United States v. Marlon Haight , 892 F.3d 1271 ( 2018 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued May 8, 2018                     Decided June 22, 2018
    No. 16-3123
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    APPELLEE
    v.
    MARLON HAIGHT,
    APPELLANT
    Consolidated with 17-3002
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:15-cr-00088-1)
    Jenifer Wicks argued the causes and filed the briefs for
    appellant/cross-appellee.
    Luke M. Jones and Lauren R. Bates, Assistant U.S.
    Attorneys, argued the causes for appellee/cross-appellant.
    With them on the briefs were Jessie K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, and
    Elizabeth Trosman, Nicholas P. Coleman, and Christopher
    Macchiaroli, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
    Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and KAVANAUGH and
    SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges.
    2
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.
    KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Marlon
    Haight of several drug- and gun-related offenses. The District
    Court sentenced Haight to 12 years and 8 months in prison.
    Haight appeals his conviction on three grounds. He
    challenges the District Court’s refusal to postpone his trial. He
    contests two of the District Court’s evidentiary rulings at trial.
    And he raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We
    affirm Haight’s conviction except that, consistent with our
    ordinary practice, we remand for the District Court to address
    Haight’s ineffective assistance claim in the first instance.
    The Government cross-appeals Haight’s sentence. The
    Government argues that Haight was subject to a 15-year
    mandatory-minimum sentence under the Armed Career
    Criminal Act because of Haight’s three prior convictions for
    violent felonies and serious drug offenses. We agree with the
    Government. We therefore vacate Haight’s sentence and
    remand for resentencing.
    I
    In 2014, the Metropolitan Police Department of
    Washington, D.C., received a tip that a man known as Boo was
    selling crack cocaine in the Lincoln Heights neighborhood of
    Washington. The tip came from Blaine Proctor, a cocaine user
    and long-time police informant. Proctor claimed to have
    bought cocaine from Boo on several occasions.
    Proctor gave the police Boo’s cell-phone number. Police
    Officer Herbert LeBoo ran the cell-phone number through a
    subscriber database and determined that the number belonged
    to Marlon Haight. Officer LeBoo then ran the name Marlon
    3
    Haight through another database and matched the name to a
    photograph. Officer LeBoo showed the photograph to Proctor,
    who said, “That’s Boo.”
    Under Officer LeBoo’s supervision, Proctor then made
    three controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Boo. After
    the third controlled purchase, police officers executed a search
    warrant at the apartment where Boo had sold the cocaine to
    Proctor. No one answered the door, so the officers used a
    battering ram to enter the apartment. While most of the officers
    were breaking down the door, Officer Clifford, who was
    standing outside the apartment building, saw two men jump
    from one of the building’s windows and run away before they
    could be apprehended. Officer Clifford later testified that he
    was “90 percent” sure that one of the jumpers was Marlon
    Haight, whose photo Officer Clifford had studied earlier that
    day.
    Meanwhile, the other officers finished breaking down the
    door and entered the apartment. There, they found Russell
    Ferguson. Ferguson lived in the apartment. Ferguson denied
    that Haight was selling cocaine from the apartment. But
    Ferguson later cooperated with the police and changed his tune:
    He testified that he had allowed Haight and four other men to
    use his apartment to process and sell crack cocaine.
    The police officers searched Ferguson’s apartment and
    found cocaine, cocaine base, crack cocaine in small plastic
    bags, a scale, baking soda, and hundreds of empty plastic bags.
    They also found marijuana, a loaded handgun, ammunition,
    cash, and a cell phone with a picture of Haight on its home
    screen.
    In the bedroom, the police saw that the screen to one of the
    windows had been pushed out. They found another cell phone
    4
    sitting on the window sill. The police later determined that
    Haight had purchased that cell phone.
    About a month later, the police located and arrested
    Haight. The police then applied for a search warrant to search
    Haight’s own apartment. While they were waiting for the
    warrant, the police staked out Haight’s apartment building.
    They saw Haight’s girlfriend leave the building carrying a
    backpack. They stopped her and eventually searched the
    backpack. In the backpack, the officers found several pounds
    of marijuana, Haight’s employment documents, and a sheaf of
    handwritten papers. The handwritten papers turned out to be
    rap lyrics and a skit script that included Haight’s name and
    expressed Haight’s desire to deal drugs in Lincoln Heights.
    Later that day, after securing the search warrant for Haight’s
    apartment, the police searched the apartment. There, they
    found another gun and more ammunition.
    The Government charged Haight with numerous drug and
    gun crimes. The jury found Haight guilty on six counts.
    At sentencing, the Government argued that Haight was
    subject to a 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence based on his
    three prior convictions for violent felonies and serious drug
    offenses. The District Court ruled that one of the three
    convictions did not qualify as a violent felony. The District
    Court therefore concluded that Haight was not subject to the
    15-year mandatory-minimum sentence. The District Court
    sentenced Haight to 12 years and 8 months in prison.
    Haight appeals his conviction. The Government cross-
    appeals Haight’s sentence.
    5
    II
    In appealing his conviction, Haight first challenges the
    District Court’s denial of his motion to postpone his trial.
    Haight also contests the District Court’s decision to admit into
    evidence: (i) Officer LeBoo’s testimony about Proctor’s out-
    of-court statement identifying Haight; and (ii) the writings
    found in the backpack carried by Haight’s girlfriend. Finally,
    Haight claims that his trial counsel was ineffective.
    A
    Haight’s trial was originally scheduled to start in
    September 2015. Between September 2015 and February
    2016, Haight moved three times to postpone the trial. The
    District Court granted each of those motions, eventually setting
    a June 2016 trial date. After granting the third motion and
    setting the June 2016 trial date, the District Court warned that
    Haight would need a compelling reason to postpone the trial
    any further.
    In February 2016, the District Court held an evidentiary
    hearing on Haight’s motion to suppress the writings found in
    the backpack. In early May, the District Court said that it was
    likely to deny Haight’s motion to suppress the writings. In
    early June, two weeks before trial, the Government moved in
    limine to introduce the writings into evidence. Haight
    responded with a fourth request to postpone the trial. Haight
    argued that he needed more time to decide how to address the
    writings and to consult with a handwriting expert.
    The District Court denied Haight’s motion to further
    postpone the trial. On appeal, Haight contends that the District
    Court abused its discretion in denying his motion. We
    disagree.
    6
    Recognizing that “judges necessarily require a great deal
    of latitude in scheduling trials,” we review a district court’s
    denial of a motion to postpone a trial under the deferential
    abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Gantt, 
    140 F.3d 249
    , 256 (D.C. Cir. 1998). We expect district courts to weigh
    various commonsense factors, including the reasons for the
    requested postponement; the length of the requested
    postponement; whether any postponements have already been
    granted; the effect of further delay on the parties, witnesses,
    attorneys, and court; and whether denying a postponement will
    result in “material or substantial” prejudice to the defendant’s
    case. Id.
    The District Court acted well within its discretion here.
    The court considered the relevant factors and explained why a
    further postponement was not warranted: Haight had already
    requested and received three postponements, which had
    delayed his trial by nine months; Haight’s experienced counsel
    had a month to consider how to address the writings; and the
    writings did not present any difficult or novel issues that
    justified further delay. The District Court’s refusal to grant yet
    another postponement was entirely reasonable.
    B
    We review the District Court’s two challenged evidentiary
    rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Borda, 
    848 F.3d 1044
    , 1055 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
    First, Haight argues that the District Court abused its
    discretion by admitting hearsay testimony. At trial, Officer
    LeBoo testified about Proctor’s initial out-of-court
    photographic identification of Haight. Haight objected that
    Officer LeBoo’s testimony on that point was inadmissible
    7
    hearsay. The District Court disagreed with Haight and
    admitted the testimony.
    Federal Rule of Evidence 802 renders hearsay generally
    inadmissible. But under Rule 801, a witness’s testimony
    recounting a declarant’s out-of-court statement is not hearsay
    if (i) the declarant’s statement “identifies a person as someone
    the declarant perceived earlier,” and (ii) the declarant “testifies
    and is subject to cross-examination about” the statement. Fed.
    R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C). The declarant of the out-of-court
    statement is ordinarily “regarded as ‘subject to cross-
    examination’ when he is placed on the stand, under oath, and
    responds willingly to questions.” United States v. Owens, 
    484 U.S. 554
    , 561 (1988).
    Officer LeBoo’s testimony recounting Proctor’s out-of-
    court statement identifying Haight was not hearsay because the
    testimony fell squarely within Rule 801: (i) Proctor’s out-of-
    court statement – “That’s Boo” – identified Haight as someone
    whom Proctor had perceived earlier, and (ii) Proctor testified
    at Haight’s trial and was subject to cross-examination about
    that statement.
    It is true that Haight’s counsel did not actually cross-
    examine Proctor about the earlier identification of Boo.
    Defense counsel presumably chose that tack because, on direct
    examination by the Government, Proctor did not remember
    having identified Boo to Officer LeBoo. Proctor’s memory
    failure was therefore potentially helpful to Haight’s defense
    and not something for defense counsel to mess with on cross-
    examination. But Rule 801 was still satisfied. As the Seventh
    Circuit has stated, a “meaningful opportunity to cross-examine
    a declarant regarding his prior identification is enough to
    satisfy the requirements of Rule 801, even if,” for strategic or
    other reasons, “the defendant chooses not to use the
    8
    opportunity.” United States v. Foster, 
    652 F.3d 776
    , 789 (7th
    Cir. 2011). We agree. Officer LeBoo’s testimony about
    Proctor’s earlier out-of-court identification of Haight was not
    hearsay.
    Even if the District Court abused its discretion in admitting
    Officer LeBoo’s testimony on that issue, the error was
    harmless. Officer LeBoo’s testimony helped show that Haight
    and Boo were the same person. But the Government
    introduced abundant other evidence to establish that fact.
    Second, Haight maintains that the District Court abused its
    discretion by admitting the handwritten lyrics and handwritten
    script that the police found in the backpack carried by Haight’s
    girlfriend. Haight argues that: (i) the writings were not
    properly authenticated under Rule 901; (ii) the writings
    constituted prior-acts evidence not admissible under Rule
    404(b); and (iii) the probative value of the writings was
    substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
    under Rule 403. We disagree with Haight.
    Under Rule 901, the Government had to “produce
    evidence sufficient to support a finding that” the writings were
    what the Government claimed they were: lyrics and a script
    written by Haight. That authentication evidence could include
    the “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
    distinctive characteristics” of the writings, “taken together with
    all the circumstances.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a), (b)(4).
    The District Court did not abuse its discretion in
    concluding that the Government satisfied Rule 901. The
    Government established that Haight’s name appeared on the
    writings and that the writings were in a backpack that also
    contained Haight’s employment papers.            Furthermore,
    Haight’s girlfriend was carrying the backpack, and she had just
    9
    brought it out of the apartment that she and Haight shared. See,
    e.g., United States v. Mejia, 
    597 F.3d 1329
    , 1335-37 (D.C. Cir.
    2010); United States v. Thorne, 
    997 F.2d 1504
    , 1508 (D.C. Cir.
    1993); United States v. Harvey, 
    117 F.3d 1044
    , 1049 (7th Cir.
    1997).
    The District Court also did not abuse its discretion in
    admitting the writings under Rule 404(b). Assuming without
    deciding that the writings constituted evidence of another
    “crime, wrong, or other act” within the meaning of Rule
    404(b), the District Court admitted the writings for permissible
    purposes, including identity, knowledge, and intent. See
    United States v. Bowie, 
    232 F.3d 923
    , 930 (D.C. Cir. 2000). As
    the District Court explained, the writings tended to show that
    Haight: (i) owned the backpack and the marijuana found in the
    backpack; (ii) knew about guns and drug dealing; (iii)
    possessed the guns and drugs found in Ferguson’s apartment;
    and (iv) intended to distribute drugs in Lincoln Heights.
    Finally, as to Haight’s Rule 403 argument, the District
    Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
    probative value of the writings outweighed any danger of
    unfair prejudice.
    In short, we reject Haight’s evidentiary challenges.
    C
    Haight next contends that his counsel’s failure to obtain a
    handwriting expert deprived him of his constitutional right to
    effective assistance of counsel.      Haight asserts that a
    handwriting expert could have testified that the writings found
    in the backpack were not in Haight’s handwriting.
    10
    Unlike most federal courts of appeals, we allow defendants
    to raise ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal. But
    because ineffective assistance claims typically require factual
    development, we ordinarily remand those claims to the district
    court “unless the trial record alone conclusively shows that the
    defendant either is or is not entitled to relief.” United States v.
    Rashad, 
    331 F.3d 908
    , 909-10 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also
    Massaro v. United States, 
    538 U.S. 500
    , 505 (2003) (district
    court is “the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary
    to determining the adequacy of representation” at trial). Like
    most ineffective assistance claims raised on direct appeal,
    Haight’s claim in this case requires further factual development
    to determine, for example, why Haight’s trial counsel did not
    obtain a handwriting expert. We therefore remand Haight’s
    ineffective assistance claim so that the District Court may
    consider that issue in the first instance.
    III
    The District Court sentenced Haight to 12 years and 8
    months in prison. The Government cross-appeals the sentence,
    arguing that Haight was subject to a 15-year mandatory-
    minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act,
    known as ACCA. We agree with the Government and remand
    for resentencing.
    Haight was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
    the federal felon-in-possession statute. ACCA imposes a 15-
    year mandatory-minimum sentence on defendants who violate
    Section 922(g) and who have three prior convictions for “a
    violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both.” 18 U.S.C.
    § 924(e)(1).
    When sentenced, Haight had prior convictions for:
    (1) distribution of cocaine in violation of D.C. law; (2) first-
    11
    degree assault under Maryland law; and (3) assault with a
    dangerous weapon under D.C. law.
    In his sentencing submissions to the District Court, Haight
    accepted that his prior D.C. conviction for distribution of
    cocaine qualified as a serious drug offense under ACCA.
    Haight also accepted that his Maryland first-degree assault
    conviction qualified as a violent felony under ACCA. Haight
    argued, however, that his D.C. conviction for assault with a
    dangerous weapon did not qualify as a violent felony under
    ACCA. Haight therefore maintained that he was not subject to
    ACCA’s 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence because he
    did not have three prior convictions for violent felonies or
    serious drug offenses. The District Court agreed with Haight.
    On appeal, the Government contends that the District
    Court erred in concluding that Haight’s D.C. assault with a
    dangerous weapon conviction was not a violent felony under
    ACCA. We review the District Court’s interpretation of
    ACCA de novo. See United States v. Mathis, 
    963 F.2d 399
    ,
    404 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
    In response, Haight not only argues that his D.C. assault
    with a dangerous weapon conviction is not a violent felony, but
    also contends – for the first time – that his Maryland first-
    degree assault conviction is not a violent felony. Because
    Haight did not raise that latter argument in the District Court,
    we review that claim for plain error. See United States v.
    Sheffield, 
    832 F.3d 296
    , 311 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
    A
    We first address whether Haight’s D.C. conviction for
    assault with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a conviction for a
    violent felony under ACCA.
    12
    As relevant here, ACCA defines “violent felony” to
    include, among other things, “any crime punishable by
    imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that “has as an
    element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
    force against the person of another.”             18 U.S.C.
    § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The Supreme Court has stated that “physical
    force” in that provision means “violent force – that is, force
    capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”
    Johnson v. United States, 
    559 U.S. 133
    , 140 (2010).
    In determining whether a given conviction qualifies as a
    violent felony under ACCA, we employ the so-called
    categorical approach, examining only the elements of the
    crime, not the particular facts underlying the defendant’s prior
    conviction. See Taylor v. United States, 
    495 U.S. 575
    , 600
    (1990). In other words, we assess the crime categorically, “in
    terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of
    how an individual offender might have committed it on a
    particular occasion.” Begay v. United States, 
    553 U.S. 137
    , 141
    (2008). If the law defines the crime in such a way that it can
    be committed using either violent or non-violent force, then the
    crime is not a violent felony under ACCA, even if the
    defendant actually used violent force in committing the crime.
    See United States v. Redrick, 
    841 F.3d 478
    , 482 (D.C. Cir.
    2016).
    The elements of D.C. assault with a dangerous weapon are:
    “(1) an attempt, with force or violence, to injure another, or a
    menacing threat, which may or may not be accompanied by a
    specific intent to injure; (2) the apparent present ability to
    injure the victim; (3) a general intent to commit the acts which
    constitute the assault; and (4) the use of a dangerous weapon in
    committing the assault.” Spencer v. United States, 
    991 A.2d 1185
    , 1192 (D.C. 2010). A “dangerous weapon” is an object
    that is “likely to produce death or great bodily injury by the use
    13
    made of it.” Powell v. United States, 
    485 A.2d 596
    , 601 (D.C.
    1984) (emphasis removed).
    The elements of the offense indicate that the D.C. crime of
    assault with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a violent felony
    under ACCA. See United States v. Brown, No. 15-3056, 
    2018 WL 2993179
    , at *12-13 (D.C. Cir. June 15, 2018) (D.C. assault
    with a dangerous weapon is crime of violence under
    Sentencing Guidelines); In re Sealed Case, 
    548 F.3d 1085
    ,
    1089 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (equivalent ACCA and Guidelines
    provisions are interpreted the same way).
    Haight raises two separate arguments against that
    conclusion.
    First, Haight claims that the D.C. offense of assault with a
    dangerous weapon can be committed with so-called indirect
    force, such as using a hazardous chemical to burn someone,
    rather than with more direct force, such as using a gun or a
    knife to maim someone. See, e.g., Sloan v. United States, 
    527 A.2d 1277
     (D.C. 1987) (lye); Bishop v. United States, 
    349 F.2d 220
     (D.C. Cir. 1965) (sulphuric acid). And he claims that the
    use of indirect physical force does not qualify as the use of
    physical force under this statute. We do not perceive any such
    distinction between direct and indirect force in the language of
    the statute or in the relevant precedents. Moreover, in United
    States v. Castleman, 
    134 S. Ct. 1405
     (2014), the Supreme Court
    addressed a similar statute referencing prior crimes committed
    with “physical force,” and the Court refused to distinguish
    indirect physical force from direct physical force. In the
    Supreme Court’s analysis, it did not matter what tool or method
    the defendant may have used to harm the victim. See id. at
    1414-15. Of course, ACCA requires that the physical force be
    violent force – that is, “force capable of causing physical pain
    or injury to another person.” Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140. But by
    14
    analogy from Castleman, so-called indirect violent force is still
    violent force.
    In so concluding, we agree with ten other federal courts of
    appeals that have addressed the question either in the ACCA
    context or in equivalent contexts. See United States v. Ellison,
    
    866 F.3d 32
    , 37-38 (1st Cir. 2017) (Guidelines); United States
    v. Hill, 
    832 F.3d 135
    , 143-44 (2d Cir. 2016) (18 U.S.C.
    § 924(c)(3)); United States v. Chapman, 
    866 F.3d 129
    , 132-33
    (3d Cir. 2017) (Guidelines); United States v. Reid, 
    861 F.3d 523
    , 528-29 (4th Cir. 2017) (ACCA); United States v.
    Verwiebe, 
    874 F.3d 258
    , 261 (6th Cir. 2017) (Guidelines);
    United States v. Jennings, 
    860 F.3d 450
    , 458-60 (7th Cir. 2017)
    (ACCA and Guidelines); United States v. Rice, 
    813 F.3d 704
    ,
    706 (8th Cir. 2016) (Guidelines); Arellano Hernandez v.
    Lynch, 
    831 F.3d 1127
    , 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (18 U.S.C. § 16);
    United States v. Ontiveros, 
    875 F.3d 533
    , 536-38 (10th Cir.
    2017) (Guidelines); United States v. Deshazior, 
    882 F.3d 1352
    ,
    1357-58 (11th Cir. 2018) (ACCA). But see United States v.
    Rico-Mejia, 
    859 F.3d 318
    , 322-23 (5th Cir. 2017).
    Second, Haight contends that D.C. assault with a
    dangerous weapon can be committed recklessly, and therefore
    does not categorically require the use of violent force “against
    the person of another” within the meaning of ACCA.
    Haight’s recklessness argument contravenes the Supreme
    Court’s recent decision in Voisine v. United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 2272
     (2016). There, in interpreting Section 922(g)’s provision
    for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, the Court held
    that reckless domestic assault involves the use of physical
    force. Id. at 2278-80; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii),
    922(g)(9). Focusing on the word “use,” the Court reasoned that
    the word is “indifferent as to whether the actor has the mental
    state of intention, knowledge, or recklessness with respect to
    15
    the harmful consequences of his volitional conduct.” Voisine,
    136 S. Ct. at 2279.
    The statutory provision at issue in Voisine contains
    language nearly identical to ACCA’s violent felony provision:
    Both provisions penalize defendants convicted of crimes that
    have “as an element” the “use” of “physical force.” 18 U.S.C.
    §§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), 924(e)(2)(B)(i). So Voisine’s reasoning
    applies to ACCA’s violent felony provision. As long as a
    defendant’s use of force is not accidental or involuntary, it is
    “naturally described as an active employment of force,”
    regardless of whether it is reckless, knowing, or intentional.
    Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2279.
    It is true that ACCA requires a defendant to use violent
    force “against the person of another” – a phrase that does not
    appear in the statutory provision that the Supreme Court
    considered in Voisine. But the provision at issue in Voisine still
    required the defendant to use force against another person –
    namely, the “victim.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). In the
    words of the Supreme Court in Voisine, the phrase
    “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” is “defined to
    include any misdemeanor committed against a domestic
    relation that necessarily involves the ‘use . . . of physical
    force.’” Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2276 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
    § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)).
    In light of Voisine, we conclude that the use of violent
    force includes the reckless use of such force. In so concluding,
    we agree with four other courts of appeals that have addressed
    the issue either in the ACCA context or in the equivalent
    Guidelines “crime of violence” context. See United States v.
    Mendez-Henriquez, 
    847 F.3d 214
    , 220-22 (5th Cir. 2017)
    (Guidelines); United States v. Verwiebe, 
    874 F.3d 258
    , 262 (6th
    Cir. 2017) (Guidelines); United States v. Fogg, 
    836 F.3d 951
    ,
    16
    956 (8th Cir. 2016) (ACCA); United States v. Pam, 
    867 F.3d 1191
    , 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2017) (ACCA). We recognize that
    the First Circuit has reached a contrary conclusion, but we
    respectfully disagree with that court’s decision. See United
    States v. Windley, 
    864 F.3d 36
     (1st Cir. 2017).
    In sum, we conclude that Haight’s D.C. conviction for
    assault with a dangerous weapon counts as a violent felony
    under ACCA.
    B
    We conclude that the District Court did not err, much less
    plainly err, in classifying Haight’s Maryland first-degree
    assault conviction as a violent felony under ACCA.
    Maryland first-degree assault is defined as follows: “(1) A
    person may not intentionally cause or attempt to cause serious
    physical injury to another. (2) A person may not commit an
    assault with a firearm.” Md. Code, Crim. Law § 3-202(a). To
    convict a defendant of first-degree assault, the government
    must prove that the defendant committed a second-degree
    assault and either (1) “used a firearm to commit assault” or
    (2) “intended to cause serious physical injury in the
    commission of the assault.” Md. Crim. Pattern Jury Instr.
    4:01.1.
    As with D.C. assault with a dangerous weapon, the
    additional elements that convert Maryland second-degree
    assault into first-degree assault – the use of a firearm or the
    intention to cause serious physical injury – require the
    defendant to use, attempt to use, or threaten to use violent force
    against another person. The District Court did not err – much
    less plainly err – in reaching that commonsense conclusion,
    which is the same conclusion reached by the only federal court
    17
    of appeals to have considered the question. See United States
    v. Redd, 372 F. App’x 413, 415 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Because the
    elements of first-degree assault under Maryland law
    encompass the use or attempted use of physical force,” the
    defendant’s two convictions for first-degree assault
    “categorically qualify as ACCA predicates.”).
    In sum, Haight had three ACCA-predicate convictions. As
    a result, Haight was subject to a 15-year mandatory-minimum
    sentence under ACCA. We therefore remand for resentencing.
    ***
    As to Haight’s conviction, we affirm the judgment of the
    District Court except that we remand for the District Court to
    address Haight’s ineffective assistance claim in the first
    instance. As to Haight’s sentence, we vacate the judgment of
    the District Court and remand for resentencing.
    So ordered.