SFO Good-Nite Inn, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board , 700 F.3d 1 ( 2012 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued October 5, 2012            Decided November 20, 2012
    No. 11-1295
    SFO GOOD-NITE INN, LLC,
    PETITIONER
    v.
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    RESPONDENT
    Consolidated with No. 11-1325
    On Petition for Review and Cross-Application
    for Enforcement of an Order of the
    National Labor Relations Board
    Patrick W. Jordan argued the cause for petitioner. With
    him on the briefs was Nanette Joslyn.
    MacKenzie Fillow, Attorney, National Labor Relations
    Board, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief
    were John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda
    Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Usha
    Dheenan, Supervisory Attorney.
    Before: ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and
    RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.
    2
    Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
    ROGERS, Circuit Judge: SFO Good-Nite Inn, LLC,
    withdrew recognition of Unite Here! Local 2 based on anti-
    union petitions that the National Labor Relations Board found
    were impermissibly tainted by Good-Nite’s unlawful assistance
    to the decertification effort in violation of sections 8(a)(5) and
    (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 
    29 U.S.C. § 158
    (a)(1),
    (5). Good-Nite petitions for review on the principal ground that
    the Board applied the wrong line of its precedent, Hearst Corp.,
    
    281 N.L.R.B. 764
     (1986), and expanded the conduct covered by
    it, unreasonably departing from its settled causality precedent in
    Master Slack Corp., 
    271 N.L.R.B. 78
     (1984).
    Regardless of whether the Board previously forthrightly
    explained the distinction between these two lines of its
    precedent, the Board has now articulated a clear line for
    applying the Hearst presumption of taint in “the narrow
    circumstance where an employer unlawfully instigates or
    propels a decertification campaign, and then invokes the results
    of that campaign to justify its unilateral withdrawal of
    recognition from its employees’ representative.” SFO Good-
    Nite Inn, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 16, at 4 (July 19, 2011). The
    Board explained that the Hearst presumption applies where the
    employer is directly involved in advancing a decertification
    petition, whereas the Master Slack test applies where the
    employer committed unfair labor practices unrelated to the
    petition that may have contributed to the erosion of support for
    the union. Upon finding that Good-Nite directly assisted and
    advanced the decertification effort by coercively asking
    employees to sign the petitions and unlawfully threatening to
    fire an employee for opposing it, the Board applied the Hearst
    presumption as there was no need to make a specific causation
    finding under Master Slack.
    3
    We hold that the Board’s Hearst presumption is reasonable
    and consistent with the Act, and that the Board’s factual findings
    are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
    Accordingly, we deny the petition for review and grant the
    Board’s cross application for enforcement.
    I.
    In March 2004, Good-Nite purchased a hotel located near
    the San Francisco International Airport and assumed the prior
    owner’s obligations under a collective bargaining agreement
    with housekeeping and janitorial employees represented by
    Unite Here! Local 2 (“the Union”). At the relevant time the
    represented unit consisted of 24 employees. The agreement was
    due to expire in November 2004, but in August 2004 Good-Nite
    and the Union agreed that it would remain in effect during their
    renegotiations for a new agreement.
    During a bargaining session on August 23, 2005, the Union
    demanded that Good-Nite discharge five new housekeepers
    unless they paid union dues pursuant to a union-security clause
    in the agreement. On August 31, Good-Nite general manager
    Azfal “A.C.” Chaudhry and banquet manager Naomi Grace
    Vargas met with two of those housekeepers, Cristina Valencia
    and Maria Maldonado. At the meeting, Chaudhry told Valencia
    and Maldonado about the outstanding dues, stated that the Union
    was “no good,” and asked them to consider signing a “paper” to
    eliminate the Union. According to Valencia, Chaudhry
    questioned why they wanted a union when he was willing to
    give them paid vacation and health insurance, benefits they were
    not then receiving. Two hours later, Vargas approached
    Valencia and told her that Chaudhry was waiting for her
    response.     Neither Valencia nor Maldonado signed a
    decertification petition. Maldonado told co-worker Luz Verdin
    4
    that she was afraid management would make her sign a petition
    or lose her job.
    Also in late August, Good-Nite assistant manager Leah
    Aquino approached housekeeper Margarita Taloma and asked
    her to sign an anti-union petition. A few days later Aquino
    unexpectedly arrived at Taloma’s home and again asked her to
    sign a petition. Taloma refused. Another employee testified
    that there were “rumors about signatures that were being
    requested [by Good-Nite management] for non-unionizing.” Tr.
    of ALJ Hr’g, Apr. 18, 2006, at 143.
    Valencia, Maldonado, and Taloma all told housekeeping
    inspector Consuelo Contreras, who was on the Union
    negotiating committee, about Good-Nite’s solicitation of their
    signatures.    On September 6, Contreras urged another
    housekeeper, Xiang Tan, not to sign the petitions. Two hours
    later, Chaudhry and Good-Nite’s owner, Eric Yokeno, asked
    Contreras why she was telling employees not to sign the
    petitions and told her that she could be fired for doing so at
    work. Good-Nite did not have a work rule against solicitation.
    On September 7, Chaudhry fired Valencia and Maldonado,
    citing a seasonal slowdown in business. This was contrary to
    Good-Nite’s usual practice of laying off employees subject to
    recall, rather than firing them. Contreras, the employee most
    knowledgeable about their work, had not been asked about their
    work performance and thought they were both good workers.
    Other housekeepers with less seniority who had signed a
    decertification petition were not fired. By September 7, a Union
    field representative heard that Good-Nite management had been
    asking employees to sign a decertification petition.
    On September 14, 2005, Good-Nite withdrew recognition
    of the Union based on petitions signed by 13 of the 24 unit
    5
    employees stating that they no longer wished to be represented
    by the Union. When housekeeper Luz Verdin requested
    vacation leave, assistant manager Aquino told her on October 4
    that she would grant the request if Verdin signed an anti-union
    petition, which she did. Aquino then backdated Verdin’s
    signature to make it appear that she had signed the petition on or
    before Good-Nite’s withdrawal of Union recognition. On
    October 14, 2005, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge
    with the Board. The General Counsel of the Board issued a
    complaint on March 1, 2006.
    The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found, after a
    hearing, that Good-Nite had violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act
    by soliciting employees to sign an anti-union petition with
    threats or promised benefits; sections 8(a)(3) and (1) by
    discharging Valencia and Maldonado to discourage union
    membership and activities; and sections 8(a)(5) and (1) by
    unlawfully withdrawing recognition of and refusing to bargain
    with the Union. Applying the four-factor causation test of
    Master Slack, the ALJ found this unlawful conduct had tainted
    the employee petitions disavowing the Union. The ALJ, in
    addition to recommending reinstatement of Maldonado and
    Valencia with back pay and expunging references to their
    unlawful discharges from Good-Nite’s files, proposed a cease
    and desist order and various affirmative actions, including that
    Good-Nite bargain with the Union. In March 2008, the Board
    adopted the ALJ’s factual findings and proposed order. SFO
    Good-Nite Inn, LLC, 
    352 N.L.R.B. 268
     (2008). Because the
    Board’s decision was rendered by a non-quorum of only two
    members, this court vacated the decision in view of New
    Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 
    130 S. Ct. 2635
     (2010); Laurel
    Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    564 F.3d 469
    ,
    476 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and remanded the case for further
    proceedings. SFO Good-Nite Inn, LLC v NLRB, No. 08-1148
    (D.C. Cir. Sept. 20, 2010).
    6
    On July 19, 2011, a three-member Board issued a decision
    incorporating by reference most of the 2008 decision and
    explaining further why Good-Nite’s withdrawal of recognition
    violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Agreeing with the
    General Counsel that Good-Nite’s conduct per se precluded its
    reliance on the petitions as a valid basis for withdrawing
    recognition of the Union, the Board ruled that “the disposition
    of this case is properly controlled by Hearst Corp., holding that
    an employer may not withdraw recognition based on a petition
    that it unlawfully assisted, supported, or otherwise unlawfully
    encouraged, even absent specific proof of the misconduct’s
    effect on employee choice.” SFO Good-Nite Inn, 357 N.L.R.B.
    No. 16, at 1 (footnote omitted). One member dissented in part,
    on the ground that the Hearst presumption should be rebuttable
    while acknowledging that the difference was immaterial because
    Good-Nite “failed to show that its misconduct could not have
    tainted the employees’ petition.” Id. at 5 (Member Hayes,
    concurring in part, dissenting in part). A unanimous Board
    adopted the ALJ’s proposed order. Good-Nite petitions for
    review, and the Board cross-applies for enforcement of its
    Order.
    II.
    “[I]t is our longstanding rule that the Board is entitled to
    summary enforcement of the uncontested portions of its orders.”
    Carpenters & Millwrights, Local Union 2471 v. NLRB, 
    481 F.3d 804
    , 808 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
    alterations omitted). The Board accordingly seeks summary
    enforcement of its unchallenged findings that Good-Nite
    violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by soliciting employees
    Taloma and Verdin to sign an anti-union petition with threats
    and promised benefits, and by threatening employee Contreras
    with discharge if she told other employees not to sign the
    petitions. Because Good-Nite did not file exceptions to these
    7
    findings, section 10(e) of the Act jurisdictionally bars Good-Nite
    from obtaining review of them. 
    29 U.S.C. § 160
    (e); see also W
    & M Props. of Conn., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    514 F.3d 1341
    , 1345 (D.C.
    Cir. 2008). The Board is therefore entitled to summary
    enforcement of these findings.
    The Board also seeks summary enforcement of its Order
    directing Good-Nite to reinstate employees Valencia and
    Maldonado. The Board found that Good-Nite violated sections
    8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Valencia and
    Maldonado because they did not sign the anti-union petitions.
    Good-Nite challenges as clearly erroneous the factual finding
    that its general manager, Chaudhry, solicited Valencia’s and
    Maldonado’s signatures on an anti-union petition. But it does
    not challenge the Board’s determination that the discharges were
    unlawful. Good-Nite acknowledges that other record evidence
    — namely Chaudhry’s possession of the signed anti-union
    petitions at the time of the firings — would have supported the
    finding that the firings were unlawful, irrespectively of the
    alleged solicitations. The Board is therefore entitled to summary
    enforcement of the reinstatement portion of its Order.
    III.
    Good-Nite contends that the Board erred in declining to
    apply its traditional Master Slack test to evaluate disaffection
    petitions for taint and instead adopted a new rule based on “its
    little cited decision in Hearst Corporation,” Petr’s Br. at 18,
    under which, it asserts, the General Counsel is relieved of the
    burden to prove a causal nexus between the employer’s conduct
    and employee disaffection and instead can rely on what Good-
    Nite characterizes as overbroad “per se categories” of conduct,
    
    id.
     Objecting that “the Board provided no reasoned explanation
    for departing from Master Slack, [n]or explained how its new
    rule will not result in arbitrary decisions with no evidentiary
    8
    support,” 
    id.,
     Good-Nite concludes that the new rule will impede
    employees’ section 7 rights and curtail employers’ free speech
    rights under section 8(c) of the Act. In Good-Nite’s view, had
    the Board properly applied its Master Slack precedent and
    considered all of the evidence, the Board “should have found
    that the unfair labor practices were isolated, mostly occurring
    after the Union lost majority support and were unknown to the
    rest of the bargaining unit.” 
    Id.
     at 18–19. Good-Nite ignores
    the Board’s explanation and rationale for applying the Hearst
    presumption and the substantial evidence supporting the Board’s
    factual findings.
    A. The court “accord[s] a very high degree of deference to
    administrative adjudications by the [Board].”               United
    Steelworkers of Am., Local Union 14534 v. NLRB, 
    983 F.2d 240
    ,
    244 (D.C. Cir. 1993). “The Board, of course, is given
    considerable authority to interpret the provisions of the [Act].
    If the Board adopts a rule that is rational and consistent with the
    Act, then the rule is entitled to deference from the courts.” Fall
    River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 
    482 U.S. 27
    , 42
    (1987) (citation omitted). Such deference is appropriate here.
    Section 8(a)(5) of the Act provides that “[i]t shall be an
    unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain
    collectively with the representatives of his employees.” 
    29 U.S.C. § 158
    (a)(5). There are circumstances, however, where
    an employer may unilaterally withdraw recognition from a union
    if it can show through objective evidence that the union has lost
    majority support as, for example, by presenting a petition signed
    by a majority of employees in the bargaining unit stating that
    they no longer wish to be represented by the union. See Flying
    Food Grp., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    471 F.3d 178
    , 182 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
    (discussing Levitz Furniture Co., 
    333 N.L.R.B. 717
     (2001)).
    This privilege is not absolute.
    9
    In Hearst Corp., 281 N.L.R.B. at 764, the Board found that
    the employer had unlawfully solicited employee signatures on
    union decertification petitions. For example, the employer had
    interrogated employees about their union sympathies, told them
    their continued representation by the union prevented their
    receiving better benefits, promised increased benefits and
    improved working conditions if they withdrew support for the
    union, and suggested they sign anti-union petitions and persuade
    their coworkers to withdraw their support for the union. See id.
    The unfair labor practices had occurred prior to and
    simultaneously with circulation of the petitions by employees.
    Although decertification petitions signed by a majority of the
    bargaining unit employees will generally be sufficient objective
    evidence to provide a reasonable basis for withdrawing
    recognition, the Board observed that it was “well settled” that an
    employer’s doubt about a union’s continuing majority status at
    the time it withdrew recognition “may not be raised in the
    context of any employer activities aimed at causing employee
    disaffection with the union.” Id. The Board concluded:
    Where an employer engages in such conduct, the
    decertification petitions will be found to have been
    tainted by the employer’s unfair labor practices and the
    latter, consequently, will be precluded from relying on
    the tainted petition as a basis for questioning the
    union’s continued majority status and withdrawing
    recognition from that labor organization.
    Id. The Board reached this conclusion, despite testimony from
    19 of the 56 employees in the bargaining unit that they were
    unaware of the employer’s unlawful conduct, because an
    employer should not be able to “enjoy the fruits of its violations
    by asserting that certain of its employees did not know of its
    unlawful behavior.” Id. at 765 & n.9. Drawing on its
    experience, the Board stated that it based the presumptive
    10
    finding of taint “not . . . on a finding of actual coercive effect,
    but rather on the ‘tendency of such conduct to interfere with the
    free exercise of employee rights under the Act.’” Id. at 765
    (quoting Amason, Inc., 
    269 N.L.R.B. 750
    , 750 n.2 (1984)).
    By contrast, the question in Master Slack was whether the
    employer’s unremedied flagrant violations from an earlier unfair
    labor practice case tainted the atmosphere as a matter of law,
    such that the employer’s reliance in withdrawing union
    recognition on a petition signed 8 to 9 years later by a majority
    of the bargaining unit employees was unlawful. 271 N.L.R.B.
    at 79. There were no allegations the employer directly assisted
    the decertification campaign through improper solicitation,
    threats, or other misconduct. To determine whether there was
    a causal relationship between the employer’s earlier unlawful
    conduct and the anti-union petition, the Board applied a four-
    factor test: “(1) [t]he length of time between the unfair labor
    practices and the withdrawal of recognition; (2) the nature of the
    illegal acts, including the possibility of their detrimental or
    lasting effect on employees; (3) any possible tendency to cause
    employee disaffection from the union; and (4) the effect of the
    unlawful conduct on employee morale, organizational activities,
    and membership in the union.” Id. at 84. The ALJ found that
    there was no direct evidence of a causal relationship between the
    employer’s unlawful conduct in 1973-74 and the 1982 anti-
    union petition, and that the indirect factors were insufficient to
    preclude the employer as a matter of law from withdrawing
    recognition. See id. at 85. The Board, in adopting the ALJ’s
    findings, noted that the unfair labor practices “occurred many
    years before the petition’s circulation, and that the [employer]
    ha[d] complied with the ordered remedies in many significant
    respects well before the petition’s circulation.” Id. at 78 n.1.
    In applying the Hearst presumption here, the Board began
    by stating that “it is well settled that an employer may only
    11
    withdraw recognition [of a union] if the expression of employee
    desire to decertify represents the free and uncoerced act of the
    employees concerned.” SFO Good-Nite Inn, 357 N.L.R.B. No.
    16, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although both
    Hearst and Master Slack apply this limitation, the Board
    explained, they do so in two different contexts: “Hearst applies
    when an employer has engaged in unfair labor practices directly
    related to an employee decertification effort,” such as here,
    whereas Master Slack applies to “other unfair labor practices
    distinct from any unlawful assistance by the employer in the
    actual decertification petition.” Id. at 1–2 (internal quotation
    marks omitted). A causal nexus must be shown in the Master
    Slack line of cases because “there is no straight line between the
    employer’s unfair labor practices and the decertification
    campaign, and the Master Slack test must be used to draw one,
    if it exists.” Id. at 2. By contrast, in the Hearst line of cases,
    “the employer’s unfair labor practices are not merely coincident
    with the decertification effort; rather, they directly instigate or
    propel it.” Id.
    The Board proceeded to elaborate on the scope and the
    rationale underlying the Hearst presumption. First, the Board
    emphasized that the presumption applies only in “the narrow
    circumstance where an employer unlawfully instigates or
    propels a decertification campaign, and then invokes the results
    of that campaign to justify its unilateral withdrawal of
    recognition from its employees’ representative.” Id. at 4. It then
    explained that there is “little need” for a Master Slack-type
    causation analysis in such circumstances because, as it had long
    observed, the “foreseeable consequence of such misconduct —
    and frequently its purpose — is . . . to contribute to the union’s
    loss of majority status.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The Board dismissed any need for evidence that employees who
    signed a petition knew of the employer’s unlawful labor
    practices because the victims of such practices frequently tell
    12
    their co-workers, as occurred here, and thus “‘it may be
    presumed that employees who signed the petition . . . were
    aware of the [employer’s unlawful acts], and such knowledge is
    likely to have influenced their decision.’” Id. at 4 & n.29
    (quoting Caterair Int’l, 
    309 N.L.R.B. 869
    , 880 (1992)). Finally,
    the Board explained as a matter of policy that its conclusive
    presumption “provides a strong incentive to employers to steer
    clear of potentially unlawful conduct.” 
    Id. at 4
    .
    The Board’s articulated distinction between these two lines
    of its precedent and its reasons for the Hearst presumption are
    rational and consistent with the Act.1 Good-Nite’s citation to
    Board decisions applying Master Slack to determine whether an
    employer’s involvement in a decertification campaign tainted
    the resulting petitions is unavailing. Whether or not the Board
    adequately distinguished between these two lines of its
    precedent in the past, it now has clarified that distinction and
    explained why the Hearst presumption applied to Good-Nite.
    The Board expressly stated that “[t]o the extent prior cases may
    have applied Master Slack to determine whether unfair labor
    practices directly related to a decertification effort caused
    employee disaffection, we clarify them in accordance with this
    decision.” SFO Good-Nite Inn, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 16, at 5 n.33.
    The Board may clarify its rule in this fashion so long as it
    provides, as here, a rational reason and the clarification does not
    conflict with the Act. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
    
    556 U.S. 502
    , 514–15 (2009). Good-Nite misapprehends the
    nature of our review when it objects that the Board has not
    explained why the Hearst presumption is “necessary” or a
    1
    The Fourth Circuit has endorsed the Board’s articulated
    distinction between Hearst and Master Slack, albeit where the Board
    consisted of only two members. Narricot Indus. L.P. v. NLRB, 
    587 F.3d 654
    , 664–65 (4th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by New
    Process Steel, 
    130 S. Ct. 2635
    .
    13
    “better tool” than the causation test of Master Slack. Petr’s Br.
    at 39, 41. The Board “need not demonstrate to a court’s
    satisfaction that the reasons for [one] policy are better than the
    reasons for [another]; it suffices that the . . . policy is
    permissible under the statute [and] that there are good reasons
    for it.” Fox Television, 
    556 U.S. at 515
    .
    Good-Nite’s other objections are unavailing. In particular,
    Good-Nite mischaracterizes the Board’s decision when it
    contends that the Hearst presumption adopted by the Board is
    overbroad because it precludes withdrawal of union recognition
    “if an employer does anything with or says anything about a
    disaffection petition.” Petr’s Br. at 35. The Hearst presumption
    applies only in “the narrow circumstance where an employer
    unlawfully instigates or propels a decertification campaign.”
    SFO Good-Nite Inn, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 16, at 4 (emphasis
    added). Similarly, Good-Nite’s contention that the Hearst
    presumption will impede employees’ section 7 rights overlooks
    the fact, noted by the Board, that employees may still petition
    the Board directly for a decertification election, id. at 3.
    Good-Nite’s remaining arguments are unpersuasive. First,
    its description of Hearst as “little cited” is not well taken.
    Petr’s Br. at 18. The Board and Good-Nite itself cite Board
    decisions enforced by the courts that applied the Hearst
    presumption where an employer solicited signatures or
    otherwise unlawfully encouraged a union decertification
    process. See, e.g., Wire Prods Mfg., 
    326 N.L.R.B. 625
     (1998),
    enforced mem. sub. nom. NLRB v. R.T. Blankenship & Assocs.,
    Inc., 
    210 F.3d 375
     (7th Cir. 2000); V & S ProGalv, Inc., 
    323 N.L.R.B. 801
     (1997), enforced, 
    168 F.3d 270
     (6th Cir. 1999);
    Am. Linen Supply Co., 
    297 N.L.R.B. 137
     (1989), enforced, 
    945 F.2d 1428
     (8th Cir. 1991).
    14
    Second, Good-Nite attempts to distinguish those cases as
    limited to circumstances where the decertification petition
    would have failed “but for” the employer assistance, whereas
    the presumption in its case applies if an employer merely
    supports or encourages a decertification campaign. The Board
    pointed out that none of the cases suggested a “but for” analysis
    or made such a finding. See Respd’s Br. 37–38. Regardless,
    whether or not those cases used a direct cause analysis does not
    demonstrate the Board erred in applying the Hearst presumption
    here. At oral argument Good-Nite maintained that the Hearst
    presumption should be limited to instances where an employer
    is directly involved in the preparation and dissemination of a
    decertification petition. But it offered no persuasive reason why
    the rationale for such a rule would not extend to instances where
    an employee created and disseminated the petition but the
    employer unlawfully and coercively solicited signatures from
    employees in the bargaining unit, as appears to have occurred
    in Hearst itself, 281 N.L.R.B. at 764.
    Good-Nite objects as well to the unrebuttable nature of the
    Hearst presumption adopted by the Board, contending it will
    result in arbitrary findings without substantial evidentiary
    support. The Board was in agreement that unlawful employer
    involvement would presumptively taint an anti-union petition
    even without specific proof that the employer’s conduct affected
    employee signatures. A majority concluded the presumption
    should be conclusive because of the “inherent unreliability” of
    after-the-fact employee testimony about their reasons for
    rejecting a union. SFO Good-Nite Inn, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 16, at
    4. One Member urged that the presumption should simply shift
    the burden to the employer “to present objective proof that its
    misconduct did not cause or further disaffection,” suggesting it
    is “possible, even if not likely, that subsequent evidence of
    disaffection by an employee majority is an accurate and reliable
    15
    expression of free choice.” Id. at 5 (Member Hayes, concurring
    in part, dissenting in part).
    The Board majority’s preferred conclusive presumption is
    entitled to deference as rational and consistent with the Act.
    The Supreme Court has observed that “employees are more
    likely than not, many months after a card drive and in response
    to questions by company counsel, to give testimony damaging
    to the union, particularly where company officials have
    previously threatened reprisals for union activity in violation of
    [section] 8(a)(1).” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 
    395 U.S. 575
    ,
    608 (1969). Notably, the Supreme Court has endorsed a
    conclusive presumption adopted by the Board in the context of
    union recognition. See Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    517 U.S. 781
    , 785–87 (1996).
    B. The Board found that Good-Nite unlawfully solicited
    Valencia’s, Maldonado’s, and Taloma’s signatures on anti-
    union petitions with threats or promised benefits, and threatened
    to fire Contreras because she told a coworker not to sign a
    petition. SFO Good-Nite Inn, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 16, at 2. The
    Board further found that these unfair labor practices “were
    obviously directly related to furthering the employees’
    decertification campaign.” Id. at 3. The Board’s factual
    findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on
    the record considered as a whole. 
    29 U.S.C. § 160
    (e); Hard
    Rock Holdings, LLC v. NLRB, 
    672 F.3d 1117
    , 1121 (D.C. Cir.
    2012). The court will not reverse the Board’s adoption of the
    ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is “hopelessly
    incredible, self-contradictory, or patently unsupportable.” Hard
    Rock Holdings, 
    672 F.3d at 1121
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    Good-Nite contends that some of the unfair labor practices
    could not have tainted the petitions because they occurred on or
    16
    after September 6, when the twelfth unit employee signed a
    decertification petition and the Union allegedly lost its majority
    support. Even assuming this is true, Good-Nite does not extend
    this suggestion to the evidence of its solicitations of Valencia,
    Maldonado, and Taloma in late August 2005. Instead Good-
    Nite presents a credibility challenge to the Board’s finding that
    Chaudhry solicited signatures from Valencia and Maldonado.
    This contention fails.
    Valencia consistently testified that Chaudhry asked her and
    Maldonado at the August 31 meeting to “sign a paper for him
    that would de-unionize the firm.” Tr. of ALJ Hr’g, Apr. 18,
    2006, at 161; see id. at 182, 189. Good-Nite suggests the
    “paper” was a Union membership application rather than an
    anti-union petition because the record does not indicate a
    petition existed before September 3, 2005. The petitions in the
    record consist of a single handwritten sentence followed by
    signatures on blank pages, not technical or complex documents
    that could not be created on short notice. Because Chaudhry
    easily could have created a petition if Valencia and Maldonado
    agreed to sign it, it is irrelevant whether a decertification
    petition existed at the time of the August 31 meeting.
    Additionally, the ALJ credited Valencia’s testimony over
    Chaudhry’s denials about what occurred at the August 31
    meeting, finding Chaudhry’s testimony “unreliable,” “shifting,”
    and “evasive,” SFO Good-Nite Inn, 352 N.L.R.B. at 274 n.5,
    and the Board adopted the ALJ’s credibility determinations in
    finding that Chaudhry unlawfully solicited their signatures.
    Although Valencia’s testimony was occasionally unclear — and
    with respect to her subsequent encounter with Vargas
    potentially inconsistent with her October 2005 affidavit —
    Good-Nite points to nothing from which the court could
    conclude this is one of the “most extraordinary circumstances”
    where a credibility determination should be overturned. U-Haul
    17
    Co. of Nev. v. NLRB, 
    490 F.3d 957
    , 962 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    C. Finally, Good-Nite contends that parts of the Board’s
    Order are moot and should not be enforced by the court. It
    relies on its asserted compliance with an affirmative bargaining
    order issued by the district court that was obtained by the
    Board’s General Counsel following the ALJ’s decision. See
    Norelli v. SFO Good-Nite Inn, No. 06-07335, 
    2007 WL 662477
    ,
    at *16–17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2007); 
    29 U.S.C. § 160
    (j).
    Because it complied with the relief ordered by the district court
    and that relief was equivalent in material respects to the relief
    prescribed in the Board’s Order, Good-Nite maintains any claim
    for further enforcement is moot. This contention fails for
    several reasons.
    First, the district court’s injunction did not cover all of the
    relief called for in the Board’s Order, such as making whole
    Valencia and Maldonado, purging Good-Nite’s records
    referring to their unlawful firings, and requiring Good-Nite to
    turn over certain material to the Board for use in determining
    compliance. The Board’s Order also imposes a continuing
    obligation for Good-Nite to bargain with the Union while the
    district court’s injunction only ordered Good-Nite to bargain for
    90 days. Second, Good-Nite offers no evidence to show it has
    complied in full with the Board’s Order. Moreover, the
    Supreme Court has held that “‘it [is] plain from the cases that
    the employer’s compliance with an order of the Board does not
    render the cause moot, depriving the Board of its opportunity to
    secure enforcement from an appropriate court.’” NLRB v.
    Raytheon Co., 
    398 U.S. 25
    , 27 (1970) (quoting NLRB v. Mexia
    Textile Mills, 
    339 U.S. 563
    , 567 (1950)). Conceding this point,
    Good-Nite requests that the court exercise its equitable powers
    not to enforce the Order’s requirements that Good-Nite reinstate
    Valencia and Maldonado and post for 60 days a signed notice
    18
    regarding its violations of the Act and commitment not to repeat
    them. See NLRB v. Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 
    628 F.2d 1
    , 7 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Other than its bald assertion of
    compliance Good-Nite offers no explanation why this court
    should exercise its discretionary powers to deny enforcement of
    the Board’s Order, and we decline to do so.
    Accordingly, we deny the petition for review and grant the
    Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its Order.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-1295, 11-1325

Citation Numbers: 403 U.S. App. D.C. 75, 700 F.3d 1, 194 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2678, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 23819

Judges: Rogers, Garland, Randolph

Filed Date: 11/20/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (17)

Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board , 116 S. Ct. 1754 ( 1996 )

national-labor-relations-board-v-maywood-plant-of-grede-plastics-a , 628 F.2d 1 ( 1980 )

National Labor Relations Board v. American Linen Supply ... , 945 F.2d 1428 ( 1991 )

Carpenters & Millwrights, Local Union 2471 v. National ... , 481 F.3d 804 ( 2007 )

V & S Progalv, Inc., Petitioner/cross-Respondent v. ... , 168 F.3d 270 ( 1999 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Raytheon Co. , 90 S. Ct. 1547 ( 1970 )

Flying Food Group, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board , 471 F.3d 178 ( 2006 )

U-Haul Co. of Nevada, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board , 490 F.3d 957 ( 2007 )

W & M Properties of Connecticut, Inc. v. National Labor ... , 514 F.3d 1341 ( 2008 )

Narricot Industries v. National Labor Relations Board , 587 F.3d 654 ( 2009 )

Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. National ... , 564 F.3d 469 ( 2009 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc. , 70 S. Ct. 826 ( 1950 )

Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. National Labor ... , 107 S. Ct. 2225 ( 1987 )

Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television ... , 129 S. Ct. 1800 ( 2009 )

Hard Rock Holdings, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board , 672 F.3d 1117 ( 2012 )

united-steelworkers-of-america-afl-cio-clc-local-union-14534-v-national , 983 F.2d 240 ( 1993 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Gissel Packing Co. , 89 S. Ct. 1918 ( 1969 )

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