 1996 )

Jemison v. National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc. , 1998 D.C. App. LEXIS 208 ( 1998 )

james-j-gallo-jr-rose-maria-gallo-v-city-of-philadelphia-renald , 161 F.3d 217 ( 1998 )

Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner , 96 S. Ct. 167 ( 1975 )

County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 118 S. Ct. 1708 ( 1998 )

No. 98-5283 , 212 F.3d 781 ( 2000 )

Tyler v. Central Charge Service, Inc. , 1982 D.C. App. LEXIS 337 ( 1982 )

Williams v. Alabama State University , 102 F.3d 1179 ( 1997 )

John Steven Thomas Olinger v. Dennis J. Larson City of ... , 134 F.3d 1362 ( 1998 )

Joyner v. Sibley Memorial Hospital , 2003 D.C. App. LEXIS 417 ( 2003 )

Taylor v. Meacham , 82 F.3d 1556 ( 1996 )

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