New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission , 824 F.3d 1012 ( 2016 )


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  • ``United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued February 22, 2016             Decided June 3, 2016
    No. 14-1210
    STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.,
    PETITIONERS
    v.
    U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND UNITED
    STATES OF AMERICA,
    RESPONDENTS
    COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,
    INTERVENORS
    Consolidated with 14-1212, 14-1216, 14-1217
    On Petitions for Review of an Order
    of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    Andrew W. Amend, Senior Assistant Solicitor General,
    Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York,
    argued the cause for petitioners State of New York, et al.
    With him on the briefs were Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney
    2
    General, John J. Sipos, Kathryn M. DeLuca, Laura E. Heslin,
    Assistant Attorneys General, Barbara D. Underwood,
    Solicitor General, Anisha S. Dasgupta, Deputy Solicitor
    General, Monica Wagner, Deputy Bureau Chief, Maura
    Healy, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for
    the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Seth Schofield,
    Assistant Attorney General, Joseph F. Halloran, George
    Jepsen, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for
    the State of Connecticut, Robert D. Snook, Assistant Attorney
    General, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Office of the
    Attorney General for the State of Vermont, and Kyle H.
    Landis-Marinello, Assistant Attorney General. Melissa A.
    Hoffer, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
    General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, entered an
    appearance.
    Kevin W. Bell was on the brief for amicus curiae The
    California State Energy Resources Conservation and
    Development Commission in support of petitioners State of
    New York, et al.
    Geoffrey H. Fettus argued the cause for petitioners
    Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. With him on
    the briefs were Diane Curran and Mindy Goldstein.
    Wallace L. Taylor was on the brief for amicus curiae
    Sierra Club in support of petitioners.
    Andrew P. Averbach, Solicitor, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission, argued the cause for federal respondents. With
    him on the brief were John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney
    General, U.S. Department of Justice, John E. Arbab,
    Attorney, Robert M. Rader, Senior Attorney, U.S. Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission, and Michelle D. Albert, Attorney.
    Charles E. Mullins, Senior Attorney, entered an appearance.
    3
    David A. Repka argued the cause for intervenor-
    respondents. With him on the brief were Ellen C. Ginsberg,
    Jonathan M. Rund, Brad Fagg, Jay E. Silberg, and Kimberly
    A. Harshaw.
    Before: KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and
    SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    SENTELLE.
    SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Several states, a Native
    American community, and numerous environmental
    organizations have filed petitions for review of a rule and
    generic environmental impact statement promulgated by the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the “NRC”), concerning the
    continued, and possibly indefinite, storage of spent fuel from
    nuclear power plants in the United States. The petitioners
    argue that the NRC fails to comply with its obligations under
    the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 
    42 U.S.C. § 4321
     et seq. Specifically, the petitioners contend that the
    NRC did not consider alternatives to and mitigation measures
    for the continued storage of spent nuclear fuel, miscalculated
    the impacts of continued storage, and relied on unreasonable
    assumptions in its environmental impact statement. Because
    we hold that the NRC did not engage in arbitrary or
    capricious decision-making, we deny the petitions for review.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    The United States has committed to the development of
    nuclear energy, yet to-date it lacks a permanent solution for
    one consequence of that commitment—the generation of
    spent nuclear fuel, which “poses a dangerous, long-term
    4
    health and environmental risk.” New York v. NRC (New York
    I), 
    681 F.3d 471
    , 474 (D.C. Cir. 2012). This case is not the
    first, nor even the second, time that concerned parties have
    petitioned this Court to address the spent-nuclear-waste
    problem. See, e.g., Minnesota v. NRC, 
    602 F.2d 412
    , 413,
    418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (remanding the NRC’s decision to
    expand “on-site capacity for the storage of spent nuclear fuel
    assemblies” in light of “[t]he complex and vexing question of
    the disposal of nuclear wastes”); New York I, 681 F.3d at 483
    (vacating the NRC’s rule governing the temporary storage of
    spent nuclear fuel); see also In re Aiken Cnty., 
    645 F.3d 428
    ,
    430 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (considering a challenge to the
    Department of Energy’s attempt to withdraw its application
    for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel); Ind. Mich.
    Power Co. v. DOE, 
    88 F.3d 1272
    , 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
    (requiring the Department of Energy to fulfill its contractual
    obligations to dispose of spent nuclear fuel generated by
    operators of civilian nuclear power plants).
    In light of this extensive history, we provide only an
    overview of the spent-nuclear-fuel issue. The so-called
    “nuclear fuel cycle” consists of three primary phases. See
    Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future,
    Report to the Secretary of Energy 9-11 (2012) [hereinafter
    BRC Report]. First, “uranium is mined and processed into
    fuel for use in a nuclear reactor.” Id. at 9. Second, nuclear
    plants use the uranium fuel. Id. Third, spent fuel, even if
    reprocessed, ultimately must be sent for disposal. Id. The
    term “nuclear fuel cycle” is therefore somewhat of a
    misnomer; “every foreseeable approach to the nuclear fuel
    cycle still requires a means of disposal that assures the very
    long-term isolation of radioactive wastes from the
    environment.” Id. at 11. And “virtually all spent fuel[]
    remain[s] radioactive for thousands of years . . . .” Id. at 14.
    5
    Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
    for the purpose of “establish[ing] a schedule for the siting,
    construction, and operation of repositories that will provide a
    reasonable assurance that the public and the environment will
    be adequately protected from the hazards posed by high-level
    radioactive waste and . . . spent nuclear fuel . . . .” Pub. L.
    No. 97-425, § 111(b)(1), 
    96 Stat. 2201
    , 2207 (codified at 
    42 U.S.C. § 10131
    (b)(1)). In 2008, after nearly two decades of
    regulatory and political discord, the Department of Energy
    sought construction authorization from the NRC to establish a
    repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. See In re Aiken
    Cnty., 
    645 F.3d at 431-32
    . But a change in the presidential
    administration brought with it a shift in nuclear energy policy,
    and in 2010 the Department of Energy withdrew its
    application. 
    Id. at 432
    . Our characterization in New York I of
    the nation’s spent-fuel-storage policy still rings true today:
    “[a]t this time, there is not even a prospective site for a
    repository, let alone progress toward the actual construction
    of one.” 681 F.3d at 474.
    Absent a permanent repository, the majority of spent
    nuclear fuel remains stored on-site at reactors. BRC Report,
    supra, at 14; see also New York I, 681 F.3d at 474. After
    removal from a reactor, “spent fuel is transferred to a deep,
    water-filled pool . . . for at least five years” in order to cool.
    BRC Report, supra, at 11. Once the spent nuclear fuel has
    “cooled sufficiently in wet storage [i.e., a pool], it may be
    transferred to dry storage[,]” which “generally consist[s] of a
    fuel storage grid placed within a steel inner container and a
    concrete and steel outer container[,]” also known as a “dry
    cask.” Id. “Most [spent nuclear fuel], however, will remain
    in spent-fuel pools until a permanent disposal solution is
    available.” New York I, 681 F.3d at 474.
    6
    From 1984 until this Court’s decision in New York I, the
    NRC relied on a “Waste Confidence Decision” in order to
    assess the risk of on-site storage of spent nuclear fuel and the
    likelihood that a permanent off-site storage solution will be
    available. Id. at 474-75 (citing Minnesota v. NRC, 
    602 F.2d at 418
    ). In New York I, we vacated the 2010 update to the
    NRC’s Waste Confidence Decision and its Temporary
    Storage Rule governing the storage of spent nuclear fuel. 
    Id. at 483
    . In support of the Waste Confidence Decision and the
    Temporary Storage Rule, the NRC prepared an environmental
    assessment (“EA”) with a finding of no significant impact.
    
    Id. at 476
    . We held that the NRC’s analysis was deficient
    because: (1) the Waste Confidence Decision “did not examine
    the environmental effects of failing to establish a repository”;
    (2) the NRC “failed to properly examine the risk of [pool]
    leaks in a forward-looking fashion”; and (3) the NRC “failed
    to examine the potential consequences of pool fires” in
    addition to the probabilities that such fires might occur. 
    Id. at 478-79
    .
    In response to our New York I decision, the NRC altered
    its approach to the continued storage of spent nuclear fuel.
    Instead of relying on an EA with a finding of no significant
    impact, the NRC prepared a Generic Environmental Impact
    Statement (“GEIS”) and proposed a Continued Storage Rule
    (the “Rule”) to codify its analysis of the effects of continued
    on-site storage of spent nuclear fuel. See 
    79 Fed. Reg. 56,238
    (2014) (Continued Storage Rule); 
    79 Fed. Reg. 56,263
     (2014)
    (notice of GEIS); J.A. 263-1560 (GEIS). The stated purpose
    of the Rule “is to preserve the efficiency of the NRC’s
    licensing process by adopting into the NRC’s regulations the
    Commission’s generic determinations of the environmental
    impacts of the continued storage of spent nuclear
    fuel . . . beyond the licensed life for operations of a
    reactor . . . .” 79 Fed. Reg. at 56,239. The Rule incorporates
    7
    the findings of the GEIS into all future reactor licensing
    proceedings and precludes reconsideration of those findings
    absent a waiver under 
    10 C.F.R. § 2.335
    . See 
    10 C.F.R. § 51.23
    (b); 79 Fed. Reg. at 56,243.
    The petitioners in this case, a group of states and a Native
    American community (collectively, the “States”) along with a
    group of environmental organizations (collectively, the
    “NRDC”), submitted comments to both the GEIS and the
    Rule. The petitioners now challenge the Rule and the GEIS
    on the basis that the NRC failed to comply with NEPA. Cf.
    
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (C) (detailing NEPA’s requirements for an
    environmental impact statement). They request that we
    vacate the Rule and the GEIS and remand to the NRC for
    further proceedings.
    Because we hold that the NRC did not engage in arbitrary
    or capricious decision-making, see 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A), we
    deny the petitions for review.
    II. ANALYSIS
    The States and the NRDC raise a panoply of challenges
    to the NRC’s Rule and the GEIS. First, the petitioners
    contend that the Rule is a major federal action that requires
    consideration of alternatives and mitigation measures to
    reactor licensing. Second, they dispute the NRC’s assessment
    of the environmental impacts of the continued storage of
    spent nuclear fuel, asserting: (a) failure to employ
    conservative     bounding     estimates;      (b)     inadequate
    determination of the probability of failure to site a permanent
    geologic repository; (c) insufficient assessment of the
    cumulative impacts of the continued storage of spent nuclear
    fuel; and (d) unjustified dismissal of the risks of short-term,
    high-volume pool leaks. Relatedly, the petitioners challenge
    8
    as “illusory” the NRC’s process for granting a petition for
    waiver of the Rule in site-specific licensing proceedings.
    Finally, the petitioners characterize several of the NRC’s
    underlying assumptions in the GEIS as unreasonable. We
    hold that none of these arguments is persuasive and deny the
    petitions.
    A. THE NRC APPROPRIATELY CHARACTERIZED ITS
    RULE AND CONSIDERED ALTERNATIVES AND
    MITIGATION MEASURES
    The parties disagree over the proper characterization of
    the NRC’s Rule. According to the NRC, the Rule “codif[ies]
    its generic determinations regarding the environmental
    impacts of continued storage of spent fuel at-reactor, or away-
    from-reactor sites beyond a reactor’s licensed life for
    operation.” 79 Fed. Reg. at 56,241. The NRC contends that
    “the Rule is not a licensing action . . . .” NRC’s Br. 16. The
    States and the NRDC respond that the federal action at issue
    is reactor licensing. See States’ Br. 44; NRDC’s Br. 20. And
    because licensing is indisputably a “major Federal action[]”
    under NEPA, 
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (C), the States and the NRDC
    argue that the NRC was required to prepare a complete
    environmental impact statement (“EIS”), including a
    consideration of alternatives and mitigation measures for the
    continued storage of spent fuel. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (C)
    (“[M]ajor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
    the human environment” require an EIS or its equivalent.);
    see also NRDC v. NRC, -- F.3d --, No. 14-1225, 
    2016 WL 1639661
    , at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 26, 2016) (same). We agree
    with the NRC and hold that, while the Rule is a “major
    Federal action” under NEPA, the NRC complied with its
    NEPA obligations by preparing the GEIS. Because the Rule
    is not a licensing action, the NRC need not have considered
    9
    the alternatives to licensing in the GEIS. We therefore deny
    the petitions for review on this issue.
    Under NEPA, an agency must consider both the
    environmental impacts of a proposed action and alternatives
    to that action. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (C). Part of the
    alternatives analysis includes review of measures available to
    mitigate adverse effects. See 
    40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.25
    (b),
    1502.14(f). “[W]e review both an agency’s definition of its
    objectives and its selection of alternatives under the ‘rule of
    reason.’ . . . That is, as long as the agency ‘look[s] hard at the
    factors relevant to the definition of purpose,’ we generally
    defer to the agency’s reasonable definition of objectives.”
    Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar
    (Theodore Roosevelt II), 
    661 F.3d 66
    , 73 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
    (quoting Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 
    938 F.2d 190
    , 196 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (alteration in original).
    Furthermore, “NEPA does not require agencies to discuss any
    particular mitigation plans that they might put in place, nor
    does it require agencies—or third parties—to effect any.”
    Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar
    (Theodore Roosevelt I), 
    616 F.3d 497
    , 503 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Our decision in New York I compels the result that the
    NRC’s Rule is a major federal action requiring the
    preparation of either an environmental assessment with a
    finding of no significant impact or an environmental impact
    statement. See 681 F.3d at 476. Like the NRC’s prior Waste
    Confidence Decision and Temporary Storage Rule, the NRC’s
    Rule in this case “ha[s] a preclusive effect in all future
    licensing decisions . . . .” Id. But unlike in New York I, the
    NRC has done exactly what NEPA requires for major federal
    actions; it prepared an environmental impact statement. See
    id.; 
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (C); 
    40 C.F.R. § 1502.3
    . So long as that
    10
    environmental impact statement complies with NEPA, and we
    hold that it does, no more is required.
    The face of the NRC’s Rule also makes it clear that it is
    not a licensing action. To the contrary, the Rule “codif[ies]
    [the NRC’s] generic determinations regarding the
    environmental impacts of continued storage of spent fuel at-
    reactor, or away-from-reactor sites beyond a reactor’s
    licensed life for operation.” 79 Fed. Reg. at 56,241. “[T]he
    rule does not authorize the storage of spent fuel at any site
    [and] . . . reflects only the generic environmental analysis for
    the period of spent fuel storage beyond a reactor’s licensed
    life for operation and before disposal in a repository.” Id. at
    56,243. Because the GEIS is only an input for future site-
    specific reactor licensing and does not itself impose
    regulatory requirements on reactors, the NRC need not have
    considered the alternative of ceasing licensing in the GEIS.
    The NRC instead analyzes that alternative during site-specific
    licensing proceedings. See J.A. 1040 (“The alternative of not
    issuing or not renewing a nuclear power plant license is
    considered during the site-specific review of an individual
    license application.”). The NRC did consider alternatives for
    the only action it took in the Rule—i.e., incorporating the
    GEIS into future licensing proceedings. See J.A. 338-43.
    Furthermore, contrary to the petitioners’ claims, the GEIS
    discusses mitigation measures for pool fires, J.A. 1240-41,
    1284-85, and pool leaks, including short-term, high-volume
    leaks, J.A. 838, 1394-96. It also evaluates measures such as
    the expedited transfer of spent fuel to dry storage casks, J.A.
    973-74, 1454-55, limiting the use of high-burnup fuel, J.A.
    912-19, 1246, 1258, 1339, and implementing hardened on-site
    storage, J.A. 1458. We find nothing in the GEIS to indicate
    that the NRC went astray of NEPA’s rule of reason.
    Regardless, because mitigation is equally relevant during the
    11
    life of a licensed reactor as it is during decommissioning, the
    NRC can defer consideration of such measures to site-specific
    review. See Public Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 
    900 F.2d 269
    , 282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Commission’s deferral
    of decision on specific mitigation steps until the start of
    construction, when a more detailed right-of-way would be
    known, was both eminently reasonable and embraced in the
    procedures promulgated under NEPA.”). Regardless, “NEPA
    does not require agencies to discuss any particular mitigation
    plans that they might put in place.” Theodore Roosevelt I,
    
    616 F.3d at 503
     (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    Our holding with respect to this issue is consistent with
    our decision in New York I. In that case, we held that the
    NRC’s prior Waste Confidence Decision was “a major federal
    action requiring either a [finding of no significant impact] or
    an EIS.” 681 F.3d at 476. Although we described the Waste
    Confidence Decision as “a pre-determined ‘stage’ of each
    licensing decision,” id., nowhere did we conclude that the
    NRC undertook licensing with its waste confidence
    rulemaking. The Rule in this case is likewise a major federal
    action because it has a preclusive effect on future licensing
    proceedings. See 
    10 C.F.R. § 51.23
    (b). But the proposition
    that all licensing actions are major federal actions does not
    imply its converse. When the NRC does make a licensing
    decision in partial reliance on the GEIS, it must at that time
    ensure that it has fully complied with NEPA. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (C); cf. 
    40 C.F.R. § 1502.14
     (delineating the
    requirements for including alternatives in the EIS); Ctr. for
    Sustainable Economy v. Jewell, 
    779 F.3d 588
    , 599-600 (D.C.
    Cir. 2015) (noting that the obligation to comply with NEPA
    “do[es] not mature until . . . there [has] been an irreversible
    and irretrievable commitment of resources” by the agency
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (first alteration
    12
    in original)). The NRC acknowledges as much. See Oral
    Arg. Rec. 40:43-41:40 (statements by the NRC that the
    decision whether to issue a license is site-specific and that the
    agency will consider mitigation measures and alternatives at
    that time). At this stage, we take the NRC at its word. But
    should the agency fail to consider a necessary aspect of the
    problem during site-specific proceedings, the parties might be
    able to challenge the final licensing decision. See, e.g.,
    Massachusetts v. NRC, 
    924 F.2d 311
    , 315 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
    (adjudicating consolidated petitions for review of “the
    [NRC’s] licensing of Seabrook Nuclear Power Station”); York
    Comm. for a Safe Env’t v. NRC, 
    527 F.2d 812
    , 813 (D.C. Cir.
    1975) (considering a challenge to “a final decision . . . to
    grant a license . . . for operation of a light-water-cooled
    nuclear reactor to be used for generating electricity”).
    We therefore deny the petitions for review on this issue.
    B. THE GEIS SUFFICIENTLY ANALYZES THE
    IMPACTS OF CONTINUED STORAGE OF SPENT
    NUCLEAR FUEL
    1. The GEIS Thoroughly Considers
    Essentially Common Risks to Reactor
    Sites
    The States argue that the NRC could not generically
    analyze the impacts of the continued storage of spent nuclear
    fuel because it failed to employ “conservative bounding
    assumptions” in the GEIS, particularly with regard to
    estimating the risks of pool fires and pool leaks. Specifically,
    the States contend that the NRC based its environmental
    impact determinations on data from two reactor sites—one in
    Surry, Virginia, and another near Lake Michigan. According
    to the States, neither plant captures the full range of risks
    across the country because the population density near the
    13
    Surry plant is 300 people per square mile, and the density near
    the Lake Michigan plant is 860 people per square mile. See
    J.A. 862-63, 868, 870. Because the GEIS ignores population-
    wide effects and the impacts at atypical sites, the States posit
    that the NRC must consider these impacts on a site-specific
    basis.
    We noted in New York I that “[b]oth the Supreme Court
    and this court have endorsed the [NRC’s] longstanding
    practice of considering environmental issues through general
    rulemaking in appropriate circumstances.” 681 F.3d at 480.
    We also stated that “we see no reason that a comprehensive
    general analysis would be insufficient to examine on-site risks
    that are essentially common to all plants.” Id. Furthermore,
    “whether the analysis is generic or site-by-site, it must be
    thorough and comprehensive,” id. at 481, and we are “most
    deferential” to the “NRC’s technical judgments and
    predictions . . . [,]” Blue Ridge Env’tl Def. League v. NRC,
    
    716 F.3d 183
    , 195 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). While we acknowledged in New
    York I that a generic analysis of impacts is “particularly”
    appropriate when the NRC utilizes “conservative bounding
    assumptions and the opportunity for concerned parties to raise
    site-specific differences at the time of a specific site’s
    licensing,” we did not make those factors essential. 681 F.3d
    at 480. Instead, the cornerstone of our holding was that the
    NRC may generically analyze risks that are “essentially
    common” to all plants so long as that analysis is “thorough
    and comprehensive.”
    In this case, we are convinced that the NRC has met that
    standard. True, the NRC’s analysis is not “bounding” in a
    strict sense. For example, in assessing the risks of pool fires,
    the GEIS relies on seismic data that covers “about 70 percent”
    of reactor sites. J.A. 870. This data therefore does not
    14
    “bound” the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage but
    instead approximates the variance in harms. For pool leaks,
    the NRC provides a high-level analysis of spent fuel
    discharges but neglects any estimate of the expected errors for
    its input variables, instead averring to specific “low” values
    for these parameters. See J.A. 849. Furthermore, the GEIS
    attempts to justify its reliance on data from the Surry and
    Lake Michigan plants by noting that the average risks to
    individuals are independent of population density. See J.A.
    868. However, the NRC admits that this data covers only
    “the 90th percentile population density” and that “the accident
    consequences could be greater at higher population sites.”
    J.A. 868; see also J.A. 1367 (conceding that values in the
    GEIS “do not represent worst-case values”).
    Nonetheless, according deference to the NRC’s technical
    decision-making, see Blue Ridge, 716 F.3d at 195, we find
    nothing in the GEIS to undermine the NRC’s conclusion that
    the identified risks are “essentially common” to all reactor
    sites. The GEIS incorporates research demonstrating how the
    risk analysis for pool fires is conservative, see J.A. 1348,
    1366-67, and analyzes the variance in seismic risks, see J.A.
    870.      The NRC also considers “typical hydrologic
    characteristics at nuclear power plant sites” when assessing
    the impacts of pool leaks. J.A. 1054. Furthermore, the GEIS
    “explain[s] qualitatively the factors that may cause the risk to
    be lower or higher than” at the Surry and Lake Michigan
    plants. J.A. 1367. Regardless, the NRC need not provide a
    perfect analysis, only one that is “thorough and
    comprehensive . . . .” New York I, 681 F.3d at 481. We hold
    that the GEIS meets this requirement.
    The States rely on Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. NRC,
    
    869 F.2d 719
    , 738 (3d Cir. 1989), for the proposition that the
    NRC cannot generically analyze the site-specific
    15
    consequences of reactor accidents, and hence, we are told,
    also the impacts of continued storage of spent nuclear fuel.
    However, not only is Limerick non-binding on this Court, but
    we recognized in NRDC v. NRC that the Third Circuit’s dicta
    in Limerick “did not foreclose the possibility that [reactor
    accident mitigation alternatives] could be dealt with
    ‘generically’ through a subsequent rulemaking.” 
    2016 WL 1639661
    , at *2; see also 
    id.
     at *2 n.2.
    Accordingly, we deny the petitions for review on this
    issue.
    2. The NRC Evaluated the Probability of
    Failure To Site a Repository
    The NRDC argues that the NRC fails to quantify the
    probability of failure to site a repository. Because we hold
    that the NRC adequately considered both the probability and
    consequences of failure to site a permanent repository for
    spent nuclear fuel, we deny the petitions on this issue.
    Under its regulations, the NRC need only quantify “the
    various factors” in the GEIS “to the fullest extent
    practicable . . . .” 
    10 C.F.R. § 51.71
    (d). However, “[t]o the
    extent that there are important qualitative considerations or
    factors that cannot be quantified, these considerations or
    factors will be discussed in qualitative terms.” 
    Id.
     The NRC
    complied with these obligations. The agency provided a
    qualitative analysis of the likelihood of failure to site a
    repository, see J.A. 290, 770, and considered the reasonably
    foreseeable impacts of that scenario, see J.A. 458, 461, 469-
    70, 472-73, 476, 480, 487, 496, 501, 509, 511, 517, 521, 523-
    24, 550, 570, 572, 577, 580, 583, 585, 587-89, 591, 593, 596,
    602-03, 605, 607, 610-11, 616, 618, 621. The NRDC
    provides no indication of how the NRC can or should
    otherwise assess the risk of failure to site a repository. Nor
    16
    does our decision in New York I require the NRC to do so. Cf.
    681 F.3d at 478-80 (noting only that “an agency must look at
    both the probabilities of potentially harmful events and the
    consequences if those events come to pass”). The NRC’s
    analysis was therefore sufficient to comply with NEPA.
    3. The GEIS Assesses the Cumulative
    Impacts of the Continued Storage of
    Spent Nuclear Fuel
    The NRDC argues that the GEIS fails to discuss the
    cumulative impacts of continued storage of spent nuclear fuel
    “when added to other past, present, and reasonably
    foreseeable future actions . . . .” 
    40 C.F.R. § 1508.7
    . We
    disagree.
    While it is true that NEPA requires an agency to consider
    “cumulative or synergistic environmental impact[s]” of
    related, concurrently pending proposals, Kleppe v. Sierra
    Club, 
    427 U.S. 390
    , 410 (1976), “the purpose of the
    cumulative impact requirement is to prevent agencies from
    dividing one project into multiple individual actions each of
    which has an insignificant environmental impact, but which
    collectively have a substantial impact,” Theodore Roosevelt I,
    
    616 F.3d at 514
     (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted). In this case, there are no concurrently pending
    proposals before the NRC because the NRC is not licensing
    any reactors. Instead, the NRC has codified the GEIS for use
    in future licensing proceedings. The GEIS also includes a
    detailed discussion of the cumulative impacts of continued
    storage of spent fuel over the lifetime of a licensed reactor.
    See J.A. 628-93. Pursuant to its “tiered” approach to
    assessing environmental impacts, see 
    40 C.F.R. § 1502.20
    , the
    NRC also considers the environmental impacts of waste
    disposal through 
    10 C.F.R. § 51.51
    , Table S-3, prior to any
    licensing action. See also J.A. 351, 1297. Because there is no
    17
    indication that the NRC has improperly segmented its
    environmental impact analysis, we deny the petitions on this
    issue.
    4. The NRC Did Not Ignore Short-Term,
    High-Volume Leaks
    The States argue that the NRC unreasonably “assumed”
    that short-term, high-volume pool leaks have no
    environmental consequences. While styled as a challenge to
    the NRC’s assumptions in the GEIS, the crux of the dispute is
    with the NRC’s assessment of the probability and
    consequences of short-term, high-volume leaks. Because we
    hold that the NRC adequately considered the risks of short-
    term, high-volume leaks, we deny the petitions.
    The GEIS extensively analyzes the impacts of short-term,
    high-volume leaks in addition to historic data on spent fuel
    leakage. See J.A. 839-55. In particular, the NRC notes that
    “[s]pent fuel pool leaks, while unpredictable, seldom occur.”
    J.A. 839. Furthermore, NRC regulations require plant
    licensees to monitor reactor sites, thereby increasing the
    likelihood of high-volume leak detection. See, e.g., 
    10 C.F.R. §§ 20.1501
    , 50.65; see also J.A. 836-37, 840, 1397-98. We
    therefore find nothing in the record to suggest that the NRC
    arbitrarily or capriciously disregarded the risks of short-term,
    high-volume leaks.
    5. The NRC’s Waiver Process Ensures
    Consideration of Site-Specific Impacts
    Finally, we note that the NRC’s regulations already
    provide a means by which the petitioners can raise site-
    specific    challenges    during    licensing      proceedings.
    Specifically, under 
    10 C.F.R. § 2.335
    (b), “[a] participant to an
    adjudicatory proceeding [before the NRC] . . . may petition
    18
    that the application of a specified Commission rule or
    regulation or any provision thereof . . . be waived or an
    exception be made for the particular proceeding.” The
    standard by which the NRC will grant such a petition “is that
    special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the
    particular proceeding are such that the application of the rule
    or regulation (or a provision of it) would not serve the
    purposes for which the rule or regulation was adopted.” 
    Id.
    We hold that the NRC’s waiver provision provides an
    adequate mechanism by which the petitioners can challenge
    the GEIS in site-specific proceedings.
    The petitioners raise two objections to the NRC’s waiver
    provision. First, they argue that the waiver provision shifts
    the burden of NEPA compliance from the NRC to the party
    requesting waiver. Second, the petitioners characterize the
    waiver process as “illusory.” States’ Br. 34. Neither
    argument is persuasive. First, for the reasons stated above,
    see supra Part II.B.1-4, the GEIS fulfills the NRC’s NEPA
    obligation to analyze the impacts of the continued storage of
    spent nuclear fuel. The NRC, in the GEIS, has therefore
    presented sufficient evidence to carry its burden of persuasion
    under NEPA that the impacts of continued storage of spent
    nuclear fuel are generic to all licensed reactors. The burden
    of production therefore necessarily shifts to the parties raising
    objections to provide substantial evidence demonstrating that
    the GEIS neglects those site-specific considerations, thereby
    obstructing the GEIS’s purpose “to preserve the efficiency of
    the NRC’s licensing process . . . .” 79 Fed. Reg. at 56,239.
    Of course, the NRC always retains the burden of persuasion
    under NEPA to consider fully the environmental impacts and
    alternatives for its proposed action. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (C);
    
    40 C.F.R. § 1502.1
    .
    19
    Second, the NRC conceded during oral argument that we
    have jurisdiction to review its decision to deny a waiver
    petition under 
    10 C.F.R. § 2.335
    (b). See Oral Arg. Rec.
    48:11-:40; see also NRDC v. NRC, 
    2016 WL 1639661
    , at *12
    (considering whether the NRC properly denied a waiver
    petition); cf. Massachusetts v. NRC, 
    708 F.3d 63
    , 74 & n.17
    (1st Cir. 2013) (same). Although we have stated that the
    NRC’s decision whether to grant a waiver petition “is entitled
    to deference,” that deference extends only so far as the NRC’s
    decision is not arbitrary or capricious. NRDC v. NRC, 
    2016 WL 1639661
    , at *12. Therefore, we expect that the NRC will
    give due consideration to waiver petitions raising non-
    frivolous site-specific challenges to reactor licensing. Cf. 79
    Fed. Reg. at 56,242 (stating that “concerned parties who meet
    the waiver criteria in 
    10 C.F.R. § 2.335
     will be able to raise
    site-specific issues related to continued storage at the time of
    a specific license application” (emphasis added)).
    Furthermore, the petitioners retain the ability to petition the
    NRC for a rulemaking to amend the GEIS. Cf. NRDC v.
    NRC, 
    2016 WL 1639661
    , at *5, *12. “Although rulemaking
    is far from the fastest route, it has transparency, extensive
    public input, and broad application to recommend it.” 
    Id. at *12
    . We believe these protections are sufficient to prevent
    the NRC’s waiver process from becoming “illusory.”
    Accordingly, we deny the petitions for review.
    C. THE NRC’S ASSUMPTIONS ARE NOT ARBITRARY
    OR CAPRICIOUS
    The States and the NRDC contend that the NRC utilized
    several unreasonable assumptions, including: (1) that spent
    nuclear fuel will be removed from spent-fuel pools within
    sixty years of reactor decommissioning; (2) that after the
    sixty-year period, spent fuel will be stored in dry casks that
    20
    are replaced every one hundred years; and (3) that
    institutional controls over spent nuclear fuel will exist into
    perpetuity. We hold that none of these assumptions is so
    unreasonable as to render the NRC’s decision-making
    arbitrary or capricious. We therefore deny the petitions for
    review on this issue.
    An agency does not engage in arbitrary or capricious
    decision-making by making “predictive judgment[s]” or even
    by relying on “[i]ncomplete data.” New York v. EPA, 
    413 F.3d 3
    , 31 (D.C. Cir. 2005). To the contrary, such judgments
    are “entitled to deference,” 
    id.,
     and a challenge to the
    agency’s assumptions must be more than “an effort by [a
    petitioner] to substitute its own analysis” for the agency’s,
    Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 
    225 F.3d 667
    , 737 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In this case, the NRC’s
    assumptions in the GEIS are ably supported by the record.
    First, NRC regulations already mandate removal of spent
    nuclear fuel within sixty years of the expiration of a reactor
    license. See 
    10 C.F.R. § 50.82
    (a)(3). Furthermore, as the
    NRC noted in its responses to comments, “(1) there is no need
    to cool spent fuel in a pool for more than 60 years after a
    reactor stops operating; (2) operational costs associated with
    pool storage exceed dry cask storage costs; and (3) experience
    with decommissioning of nuclear power plants indicates that
    spent fuel pools are decommissioned before the end of the 60-
    year period.” J.A. 1093. According deference to the NRC’s
    predictive judgments, we hold that the agency’s assumption
    regarding the timeframe for the removal of spent nuclear fuel
    is reasonable.
    Second, the NRC’s assumption about the timeframe for
    dry cask storage and replacement is conservative. The NRC
    concluded that “the 100-year replacement period provides a
    21
    reasonable timeframe for the routine replacement of dry
    storage systems, and that actual storage facility replacement
    will be needed less frequently than assumed in the GEIS.” 
    Id.
    The agency also noted the “low degradation rates for dry cask
    storage systems.” J.A. 1056. Furthermore, the NRC analyzed
    the costs of dry cask replacement. See J.A. 397-98. This
    assumption in the GEIS is therefore reasonable.
    Third, the record demonstrates that assuming the
    continuation of institutional controls is both reasonable and
    necessary. The NRC acknowledged that the impacts of a
    failure in institutional controls would be “catastrophic.” J.A.
    794, 798-99. Despite that conclusion, the agency also found
    that the probability of institutional controls failing is
    “remote.” J.A. 794; see also J.A. 796 (noting that it is
    unlikely that the government would abandon continued
    storage facilities and that those facilities are “highly visible”).
    Furthermore, this assumption facilitates the assessment of
    foreseeable environmental impacts from the continued storage
    of spent nuclear fuel. See J.A. 794-95; see also J.A. 1094-
    1100.
    We therefore deny the petitions for review on this issue.
    III.       CONCLUSION
    We acknowledge the political discord surrounding our
    nation’s evolving nuclear energy policy. But the role of
    Article III courts in this debate is circumscribed. “The scope
    of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is
    narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of
    the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
    Auto. Ins., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983). To the extent that the
    petitioners disagree with the NRC’s current policy for the
    22
    continued storage of spent nuclear fuel, their concerns should
    be directed to Congress.
    For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies the
    petitions for review.
    So ordered.