United States v. Ramsey, Charles W. ( 1999 )


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  •                         United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued November 9, 1998     Decided February 9, 1999
    Nos. 97-3100 and 97-3184
    United States of America,
    Appellee
    v.
    Charles W. Ramsey,
    Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 95cr00326-01)
    ---------
    Francis D. Carter, appointed by the court, argued the
    cause for the appellant.
    Charles W. Ramsey filed a brief pro se.
    Michael Fitzpatrick, Assistant United States Attorney, ar-
    gued the cause for the appellee.  Wilma A. Lewis, United
    States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Mary-Patrice Brown
    and John P. Dominguez, Assistant United States Attorneys,
    were on brief for the appellee.
    Before:  Wald, Williams and Henderson, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.
    Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge:  Charles Ram-
    sey was convicted of one count of possessing cocaine with
    intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1),
    (b)(1)(B)(ii).  Through counsel, Ramsey raises several issues,
    including whether the trial court erred:  (1) in allowing the
    Government to introduce evidence of Ramsey's character;  (2)
    in failing to find entrapment as a matter of law and (3) in
    sentencing Ramsey to 210 months' imprisonment.  Ramsey
    pro se appeals the Government's use of Francisco Fierro as
    an informant witness.  Finding no error, we affirm Ramsey's
    conviction and sentence.
    I. Background
    On December 14, 1995, Ramsey was charged in a two-count
    indictment with one count of possessing cocaine with intent to
    distribute, see 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii), and one
    count of attempted possession with intent to distribute, see 21
    U.S.C. s 846.  The charges arose out of a Drug Enforcement
    Administration (DEA) undercover operation that began earli-
    er in 1995 when Francisco Fierro agreed to assist DEA as an
    informant, following his arrest for attempted murder and
    various weapons offenses after a fight in a Miami restaurant.
    Although Fierro could provide no leads in Florida, DEA
    decided to use Fierro as an informant in the Washington,
    D.C. area because his main client had been a Washington-
    area drug dealer named Charles Ramsey.  Fierro informed
    DEA Agent Ronald Woods that he had delivered substantial
    quantities of drugs to Ramsey in Washington at least eight
    times in 1993-94 and that Ramsey accounted for all of his
    kilogram-level sales.
    The first transaction between Fierro and Ramsey took
    place in Georgetown in early 1993 when Fierro delivered
    approximately seven ounces of heroin to Ramsey.  Seven
    times over the following year, Fierro delivered between one
    and ten kilograms of cocaine to Ramsey, selling him in toto 39
    kilograms of cocaine for approximately $20,000 each.1  The
    two men used a delivery procedure that involved a meeting,
    usually in a hotel room, where Fierro "fronted" Ramsey one
    or two kilograms.  Ramsey then left to sell the cocaine and
    returned later with payment.  Fierro then fronted Ramsey
    another one or two kilograms and Ramsey repeated the
    procedure until all of the drugs had been sold, usually within
    one week.  In mid-1994, at his wife's insistence, Fierro left
    the drug trade.
    In September 1995 DEA decided to use Fierro in a "re-
    verse" undercover operation against Ramsey.  DEA's initial
    plan was to conduct the transaction differently from the way
    Fierro and Ramsey had traditionally done business--by mak-
    ing Ramsey pay for the drugs up front.  DEA also sought to
    increase its control over the operation by having DEA Agent
    Robert Valentine pose as a drug dealer.  Fierro's role was to
    facilitate the exchange between Valentine and Ramsey.
    Between mid-September 1995 and his arrest on November
    21, 1995, Ramsey and Fierro had numerous recorded tele-
    phone and face-to-face conversations about drug transactions.
    Most of the conversations were recorded by DEA or by
    Fierro using DEA-supplied equipment.  On September 25,
    1995 Ramsey met Fierro in a hotel room.  During a video-
    taped conversation, they discussed a five-kilogram transaction
    and the fact that Valentine, posing as the distributor, re-
    quired payment up front.  While Ramsey was eager to move
    several kilograms, he did not have the cash to buy the drugs
    at delivery.  On October 6, 1995 Valentine and Ramsey met
    without Fierro at a restaurant.  Ramsey mentioned that
    Washington was currently "dry" of cocaine on both the whole-
    sale and retail levels, a fact consistent with DEA information.
    Ramsey wanted to know if the drugs could be fronted but
    Valentine refused.  Nevertheless, Valentine assured Ramsey
    __________
    1  The district court ruled that Ramsey's seven cocaine transac-
    tions with Fierro were admissible to show intent and absence of
    mistake under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) but it ruled any reference to the
    heroin from their first transaction inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid.
    403.
    that he would contact him about selling five kilograms of
    cocaine.
    On October 24, 1995 Valentine and Fierro met Ramsey at a
    hotel.  They had cocaine with them.  In an audio taped
    conversation Ramsey asked to see the cocaine but, after going
    "around and around" with Valentine, still refused to pay up
    front.  Tr. at 506.  The three men arranged to meet again on
    November 2, 1995.  On November 2, in a videotaped conver-
    sation in Valentine's car, Valentine showed Ramsey five one-
    kilogram bricks.  Ramsey said that he could move the cocaine
    quickly and offered to pay for one kilogram but not until 8:00
    p.m. that evening.  Becoming increasingly suspicious, Valen-
    tine rejected the offer.
    After this transaction fell through, it was clear to DEA that
    Ramsey would not deal unless he was fronted the drugs and
    that Ramsey preferred to deal only with Fierro.  Therefore,
    DEA changed its strategy by pulling Valentine out of the
    operation and instructing Fierro to arrange a buy using his
    old procedure.  On November 15, 1995 Fierro contacted
    Ramsey and offered to front him five kilograms on November
    21, 1995.  When Ramsey arrived at Fierro's hotel room on
    the 21st, Fierro showed him the five one-kilogram bricks.
    Agreeing to a cost of $20,000 each, Ramsey decided to take
    two kilograms and said that he would return for the other
    three.  Ramsey then placed the two bricks inside a black
    duffle bag and left the room.  He was arrested by DEA
    agents in the hallway and the drugs were recovered from his
    bag.2
    On May 14, 1996 Ramsey's jury trial commenced in the
    district court.  On May 21, 1996 the jury returned a guilty
    verdict on the first count.  Before sentencing, Ramsey filed a
    __________
    2  Ramsey gave DEA a written statement before signing a
    written waiver of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  After the
    statement had been admitted into evidence at trial, the district
    court suppressed the statement.  Ramsey's defense counsel affir-
    matively asked that a mistrial not be granted.  The district court
    instructed the jury to disregard the statement and related testimo-
    ny.
    pro se motion for a new trial, arguing ineffective assistance of
    counsel.  The district court appointed new counsel on Sep-
    tember 16, 1996 and issued an order on June 27, 1997 denying
    Ramsey's new trial motion as not timely filed.  After a
    hearing, the district court denied Ramsey's objections to the
    presentence report in a December 15, 1997 order.  On De-
    cember 17, 1997 the district court sentenced Ramsey to 210
    months' imprisonment followed by eight years of supervised
    release.  Ramsey timely filed this appeal, requesting that his
    conviction be reversed or, alternatively, that he be resen-
    tenced.
    II. Discussion
    A.
    On appeal, Ramsey advances several arguments, all without
    merit.  First, Ramsey argues that the district court erred by
    twice admitting Valentine's testimony about Ramsey's past
    criminal history.  The district court, however, did not abuse
    its discretion3 in admitting the evidence because Valentine's
    testimony was not elicited to show Ramsey's propensity to
    commit a crime, see Fed. R. Evid. 404(a), but rather as a
    response to defense counsel's attempts to challenge the volun-
    tariness of Ramsey's statement and to defense counsel's
    theory that DEA had entrapped Ramsey based on the "lies"
    of its informant, Fierro.  As the record manifests, Ramsey's
    counsel raised the subject of his client's extensive criminal
    history.  See United States v. Davis, 
    127 F.3d 68
    , 71 (D.C.
    Cir. 1997) ("The elicitation by the defense of the very testimo-
    ny now challenged ... for its own affirmative purposes, is an
    independent reason for finding no error...."), cert. denied,
    
    119 S. Ct. 215
     (1998);  United States v. Baumgarten, 
    517 F.2d 1020
    , 1029 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding no prejudice from redirect
    __________
    3  If defense counsel properly preserved his objection at trial,
    we review the district court's admission of evidence for abuse of
    discretion.  See United States v. Salamanca, 
    990 F.2d 629
    , 637
    (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
    510 U.S. 928
     (1993).  Nevertheless, the
    district court's decision to admit evidence, even of prior bad acts, is
    entitled to "much deference" on review.  United States v. Lewis,
    
    693 F.2d 189
    , 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
    regarding defendant's prior arrests after defense counsel, on
    cross-examination of government witness, raised issue), cert.
    denied, 
    423 U.S. 878
     (1975).  Moreover, Ramsey was not
    prejudiced by the testimony since the Government had al-
    ready introduced evidence of two previous narcotics convic-
    tions to rebut Ramsey's entrapment defense.
    Second, Ramsey contends that Valentine provided opinion
    testimony about the drug trade even though he was not
    qualified as an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evi-
    dence 702.4  We believe that the district court did not plainly
    err in admitting this testimony.  Although the trial judge
    never formally qualified Valentine as an expert witness, his
    testimony functionally satisfied the requirements for expert
    testimony set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.5  See
    United States v. Walls, 
    70 F.3d 1323
    , 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
    (finding opinion testimony admissible under Rule 702 as
    " 'specialized knowledge' [that] would 'assist the trier of fact
    to understand the evidence' ") (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702),
    cert. denied, 
    117 S. Ct. 90
     (1996);  United States v. McDonald,
    
    933 F.2d 1519
    , 1522 n.2 (10th Cir.) (where "the court heard
    the witness describe his qualifications, including his special-
    ized knowledge, education, skill and experience, and then
    allowed the witness to give opinion testimony," appellate
    court can assume witness was accepted as expert witness),
    cert. denied, 
    502 U.S. 897
     (1991);  United States v. Maher, 
    645 F.2d 780
    , 783-84 (9th Cir. 1981) (DEA agent not qualified as
    expert but his expert testimony on drug trade was upheld in
    light of his experience).
    We also find no plain error in the district court's failure to
    instruct the jury regarding the proper weight to be given
    Valentine's opinion testimony since Ramsey can show no
    prejudice from the admission of that testimony.  See United
    States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 734 (1993) (in plain error cases
    __________
    4  Because Ramsey made no objection at trial, our review is for
    plain error.  See Lewis, 
    693 F.2d at 193
    .
    5  Rule 702 states in part:  "[A] witness qualified as an expert by
    knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
    thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
    appellant bears "burden of persuasion with respect to preju-
    dice");  United States v. Catlett, 
    97 F.3d 565
    , 571 (D.C. Cir.
    1996) (no bar in this Circuit to "dual testimony as both a fact
    and expert witness");  see also United States v. Anderskow,
    
    88 F.3d 245
    , 251 (3d Cir.) (no prejudice in light of overwhelm-
    ing evidence of defendant's predisposition and guilt and fact
    that Government did not rely on challenged opinion testimony
    during summation), cert. denied, 
    117 S. Ct. 613
     (1996).  In
    fact, Ramsey's own counsel repeatedly asked Valentine for
    opinion testimony during cross-examination.
    Nor do we accept Ramsey's contention that Valentine's
    purported opinion testimony violated Federal Rule of Evi-
    dence 704 given the context of the prosecutor's question and
    Valentine's answer.  See United States v. Smart, 
    98 F.3d 1379
    , 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (adopting Seventh Circuit test to
    determine whether expert testimony violates Rule 704(b),
    which "assess[es] two key elements," to wit:  "(1) the lan-
    guage used by the questioner and/or the expert, including use
    of the actual word 'intent';  and (2) whether the context of the
    testimony makes clear to the jury that the opinion is based on
    knowledge of general criminal practices, rather than some
    special knowledge of the defendant's mental processes") (quo-
    tation omitted), cert. denied, 
    117 S. Ct. 1271
     (1997).  After an
    initial defense objection, the district court allowed the prose-
    cutor to ask Valentine, "[D]id you have information indepen-
    dent of what you learned from [Fierro] and Mr. Ramsey
    himself which led you to believe that Mr. Ramsey would be
    ready and willing and able to engage in this cocaine transac-
    tion?"  Tr. at 552.  Ramsey argues that by answering "Yes"
    to the prosecutor's question, Valentine, if considered an ex-
    pert witness, violated Rule 704(b) ("[n]o expert witness testi-
    fying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
    defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference
    as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental
    state or condition constituting an element of the crime
    charged or of a defense thereto").  Since predisposition to
    commit a crime implicates Ramsey's entrapment defense, he
    argues that Valentine's affirmation that he was "ready and
    willing and able to engage in this cocaine transaction," with-
    out a limiting jury instruction is plain error, citing United
    States v. Boyd, 
    55 F.3d 667
    , 671 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and United
    States v. Williams, 
    980 F.2d 1463
    , 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
    Valentine, however, testified merely as to his agency's knowl-
    edge and intent at the time it decided to initiate an undercov-
    er operation against Ramsey to rebut defense counsel's sug-
    gestion that DEA relied solely on Fierro for information
    about Ramsey's willingness to deal drugs.  See, e.g., Tr. at
    550 (prosecutor affirming, "All I want to ask [Valentine] is if
    he has pertinent information that led him to believe that
    there was not going to be an entrapment issue....").
    We next reject Ramsey's claim of entrapment as a matter
    of law because the record contains ample evidence that
    Ramsey was predisposed to commit a drug offense.  See
    United States v. Neville, 
    82 F.3d 1101
    , 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
    United States v. Budd, 
    23 F.3d 442
    , 445 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert.
    denied, 
    513 U.S. 1115
     (1995).6  The record reflects that
    __________
    6  To establish entrapment Ramsey must first show that he was
    induced by the Government to commit a crime he otherwise would
    not have committed.  If Ramsey meets his burden, the Government
    must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was predis-
    posed to commit the crime.  See Neville, 
    82 F.3d at 1107
    ;  Budd, 
    23 F.3d at 445
    .  Under our "bifurcated approach," "the jury, not the
    judge, decides whether the defendant has carried his burden of
    proving inducement" and, if so, whether "the government has met
    its burden of proving predisposition."  United States v. Whoie, 
    925 F.2d 1481
    , 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  Our review "focus[es] on the
    predisposition issue" and "must uphold the jury's verdict if, viewing
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a
    reasonable jury could have found that the Government proved
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to
    commit the crime."  Neville, 
    82 F.3d at
    1107 (citing Budd, 
    23 F.3d at
    445 & n.2).  To establish predisposition, the Government must
    show a "state of mind which readily responds to the opportunity
    furnished by the officer or his agent to commit the forbidden act,"
    United States v. Burkley, 
    591 F.2d 903
    , 916 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
    (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 
    440 U.S. 966
     (1979), based on "the
    entirety of the events surrounding the ultimate commission of the
    crime," United States v. Kelly, 
    748 F.2d 691
    , 699 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
    Relevant considerations include:  Ramsey's level of interest in the
    Ramsey had a long history of dealing in substantial quantities
    of drugs.  This evidence includes:  1975 and 1976 convictions
    of similar offenses, see Neville, 
    82 F.3d at 1107-08
     (finding
    evidence of prior criminal activity probative of appellant's
    predisposition);  testimony by Fierro, Valentine and Agent
    Woods that Ramsey had frequently and recently bought large
    quantities of cocaine from Fierro using "fronting" to pay for
    the drugs;  and Ramsey's recorded admissions of previous
    narcotics deals and interest in having Fierro supply him with
    cocaine.  Although Ramsey points to his several unproductive
    meetings with Fierro and Valentine to suggest that he was
    reluctant to buy, his reluctance evaporated as soon as Fierro
    agreed to front him the drugs.
    Nor did the district court err in counting the 39 kilograms
    of cocaine Ramsey purchased from Fierro in 1993-94 as part
    of the "same course of conduct" as Ramsey's offense of
    conviction under the Sentencing Guidelines.  U.S.S.G.
    s 1B1.3(a)(2) (requiring district court to determine offense
    level "solely with respect to offenses ... that were part of the
    same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the
    offense of conviction");  see United States v. Ramsey, No.
    95-326, at 3-6 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 1997) (sentencing opinion);
    see also United States v. Pinnick, 
    47 F.3d 434
    , 438 (D.C. Cir.
    1995) (clear error review of district court's determination that
    past conduct is related to offense of conviction).  "Extraneous
    offenses qualify as part of the same course of conduct if 'they
    are sufficiently connected or related to each other as to
    warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode,
    spree, or ongoing series of offenses.' "  Pinnick, 
    47 F.3d at 438
     (quoting U.S.S.G. s 1B1.3(a)(2), comment n.9(B)).  Thus,
    the district court's inquiry must "focus[ ] on whether the
    defendant repeats the same type of criminal activity over time
    and engage[s] in an identifiable behavior pattern of specified
    criminal activity."  
    Id.
     (quotation omitted).  Here, the district
    __________
    transaction, the pressure applied by the Government, any reluc-
    tance displayed by Ramsey and Ramsey's past illegal conduct.  See
    Neville, 
    82 F.3d at 1107-08
    ;  Budd, 
    23 F.3d at 446
    ;  Burkley, 591
    F.2d at 916.
    court went beyond an analysis of temporal proximity, noting
    that the transactions involved the same parties, see United
    States v. Jones, 
    948 F.2d 732
    , 737 (D.C. Cir. 1991), were of a
    similar character and nature and involved between one and
    ten one-kilogram bricks of cocaine, see Pinnick, 
    47 F.3d at 439
    , and that the temporary hiatus was Fierro's, rather than
    Ramsey's, decision.  See United States v. Santiago, 
    906 F.2d 867
    , 872 (2d Cir. 1990) (transactions separated by 8-14
    months while buyer was incarcerated were sufficiently similar
    in other respects to constitute same course of conduct).
    Since Ramsey's nine drug transactions with Fierro manifest-
    ed an ongoing relationship and pattern of criminal activity,
    the district court did not clearly err in counting 39 kilograms
    from previous transactions as part of the "same course of
    conduct" under U.S.S.G. s 1B1.3(a)(2).
    Finally, Ramsey cannot establish sentencing entrapment
    because the district court correctly found that he was predis-
    posed to purchase five kilograms on November 21, 1995.  See
    United States v. Shepherd, 
    102 F.3d 558
    , 566 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
    (for sentencing entrapment "main element ... is ... the
    defendant's predisposition") (quotation omitted);  Walls, 70
    F.3d at 1329 (same);  see also United States v. Washington,
    
    106 F.3d 983
    , 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reviewing district court's
    findings of fact for clear error, "giving due deference to the
    district court's application of the Guidelines to the facts"),
    cert. denied, 
    118 S.Ct. 446
     (1997).  For instance, the record
    shows inter alia that Ramsey saw the five kilograms, asked
    Fierro to supply drugs weekly and routinely purchased up to
    ten, but ordinarily five, kilograms using the fronting method.
    See Shepherd, 120 F.3d at 566.7
    __________
    7  In any event our decision affirming the district court's finding
    that Ramsey's relevant conduct included the 39 kilograms that he
    purchased in 1993-94 makes his sentencing entrapment argument
    moot.  The district court attributed 44 kilograms of cocaine to
    Ramsey, of which five kilograms were from his November 21, 1995
    offense of conviction, in calculating a base offense level of 34.
    Nevertheless, Ramsey asserts that he was only predisposed to
    purchase one of the five kilograms of cocaine from Fierro on
    November 21, 1995.  See Appellant's Br. at 31-32;  Appellee's Br. at
    B.
    Ramsey's pro se challenge8 requires a lengthier discussion
    not because of its merit but because our Circuit has not
    heretofore ruled on the challenge that our sister circuit courts
    have rejected.  Ramsey asks this Court to consider whether
    the Government's use of Fierro as an informant violated 18
    U.S.C. s 201(c)(2).9 Ramsey made his challenge after the
    Tenth Circuit, in an unprecedented10 decision, held that a
    federal prosecutor's agreement granting leniency to an ac-
    complice in return for truthful testimony as a government
    witness violated the plain language of section 201(c)(2).  See
    United States v. Singleton, 
    144 F.3d 1343
    , 1352 (10th Cir.
    1998). The court therefore held inadmissible the accomplice's
    testimony and reversed Singleton's conviction.  See 
    id. at 1347
    .  The Tenth Circuit sitting en banc has since reversed
    the panel decision.  See United States v. Singleton, 
    1999 WL 6469
     (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1999) (en banc).  In the meantime, the
    Singleton panel's interpretation of section 201(c)(2) has been
    rejected by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and every federal
    district court to consider the issue, save three.  See, e.g.,
    __________
    31 & n.22.  But see Sentencing Tr. at 13 (Ramsey's counsel in-
    formed court that relevant amount of drugs was "two kilograms of
    cocaine [Ramsey] walked out the door with").  According to
    U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1(c)(3), however, "[a]t least 15 KG but less than 50
    KG of [c]ocaine" places Ramsey at level 34.  Thus, reducing the
    amount of cocaine attributable to Ramsey by four (or even five)
    kilograms is of no significance.
    8  Because Ramsey makes this argument for the first time on
    appeal, we apply the plain error standard of review.  See Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 52(b);  United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
     (1993).
    9  Section 201(c)(2) subjects to criminal liability:  "Whoever ...
    directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of value to
    any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirma-
    tion given or to be given by such person as a witness" in a federal
    trial or proceeding.
    10  Until Singleton, no other court in the thirty-six year history
    of section 201(c)(2) had applied its prohibition to a prosecutorial
    grant of leniency in exchange for truthful testimony.
    United States v. Haese, 
    162 F.3d 359
    , 366 (5th Cir. 1998)
    (rejecting Singleton and noting that circuit precedent has
    "consistently ... upheld government efforts to provide bene-
    fits to witnesses in exchange for testimony") (quotation omit-
    ted);  United States v. Webster, 
    162 F.3d 308
    , 357-58 (5th Cir.
    1998) (rejecting Singleton on plain error review);  United
    States v. Ware, 
    161 F.3d 414
     (6th Cir. 1998);  United States v.
    Szur, 
    1998 WL 661484
     (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1998);  United
    States v. Mejia, 
    1998 WL 598098
     (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1998);
    United States v. Barbaro, 
    1998 WL 556152
     (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1,
    1998) (rejecting Singleton because of historical acceptance of
    leniency in exchange for truthful testimony);  United States v.
    Juncal, 
    1998 WL 525800
     (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1998) (relying on
    historical acceptance of leniency in exchange for testimony
    and on canon of statutory construction requiring that govern-
    ment be expressly included in statutory text to come within
    statute's purview);  United States v. Reid, 
    19 F. Supp. 2d 534
    (E.D. Va. 1998);  United States v. Arana, 
    18 F. Supp. 2d 715
    (E.D. Mich. 1998);  United States v. Dunlap, 
    17 F. Supp. 2d 1183
     (D. Colo. 1998);  United States v. Pungitore, 
    15 F. Supp. 2d 705
     (E.D. Pa. 1998);  United States v. Guillaume, 
    13 F. Supp. 2d 1331
     (S.D. Fla. 1998);  United States v. Eisen-
    hardt, 
    10 F. Supp. 2d 521
     (D. Md. 1998) (criticizing Single-
    ton's reasoning, particularly application of exclusionary rule);
    United States v. Gabourel, 
    9 F. Supp. 2d 1246
     (D. Colo. 1998).
    But see United States v. Mays, No. 97-CR-127 (E.D. Tenn.
    Sept. 18, 1998);  United States v. Lowery, 
    15 F. Supp. 2d 1348
    (S.D. Fla. 1998) (agreeing with Singleton that plain meaning
    of section 201(c)(2) encompasses government);  United States
    v. Fraguela, 
    1998 WL 560352
     (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1998)
    (adopting Lowery).
    For several reasons, we hold that section 201(c)(2) does not
    prohibit the Government from granting leniency in exchange
    for truthful testimony.
    We first look to the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. s 1, which is
    to be used "[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of
    Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise," and note
    that its definition of "whoever" does not expressly include the
    United States.  1 U.S.C. s 1 (defining "whoever" to include
    "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
    societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals").
    Moreover, we conclude that the meaning of "[w]hoever" in
    section 201(c)(2) should be limited by the canon of construc-
    tion that a statute does not apply to the government or affect
    governmental rights unless the text expressly includes the
    government.  In United States v. Nardone, 
    302 U.S. 379
    , 383
    (1937), the Supreme Court declared, "[T]he cases in which
    [the canon] has been applied fall into two classes."  First, the
    canon applies if application of the statute to the United States
    "would deprive the sovereign of a recognized or established
    prerogative title or interest."  
    Id.
      There are, according to
    Nardone, two exceptions to this class of cases.  Under the
    first exception, "[t]he rule of exclusion of the sovereign is less
    stringently applied where the operation of the law is upon the
    agents or servants of the government rather than on the
    sovereign itself."  Id.11
    The Nardone canon also applies if application of the statute
    to public agents would create an obvious absurdity.  See 
    id. at 384
    ;  see also United States v. Granderson, 
    511 U.S. 39
    , 47
    n.5 (1994) (statute's plain meaning disregarded if it "leads to
    an absurd result").12
    We first conclude that application of section 201(c)(2) to the
    United States would deprive the sovereign of a critically
    important interest, one that is well established in our legal
    system and recognized by the courts, the Congress and, more
    recently, the United States Sentencing Commission.  The
    __________
    11  The second exception to this class of cases provides that "the
    sovereign is embraced by general words of a statute intended to
    prevent injury and wrong" even if the statute infringes upon a
    recognized government prerogative.  Nardone, 
    302 U.S. at 384
    .
    12  As at least two courts have noted, Nardone did not expressly
    so limit the canon's applicability.  See Ware, 
    161 F.3d at
    419 n.1;
    Arana, 
    18 F. Supp. 2d at 718
     ("Nothing in [Nardone] or any other
    Supreme Court decision 'limits' application of the canon to only the
    two classes of cases mentioned.").  Nardone simply noted that the
    canon "has been applied" to the two types of cases discussed
    therein.  Nardone, 
    302 U.S. at 383
    .
    prosecutorial prerogative to recommend leniency in exchange
    for truthful testimony arises from English common law, see
    Ware, 
    161 F.3d at 419
    , and has been repeatedly approved by
    the United States Supreme Court, which noted its "ancient"
    origins and "established usage" in holding:
    that an accomplice duly admitted as a witness in a
    criminal prosecution against his associates ... , if he
    testifies fully and fairly, will not be prosecuted for the
    same offence....  When he fulfills those conditions he is
    equitably entitled to a pardon, and the prosecutor, and
    the court if need be, when fully informed of the facts, will
    join in such a recommendation.
    The Whiskey Cases (United States v. Ford), 
    99 U.S. 594
    , 599-
    601, 604 (1878).  Although the Supreme Court has not yet
    addressed the issue before us, it has consistently upheld the
    practice of plea bargaining.  Other Supreme Court cases
    sanction by implication a prosecutorial promise of leniency in
    exchange for truthful testimony.  See Delaware v. Van Ars-
    dall, 
    475 U.S. 673
    , 679-80 (1986) (concluding that court's
    refusal to allow defendant to question witness about dis-
    missed charge violated Sixth Amendment right to confronta-
    tion); Roberts v. United States, 
    445 U.S. 552
    , 558 (1980)
    (affirming sentence due in part to defendant's refusal to
    cooperate with government in spite of being offered "favor-
    able disposition of his case");  
    id. at 568
     (Marshall, J., dissent-
    ing) (expressly upholding plea bargaining process);  Giglio v.
    United States, 
    405 U.S. 150
     (1972) (holding prosecution's
    failure to disclose promise of leniency to witness, provided in
    exchange for that witness's testimony, violated due process).
    Circuit courts have been more explicit in their approval of a
    prosecutorial plea agreement with an accomplice or co-
    defendant conditioned on his truthful testimony for the Gov-
    ernment.  See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 
    810 F.2d 947
    , 956
    (10th Cir. ), cert. denied, 
    482 U.S. 908
     (1987);  United States v.
    Dailey, 
    759 F.2d 192
    , 196 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that "[l]ong
    ago the courts rejected the notion that the testimony of co-
    defendants and other interested witnesses was so likely to be
    unreliable that it should be excluded");  United States v.
    Kimble, 
    719 F.2d 1253
     (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
    464 U.S. 1073
     (1984);  United States v. McCallie, 
    554 F.2d 770
    , 772 (6th
    Cir. 1977);  United States v. Barrett, 
    505 F.2d 1091
    , 1102 (7th
    Cir. 1974) (sanctioning grant of civil immunity in exchange for
    testimony and stating, "If the government can excuse crimi-
    nal or civil liability in settling a criminal case, surely it can
    use that power of compromise to obtain guilty pleas or to
    procure testimony in other proceedings.  Both are legitimate
    objectives of plea bargaining.") (emphasis original), cert. de-
    nied, 
    421 U.S. 964
     (1975).  According to the Fifth Circuit,
    "No practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system
    than the practice of the government calling a witness who is
    an accessory to the crime for which the defendant is charged
    and having that witness testify under a plea bargain that
    promises him a reduced sentence."  United States v.
    Cervantes-Pacheco, 
    826 F.2d 310
    , 315 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
    denied sub nom. Nelson v. United States, 
    484 U.S. 1026
    (1988).
    Moreover, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recog-
    nize and accept plea bargaining.  Although Rule 11(e), which
    sets out the procedure governing plea agreements, does not
    identify the types of commitments the Government may ask
    of individuals in exchange for leniency, the Advisory Commit-
    tee notes recognize that an agreement may require more than
    relinquishing the right to trial.  According to the notes to the
    1975 amendments of Rule 11:
    [It is apparent, though not explicitly stated, that Rule
    11(e) contemplates that the plea agreement may bind the
    defendant to do more than just plead guilty or nolo
    contendere.  For example, the plea agreement may bind
    the defendant to cooperate with the prosecution in a
    different investigation.  The Committee intends by its
    approval of Rule 11(e) to permit the parties to agree on
    such terms in a plea agreement.]
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 Advisory Committee's notes (1975)
    (brackets in original);  see also 
    id.
     Advisory Committee's
    notes (1974) ("plea agreement[s] may also contribute to the
    successful prosecution of other more serious offenders").
    In addition, both the United States Code and the Sentenc-
    ing Guidelines contemplate the prosecutor's use of a plea
    agreement in exchange for truthful testimony against a defen-
    dant.  For example, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
    established the United States Sentencing Commission and
    explicitly required it "to take into account a defendant's
    substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
    another person who has committed an offense."  28 U.S.C.
    s 994(n).  The 1984 Act also allows a court on the Govern-
    ment's motion "to impose a sentence below a level established
    by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's
    substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
    another person who has committed an offense."  18 U.S.C.
    s 3553(e).  The Sentencing Guidelines themselves authorize
    the sentencing court to depart downward for any defendant
    who provides "substantial assistance in the investigation or
    prosecution of another person who has committed an offense."
    U.S.S.G. s 5K1.1.  Among the factors the court may consider
    in determining whether to grant the Government's motion for
    downward departure are "the truthfulness, completeness, and
    reliability of any information or testimony provided by the
    defendant."  U.S.S.G. s 5K1.1(a)(2).
    Moreover, application of section 201(c)(2) to the Govern-
    ment obstructs the sovereign's, not the individual prosecu-
    tor's, interest in plea agreements inasmuch as the prosecutor
    brings federal criminal charges in the name of the United
    States.  As the Sixth Circuit aptly noted:
    When an assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) en-
    ters into a plea agreement with a defendant, that plea
    agreement is between the United States government and
    the defendant.  When an AUSA uses at trial testimony
    obtained through a plea agreement or an agreement not
    to prosecute, he does so as the government.  An AUSA
    who, pursuant to the provisions of the United States
    Sentencing Guidelines, moves for a downward departure
    under s 5K1.1, does so as the government.
    Ware, 
    161 F.3d at 421
    ;  see also 18 U.S.C. s 3553(e) (allowing
    sentence reduction "[u]pon motion of the government").
    Nor are we persuaded by any assertion that the Congress
    intended section 201(c)(2) "to prevent fraud, injury, or wrong"
    arising from government offers of leniency in exchange for
    truthful testimony.  A prosecutor is obligated to disclose any
    benefit conferred on any witness, see Giglio, 
    405 U.S. at 150
    ,
    and a benefit conferred under a plea agreement must be
    approved by the district court.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e).
    Furthermore, any prosecutor who attempts to "corruptly"
    bribe a witness could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.
    s 201(b)(3).13  Accordingly, having determined that neither of
    the exceptions to the first class of Nardone cases applies, we
    conclude that application of section 201(c)(2) to the Govern-
    ment would deprive the sovereign of a recognized and estab-
    lished prerogative and interest.  See Nardone, 
    302 U.S. at 383
    .
    In addition, we believe this case falls within the second
    class of cases to which the Nardone canon applies.  Applica-
    tion of section 201(c)(2) to a federal prosecutor offering
    leniency in exchange for truthful testimony works obvious
    absurdities.  To interpret section 201(c)(2) as the Tenth Cir-
    cuit originally did, see Singleton 
    144 F.3d at 1346-48
    , would
    expose to criminal liability any federal prosecutor who en-
    tered into a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(e) and any
    federal judge who either approved a Rule 11(e) plea agree-
    ment or reduced a sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. s 3553(e)
    or U.S.S.G. s 5K1.1(a)(2) based in part on a witness's testimo-
    __________
    13  Section 201(b)(3) subjects to criminal liability:
    Whoever ... directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers, or
    promises anything of value to any person, or offers or promises
    such person to give anything of value to any other person or
    entity, with intent to influence the testimony under oath or
    affirmation of such first-mentioned person as a witness [in
    federal trials or proceedings] or with intent to influence such
    person to absent himself therefrom....
    18 U.S.C. s 201(b)(3) (emphasis added).  That section 201(b)(3) applies to federal prosecutors
    while section 201(c)(2) does not, despite the similarities between the two sections, follows from
    Nardone; the Government has no recognized interest in paying a witness to give untruthful
    testimony and no absurdity would result in punishing a prosecutor who offers a witness money or
    any other thing of value to obtain untruthful testimony.
    ny.14  See Arana, 
    18 F. Supp. 2d at 719
    ;  Dunlap, 
    17 F. Supp. 2d at 1184-87
    .  In addition, such an interpretation of section
    201(c)(2) would end a centuries-old practice of allowing coop-
    erating criminals to testify against their confederates in hopes
    of receiving more lenient treatment.  Faced with a ban on a
    plea agreement in exchange for cooperative testimony, the
    Government would face a near impossible task in trying to
    convict those higher up in a criminal organization.  See
    generally Kastigar v. United States, 
    406 U.S. 441
    , 446 (1972)
    (noting enactment of immunity statutes "reflects the impor-
    tance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of
    such a character that the only persons capable of giving
    useful testimony are those implicated in the crime").
    The application of section 201(c)(2) to public officers also
    produces an absurd conflict with statutory schemes prescrib-
    ing reduced sentences and immunity for co-conspirators and
    accomplices who provide testimony for the Government.  See,
    e.g., 18 U.S.C s 3521 (Witness Relocation and Protection
    Act authorizing Attorney General to exchange things of value
    for witness's agreement "to testify");  18 U.S.C s 3553(e)
    (reduction below statutory minimum sentence authorized in
    exchange for "substantial assistance");  18 U.S.C ss 6001-05
    (federal immunity statutes);  28 U.S.C. s 994(n) (requiring
    Sentencing Commission to provide for sentencing guideline
    reductions);  Gabourel, 
    9 F. Supp. 2d at 1247
     (rejecting
    original Singleton interpretation after examining "the larger
    statutory context, its object and policy").  For instance, 18
    U.S.C. s 6003, a provision of the Organized Crime Control
    __________
    14  As the Sixth Circuit correctly noted:
    This result cannot be avoided by attempting to argue that the
    language of the statute forbids only the use of the testimony
    from a witness who has entered into the plea agreement, not
    the plea agreement itself.  Because a defendant who enters
    into a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11 must appear before
    the court and enter his plea, the defendant's entry of that plea
    is testimony.
    Ware, 
    161 F.3d at
    421 (citing Brady v. United States, 
    397 U.S. 742
    ,
    748 (1970)).
    Act of 1970, authorizes a United States Attorney, with the
    approval of the Attorney General or certain other federal
    officials, to seek a court order granting immunity to a witness
    whose testimony he considers necessary in the public interest.
    Yet a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. s 6003 is
    clearly "[some]thing of value" given "for or because of the
    testimony under oath or affirmation," 18 U.S.C. s 201(c)(2).
    See Ware, 
    161 F.3d at 423
     (concluding that more recently
    enacted statutes than section 201(c)(2) "specifically allow what
    [Singleton's original] broad interpretation of the more gener-
    ally applicable s 201(c)(2) would prohibit").  We therefore
    conclude that application of section 201(c)(2) to federal prose-
    cutors offering leniency in exchange for testimony works
    obvious absurdities.  For these reasons, we apply the Nar-
    done canon "which provides that statutes do not apply to the
    government or affect governmental rights unless the text
    expressly includes the government," Nardone, 
    302 U.S. at 383
    , and interpret "[w]hoever" as used in 18 U.S.C.
    s 201(c)(2) to be exclusive of the United States.
    If we were to find the language of 18 U.S.C. s 201(c)(2)
    ambiguous, which we do not, an examination of the relevant
    legislative history would be appropriate.  See Saadeh v. Far-
    ouki, 
    107 F.3d 52
    , 57 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("If the language is
    plain on its face, courts do not ordinarily resort to legislative
    history.").  Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
    Defense Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 843 (1984) (If "the statute
    is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
    question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
    based on a permissible construction of the statute.").  Noth-
    ing in section 201(c)(2)'s legislative history indicates that the
    Congress intended to apply the statute to the Government's
    plea arrangements.  Moreover, a sub silentio change of this
    magnitude to the well-established prosecutorial practice of
    granting leniency in exchange for testimony would be virtual-
    ly unprecedented.  Such a change ignores the rule of statuto-
    ry construction that "[a] party contending that legislative
    action changed settled law has the burden of showing that the
    legislature intended such a change."  Green v. Bock Laundry
    Mach. Co., 
    490 U.S. 504
    , 521 (1989).  Although House Report
    No. 87-748, notes that section 201(h) (the predecessor of
    section 201(c)(2)) "forbids offers of payments to a witness of
    anything of value 'for or because of' testimony given or to be
    given," the legislative history contains no indication that
    section 201, originally enacted in 1962 by Pub. L. No. 87-849,
    was designed to terminate the longstanding prosecutorial
    prerogative of exchanging leniency for truthful testimony.
    H.R. Rep. No. 87-748, at 16 (1961);  see also S. Rep. No.
    87-2213 (1961) (containing same language).  The legislative
    history of the 1970, 1986 and 1994 amendments to section 201
    is also silent on the issue.  Nor do those amendments address
    the resulting contradiction in the statutory scheme if the
    Congress had intended section 201(c)(2) to apply to the
    Government.  In particular, the 1986 and 1994 amendments
    were passed after 18 U.S.C s 3553(e) (reduction below statu-
    tory minimum sentence), 18 U.S.C s 6003 (immunity statute)
    and 28 U.S.C. s 994(n) (requiring Sentencing Commission to
    allow sentencing guideline reductions) but the potential con-
    flict with these statutes was never addressed.  As the Sixth
    Circuit rightly concluded, "Clearly the explanation is that no
    such conflict exists as s 201(c)(2) was never intended to apply
    to the government."  Ware, 
    161 F.3d at
    423 (citing Pub. L.
    No. 99-570 s 1007, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (
    100 Stat. 32707
    ) 5393;
    Pub. L. No. 99-646 s 48, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N (
    100 Stat. 3592
    )
    6139).
    Finally, even if federal prosecutors were subject to section
    201(c)(2), that fact would not justify excluding Fierro's testi-
    mony.  The Congress prescribed a fine or imprisonment for a
    violation of section 201(c)(2).  "Where Congress has both
    established a right and provided exclusive remedies for its
    violation, we would 'encroach upon the prerogatives' of Con-
    gress were we to authorize a remedy not provided for by
    statute."  Ware, 
    161 F.3d at 424
     (quoting United States v.
    Frazin, 
    780 F.2d 1461
    , 1466 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    479 U.S. 844
     (1986));  see United States v. Thompson, 
    936 F.2d 1249
    ,
    1251-52 (11th Cir. 1991) (court may not suppress testimony
    for statutory violation unless Congress explicitly or implicitly
    provided exclusion as a remedy for a violation), cert. denied,
    
    502 U.S. 1075
     (1992);  see also United States v. Hensel, 
    699 F.2d 18
    , 29 (1st Cir. 1983) (exclusionary rule fashioned to
    vindicate "specific, constitutionally protected rights"), cert.
    denied, 
    461 U.S. 958
     (1983);  United States v. Harrington, 
    681 F.2d 612
    , 615 (9th Cir. 1982) ("There must be an exceptional
    reason, typically the protection of a constitutional right, to
    invoke the exclusionary rule.").  Moreover, the Supreme
    Court has acknowledged the "substantial" cost of exclusion
    which "hamper[s]" the enforcement of valid laws and keeps
    "concededly relevant and reliable evidence" from the jury.
    United States v. Janis, 
    428 U.S. 433
    , 447 (1976);  see also
    United States v. Payner, 
    447 U.S. 727
    , 734 (1980) ("[U]nbend-
    ing application of the exclusionary sanction ... would impede
    unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.
    After all, it is the defendant, and not the constable, who
    stands trial.").
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that 18 U.S.C.
    s 201(c)(2) does not prohibit the Government from granting
    leniency in exchange for a witness's truthful testimony.  As
    discussed earlier, Ramsey's other assignments of error are
    without merit.  Accordingly, the defendant's conviction and
    sentence are
    Affirmed.