800 River Road Operating Co. v. National Labor Relations Board , 846 F.3d 378 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued November 15, 2016         Decided January 24, 2017
    No. 15-1204
    800 RIVER ROAD OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, D/B/A
    WOODCREST HEALTH CARE CENTER,
    PETITIONER
    v.
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    RESPONDENT
    1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST,
    INTERVENOR
    Consolidated with 15-1281
    On Petition for Review and Cross-Application
    for Enforcement of an Order of
    the National Labor Relations Board
    Brian J. Gershengorn argued the cause for Petitioner.
    With him on the briefs were Harold P. Coxson and Seth D.
    Kaufman.
    Marni von Wilpert, Attorney, National Labor Relations
    Board, argued the cause for Respondent. With her on the
    2
    brief were Kira Dellinger Vol, Supervisory Attorney, Richard
    Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, Associate
    General Counsel, and Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate
    General Counsel.
    Katherine H. Hansen argued the cause for Intervenor in
    support of Respondent. With her on the brief was William S.
    Massey.
    Before: ROGERS, BROWN, and MILLETT, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by BROWN, Circuit Judge.
    BROWN, Circuit Judge: On March 9, 2012, a unit of
    employees at 800 River Road Operating Company d/b/a
    Woodcrest Healthcare Center (“Woodcrest”) elected 1199
    SEIU United Healthcare Workers East Union (“the Union”)
    as its exclusive collective-bargaining representative.
    Woodcrest filed objections to the election with the National
    Labor Relations Board (“the NLRB” or “the Board”). It now
    challenges certain conduct that occurred during the ensuing
    representation hearing.
    Woodcrest asserts three reasons to conclude the Hearing
    Officer abused his discretion in the underlying proceeding,
    and it also argues the Board abused its discretion when it
    affirmed the Hearing Officer’s recommendations to overrule
    Woodcrest’s objections. It now asks this Court to set aside
    the Board’s order requiring it to bargain with the Union, see
    800 River Road Operating Co., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (2015),
    and to remand for a new election. The Board and the Union
    as Intervenor seek enforcement of the Board’s order.
    We deny Woodcrest’s petition and grant the Board’s
    cross-application for enforcement.
    3
    I.
    Woodcrest argues the Hearing Officer abused his
    discretion in three respects. Because Woodcrest seeks to set
    aside the Board’s affirmation of the Hearing Officer’s
    recommendations, assessing these challenges requires detailed
    consideration of the underlying facts and procedural history.
    A.
    On January 23, 2012, the Union filed a petition to
    represent a unit of employees at Woodcrest, a skilled nursing
    facility in Milford, New Jersey. The election took place on
    March 9, 2012, resulting in a 122–81 vote in favor of
    representation. Two additional ballots were challenged.
    Woodcrest filed twelve timely objections to the conduct
    of the election, see 
    29 C.F.R. § 102.69
    (a), alleging various
    forms of unlawful conduct had occurred prior to the election.
    See 
    29 U.S.C. § 158
    (a)(1) (making it unlawful “for an
    employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees”
    during a representation election).           Pursuant to Board
    regulations, Woodcrest attached a “written offer of proof” to
    its objections that “identif[ied] each witness [it] would call to
    testify concerning the issue and summarizing each witness’s
    testimony.” 
    29 C.F.R. § 102.66
    (c); 
    id.
     § 102.69(a). Only the
    Regional Director reviewed the content of this offer of proof.
    See id. § 102.69(a) (“The party filing the objections shall
    serve a copy of the objections, including the short statement
    of reasons therefor, but not the written offer of proof, on each
    of the other parties to the case . . . .” (emphasis added)); id.
    (“The regional director will transmit a copy of the objections
    to each of the other parties to the proceeding, but shall not
    transmit the offer of proof.” (emphasis added)).
    4
    Based on this offer of proof, the Regional Director
    determined Objections One and Two should proceed to a
    hearing before an NLRB Hearing Officer; the remaining ten
    objections were dismissed. See id. § 102.69(c)(1)(ii) (noting
    the Regional Director will set objections for hearings if he
    “determines that the evidence described in the accompanying
    offer of proof could be grounds for setting aside the election if
    introduced at a hearing . . . .” (emphasis added)). Both of the
    surviving objections pertained to behavior of certain
    Woodcrest supervisors during the “critical period”—i.e., the
    period of time between the petition for representation and the
    election. Objection One alleged three Woodcrest supervisors
    (Janet Lewis, Bonita Thornton, and Jane Cordero) “created a
    coercive atmosphere and/or interfered with employee free
    choice by soliciting Union authorization cards and/or creating
    the impression that they had solicited or were soliciting [such]
    cards.” Pet’r Br. 8. Objection Two claimed three Woodcrest
    supervisors (Israel Vergel de Dios, Cordero, and Thornton)
    “created a coercive atmosphere and/or interfered with
    employee free choice by promoting the Union and/or creating
    the impression that they favored the Union, conveying to
    voters that they should support the Union.” Pet’r Br. 9. See
    Harborside Healthcare, Inc., 
    343 N.L.R.B. 906
    , 909 (2004)
    (setting forth the NLRB’s two-prong test for assessing
    coercive supervisory conduct during an election).
    The hearing took place over the course of three days—
    Thursday May 10, Friday May 11, and Monday May 14. On
    the morning of the first day, Woodcrest called four witnesses.
    First, it solicited testimony from Loesha Chase, who had
    previously worked as a companion to two of Woodcrest’s
    residents through a third-party company. 1         Woodcrest
    1
    Chase stopped working for Woodcrest in 2004, but she still visited
    Woodcrest regularly in her capacity as a companion to its residents.
    5
    believed Chase “possessed knowledge of its supervisors’
    coercive and objectionable conduct and other information
    related to the union organizing campaign.” Pet’r Br. 10.
    Instead, Chase said she had no knowledge of what occurred at
    Union meetings, no knowledge regarding the solicitation of
    Union cards, and no knowledge about which supervisors (if
    any) were involved in the organizing drive.           Second,
    Woodcrest called Vergel de Dios, one of the supervisors it
    believed had committed objectionable conduct by
    “surreptitiously threatening employees with consequences if
    they did not support the Union or sign an authorization card.”
    Pet’r Br. 10.       He denied engaging in this conduct.
    Additionally, Vergel de Dios denied exerting influence over
    how his employees would testify if subpoenaed about his pre-
    election conduct. Instead, he explained he knew his staff
    would testify “truthfully”—i.e., that he never had “an
    influence with them to vote yes.” J.A. 197–98. Throughout
    his testimony, Woodcrest also repeatedly sought permission
    to treat Vergel de Dios as a hostile witness, permission the
    Hearing Officer did not grant.
    Third, Woodcrest called Lewis, another supervisor whom
    it believed had committed objectionable conduct by soliciting
    Union cards and influencing employees to join the Union.
    Lewis said she had not encouraged employees to research the
    Union and had no knowledge of objectionable conduct
    committed by Thornton. She also denied being approached
    by employees as a source of Union authorization cards and
    asked Woodcrest’s attorney, “What’s a [U]nion card?” J.A.
    225.
    Lastly, Woodcrest called Lorri Senk, the administrator
    responsible for operational and human resources functions.
    Senk testified Susan Langdon—an evening supervisor of
    Woodcrest’s registered nurses—had told her about Jane
    6
    Cordero’s involvement in organizing the Union. Langdon
    informed Senk that Langdon had overheard Cordero speaking
    to an unnamed licensed practical nurse about “getting
    employees to attend [a] [U]nion meeting.” J.A. 229–30.
    Langdon believed Cordero withheld information about Union
    representatives making home visits and phone calls to
    Woodcrest employees. Additionally, Senk testified Maria
    Sanchez, a Woodcrest employee, “had stated on several
    occasions” that various supervisors—including Cordero and
    Lewis—were involved in the Union organizing campaign.
    J.A. 239. Finally, Senk stated she found a list of “[U]nion
    insiders” slipped under her door that included Dave Repoli—
    Woodcrest’s former administrator, Clarice Gogia—
    Woodcrest’s former Director of Nursing, and Jane Cordero.
    J.A. 234.
    On the morning of the hearing’s second day, Woodcrest
    presented three additional witnesses.          First, it called
    Cordero—the supervisor about whom Senk had testified.
    Cordero denied participating in any untoward Union
    authorization card distributions. She also denied engaging in
    any conversations about getting employees to attend Union
    meetings, which contradicted Senk’s testimony. Second,
    Woodcrest called Clarice Gogia—one of the employees
    included on the list of “Union insiders” Senk said she had
    received. Gogia testified her last day of employment at
    Woodcrest was June 15, 2011—six months before the Union
    filed its petition for representation. 2 She denied having any
    knowledge of any supervisors engaging in objectionable
    conduct.       Finally, Woodcrest called Katherine Frost,
    Woodcrest’s former Director of Admissions and Marketing.
    Frost ceased working at Woodcrest in July 2011—
    2
    In his report, the Hearing Officer stated Gogia ceased employment
    in June, 2012.
    7
    approximately six months before the filing of the
    representation petition—and testified she entered Woodcrest
    only once per month during the three-month critical period.
    Nevertheless, Woodcrest believed she was “actively involved
    in assisting the Union’s organizing efforts.” Pet’r Br. 10.
    Like the others, she denied giving such assistance, instead
    testifying she made no observations about a Union drive
    during her visits, and she “wouldn’t know any [U]nion
    contacts.” J.A. 291; see also J.A. 293 (noting she learned of
    the election only after it occurred). She also stated she knew
    of no objectionable supervisory conduct.
    At this point, a midday recess was taken. During the
    recess, the parties discussed three separate groups of
    witnesses, each of which is crucial to this case.
    First, Woodcrest met ex parte to request the Hearing
    Officer issue subpoenas to six of Vergel de Dios’s
    approximately twenty-four subordinates regarding his pre-
    election conduct. See 
    29 C.F.R. § 102.66
    (f) (permitting ex
    parte requests). NLRB regulations mandate issuance of such
    subpoenas, 
    id.,
     but, instead, the Hearing Officer invited the
    Union’s attorney to participate in both an off-the-record and
    an on-the-record conversation about the potential witnesses.
    Woodcrest explained its need for the subpoenas based on
    the allegedly conflicting testimony of Vergel de Dios and
    Senk. Whereas Vergel de Dios had testified he did not tell his
    subordinates what to say if asked about his pre-election
    conduct, Senk testified Vergel de Dios had stated at a meeting
    of department heads “he didn’t have anything to worry about
    because he had spoken with his people and he knew what they
    would say, and they would have his back.” J.A. 301.
    Woodcrest interpreted Senk’s testimony as demonstrating
    8
    Vergel de Dios had sought to influence any future testimony
    given by his employees.
    Woodcrest had not previously interviewed any of the six
    witnesses because they had all exercised their Johnnie’s
    Poultry rights not to speak to Woodcrest before the hearing.
    See 
    146 N.L.R.B. 770
    , 775 (1964) (holding that, when
    interrogating an employee before a hearing, an employer
    “must communicate to the employee the purpose of the
    questioning, assure him that no reprisal will take place, and
    obtain his participation on a voluntary basis . . . ”).
    Nevertheless, Woodcrest argued it had a “reasonable belief”
    the six employees would have “factually based firsthand
    knowledge” of Vergel de Dios’s pre-election conduct because
    they were “members of his department.” J.A. 304. Their
    testimony would help Woodcrest establish Vergel de Dios’s
    lack of candor regarding whether he attempted to exert
    influence over his subordinates’ potential testimony. Further,
    Woodcrest stated that, based on Vergel de Dios’s purportedly
    dishonest testimony, “[a] conclusion could be drawn about
    how that group of employees even voted.” J.A. 301.
    Next, the parties discussed subpoenas that had already
    been issued to eight Woodcrest employees. Woodcrest
    contended these individuals “were actively engaged in the
    [Union] campaign [and were] the most likely people to know
    whether the supervisors engaged in pro-union conduct.” J.A.
    309. All eight employees also had exercised their Johnnie’s
    Poultry rights, meaning Woodcrest could not attest to the
    content of their testimony. Despite this fact, Woodcrest
    represented it would ask “specific, direct questions as to what
    knowledge they have, if any, as to were supervisors engaging
    in pro-union conduct [sic].” J.A. 308. Throughout the
    discussion, the Hearing Officer seemed to presume the
    9
    witnesses definitively had no firsthand knowledge, as
    exemplified by the following exchanges:
    HEARING OFFICER: Okay. My inclination
    is that there is nothing that [the subpoenaed
    witness] is going to tell us that is going to—
    there’s no direct knowledge of, there’s no facts
    that she has that—
    MR. MENDELSON: Well, how would any of
    us know it. She hasn’t been vetted.
    HEARING         OFFICER      POMIANOWSKI:
    Right. . . .
    J.A. 309. And again:
    HEARING OFFICER: What I’m saying is . . .
    [the witness] does not have any factually
    based, direct knowledge about the objections,
    themselves.
    MR. MENDELSON: I can’t agree with that
    statement.
    J.A. 320.
    Lastly, the parties discussed five witnesses with whom
    Woodcrest had previously spoken. Consequently, Woodcrest
    could affirmatively assert these individuals possessed
    knowledge of, among other things, supervisory solicitation of
    Union cards and support of the Union.
    After the recess concluded, Woodcrest put three more
    witnesses on the stand. First, Cartney Ezyk testified. During
    the recess, Woodcrest represented to the Hearing Officer that
    10
    Ezyk would testify he was told employees who wanted Union
    authorization cards should speak to Lewis, and Ezyk’s
    testimony backed up this representation. Second, Woodcrest
    called Remi Sajimi, a licensed practical nurse at Woodcrest.
    Sajimi had also exercised Johnnie’s Poultry rights, but, during
    the recess, Woodcrest represented to the Hearing Officer
    Sajimi would testify “Jane Cordero told her . . . that [she]
    would make sure certain employees made it to a [U]nion
    meeting.” J.A. 308. On the stand, Sajimi denied this.
    Finally, Woodcrest called Thornton—the last of the
    supervisors whom it believed had engaged in objectionable
    conduct. She, like the others, denied any wrongdoing. 3
    At the conclusion of the afternoon testimony, the Hearing
    Officer denied the requests for the six subpoenas of Vergel de
    Dios’s subordinates. He explained the subpoenas were
    “exploratory” and emphasized Woodcrest’s inability to make
    an offer of proof that the witnesses had “specific knowledge,
    firsthand knowledge, factually based on the objections.” J.A.
    344–45. For the same reasons, he also explained he would
    not permit the eight, already-subpoenaed witnesses to testify.
    However, he stated the five “vetted” witnesses with direct
    knowledge could testify on Monday.
    When Monday morning arrived, however, Woodcrest
    refused to continue participating in the Hearing. After
    informing the Hearing Officer his Friday-afternoon rulings
    had “irrevocably and hopelessly compromised [its] ability to
    make [its case],” J.A. 363, it voluntarily left the proceedings.
    3
    Woodcrest had planned on calling a fourth witness—Ms.
    Beziole—but the Hearing Officer would not hear her testimony.
    11
    B.
    On June 4, 2012, the Hearing Officer recommended
    overruling both of Woodcrest’s election objections. The
    report faulted Woodcrest for not presenting witnesses with
    “first-hand factual knowledge” of the objections, despite its
    “prior representation to the Regional Director.” J.A. 23. It
    also noted Woodcrest’s refusal to continue participating in the
    Hearing. The Hearing Officer concluded Woodcrest was
    “using the hearing to investigate” conduct rather than present
    a case. J.A. 24. The report did not mention either the denial
    of the six requested subpoenas or the refusal to hear the
    testimony from the eight subpoenaed witnesses.
    On January 9, 2013, the Board affirmed the Hearing
    Officer’s report, concluding that, under the circumstances,
    “the hearing officer acted reasonably to halt the employer’s
    manifest fishing expedition.” J.A. 70. Though the Board
    acknowledged the Hearing Officer committed error by not
    issuing the six subpoenas, the error was not prejudicial. See
    J.A. 70 (noting “it is reasonable to conclude that even had the
    hearing officer issued the requested subpoenas, he would have
    refused to permit the witnesses to testify or, if presented with
    a petition, would have revoked those subpoenas”). The Board
    certified the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
    representative for the relevant Woodcrest employees on
    November 26, 2014. 4
    The National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”) does not
    permit this Court to directly review the Board’s certification
    decision.   See 
    29 U.S.C. § 159
    (d); see also Boire v.
    4
    The Board issued its first certification decision on July 10, 2013,
    see 800 River Road Operating Co., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (2013),
    but that order was set aside after the Supreme Court’s decision in
    NLRB v. Noel Canning, 
    134 S. Ct. 2550
     (2014).
    12
    Greyhound Corp., 
    376 U.S. 473
    , 476–80 (1964). To obtain
    review, an employer must refuse, as Woodcrest did here, to
    bargain with the Union. Consequently, on February 7, 2013,
    the Union filed unfair labor practice claims under 
    29 U.S.C. § 158
    (a)(1) and (5). The NLRB’s General Counsel (“GC”)
    issued a complaint against Woodcrest on February 19, 2013,
    and the Board granted summary judgment in favor of the GC
    on June 15, 2015. See 800 River Road Operating Co., 362
    N.L.R.B. No. 114 (2015). The unfair labor practice order
    gives this Court jurisdiction under 
    29 U.S.C. § 160
    (e) and (f).
    Woodcrest now asks this Court to set aside the Board’s
    June 15 order and to remand with instructions for a new
    election rather than a new hearing. It alleges the Hearing
    Officer abused his discretion and caused prejudicial error
    when he failed to (1) issue the requested subpoenas for six of
    Vergel de Dios’s employees; (2) permit eight subpoenaed
    witnesses to testify at the Hearing; and (3) grant Woodcrest’s
    request to treat Vergel de Dios as a hostile witness.
    Woodcrest also contends the Board abused its discretion when
    it “inexplicably affirmed [the Hearing Officer] with little
    analysis” and overruled Woodcrest’s objections. Pet’r Br. 21,
    30. The Board seeks enforcement of its June 15 order, which
    compels Woodcrest to provide the Union with certain
    requested information, as well as to bargain with the Union.
    The Union intervened in support of the Board.
    II.
    A.
    This Court has noted that, “[o]n questions regarding
    representation, we accord the Board an especially wide degree
    of discretion.” Randell Warehouse of Ariz., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    252 F.3d 445
    , 447–48 (D.C. Cir. 2001). We “will overturn a
    Board decision to certify an election in only the rarest of
    13
    circumstances.” N. of Market Senior Servs., Inc. v. NLRB,
    
    204 F.3d 1163
    , 1167 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also 
    id.
     (“A party
    seeking to overturn an election bears a heavy burden of
    showing that the election is invalid.” (emphasis added));
    Randell Warehouse, 
    252 F.3d at 448
     (“[T]he scope of our
    review of the Board’s decisions in cases involving
    certification is extremely limited.”).
    Notwithstanding this extraordinary deference, the
    Board’s discretion “has limits.” Int’l Transp. Serv. Inc. v.
    NLRB, 
    449 F.3d 160
    , 163 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The Court is “not
    merely the Board’s enforcement arm,” Randell Warehouse,
    
    252 F.3d at 448
    , and will not simply “rubberstamp” Board
    decisions. Int’l Transp. Serv., 
    449 F.3d at 163
    . Instead, we
    have the “responsibility to examine carefully both the Board’s
    findings and its reasoning . . . .” Randell Warehouse, 
    252 F.3d at 448
    . Additionally, this Court sets aside Board orders
    that have “no reasonable basis in law, either because the
    proper legal standard was not applied or because the Board
    applied the correct standard but failed to give the plain
    language of the standard its ordinary meaning.” NLRB v.
    McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 
    964 F.2d 1153
    , 1156 (D.C. Cir.
    1992).
    B.
    We will “affirm the Board’s order to bargain unless the
    Board abused its discretion in overruling [an employer’s]
    objections,” Randell Warehouse, 
    252 F.3d at 448
    , and the
    abuse of discretion was prejudicial, see Ozark Auto. Distribs.,
    Inc. v. NLRB, 
    779 F.3d 576
    , 582 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting the
    harmless-error rule exists “[i]n administrative law, as in
    federal civil and criminal litigation”). An error is harmless
    unless it “affected the outcome of the [underlying]
    proceedings.” United States v. Coumaris, 
    399 F.3d 343
    , 347
    14
    (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Salem Hosp. Corp. v. NLRB, 
    808 F.3d 59
    , 68 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting no prejudice occurs
    where “excluded evidence would not compel or persuade to a
    contrary result”). Whether an error is prejudicial “depends on
    a number of factors, including the closeness of the case, the
    centrality of the issue in question, and the effectiveness of any
    steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Huthnance v.
    District of Columbia, 
    722 F.3d 371
    , 381 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
    III.
    Woodcrest faults the Hearing Officer for failing to
    provide a full and fair hearing of its objections.
    A.
    First, Woodcrest claims the denial of its request to
    subpoena six of Vergel de Dios’s subordinates destroyed a
    “central” aspect of its case because the employees “would
    have” provided testimony concerning Vergel de Dios’s
    “objectionable and coercive conduct.” Pet’r Br. 23. Since
    NLRB regulations mandate the issuance of such subpoenas,
    
    29 C.F.R. § 102.66
    (f), the denial undisputedly constituted
    error—a fact the NLRB recognized when it adopted the
    Hearing Officer’s recommendations.       Thus, to prevail,
    Woodcrest need only demonstrate the error was not harmless.
    See Salem Hosp., 808 F.3d at 68 (noting no prejudice occurs
    where “excluded evidence would not compel or persuade to a
    contrary result”).
    Unfortunately for Woodcrest, it cannot make this
    showing here. The company’s failure to meet this burden has
    less to do with the Hearing Officer’s rulings than its lawyer’s
    litigation choices.
    15
    Most notably, Woodcrest walked out of the hearing on
    Monday morning. This voluntary choice means we cannot
    separate the harm Woodcrest suffered (if any) as a result of
    the Hearing Officer’s denial from the prejudice caused by
    Woodcrest’s decision to truncate the hearing. For instance,
    according to Woodcrest, the subpoena denials prevented six
    of Vergel de Dios’s employees from providing testimony
    establishing Vergel de Dios’s improper influence over his
    subordinates. Yet, Woodcrest’s choice not to present its five
    remaining witnesses also prevented the Hearing Officer from
    hearing from an employee who allegedly would have testified
    Vergel de Dios told him to “vote what your heart tells you, as
    well as vote what is best for you.” J.A. 316–17. If this
    witness testified consistently, he would have directly undercut
    Vergel de Dios’s denial. See J.A. 206–07. Perhaps
    Woodcrest was prejudiced by the Hearing Officer’s decision
    to deny the subpoenas. See Ozark, 779 F.3d at 585 (noting
    the Court’s willingness to “assum[e] that the documents, if
    disclosed, would have supported the company’s claim” when
    assessing the prejudicial effect of a hearing officer’s decision
    to quash subpoenas). But perhaps Woodcrest’s own decision
    to short-circuit the hearing and forgo the evidence it might
    have provided had a greater impact. Woodcrest cannot
    simply create (or contribute to the creation of) prejudice and
    then plead reversible error. It must demonstrate the NLRB’s
    error was dispositive. See Salem Hosp., 808 F.3d at 68.
    Additionally, Woodcrest has not actually shown the
    denials “excluded critical evidence.” Pet’r Br. 21. In its
    brief, Woodcrest claims the six employees were “central” to
    its case because they “would have testified as to Vergel de
    Dios’ objectionable and coercive conduct.” Pet’r Br. 23
    (emphasis added). Woodcrest also argues the centrality of the
    testimony would have prevented the Hearing Officer from
    revoking the subpoenas once given.          See 29 C.F.R.
    16
    § 102.66(f) (permitting revocations “if, in [the hearing
    officer’s] opinion, the evidence whose production is required
    does not relate to any matter under investigation or in
    question in the proceedings”). But Woodcrest does not back
    up these claims with any concrete evidence. When arguing
    before the Hearing Officer and this Court, all Woodcrest
    offered to support its “reasonable belief” that these witnesses
    had relevant knowledge was the fact that they were “members
    of [Vergel de Dios’s] department.” See, e.g., J.A. 304; Oral
    Arg. Tr. 10–11. It could not specify why these six, as
    compared to the other approximately eighteen employees
    supervised by Vergel de Dios, had relevant knowledge. Oral
    Arg. Tr. 42–43. And, when pressed at oral argument to
    justify the need for the testimony, Woodcrest’s counsel
    admitted it did not “know[] at the end of the day” what they
    would say. Oral Arg. Tr. 10.
    By contrast, it appears Woodcrest voluntarily chose not
    to call witnesses whom it had expressly identified as having
    knowledge about Vergel de Dios’s behavior.                When
    Woodcrest first filed its objections, it submitted to the
    Regional Director a list of witnesses it planned to call, along
    with a description of what they would say in their testimony.
    See 
    29 C.F.R. § 102.69
    (a). According to Board case law, this
    offer of proof needed to “specifically identify[] witnesses who
    would provide direct rather than hearsay testimony to support
    its objections, specifying which witnesses would address
    which objections.” Transcare N.Y., Inc., 
    355 N.L.R.B. 326
    ,
    326 (2010); see also City Wide Insulation of Madison, Inc.,
    
    338 N.L.R.B. 793
    , 795 (2003) (noting the objecting party
    must send this evidence to the Regional Office). This offer of
    proof served as the basis for the Regional Director’s decision
    to set the two objections for a hearing. See 
    29 C.F.R. § 102.69
    (c)(1)(ii) (noting the Regional Director will set
    objections for hearings if he “determines that the evidence
    17
    described in the accompanying offer of proof could be
    grounds for setting aside the election if introduced at a
    hearing . . . .” (emphasis added)). In his report recommending
    Woodcrest’s first two objections proceed to a hearing, the
    Regional Director explicitly stated Woodcrest’s offer of proof
    “provided the names of several supervisory and bargaining
    unit employees whom it contends will testify that
    Environmental Director Israel Vergel de Dios . . . actively
    supported the Union.” J.A. 6. In support, Woodcrest
    “assert[ed] that the witnesses will testify that Vergel de Dios
    expressed his opinion to unit employees that they were
    underpaid and unappreciated and, thus, needed the protection
    of the Union.” 
    Ibid.
     Yet, at oral argument, Woodcrest’s
    counsel stated neither the six subpoenaed employees nor the
    five employees it refused to call on Monday were on the list
    submitted to the Regional Director. Oral Arg. Recording
    49:20; Oral Arg. Tr. 49. Assuming Woodcrest provided
    truthful submissions to the Regional Director, it cannot now
    demonstrate to this Court that the Hearing Officer’s refusal to
    issue the subpoenas served as the source of prejudice, as
    compared to Woodcrest’s own decision not to call the
    employees it asserted had already provided it with direct
    knowledge of Vergel de Dios’s coercive conduct.
    All told, Woodcrest’s voluntary decision to leave the
    Hearing, its failure to demonstrate the centrality of the
    witnesses to its case, and the potential for the Hearing Officer
    to exercise permissible discretion to revoke the subpoenas
    means Woodcrest cannot prove the denial of the six
    subpoenas “irreparably prejudiced” its case. Pet’r Br. 38. It
    thus has not demonstrated reversible error occurred.
    In addition to its prejudice arguments, Woodcrest points
    to our decision in ManorCare, LLC v. NLRB, 
    823 F.3d 81
    , 87
    (D.C. Cir. 2016), and urges us to find, as we did there, that the
    18
    Board abused its discretion because its analysis was too
    “cursor[y]” or “truncated.” But that decision has no bearing
    on the instant case. In ManorCare, the employer presented
    direct testimony from multiple employees that two other
    employees had threatened to “punch[] people in the face,”
    “beat[] people up,” and “slash [people’s] tires,” among other
    things. 
    Id.
     at 83–84. This testimony was also corroborated by
    “several other managers and supervisors.” 
    Id. at 84
    . The
    Hearing Officer found these threats disturbed the laboratory
    conditions necessary for a fair and free election, 
    id.,
     but the
    Board reversed, finding the threatening statements were
    jocular in nature, 
    id. at 85
    . In doing so, the Board disregarded
    its own precedent, which laid out six factors for assessing a
    threat’s seriousness and its likelihood of causing voter
    intimidation. 
    Id.
     at 85–87. Instead, “the Board cursorily
    acknowledged its own precedent and then dismissed the effect
    of the threatening statements.” 
    Id. at 87
    . Within that context,
    we found the Board’s discussion “too brief to demonstrate
    how the facts of [that] case align[ed] with the Board’s
    precedent.” 
    Id.
    Here, by contrast, we contextualize the Board’s
    discussion within a hearing where ten witnesses provided
    virtually no testimony of objectionable conduct, a fact which
    the Hearing Officer discussed at length in his report. See J.A.
    25–30 (summarizing each of the ten witness’s testimony and
    highlighting how each failed to corroborate Woodcrest’s
    representations); see also J.A. 70 (Board adoption of Hearing
    Officer’s recommendations) (referencing this same lack of
    corroboration to support its conclusion that Woodcrest was
    not prejudiced by the denial of the subpoenas). Further, we
    place it within a hearing where the employer chose to
    voluntarily walk out rather than proffer any additional
    evidence to strengthen its case—another fact acknowledged
    by the Hearing Officer. See J.A. 23. Within this framework,
    19
    we cannot find the NLRB abused its discretion when it
    affirmed the Hearing Officer’s recommendations, concluded
    Woodcrest was engaging in a “fishing expedition,” J.A. 70,
    and dismissed the error as harmless. See Huthnance, 722
    F.3d at 381 (noting courts consider “the closeness of the case”
    when assessing the prejudicial effect of an error).
    B.
    Woodcrest next contends the Hearing Officer abused his
    discretion when he refused to permit eight, already-
    subpoenaed witnesses to testify. Woodcrest argues the
    Hearing Officer imposed a “novel requirement” by insisting
    Woodcrest confine its case only to witnesses it had previously
    “vetted.” Pet’r Br. 47. According to Woodcrest, this
    imposition is especially inappropriate in the context of such
    investigation hearings, which provide no pre-hearing
    discovery mechanisms and which afford subpoenaed
    witnesses the right not to speak to the employer beforehand.
    Johnnie’s Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R.B. at 775. Since all eight
    witnesses had exercised these rights, Woodcrest asserts the
    “vetting” requirement placed it in an impossible position. 5
    As a general matter, Woodcrest identifies a valid
    potential concern. The Hearing Officer did repeatedly inform
    Woodcrest he wanted to hear from witnesses with “firsthand”
    or “direct” knowledge. See, e.g., J.A. 304, 309, 320. Under
    NLRB regulations, the employer has the burden of
    demonstrating objectionable conduct.              Harborside
    Healthcare, 343 N.L.R.B. at 910 (noting the objecting party
    5
    Just how impossible is difficult to assess. Woodcrest represented
    to the Board that it interviewed “between 100 and 150 employees”
    over four days. J.A. 76. But the record does not reveal how many
    of these employees spoke at length to Woodcrest, as opposed to
    summarily exercising their Johnnie’s Poultry rights.
    20
    has the burden “to establish, not just that objectionable acts
    occurred, but also that they interfered with the employees’
    exercise of free choice to such an extent that they materially
    affected the results of the election”); Amalgamated Clothing
    Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 
    424 F.2d 818
    , 827 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
    (noting a party “must produce specific evidence” of
    inappropriate conduct). And, it must meet this burden,
    notwithstanding the lack of discovery mechanisms, the
    existence of Johnnie’s Poultry rights, and the bar against
    using a representation hearing as a “fishing expedition.”
    Cauthorne Trucking, 
    256 N.L.R.B. 720
    , 720 (1981).
    Furthermore, particularly in cases like the instant one—where
    the supervisors cause the allegedly objectionable conduct—
    the employer may find it difficult to find either a supervisor
    eager to confess or an employee willing to implicate a
    supervisor. In that case, limiting witnesses solely to those
    with “direct knowledge” may constitute an abuse of discretion
    that hamstrings the employer, leaving no feasible means for it
    to meet the evidentiary burden.
    But that is not the case here. After two days of
    testimony, and in the absence of any proffer outlining the
    anticipated testimony’s relevance, the Hearing Officer did not
    abuse his discretion by refusing to hear eight additional
    witnesses.
    Given the specific and direct testimony prefigured by
    Woodcrest’s submissions to the Regional Director, the initial
    focus on general witnesses is puzzling. Despite its offer of
    proof, nine out of Woodcrest’s ten witnesses provided no
    direct testimony of objectionable conduct and, in fact,
    provided testimony that directly contradicted Woodcrest’s
    21
    representations. 6 Though the Hearing Officer never saw the
    offer of proof, he knew of its existence and what it must
    contain. See J.A. 23 (noting, in his report, Woodcrest did not
    provide “any testimony of first-hand factual knowledge of
    facts surrounding the alleged objectionable conduct[,] . . .
    notwithstanding counsel’s prior representation to the Regional
    Director that it would present direct factual testimony from
    witnesses to demonstrate that Petitioner engaged in the
    alleged objectionable conduct”). After two days, it was
    reasonable for the Hearing Officer to conclude he needed a
    more substantial proffer to justify allowing the parade of
    witnesses to continue.
    Furthermore, though the Hearing Officer used words like
    “direct” and “firsthand,” J.A. 309, 320, the record read as a
    whole reveals the Hearing Officer’s willingness to allow
    witnesses to testify, so long as Woodcrest could provide any
    basis—even circumstantial evidence—for that testimony. Or,
    to put it another way, we read the Hearing Officer not as
    asking Woodcrest to tell him what the witnesses would say,
    but to tell him how it knew what the witnesses likely would
    say.
    The Hearing Officer’s differing treatment of two of
    Woodcrest’s potential witnesses—Remi Sajimi and Ms.
    Beziole—illustrates this point. Sajimi had exercised her
    Johnnie’s Poultry rights, and Woodcrest accordingly could
    not vet her. Woodcrest represented to the Hearing Officer
    that an employee with “direct knowledge” had told Woodcrest
    she had “overheard . . . Cordero telling Remi that [Cordero]
    would make sure certain employees attended a [U]nion
    meeting.” J.A. 307. Despite this extremely attenuated,
    6
    The tenth witness provided hearsay testimony about Langdon—a
    Woodcrest supervisor—and Sanchez—a Woodcrest employee;
    Woodcrest did not follow up by calling either party to testify.
    22
    hearsay evidence, the Hearing Officer stated Sajimi had
    “direct knowledge,” J.A. 308, and she was permitted to
    testify. In contrast, the Hearing Officer did not permit the
    testimony of Ms. Beziole. Unlike Sajimi, Woodcrest believed
    Ms. Beziole had relevant knowledge only because she was a
    “[U]nion supporter.” J.A. 309. Woodcrest used this same
    “Union supporter” assertion to justify its need for the eight
    subpoenas. The Hearing Officer refused to hear from all nine
    witnesses on the same grounds: Woodcrest could not make
    any proffer to back up its representations about what the
    employees would say once called. The decision to deny the
    eight subpoenas also came after Remi Sajimi testified, where
    she contradicted Woodcrest’s representation and instead
    corroborated Cordero’s version of events.
    Under these circumstances, we cannot say the Hearing
    Officer abused his discretion by requiring Woodcrest to
    provide even the most basic proffer in support of its request
    for additional witnesses after two full days of testimony.
    Moreover, even had we found the Hearing Officer abused his
    discretion, Woodcrest’s voluntary decision to walk out of the
    hearing again prevents it from demonstrating reversible error.
    See supra Part III.A. Thus, under either the abuse-of-
    discretion or reversible-error prongs of the analysis,
    Woodcrest’s argument fails.
    C.
    Finally, we easily dismiss Woodcrest’s contention that
    the Hearing Officer abused his discretion by refusing to allow
    Woodcrest to treat Vergel de Dios as a hostile witness.
    NLRB regulations expressly state “rules of evidence
    prevailing in courts . . . shall not be controlling” in
    proceedings challenging election results.          
    29 C.F.R. § 102.66
    (a). Consequently, we cannot say the Hearing
    23
    Officer abused his discretion by opting not to apply a
    nonbinding rule, especially since the Hearing Officer did
    permit Woodcrest to ask leading questions and to continue
    lines of questioning to which the Union objected. See, e.g.,
    J.A. 184–85 (allowing leading questions); J.A. 185
    (overruling objection because the Hearing Officer “want[ed]
    to see where this is going”); J.A. 196 (overruling relevance
    objection because he “still want[ed] to hear it”); J.A. 206–07
    (noting he “wanted to hear the answer” to the leading question
    “did you . . . ever have the discussion about words to the
    effect of voting what your heart tells you” or “vote what is
    best for you”); J.A. 208–09. As a result, we also cannot say
    the Board abused its discretion when it affirmed the Hearing
    Officer’s recommendations, particularly given the “especially
    wide degree of discretion” this Court affords the Board “[o]n
    questions regarding representation.” Randell Warehouse, 
    252 F.3d at
    447–48.
    IV.
    Because we hold the Board did not abuse its discretion,
    we deny Woodcrest’s request to set aside the Board’s June 15
    order and to remand with direction for a new election. We
    grant the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement of the
    same order.
    So ordered.