National Biodiesel Board v. Environmental Protection Agency , 843 F.3d 1010 ( 2016 )


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  • United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued October 27, 2016           Decided December 20, 2016
    No. 15-1072
    NATIONAL BIODIESEL BOARD,
    PETITIONER
    v.
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
    RESPONDENT
    On Petitions for Review of Administrative Actions of the
    United States Environmental Protection Agency
    Consolidated with 15-1073
    _____
    Bryan M. Killian argued the cause for petitioner. With him
    on the briefs were David B. Salmons and Sandra P. Franco.
    Perry M. Rosen, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was
    John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, and Susan
    Stahle, Of Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
    Before: TATEL, BROWN, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.
    2
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
    TATEL, Circuit Judge: Petitioner, a trade association
    representing the domestic biofuel industry, challenges the
    Environmental Protection Agency’s decision to allow a group
    of Argentine biofuel producers and other companies to use
    certain recordkeeping practices in connection with sales of
    their product in the United States. Petitioner separately
    challenges the regulation, promulgated in 2010, pursuant to
    which EPA granted the Argentine application. Although this
    case implicates a pressing international issue—whether EPA
    is meeting its responsibility to protect against harmful global
    land-use changes resulting from our country’s demand for
    renewable fuels—we can resolve it on familiar terrain.
    Petitioner’s challenge to the 2010 regulation is untimely, and
    EPA’s decision to grant the Argentine application was neither
    arbitrary nor capricious, as it comports with agency
    regulations and rests upon the kind of highly technical
    judgments to which we owe agencies great deference.
    I.
    Established by Congress in 2005, the Renewable Fuel
    Standard (RFS) program requires transportation fuel—the
    kind used in cars and sold at gas stations—to include specific
    amounts of “renewable fuel” made from planted crops, trees,
    animal waste, algae, or other alternatives to traditional fossil
    fuels. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58,
    § 1501, 
    119 Stat. 594
     (codified as amended at 
    42 U.S.C. § 7545
    (o)). In 2007, Congress amended the program both to
    significantly increase use of renewable fuel and to ensure this
    increase would reduce greenhouse-gas emissions and thereby
    “lower the risk of climate change.” 
    75 Fed. Reg. 14,670
    ,
    14,799; see id. at 14,673, 14,843; Energy Independence and
    Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–140, §§ 201–204, 
    121 Stat. 1492
     (codified as amended at 
    42 U.S.C. § 7545
    (o)).
    3
    Specifically, recognizing that demand for renewable fuels
    might spur land-use changes like deforestation, which
    exacerbate greenhouse-gas emissions and wreak ecological
    harm, Congress mandated that renewable fuel from planted
    crops come from agricultural land already cleared or
    cultivated prior to the 2007 statute’s enactment. 
    42 U.S.C. § 7545
    (o)(I)(i). See e.g., 75 Fed. Reg. at 14,692.
    In order to accomplish this objective, Congress defined
    “renewable fuel” as “fuel that is produced from renewable
    biomass” and specified that “renewable biomass” means, as
    relevant here, “[p]lanted crops and crop residue harvested
    from agricultural land cleared or cultivated at any time prior
    to December 19, 2007, that is either actively managed or
    fallow, and nonforested.” 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 7545
    (o)(1)(J),
    (o)(1)(I)(i).
    To implement the RFS program, the statute directs EPA
    to “promulgate regulations to ensure that gasoline sold or
    introduced into commerce in the United States . . . contains
    the         applicable       volume        of         renewable
    fuel,” 
    id.
     § 7545 (o)(2)(A)(i),    including       “compliance
    provisions applicable to refineries, blenders, distributors, and
    importers” of renewable fuels, id. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(iii)(I).
    Pursuant to that authority, EPA took the actions challenged
    here.
    Renewable fuel is made from plant material, known as
    feedstock, typically sent from farms to grain elevators, then to
    crushers, and eventually to fuel producers, who transform it
    into renewable fuel. Biofuel produced abroad and intended for
    use by domestic refiners—the subject of this litigation—is
    often sent from producers to importers, who then sell the
    renewable fuel for incorporation into domestic transportation
    fuel.
    4
    Under the RFS program, producers and importers of
    renewable fuel generate “Renewable Identification Numbers”
    (RINs)—codes that correspond to batches of fuel. See 
    40 C.F.R. §§ 80.1452
    , 80.1426. In turn, refiners and importers
    acquire RINs to demonstrate that they have introduced into
    the transportation-fuel supply the requisite amount of
    renewable fuel. 
    42 U.S.C. § 7545
    (o)(3)(B)(ii)(I); see 
    40 C.F.R. § 80.1405
    (c); Hermes Consolidated, LLC v. EPA, 
    787 F.3d 568
    , 572 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing the RFS program).
    In 2010, EPA promulgated a final rule that imposes
    recordkeeping requirements on RIN-generating producers and
    importers in order to verify that crops used in renewable fuel
    production come from qualified land, i.e., land in cultivation
    prior to December 19, 2007. 75 Fed. Reg. at 14,699–701; 
    40 C.F.R. § 80.1454
    . The Rule gives producers and importers
    three options. 
    40 C.F.R. §§ 80.1454
    (c)(1), (g), (h).
    The first, individual tracking, requires producers or
    importers to keep, but not provide to EPA unless requested,
    (1) “[m]aps or electronic data identifying the boundaries of
    the land” where each type of feedstock was harvested, (2)
    “commercial documents showing the quantity of feedstock
    purchased from each area . . . and showing each transfer of
    custody from the location where it was produced to the
    renewable fuel production facility,” and (3) records sufficient
    to verify that the feedstock came from land cleared or
    cultivated prior to December 19, 2007, such as sales records.
    
    Id.
     § 80.1454(c)(1).
    The second option, aggregate compliance, excuses from
    recordkeeping requirements “any producer or RIN-generating
    importer” in a country subject to an approved aggregate
    compliance plan. Id. § 80.1454(g). A country is eligible for
    the aggregate compliance approach if EPA determines that its
    5
    total amount of agricultural land is no higher than it was in
    2007. See id. § 80.1457 (establishing the petition process for
    the aggregate compliance approach for foreign counties).
    United States domestic renewable-fuel producers are currently
    exempt from recordkeeping requirements based on EPA’s
    finding that total U.S. agricultural land has not exceeded its
    2007 baseline. Id. § 80.1454(g). Only one foreign country—
    Canada—has sought and obtained an approved aggregate
    compliance regime. 
    76 Fed. Reg. 14,007
    .
    A third option—the one at issue here —is the alternative
    tracking requirement. 
    40 C.F.R. § 80.1454
    (h). Under this
    provision, a “foreign or domestic renewable fuel producer or
    RIN-generating importer” can participate in an industry-
    funded program in which an “independent third party
    conduct[s] a comprehensive program of annual compliance
    surveys . . . to be carried out in accordance with a survey plan
    which has been approved by EPA.” 
    Id.
     §§ (h), (h)(1). The
    independent surveyor must perform “feedstock audits of
    renewable fuel production and import facilities” and “[o]btain
    the records and product transfer documents associated with
    the feedstocks being audited.” Id. §§ (h)(3)(i)–(ii). The
    surveyor must “[c]onfirm that feedstocks used to produce
    RIN-generating renewable fuels” come from qualifying land,
    and “[i]mmediately notify EPA” of noncompliance. Id.
    §§ (h)(3)(iv)–(vi). Overall, annual surveys must be
    “representative” of the entities in the survey area and
    “[d]esigned to achieve the same level of quality assurance”—
    that is, the same level of confidence that renewable fuels
    come from qualified land—as the individual tracking and
    aggregate compliance options. Id. §§ (h)(2)(iii)–(iv).
    In 2012, the Argentine Chamber of Biofuels (CARBIO),
    a nonprofit association of biodiesel producers, soybean
    growers, warehouses, and oil-crushing mills, submitted a
    6
    comprehensive survey program for EPA’s approval as an
    alternative tracking program. In considering the application,
    EPA required CARBIO to answer many questions about its
    proposal and submit additional materials in the form of seven
    addenda. Some two-and-a-half years later, EPA approved the
    application, finding that CARBIO’s proposal satisfied section
    80.1454(h)’s requirements.
    The plan works like this. Using historical satellite
    images, CARBIO begins by identifying land cleared or
    cultivated prior to 2007. CARBIO then classifies these lands
    as either “go areas,” from which feedstock may be used, or
    “no go areas.” When feedstock arrives at a crushing plant,
    each shipment is inspected—using a document known as a
    carta de porte, or waybill—to ensure that the zip code of
    origination matches an identified go area. If ineligible land
    falls within a zip code, no feedstock from that zip code may
    qualify. The plan calls for the independent surveyor to visit
    each producer and crushing plant at least once a year, as well
    as some five percent of grain elevators and farms. Any
    feedstock supplier, such as a farm or grain elevator, not
    visited in a given year will submit to a desk audit of its
    product-transfer documents to verify compliance with the
    Rule’s qualified-land restriction.
    On November 13, 2013, while EPA was considering
    CARBIO’s proposal, Petitioner National Biodiesel Board
    (NBB) sent a letter to EPA expressing concern about the
    viability of enforcing an alternative tracking program abroad
    and requesting that EPA “provide the public with notice and
    comment on any proposed survey plan for foreign feedstocks
    and production before EPA takes any action.” On January 27,
    2015, EPA approved the CARBIO proposal and responded to
    NBB, explaining that “[g]iven the significant notice and
    comment process used to develop [the recordkeeping]
    7
    regulations,” the agency “d[id] not find it appropriate to create
    additional notice and comment processes for each plan
    approval as you suggested in your letter.”
    NBB then filed these petitions for review. In case number
    15-1073, Petitioner seeks review of the 2010 Rule that
    established the alternative tracking program. 
    75 Fed. Reg. 14,670
    . In case number 15-1072, Petitioner challenges EPA’s
    approval of CARBIO’s alternative tracking proposal. We
    consolidated the cases and heard them together at oral
    argument.
    II.
    EPA offers a threshold objection to the petitions for
    review—that NBB lacks Article III standing. In response,
    NBB asserts that it has standing on behalf of its members:
    domestic producers who will suffer injury as a result of
    increased competition from Argentine biodiesel.
    Article III standing requires “injury in fact” that is “actual
    or imminent” and “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged
    action of the defendant” as well as “likely . . . redress[able] by
    a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560–61 (1992) (internal citations and quotation
    marks omitted). Under the doctrine of competitor standing,
    economic actors “suffer constitutional injury in fact when
    agencies lift regulatory restrictions on their competitors or
    otherwise allow increased competition.” Louisiana Energy
    and Power Authority v. FERC, 
    141 F.3d 364
    , 367 (D.C. Cir.
    1998). An association, such as NBB, may represent the
    interests of its members if—the issue here—“at least one of
    [its] members has standing to sue in [its] . . . own right.” See
    American Library Association v. FCC, 
    401 F.3d 489
    , 492
    (D.C. Cir. 2005).
    8
    This case differs little from Delta Construction v. EPA,
    
    783 F.3d 1291
     (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam), in which we
    held that an importer and seller of a vegetable-based fuel
    suffered constitutional injury as a result of “EPA regulations
    that incentivize[d] other renewable fuels like electricity sold
    by its competitors.” Id. at 1299. Here it is “self-evident” that
    NBB members meet the constitutional prerequisites of injury,
    causation, and redressability, as approval of the CARBIO plan
    incentivizes importation of renewable fuels that will compete
    with domestic production, and an order vacating that approval
    would eliminate the resultant competitive harm. Id. at 1299–
    1300 (quoting White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, 
    748 F.3d 1222
    , 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert granted on other
    grounds sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 
    135 S. Ct. 702
     (2014)).
    Declarations submitted by NBB confirm that its members
    “compete with imports” in the U.S. biodiesel market.
    With standing established, we turn to Petitioner’s
    challenges.
    III.
    We begin with NBB’s attack on section 80.1454(h),
    which EPA promulgated in 2010. 
    75 Fed. Reg. 14,670
    . EPA
    argues that the challenge is untimely.
    Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act provides that a
    petition for review of any nationally applicable regulations:
    shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice
    of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in
    the Federal Register, except that if such petition is
    based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth
    day, then any petition for review under this
    subsection shall be filed within sixty days after such
    grounds arise.
    9
    
    42 U.S.C. § 7607
    (b)(1). NBB failed to challenge the Rule
    until it initiated this action some five years after notice was
    promulgated—despite exhaustively commenting during the
    rulemaking process and then even intervening on behalf of
    EPA in support of the Rule in a lawsuit before this circuit.
    National Petrochemical and Refiners Association v. EPA, 
    630 F.3d 145
     (D.C. Cir. 2010). NBB nonetheless maintains that,
    for several reasons, its challenge to the Rule is timely.
    First, NBB notes that section 307(b)(1)’s provision for
    judicial review after the initial sixty days “if such petition is
    based solely on grounds arising after,” 
    42 U.S.C. § 7607
    (b)(1), includes “the occurrence of an event that ripens
    a claim.” American Road & Transportation Builders
    Association v. EPA, 
    588 F.3d 1109
    , 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2009). It
    follows, says NBB, that approval of the CARBIO proposal
    conferred on it a newly ripened claim because until that point
    it had no idea that EPA would “interpret its regulation in an
    arbitrary way” that would injure its members. Petitioner’s
    Br. 52.
    On this point, NBB relies on our decision in Coalition for
    Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 
    684 F.3d 102
    , 129–32
    (D.C. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Utility
    Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 
    134 S. Ct. 2427
     (2014), in
    which we held that section 307(b)(1) did not bar industry
    petitioners’ challenge to a longstanding EPA program when a
    new rule expanded the program “to never-regulated sources”
    operated by those industries. Id. at 130. The new rule gave
    petitioners “newly ripened” claims against the program
    because, as we explained, prior to its expansion the prospect
    that the program would injure petitioners was too speculative
    to confer jurisdiction on the court. Id. at 131. Here, in stark
    contrast, NBB members were subject to the Rule on day one,
    which is why NBB both participated in the rulemaking
    10
    process and intervened in litigation challenging the Rule.
    Instead of defending the Rule, NBB members could have
    argued then that the Rule’s recordkeeping requirements were
    insufficient to protect against the importation of nonqualified
    renewable fuel. Because NBB was well positioned to
    challenge the Rule on these grounds when it was first
    promulgated, the CARBIO plan conferred on NBB no “newly
    ripened” claim. See Sierra Club de Puerto Rico v. EPA, 
    815 F.3d 22
    , 26–28 (D.C. Cir 2016) (explaining that Coalition left
    unchanged the principle that mere application of a regulation,
    “without anything more,” falls short of “after-arising
    grounds.”).
    Coalition aside, NBB’s argument that the CARBIO plan
    gives rise to a newly ripened claim because, prior to it, the
    recordkeeping regulations “could potentially have been
    applied by EPA in a manner that would not have injured
    Petitioner or its members,” reveals the true “grounds” upon
    which NBB seeks to challenge EPA: the agency’s decision to
    grant the CARBIO proposal as an application of the Rule not
    the Rule itself. Petitioner’s Br. 52. We consider that issue in
    Part IV, infra.
    NBB next argues that its challenge is timely because EPA
    “reopened” the Rule when it approved the CARBIO proposal.
    The reopener doctrine allows an otherwise untimely challenge
    to proceed “where an agency has—either explicitly or
    implicitly—undertaken to ‘reexamine its former choice.’”
    National Mining Association v. Department of the Interior, 
    70 F.3d 1345
    , 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Public Citizen v.
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
    901 F.2d 147
    , 151 (D.C.
    Cir. 1990)). The CARBIO proposal is, the argument goes, a
    “constructive” reopening of the Rule, which “occurs if the
    revision of accompanying regulations ‘significantly alters the
    stakes of judicial review’ as the result of a change that ‘could
    11
    have not been reasonably anticipated.’” National Resources
    Defense Council v. EPA, 
    571 F.3d 1245
    , 1266 (D.C. Cir.
    2009) (per curiam) (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 
    551 F.3d 1019
    , 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). We have described the
    magnitude of alteration required to invoke this doctrine as a
    “sea change,” and have declined to apply it when “the basic
    regulatory scheme remains unchanged.” 
    Id.
     As the Rule
    expressly establishes that foreign producers may seek
    approval of an alternative tracking program, the CARBIO
    plan neither alters that regulatory framework nor works a
    change that NBB members could not have reasonably
    anticipated. To the extent NBB argues that the CARBIO
    proposal is out of line with the Rule, this is—yet again—a
    challenge to EPA’s application of the Rule rather than to the
    Rule itself.
    For these reasons, NBB’s petition for review of the Rule
    is untimely under section 307(b)(1) and is, accordingly,
    dismissed.
    IV.
    We now turn to the heart of this case—whether EPA
    erred when it approved the CARBIO plan. NBB challenges
    EPA’s action on both procedural and substantive grounds.
    With respect to procedure, NBB contends that EPA erred
    when it approved the CARBIO plan via informal adjudication
    without public notice and comment. As a general matter,
    “agencies have ‘very broad discretion whether to proceed by
    way of adjudication or rulemaking.’” Qwest Services Corp. v.
    FCC, 
    509 F.3d 531
    , 536 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Time
    Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 
    240 F.3d 1126
    , 1141
    (D.C. Cir. 2001)). Not only does the Rule do nothing to fetter
    this discretion, but it expressly requires public notice and
    comment for country-wide aggregative compliance
    12
    applications, see 
    40 C.F.R. §§ 80.1454
    (g)(1), 80.1457, while
    imposing no notice and comment requirement for the
    approval of alternative tracking plans like the one submitted
    by CARBIO, 
    id.
     § 80.1454(h).
    NBB insists that EPA’s approval of the CARBIO
    proposal was, in effect, a rule that required notice and
    comment, not an adjudication, because the plan “provides a
    new set of substantive standards for future conduct,
    indefinitely applying to a large number of entities,” involves
    “several policy determinations,” and leaves “key facts . . .
    unresolved.” Reply 11-12. But we need not meditate on the
    sometimes-fuzzy line between rulemaking and informal
    adjudication because EPA’s approval of the CARBIO plan
    was a straightforward instance of adjudication. Only after a
    two-and-a-half-year process, during which EPA frequently
    asked for new information and modifications to the proposal
    and CARBIO submitted several addenda, did the agency
    approve the CARBIO plan. The nature of that proceeding
    “reflect[s] a highly fact-specific, case-by-case style”
    characteristic of adjudication. Conference Group, LLC v.
    FCC, 
    720 F.3d 957
    , 965 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting AT&T v.
    FCC, 
    454 F.3d 329
    , 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). The approval, by
    its own terms, applies only to the CARBIO program; indeed,
    NBB never even suggests that an entity other than CARBIO
    or its producer-members could avail itself of the program
    without making a separate application to EPA. That the
    CARBIO plan will survey some yet-unidentified feedstock
    suppliers hardly transforms the approval into a rulemaking,
    lest every element of a license application need be set in stone
    to escape notice and comment. Under NBB’s theory, an
    agency could not by adjudication issue a permit to transport
    cargo without first knowing who would drive the truck. And
    as we have explained, the fact that an agency action applies to
    a “large number of licensees” “carr[ies] [little] weight” in our
    13
    analysis. Goodman v. FCC, 
    182 F.3d 987
    , 994 (D.C. Cir.
    1999).
    On to NBB’s substantive objection: that approval of the
    CARBIO plan was arbitrary and capricious. Our standard of
    review under the Clean Air Act is the same as under the
    Administrative Procedure Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A), and we
    will affirm EPA’s action “if the record shows EPA considered
    all relevant factors and articulated a ‘rational connection
    between the facts found and the choice made.’” Catawba
    County v. EPA, 
    571 F.3d 20
    , 41 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
    (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 
    371 U.S. 156
    , 168 (1962)). That said, we will not hesitate to overturn
    agency action as arbitrary and capricious if the agency fails to
    “comply with its own regulations.” Environmentel, LLC v.
    FCC, 
    661 F.3d 80
    , 85 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Critical to our
    resolution of this challenge, we give an “extreme degree of
    deference to EPA when it is evaluating scientific data within
    its technical expertise.” Catawba, 
    571 F.3d at 41
     (quoting
    City of Waukesha v. EPA, 
    320 F.3d 228
    , 247 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
    (alteration omitted)). This deference is especially appropriate
    when EPA “acts under ‘unwieldy and science-driven’
    statutory schemes like the Clean Air Act.” Bluewater
    Network, 
    372 F.3d 404
    , 410 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting
    Husqvarna AB v. EPA, 
    254 F.3d 195
    , 199 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
    NBB contends that EPA’s approval of the CARBIO
    proposal was arbitrary and capricious because the plan fails to
    comply with the alternative tracking requirements set out in
    
    40 C.F.R. § 80.1454
    (h) in three ways: (1) its omission of
    importers; (2) its reliance on satellite technology, as well as
    waybills for verifying the origin of feedstock; and (3) its
    failure to identify, in advance, participating feedstock
    producers and other entities in the supply chain. We consider
    each in turn.
    14
    A.
    NBB first argues that the CARBIO plan is out of sync
    with the Rule because it fails to include importers. As
    designed, the CARBIO proposal tracks the fuel supply chain
    from farm through biodiesel production, but not thereafter. As
    NBB points out, however, section 80.1454(h) appears to
    suggest, in three places, that a survey plan must include
    producers and importers. 
    40 C.F.R. §§ 80.1454
    (h)(2)(ii)
    (specifying that surveys must be “[c]onducted at renewable
    fuel production and import facilities and their feedstock
    suppliers”) (emphasis added); (h)(2)(iii) (requiring surveys to
    be “[r]epresentative of all renewable fuel producers and
    importers in the survey area”) (emphasis added); (h)(3)(i)
    (requiring “feedstock audits of renewable fuel production and
    import facilities in accordance with the survey plan”)
    (emphasis added).
    EPA responds that the best reading of section 80.1454(h)
    is that only an alternative tracking plan sponsored by RIN-
    generating importers needs to include importers, whereas the
    CARBIO proposal is sponsored by RIN-generating producers.
    “[W]e review an agency’s interpretation of its own
    regulations with ‘substantial deference.’ ” In re Sealed Case,
    
    237 F.3d 657
    , 667 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Thomas
    Jefferson University v. Shalala, 
    512 U.S. 504
    , 512 (1994)).
    Even without that deference, however, we can readily adopt
    EPA’s interpretation given our obligation to “read . . . words
    ‘in their context and with a view to their place in the
    overall . . . scheme.’” King v. Burwell, 
    135 S. Ct. 2480
    , 2489
    (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
    
    529 U.S. 120
    , 133 (2000)).
    Section 80.1454(h) specifies that “[a]ny foreign or
    domestic renewable fuel producer or RIN–generating
    importer” may adopt an alternative tracking requirement.
    15
    (emphasis added). Elaborating, section 80.1454(h)(1) states
    that “a renewable fuel producer or importer” must sponsor an
    independent survey plan in order to comply. (emphasis
    added). The Rule thus provides that either RIN-generating
    producers or RIN-generating importers may sponsor an
    alternative tracking plan, and, by implication, without
    participation from the other. Given that the purpose behind
    these recordkeeping provisions is to ensure that entities
    generating RINs can produce the records needed to verify that
    renewable fuel comes from qualified land, we agree with EPA
    that little additional value would flow from requiring a
    producer, once it has generated the RIN and possesses those
    records, to continue monitoring its product downstream. By
    contrast, if an importer is the RIN-generating entity, then
    biofuel producers are upstream, and an importer can only
    possess the necessary documentation if it has tracked the
    product from the farm to its doors. This second scenario is,
    EPA explains, why the three provisions cited by NBB
    inelegantly refer to producers and importers. Respondent’s
    Br. 50–51.
    Additional textual clues favor EPA’s view. For one thing,
    as EPA points out, the alternative tracking program is open to
    any “foreign or domestic renewable fuel producer.” 
    40 C.F.R. § 80.1454
    (h) (emphasis added). At the moment, domestic
    producers are subject to the aggregate compliance regime,
    based on EPA’s determination that the total amount of
    agricultural land in the United States is no higher than it was
    in 2007. 
    Id.
     § 80.1454(g). Were the United States to exceed
    that 2007 baseline and become ineligible for the aggregate
    compliance regime, then domestic producers could avail
    themselves of alternative tracking. Under that scenario, it
    would make no sense to interpret the regulations as requiring
    a program sponsored by domestic producers to include
    16
    “importers”—domestic fuel, unlike domestic beer, is never
    imported.
    Second, the alternative tracking approach must “achieve
    at least the same level of quality assurance” as individual
    tracking. Id. § 80.1454(h)(2)(iv). Because individual tracking
    regulations do not require producers to track what importers
    do with renewable fuel, EPA notes, it would be logical to
    interpret alternative tracking in the same way. See id.
    § 80.1454(c)(1).
    Third, as EPA observes, the regulation’s preamble
    includes not a single reference to importers. According to
    EPA, this demonstrates that it “envisioned [alternative
    tracking] survey plans from renewable biomass producers
    need not reach the actions of importers in the context of the
    alternative tracking program.” Respondent’s Br. 51; see 75
    Fed. Reg. at 14,700.
    Fourth, reading the regulation in EPA’s preferred manner
    creates no gap in the regulatory scheme. Approval of an
    alternative tracking plan only allows participating entities to
    avail themselves of section 80.1454(h)’s recordkeeping
    provisions. Non-participating entities, like RIN-generating
    importers, remain subject to section 80.1454(c)(1)’s
    individual tracking requirements, as well as to other
    regulatory provisions that stand independent of the
    recordkeeping measures in section 80.1454. See, e.g., 
    40 C.F.R. § 80.1451
    (d) (directing producers and RIN-generating
    importers to submit quarterly reports that include “electronic
    data identifying the land . . . from which each type of
    feedstock . . . was harvested.”).
    17
    Taken together, these features of the regulation
    demonstrate that the CARBIO plan’s omission of importers is
    consistent with the best reading of the Rule.
    B.
    NBB’s second argument rests on the Rule’s requirement
    that an alternative tracking plan must be “[d]esigned to
    achieve the same level of quality assurance” as the individual
    tracking      and     aggregate      compliance       options.
    
    Id.
     § 80.1454(h)(2)(iv). According to NBB, several features
    of the CARBIO plan make it less likely than these other
    recordkeeping regimes to ensure that feedstock comes from
    qualified land.
    One such feature is the plan’s use of satellite technology
    to identify land cleared or cultivated prior to 2007, a
    methodology NBB calls too “untested” and ill-defined to
    provide the requisite level of quality assurance. For several
    reasons, this claim fails on the launch pad.
    For one thing, under the regulation, the CARBIO plan
    must provide “the same level of quality assurance” as the
    individual and aggregate compliance approaches. Id.
    § 80.1454(h)(2)(iv). Because the regulation establishing the
    petition process for aggregate compliance plans expressly
    contemplates the use of “[s]atellite imagery or data” to
    evaluate when land was cleared or cultivated, how could the
    CARBIO plan possibly fall short for doing precisely the same
    thing? See id. §§ 80.1457(b)(3)(i), (b)(4)(i).
    In any event, we can hardly imagine a more appropriate
    occasion to defer to EPA’s expert judgment than its
    assessment of whether a particular satellite methodology can
    accurately measure environmental change. Indeed, Petitioner
    18
    has identified no basis in the record to upset the agency’s
    conclusion as to CARBIO’s use of satellite technology.
    The CARBIO proposal includes 23 pages explaining its
    methodology. Relying predominantly on images collected by
    NASA’s Landsat program, the plan takes electromagnetic
    data gathered by sensors on Landsat satellites and then
    employs algorithms to transform that data into categories of
    land use. EPA is well-positioned to evaluate the proposal’s
    technical feasibility, as the agency itself uses satellite data to
    measure international land-use changes as part of its analysis
    of lifecycle greenhouse-gas emissions in the Renewable Fuel
    Standard program. See EPA, Renewable Fuel Standard
    Program Regulatory Impact Analysis, 317 (2010). Moreover,
    the Landsat program is, since the launch of its first satellite in
    1972, “the longest continuous space-based record of Earth’s
    land      in     existence.”       NASA,       About     Landsat,
    http://landsat.gsfc.nasa.gov/?page_id=2. Today, the program
    produces images capable of spotting “[w]hen a new road
    appears in the dense forests of Peru[] or a baseball diamond-
    sized patch of forest is felled in the Republic of Congo.”
    NASA, Staying Alert: How a New Landsat-Based Tool Spots
    Deforestation,            http://landsat.gsfc.nasa.gov/?p=12335.
    Researchers have used Landsat data to view and characterize
    subtle vegetation changes in the Alaskan tundra. Junchang Ju
    and Jeffrey G. Masek, The Vegetation Greenness Trend in
    Canada and US Alaska from 1984-2012 Landsat Data, 176
    Remote Sensing of Environment 1 (2016). These do not strike
    us as markers of an unproven or untrustworthy technology.
    NBB believes that the land categories adopted in the plan
    will result in the misclassification of native forests as
    qualified land. But the proposal classifies native forests as
    “other vegetation” and specifies that “go areas” will exclude
    that category. Without context, NBB’s passing reference to
    19
    the plan’s treatment of wetlands provides an insufficient basis
    to set the agency’s action aside. Petitioner’s Br. 42–43. The
    plan requires CARBIO—not the independent surveyor—to
    identify go areas. Yet nothing in the Rule precludes such an
    arrangement and, for good measure, the proposal specifies
    that a third party will verify its maps on an annual basis.
    NBB separately contends that the plan’s reliance on
    satellite imagery to verify historical land use runs afoul of the
    Rule’s requirement that the independent surveyor “[o]btain
    the records and product transfer documents associated with
    the feedstocks being audited.” 
    40 C.F.R. § 80.1454
    (h)(3)(ii)
    (emphasis added). This is so, it maintains, because these
    images cannot constitute “records” within the meaning of that
    provision. NBB gives us no basis—nor can we divine one—
    for concluding that the expansive term “record” excludes
    historical satellite images.
    NBB also takes issue with the plan’s use of waybills.
    Under the plan, waybills are inspected to ensure feedstock
    was sent from a zip code that matches an identified go area. If
    ineligible land falls within a zip code, no feedstock from that
    zip code may qualify.
    NBB thinks this system is inadequate because waybills
    display only whether feedstock was shipped from a qualifying
    zip code, so shipments made from qualifying land could
    contain unqualified feedstock. In other words, NBB fears that
    qualified land might launder unqualified feedstock. But any
    concern about feedstock laundering is equally present under
    the individual tracking regime and, as noted above,
    CARBIO’s proposal need achieve only the “same level of
    quality    assurance”     as     individual   tracking.   
    Id.
    § 80.1454(h)(2)(iv) (emphasis added); see also id.
    § 80.1454(c)(1)(i)(B) (relying on transfer documents from
    20
    qualified land to show the quantity of feedstock purchased
    from each area and to verify the chain of custody for said
    feedstock). Moreover, the CARBIO proposal, like other
    alternative tracking programs, includes independent audits to
    verify compliance by feedstock suppliers, as opposed to the
    passive recordkeeping requirements of individual tracking.
    In a related argument, NBB contends that the CARBIO
    plan fails to explain how it will prevent mixing of qualified
    and unqualified feedstock. Again, however, NBB never
    explains how the CARBIO plan is any more deficient in this
    respect than the individual tracking regime—the relevant
    question. Moreover, the CARBIO plan provides, with no
    direct analogue under the individual tracking provision, for
    use of a “mass balance” approach, which ensures that RINs
    are only generated in proportion to the quantity of qualified
    biomass. Additional regulatory requirements—independent of
    the recordkeeping provisions at issue—impose a
    responsibility to segregate qualified renewable fuel from
    nonqualified renewable fuel. See, e.g., 
    40 C.F.R. §§ 80.1466
    (d)(vi)(B), (j)(1).
    Having been given no basis to disturb EPA’s conclusion
    that the CARBIO plan is “[d]esigned to achieve the same
    level of quality assurance” as the individual tracking and
    aggregate compliance regimes, we move on to NBB’s final
    challenge.
    C.
    Under section 80.1454(h)(2)(iii), “annual compliance
    surveys . . . must be . . . [r]epresentative of all renewable fuel
    producers and importers in the survey area and representative
    of their feedstock suppliers.” Elaborating, the Rule states that
    the “survey program must include a statistically supportable
    methodology.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 14,670. Because the CARBIO
    21
    proposal does not identify the survey area and all of the
    feedstock suppliers in advance, NBB argues, EPA failed to
    “rationally” assess whether the CARBIO program will use a
    sampling methodology that is “representative” of the
    feedstock suppliers. Petitioner’s Br. 35–38.
    This challenge misses the regulation’s distinction
    between survey plans and surveys. See, e.g., 
    40 C.F.R. § 80.1454
    (h)(1) (stating that “an independent third party
    conduct[s] a comprehensive program of annual compliance
    surveys, to be carried out in accordance with a survey plan
    which has been approved by EPA”). The regulation mandates
    representative surveys. Only in the report issued to EPA after
    a survey is complete must the independent surveyor identify
    “the covered area surveyed.” 
    Id.
     § 80.1454(h)(3)(vii)(D). A
    survey plan, by contrast, must include “the parties for whom
    the survey is to be conducted,” as well as a “methodology” for
    conducting audits. Id. § 80.1454(h)(4). But the regulation
    nowhere mandates that survey plans identify feedstock
    suppliers or survey areas.
    NBB’s theory—that EPA may not approve an alternative
    tracking program without knowing the full population of
    feedstock suppliers in advance—scrambles the sequence
    envisioned in the regulation. Moreover, it is unclear why EPA
    must know the precise universe of feedstock suppliers in the
    survey in order to determine, in advance, whether a
    methodology for conducting those surveys is acceptable.
    NBB separately questions whether CARBIO’s plan to use
    a “random sampling methodology with probability
    proportional to size (PPS) of feedstock amounts supplied for
    biodiesel production” is a proper statistical methodology.
    Given our highly deferential standard of review, however, we
    are more likely to brew renewable fuel ourselves than second-
    22
    guess the EPA’s determination on this highly technical point
    based on a fleeting attack by the challenger.
    V.
    For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the petition in case
    number 15-1073 and deny the petition in case number 15-
    1072.
    So ordered.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-1072; Consolidated with 15-1073

Citation Numbers: 843 F.3d 1010, 46 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20194, 83 ERC (BNA) 1861, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22593, 2016 WL 7368626

Judges: Tatel, Brown, Kavanaugh

Filed Date: 12/20/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

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