Steven Larrabee v. Carlos Del Toro ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued October 22, 2021                Decided August 2, 2022
    No. 21-5012
    STEVEN M. LARRABEE,
    APPELLEE
    v.
    CARLOS DEL TORO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
    OF THE NAVY, AND UNITED STATES,
    APPELLANTS
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:19-cv-00654)
    Cynthia A. Barmore, Attorney, U.S. Department of
    Justice, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs
    were Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
    and Sharon Swingle, Attorney.
    Stephen I. Vladeck argued the cause for appellee. With him
    on the brief was Eugene R. Fidell.
    A. Richard Ellis was on the brief for amicus curiae
    National Institute of Military Justice in support of appellee.
    Joshua E. Kastenberg and J. Wesley Moore, pro se, were
    on the brief for amici curiae in support of appellee.
    2
    Before: TATEL, ∗ RAO, and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO. +
    Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by
    Circuit Judge TATEL.
    RAO, Circuit Judge: Steven Larrabee, a member of the
    Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, pleaded guilty at a court-martial
    to the sexual assault of a civilian. In this collateral challenge to
    his sentence, Larrabee argues that the statutory grant of military
    jurisdiction over Fleet Marine Reservists exceeds Congress’
    authority to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation
    of the land and naval Forces,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14
    (“Make Rules Clause”), and that his “case[]” did not “aris[e] in
    the land and naval forces,” id. amend. V (“Grand Jury Clause”).
    The district court held for Larrabee. We now reverse.
    Whether a person may be subjected to court-martial
    jurisdiction turns “on one factor: the military status of the
    accused.” Solorio v. United States, 
    483 U.S. 435
    , 439 (1987).
    Based on the Supreme Court’s precedents interpreting the
    Make Rules Clause as well as the original meaning of that
    Clause, we hold that a person has “military status” if he has a
    formal relationship with the military that includes a duty to
    obey military orders. As a Fleet Marine Reservist, Larrabee
    was “actually [a] member[] or part of the armed forces,” and
    therefore amenable to military jurisdiction under the Make
    Rules Clause. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
    ∗
    Circuit Judge TATEL assumed senior status after this case was
    argued and before the date of this opinion.
    +
    Circuit Judge WALKER joins the majority opinion as to all except
    Part III.
    3
    11, 15 (1955). We also hold that the Fifth Amendment’s Grand
    Jury Clause did not separately bar Larrabee’s court-martial.
    I.
    A.
    The Fleet Marine Corps Reserve is one part of the Marine
    Corps, alongside the Regular Marine Corps and the Marine
    Corps Reserve. 1 
    10 U.S.C. § 8001
    (a)(2). Its name
    notwithstanding, the Fleet Marine Reserve is not a “reserve
    component” of the armed forces. See 
    id.
     § 10101 (listing the
    military’s reserve components). Marine Corps reservists are
    part-time soldiers who maintain civilian jobs but who are
    trained like full-time troops and who may be ordered into
    active-duty service, if necessary. Id. §§ 10102, 12301(a)–(b).
    Membership in the Fleet Marine Reserve, by contrast, is a de
    facto retirement status for those who have previously served in
    active duty. See United States v. Begani, 
    81 M.J. 273
    , 275
    (C.A.A.F. 2021) (recognizing that after a Marine’s transfer to
    the Fleet Marine Reserve, “for all intents and purposes, he [has]
    retired”) (cleaned up). A Marine becomes eligible to transfer
    into the Fleet Marine Reserve after serving in active duty for at
    least twenty years. 
    10 U.S.C. § 8330
    (b). After thirty total years
    of service, he is then formally retired. 2 
    Id.
     § 8331(a); see also
    id. § 8326(a). At any time after completing his required years
    of service—whether he is in active duty, a Fleet Marine
    1
    The Fleet Marine Reserve was 15,600 strong at the time of oral
    argument.
    2
    By statute, Fleet Marine Reservists and formally retired Marines
    have similar rights and responsibilities. They are entitled to the same
    amount of pay, see 
    10 U.S.C. §§ 8326
    (c)(2), 8330(c)(1), and are both
    subject to ongoing service duties, see 
    id.
     § 688(a)–(c). In this
    opinion, we use the term “military retiree” in its formal sense, to refer
    to persons on Marine Corps’ retired lists.
    4
    Reservist, or a retiree—a Marine may request to be discharged,
    which results in a “[c]omplete severance from all military
    status.” MARINE CORPS ORDER 1900.16, SEPARATION AND
    RETIREMENT MANUAL ¶ 1002.20 (2019) [hereinafter MCO
    1900.16].
    During the window between active duty and formal
    retirement, members of the Fleet Marine Reserve receive
    “retainer pay,” calculated based on their rank and years of
    service at the time of transfer. 
    10 U.S.C. §§ 8330
    (c)(1), 8333.
    They are also subject to ongoing military duties. In times of
    war or national emergency or “when otherwise authorized by
    law,” Fleet Marine Reservists “may be ordered … to active
    duty without [their] consent” for the duration of the crisis, and
    up to six months thereafter. 
    Id.
     § 8385(a). In peacetime, they
    agree to serve for up to twelve months in any two-year period,
    see id. § 688(a), (b)(3), (e)(1), and may be ordered into “active
    duty for training” for up to two months in any four-year period,
    id. § 8385(b). Finally, they must comply with administrative
    reporting requirements—they must inform the military if they
    change addresses, for instance—and are subject to restrictions
    on foreign employment.
    Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”),
    Fleet Marine Reservists may be court-martialed. Id.
    § 802(a)(6). Congress has given the military courts jurisdiction
    over the Fleet Marine Reserve since 1925. See Act of Feb. 28,
    1925, §§ 2, 10, Pub. L. No. 68-512, 
    43 Stat. 1080
    , 1080–81,
    1083.
    B.
    The facts in this case are undisputed. After twenty years in
    active-duty service, Larrabee transferred to the Fleet Marine
    Reserve. He began working as a civilian employee on his
    former base in Iwakuni, Japan, and moonlighting as a manager
    5
    at two local bars near the base. After a late night of drinking,
    Larrabee sexually assaulted an inebriated and unconscious
    bartender and filmed the encounter on his cell phone. His
    victim, the wife of an active-duty Marine, reported the assault
    to Military Police, who obtained the video from Larrabee’s
    phone. The victim’s husband was immediately reassigned to a
    posting in the United States. Larrabee was charged with
    “sexual assault” and “indecent recording” under the UCMJ.
    See 
    10 U.S.C. §§ 920
    (b), 920c(a)(2). He pleaded guilty at a
    court-martial and was sentenced to ten months’ confinement
    and a dishonorable discharge.
    Larrabee appealed to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of
    Criminal Appeals (“CCA”), arguing, as relevant here, that the
    UCMJ provision authorizing court-martial jurisdiction over
    members of the Fleet Marine Reserve, 
    10 U.S.C. § 802
    (a)(6),
    was unconstitutional. Military retirees, he argued, are not part
    of “the land and naval Forces” that Congress may place under
    the jurisdiction of courts-martial. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
    The CCA had recently held that personnel “in a retired status
    remain members of the land and Naval forces who may face
    court-martial,” United States v. Dinger, 
    76 M.J. 552
    , 557 (N-
    M. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (cleaned up), so it “summarily
    reject[ed]” Larrabee’s challenge as well, United States v.
    Larrabee, 
    2017 WL 5712245
    , at *1 n.1 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
    Nov. 28, 2017). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
    (“CAAF”) summarily upheld his conviction without reaching
    the constitutional question at issue here. United States v.
    Larrabee, 
    78 M.J. 107
     (C.A.A.F. 2018) (mem.), cert. denied,
    
    139 S. Ct. 1164
     (2019).
    His direct appeals exhausted, Larrabee brought this
    collateral challenge to his sentence in the District Court for the
    District of Columbia. He argued that Section 802(a)(6) is
    facially unconstitutional because a Fleet Marine Reservist is
    6
    “for all practical purposes a civilian” and therefore not subject
    to regulation under the Make Rules Clause. See U.S. CONST.
    art. I, § 8, cl. 14. In the alternative, even if the Fleet Marine
    Reserve is part of the “land and naval Forces,” Larrabee
    insisted his court-martialing was still unconstitutional under
    the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause because his “case[]”
    did not “aris[e] in the land or naval forces.” Id. amend. V
    (requiring grand jury indictments for all “capital[] or otherwise
    infamous” crimes, “except in cases arising in the land or naval
    forces, or in the Militia”). Under the Grand Jury Clause,
    Larrabee argued, the military may not court-martial a retiree
    for an offense that bears “no connection to the armed forces.”
    Since he was accused of committing civilian crimes against a
    civilian on private property, the court-martial’s exercise of
    jurisdiction in his case was unconstitutional.
    After both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings,
    the district court held for Larrabee. See Larrabee v.
    Braithwaite, 
    502 F. Supp. 3d 322
    , 333 (D.D.C. 2020). The
    central question, the court explained, was “one of status,
    namely, whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is
    a person who can be regarded as falling within the term ‘land
    and naval Forces.’” 
    Id. at 328
     (quoting Kinsella v. United
    States ex rel. Singleton, 
    361 U.S. 234
    , 241 (1960)). Fleet
    Marine Reservists were part of the “land and naval Forces,” the
    court reasoned, only if subjecting them to court-martial
    jurisdiction was “necessary to maintain good order and
    discipline” within the military’s ranks. 
    Id. at 331
    . Because
    “trial by military court-martial ‘was intended to be only a
    narrow exception to the normal and preferred method of trial
    in courts of law,’” the court held the government bore the
    burden of showing why subjecting persons in the Fleet Marine
    Reserve to court-martial jurisdiction was necessary. 
    Id. at 327
    (quoting Reid v. Covert, 
    354 U.S. 1
    , 21 (1957) (plurality
    opinion)).
    7
    The government offered two reasons why subjecting Fleet
    Marine Reservists to court-martial jurisdiction was necessary
    to preserve military order and discipline, but the district court
    was persuaded by neither. First, the government argued that
    because they may be ordered into active duty “without [their]
    consent,” 
    10 U.S.C. § 8385
    (a), Fleet Marine Reservists remain
    a part of the nation’s fighting forces. Subjecting them to court-
    martial jurisdiction was therefore essential to uphold order in
    the military’s ranks. As the district court pointed out, however,
    under current military regulations “retirees are highly unlikely
    to be recalled.” Larrabee, 502 F. Supp. 3d at 331. Congress has
    extended court-martial jurisdiction over Marine Corps
    reservists only in narrow circumstances but has subjected
    members of the Fleet Marine Reserve to court-martial at all
    times. That discrepant treatment was fatal to any military
    necessity argument, in the court’s view.
    Second, the government argued that Fleet Marine
    Reservists’ “retainer pay represents reduced compensation for
    [their] current part-time services,” but the court found this
    inaccurate because “military retirement benefits actually
    represent deferred pay for past services,” and irrelevant
    because the receipt of a military pension was not, standing
    alone, sufficient to place a person in the “land and naval
    Forces.” Id. at 330. Soldiers’ dependents are entitled to military
    benefits, and military contractors are often paid by the military,
    but neither class of persons may be court-martialed. Id. at 330–
    31 (citing Covert, 
    354 U.S. at 23
    , and McElroy v. United States
    ex rel. Guagliardo, 
    361 U.S. 281
    , 286 (1960), respectively).
    Finding none of the government’s arguments persuasive, the
    court held Section 802(a)(6) facially unconstitutional and did
    not reach Larrabee’s as-applied challenge. The government
    timely appealed.
    8
    II.
    Our review of the district court’s judgment on the
    pleadings is de novo. Jones v. Dufek, 
    830 F.3d 523
    , 525 (D.C.
    Cir. 2016). The authority of a federal court to collaterally
    review a jurisdictional challenge to a conviction by court-
    martial is long established. See In re Grimley, 
    137 U.S. 147
    ,
    150 (1890) (“It cannot be doubted that the civil courts may in
    any case inquire into the jurisdiction of a court-martial, and if
    it appears that the party condemned was not amenable to its
    jurisdiction, may discharge him from the sentence.”). That
    authority persists even where the court-martial’s sentence was
    not custodial, or if the plaintiff is no longer in military custody.
    See Sanford v. United States, 
    586 F.3d 28
    , 32 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
    (“[F]ederal courts have jurisdiction to review the validity of
    court-martial proceedings brought by non-custodial
    plaintiffs.”) (cleaned up); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 
    420 U.S. 738
    , 749–53 (1975) (reading the UCMJ and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    to permit non-habeas collateral attacks against court-martial
    judgments that are allegedly “void”).
    Faced with a constitutional challenge to a military court’s
    sentence, we must assess whether the military courts properly
    exercised jurisdiction in Larrabee’s case. See Grisham v.
    Hagan, 
    361 U.S. 278
    , 279–80 (1960) (giving no deference to a
    court-martial’s finding that it had jurisdiction over the
    accused); Guagliardo, 
    361 U.S. at
    282–84 (same); Singleton,
    
    361 U.S. at
    235–36 (same); Covert, 
    354 U.S. at
    3–5 (same).
    “[W]hether the Constitution requires Article III courts to try
    [certain] offenses,” or whether they may be tried in a different
    forum, “is a structural question of subject matter jurisdiction”
    subject to “de novo review” in this court. Al Bahlul v. United
    States, 
    840 F.3d 757
    , 760 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc)
    (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Our jurisdiction cannot be
    circumscribed by the decisions of Article I courts, because the
    9
    Constitution’s structure of separated powers requires the
    Article III courts to exercise “judicial Power” independently of
    the other departments. U.S. CONST. art. III; cf. Marbury v.
    Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). We therefore
    proceed to consider whether the exercise of court-martial
    jurisdiction over Larrabee was constitutional.
    III.
    At the outset, we address the government’s argument that
    this court must defer to Congress in determining whether Fleet
    Marine Reservists are properly subject to court-martial
    jurisdiction under the Make Rules Clause. 3 Because “any
    expansion of court-martial jurisdiction … necessarily
    encroaches on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up under
    Article III of the Constitution,” Toth, 350 U.S. at 15, we cannot
    simply defer to Congress’ decision to extend court-martial
    jurisdiction over Fleet Marine Reservists. Such extension is
    constitutional only if Fleet Marine Reservists “can be regarded
    as falling within the term ‘land and naval Forces,’” Singleton,
    
    361 U.S. at
    241—a question that turns on “the military status
    of the accused,” Solorio, 
    483 U.S. at 439
    .
    When confronted with a UCMJ provision allowing court-
    martial jurisdiction over a class of persons, the Supreme Court
    has repeatedly declined to defer to Congress. See, e.g.,
    3
    The government has argued that Larrabee was properly subject to
    court-martial jurisdiction because Section 802(a)(6) is consistent
    with the Make Rules Clause. This case therefore does not implicate
    the jurisdiction of courts-martial in theaters of war. In that distinct
    context, given “the extraordinary circumstances present in an area of
    actual fighting,” courts-martial may try both civilians and military
    personnel. Covert, 
    354 U.S. at 33
    . That power stems not from
    Congress’ authority under the Make Rules Clause, but “must rest on
    the Government’s ‘war powers.’” 
    Id.
    10
    Guagliardo, 
    361 U.S. at
    283–87 (giving no deference to
    Congress’ determination that civilian military contractors may
    be court-martialed); Covert, 
    354 U.S. at
    19–23 (same, for
    servicemembers’ dependents); Toth, 350 U.S. at 19–23 (same,
    for former servicemembers). Instead the Court has asked
    whether the accused was “actually [a] member[] or part of the
    armed forces,” or else was a “civilian[] … entitled to have the
    benefit of safeguards afforded those tried in the regular courts
    authorized by Article III.” Toth, 350 U.S. at 15, 23. Although
    Congress maintains “plenary” authority under the Make Rules
    Clause to determine which offenses may be punished by court-
    martial, Solorio, 
    483 U.S. at 441
    , it does not possess the
    anterior authority to define which persons may be
    constitutionally court-martialed.
    The government argues that this case is unique because
    Congress has not only authorized the court-martialing of Fleet
    Marine Reservists under the Make Rules Clause but has also
    defined the Fleet Marine Reserve as part of the “armed forces”
    pursuant to its authority under the Army and Navy Clauses. 
    10 U.S.C. §§ 101
    (a)(4), 8001(a)(2); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls.
    12–13 (“Army and Navy Clauses”) (authorizing Congress to
    “raise and support Armies” and “provide and maintain a
    Navy”). Without question, Congress’ power to raise and
    support the nation’s fighting forces is capacious and entitled to
    substantial deference. See United States v. O’Brien, 
    391 U.S. 367
    , 377 (1968) (“The constitutional power of Congress to
    raise and support armies and to make all laws necessary and
    proper to that end is broad and sweeping.”). It follows, the
    government argues, that if Congress raises a military force
    pursuant to the Army and Navy Clauses, individuals in that
    force are ipso facto in “the land and naval Forces” covered by
    the Make Rules Clause.
    11
    The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that these
    Clauses are not coextensive, noting that “there might be
    circumstances where a person could be ‘in’ the armed services
    for purposes of [the Make Rules Clause] even though he had
    not formally been inducted into the military.” Covert, 
    354 U.S. at 23
    ; see also Guagliardo, 
    361 U.S. at
    284–85 (citing Ex parte
    Reed, 
    100 U.S. 13
     (1879)). Because these Clauses are not
    perfectly overlapping, it is not necessarily the case that if a
    person is part of the forces Congress has raised under the Army
    and Navy Clauses, he may be court-martialed under the Make
    Rules Clause. The fact that Congress has chosen to define the
    Fleet Marine Reserve as part of the armed forces is therefore
    not sufficient to make its members constitutionally amenable
    to court-martial.
    The Supreme Court has not deferred to Congress’
    judgments in this area, but instead has assessed whether a
    person was actually in the armed forces, or instead was a
    civilian. In Guagliardo, the Court indicated that if Congress
    wanted to subject military contractors to court-martial
    jurisdiction, it could draft them into the armed forces. See 361
    U.S. at 286. For Congress to invoke its power under the Army
    and Navy Clauses and label them part of the “land and naval
    Forces” would not have been enough. Similarly, in Toth, the
    Court held that Congress could not extend court-martial
    jurisdiction over a former serviceman who had been discharged
    from the army and returned to civilian life. See 350 U.S. at 22–
    23. Nothing in Toth or its successor cases suggests that if
    Congress had just defined the accused civilian as a member of
    the “land and naval Forces,” the Court would have reached a
    different result. Congress may not, through an act of legislative
    bootstrapping, expand the scope of the Make Rules Clause by
    defining (or redefining) its terms.
    12
    Contrary to the government’s assertions, Congress cannot
    rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause “to extend military
    jurisdiction to any group of persons beyond that class
    described” in the Make Rules Clause. Covert, 
    354 U.S. at
    20–
    21; see also Toth, 350 U.S. at 22 (explaining that the Make
    Rules Clause does not “deprive people of trials under Bill of
    Rights safeguards, and we are not willing to hold that power to
    circumvent those safeguards should be inferred through the
    Necessary and Proper Clause”). As the Court has recognized,
    “a statute cannot be framed by which a civilian can lawfully be
    made amenable to the military jurisdiction in time of peace.”
    Covert, 
    354 U.S. at 35
     (quoting WILLIAM WINTHROP,
    MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 107 (2d ed. 1920) (1886))
    (cleaned up).
    Congress’ authority under the Make Rules Clause is
    circumscribed by Article III and the Grand Jury Clause, which
    protect individual liberty interests. See 
    id. at 21
     (“Every
    extension of military jurisdiction is an encroachment on the
    jurisdiction of the civil courts, and, more important, acts as a
    deprivation of the right to jury trial and of other treasured
    constitutional protections.”). Because of the constitutional
    interests at stake, we do not defer to Congress’ judgments about
    the classes of persons who are within the “land and naval
    Forces,” and thus subject to court-martial jurisdiction.
    IV.
    Whether Larrabee was constitutionally subjected to court-
    martial jurisdiction turns “on one factor: the military status of
    the accused.” Solorio, 
    483 U.S. at 439
    . Neither the Supreme
    Court nor this court has spoken directly to the constitutional
    question of whether Fleet Marine Reservists specifically, or
    inactive-duty military retirees more generally, may be court-
    martialed. The Court’s decisions interpreting the Make Rules
    13
    Clause, however, draw a consistent distinction between
    civilians on the one hand and persons in the armed forces on
    the other. “[I]f the language of [the Make Rules Clause] is
    given its natural meaning, the power granted does not extend
    to civilians[.] … The term ‘land and naval Forces’ refers to
    persons who are members of the armed services and not to
    [civilians].” Covert, 
    354 U.S. at
    19–20 (cleaned up).
    In each case in which the Court has found that the accused
    was in “the land and naval Forces,” he had a formal
    “relationship with the military and its institutions,” which made
    him “actually [a] member[] or part of the armed forces.” Toth,
    350 U.S. at 14–15. Soldiers in active-duty service, most
    typically, may be subject to court-martial jurisdiction. Cf.
    Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857). Such
    active-duty personnel have been inducted into the military, are
    in the chain of command, and are required to obey their
    superiors’ orders. But the Court has also held that, in certain
    narrow circumstances, the Constitution permits the court-
    martialing of persons not presently in active-duty service—so
    long as they have a particular kind of “relationship with the
    military and its institutions.” Toth, 350 U.S. at 14.
    The Court’s Make Rules Clause jurisprudence has been
    shaped in response to a diverse range of cases in which a person
    was court-martialed. What unites the decisions in these
    different contexts is that the persons found to be properly
    within “the land and naval Forces” had a formal relationship
    with the military that included an obligation to obey military
    orders.
    In Reed, for instance, the Court held that a Navy
    paymaster’s clerk was amenable to court-martial. 
    100 U.S. at 22
    . The clerk had never been formally inducted into the Navy
    and so was not an active-duty servicemember. Nevertheless,
    14
    the clerk had agreed to serve on a naval vessel, binding
    “himself to be subject to the laws and regulations for the
    government of the navy and the discipline of the vessel,” and
    had “take[n] an oath … to serve until discharged.” 
    Id.
     at 19–
    20, 22 (cleaned up). The clerk’s formal relationship with the
    Navy was further confirmed by the fact that he was appointed
    by the commander of the ship and could only be discharged in
    the same way. He wore a uniform, had a fixed rank, and was
    on the Navy’s payroll. 
    Id. at 22
    . Finally, at the time of his court-
    martialing, the clerk had not been discharged and so had an
    ongoing obligation to obey the orders of the vessel’s
    commander. 
    Id. at 20
    . In light of these observations, the Court
    concluded, “[i]f these officers are not in the naval service, it
    may well be asked who are.” 
    Id. at 22
    .
    Similarly, in Kahn v. Anderson, the Court held that a group
    of soldiers who had been court-martialed and sentenced to a
    term of imprisonment remained amenable to court-martial for
    crimes committed while in military custody. See 
    255 U.S. 1
    , 7–
    8 (1921). The prisoners had argued that, as a result of their
    initial conviction, they had “ceased to be soldiers and were no
    longer subject to military law.” 
    Id. at 7
    . Rejecting that
    argument as “unsubstantial,” the Court held that “even if their
    discharge as soldiers had resulted from the previous sentences
    … it would be here immaterial, since, as they remained military
    prisoners, they were for that reason subject to military law and
    trial by court-martial for offenses committed during such
    imprisonment.” 
    Id.
     at 7–8 (citing Carter v. McClaughry, 
    183 U.S. 365
    , 383 (1902)). The prisoners had a legal relationship
    with the armed forces, even if involuntary, because they were
    “military prisoners undergoing punishment for previous
    sentences.” Id. at 7. As the Court explained in Carter, because
    military jurisdiction “attache[s]” at the time of a soldier’s
    court-martialing, he remains under the military’s jurisdiction
    until his release. 
    183 U.S. at 383
    . “Having [been] sentenced,
    15
    his status [is] that of a military prisoner” who must obey
    military orders. 
    Id.
     Therefore, “for offences committed during
    his confinement he [is] liable to trial and punishment by court
    martial.” 
    Id.
    Congress also may authorize courts-martial to punish
    those who disobey lawful draft orders. See Billings v.
    Truesdell, 
    321 U.S. 542
    , 556 (1944) (“We have no doubt of the
    power of Congress to enlist the manpower of the nation for
    prosecution of the war and to subject to military jurisdiction
    those who are unwilling, as well as those who are eager, to
    come to the defense of their nation in its hour of peril.”). 4 From
    the moment he is called to serve, a draftee becomes part of “the
    land and naval Forces”—bound to the military by a legal duty
    to serve, even if involuntarily. Cf. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S.
    (5 Wheat.) 1, 20 (1820) (“[I]f Congress had pleased so to
    declare, a militia man, called into the service of the United
    States, might have been held and considered as being
    constructively in that service, though not actually so.”); Martin
    v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 33–34 (1827) (permitting the
    court-martialing of a man who was ordered into militia service,
    but refused to join). Even if he refuses to be inducted, a draftee
    is a member of the armed forces and obliged to obey military
    orders. Billings, 
    321 U.S. at 556
    .
    The clerk in Reed, the prisoner in Kahn, and the draftee in
    Billings each had a legal relationship to the military that
    included an ongoing duty to obey military orders. For that
    reason, they came within the scope of “the land and naval
    Forces.”
    4
    Billings ultimately held that the courts-martial lacked jurisdiction
    for statutory, not constitutional, reasons. See 
    321 U.S. at
    556–58.
    16
    By contrast, in every case in which the Court has struck
    down the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over a class of
    persons, the accused had no formal relationship with the
    military and no ongoing obligation to obey military orders. In
    Toth, for example, the Court made clear that servicemembers
    who have been legally discharged and returned to civilian life
    are not part of “the land and naval Forces.” See 350 U.S. at 22–
    23. Although Toth was accused of committing a crime while a
    servicemember, at the time of his arrest he had been discharged
    and “had no relationship of any kind with the military.” Id. at
    13. Whatever his prior relation to the military, the Make Rules
    Clause did not permit a discharged soldier to be court-
    martialed. “For given its natural meaning, the power granted
    Congress ‘To make Rules’ to regulate ‘the land and naval
    Forces’ would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to
    persons who are actually members or part of the armed
    forces”—that is, persons who are in the armed forces at the
    time of their court-martialing. Id. at 15. The Court explained
    that the purpose of the military justice system would not be
    impaired by “giving ex-servicemen the benefit of a civilian
    court trial when they are actually civilians.” Id. at 22.
    In a pair of successor cases, the Court extended Toth’s
    basic logic to hold that servicemembers’ civilian dependents
    may not be court-martialed. “The term ‘land and naval Forces’
    refers to persons who are members of the armed services and
    not to their civilian wives, children and other dependents.”
    Covert, 
    354 U.S. at
    19–20; see also Singleton, 
    361 U.S. at 248
    .
    As the Court explained, the servicemembers’ dependents “had
    never been members of the army, had never been employed by
    the army, [and] had never served in the army in any capacity.”
    Covert, 
    354 U.S. at 32
    . Although they often live with
    servicemembers on military installations and receive military
    benefits, they “do not lose their civilian status and their right to
    a civilian trial” by virtue of those facts. 
    Id. at 23
    .
    17
    Similarly, the Court has held that private military
    contractors may not be court-martialed. Like discharged
    soldiers and servicemembers’ dependents, the Constitution
    “requires [the military’s] civilian employees to be afforded the
    same right of trial by jury.” Grisham, 
    361 U.S. at 280
    . In
    Guagliardo, the Court noted that private contractors could be
    court-martialed if they had voluntarily bound themselves to the
    military through procedures like those used by the paymaster’s
    clerk in Reed, or if they had been “incorporate[d] … directly
    into the armed services, either by compulsory induction or by
    voluntary enlistment.” 361 U.S. at 286. But unless such action
    were taken to bring them into a “military status,” private
    contractors remained “civilians” outside the scope of the Make
    Rules Clause. Id. at 287, 284.
    The Court has declined to adopt a bright-line test to
    distinguish between civilians and those within the “land and
    naval Forces.” See Covert, 
    354 U.S. at 22
     (“Even if it were
    possible, we need not attempt here to precisely define the
    boundary between ‘civilians’ and members of the ‘land and
    naval Forces.’”). Nonetheless, its decisions construing the
    scope of the Make Rules Clause, read together, suggest that a
    person is part of the “land and naval Forces” and may be
    subject to court-martial jurisdiction if he has a formal
    relationship with the armed forces that includes a duty to obey
    military orders. 5
    5
    A legal relationship to the military that includes an obligation to
    obey military orders is sufficient for membership in “the land and
    naval Forces.” Therefore, we need not decide whether such a
    relationship is necessary for membership in “the land and naval
    Forces.”
    18
    V.
    The rule suggested by the Court’s caselaw is consistent
    with our understanding of the original meaning of the Make
    Rules Clause. The American “court-martial is in fact older than
    the Constitution.” Ortiz v. United States, 
    138 S. Ct. 2165
    , 2175
    (2018) (cleaned up). The Court has therefore often “undertaken
    … the difficult task of interpreting [the Make Rules Clause] by
    drawing upon English constitutional history.” Loving v. United
    States, 
    517 U.S. 748
    , 760 (1996). The organization and
    regulation of the eighteenth-century British military, as well as
    an American court-martial proceeding at the end of the
    Revolutionary War, suggest that at the Founding, the term
    “land and naval Forces” was understood to encompass
    inactive-duty personnel who remained obligated to obey
    military orders, including orders to serve again if called. Such
    inactive-duty soldiers, in other words, were regarded as having
    “military status.”
    We begin with the pre-Revolutionary example of “half-
    pay officers.” In the seventeenth century, in recognition of
    prior service, the British government began paying certain
    officers a reduced salary in peacetime. See JOHN CHILDS, THE
    BRITISH ARMY OF WILLIAM III, 1689–1702, at 70 (1987). Half-
    pay officers were allowed to live otherwise ordinary civilian
    lives but had to return to active-duty service if ordered. See
    N.A.M. Rodger, Commissioned Officers’ Careers in the Royal
    Navy, 1690–1815, 3 J. FOR MAR. RSCH. 85, 90–91 (2001). After
    1714, all British officers became eligible to participate in this
    system, which fed the rise of a burgeoning corps of officers
    who made lifelong careers in the military. “By mid-century
    long service had become the norm,” and the half-pay system
    was a recognizable feature of British military culture. JOHN
    BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER 56 (1989).
    19
    When compared to active-duty soldiers, half-pay officers’
    connections to Britain’s armed forces were quite sparse. Aside
    from their diminished pay, their only connection to the military
    was their ongoing service obligation. 6 Nevertheless,
    throughout the eighteenth-century, Parliament consistently
    described these half-pay officers as part of “his Majesty’s land
    forces and marines.” 9 Geo. 2 ch. 34, § 21; see also THE
    ANNALS OF KING GEORGE, YEAR THE THIRD 153 (1718)
    (describing funds appropriated for “Half-pay to the Officers of
    the Land Forces and Marines disbanded” after the Jacobite
    uprising of 1715). In 1758, Edmund Burke’s Annual Register
    reported that Parliament had set aside funds for the “widows of
    such reduced officers of the land forces and marines, as died
    upon the establishment of half-pay.” 1 ANNUAL REGISTER 128
    (Edmund Burke ed., 4th ed. 1764) (1758). Decades later, the
    House of Commons directed one of its committees to estimate
    the cost of “Half Pay and Allowances [for] the Reduced
    Officers of His Majesty’s [North] American Forces” for the
    coming year. 50 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS [1794–
    95], at 84 (c. 1795).
    Although British half-pay officers were recognized as
    having military status, across the eighteenth century there was
    considerable debate about whether these officers should be
    subjected to the jurisdiction of peacetime courts-martial. Some
    half-pay officers were court-martialed in the early 1700s under
    the Mutiny Act adopted in 1689. See 1 JOHN MCARTHUR,
    PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF NAVAL AND MILITARY COURTS
    MARTIAL 190 (1805) (“[O]fficers on half pay were originally
    6
    While all half-pay officers were in principle subject to recall,
    “[o]fficers were retained on the list who were known to be incapable
    and even insane because no other support for their old age was
    available.” Rodger, 3 J. FOR MAR. RSCH. at 91. For such officers, the
    half-pay system was a de facto retirement.
    20
    deemed, though not in actual service, to be subject to martial
    law.”); cf. Loving, 
    517 U.S. at
    761–65 (discussing the Mutiny
    Act’s history). After realizing that the Act’s terms furnished
    uncertain legal grounds for those proceedings, Parliament
    amended the Act in 1748 to make clear that half-pay officers
    were subject to court-martial jurisdiction. 7 22 Geo. 2 c. 5; see
    1 MCARTHUR at 189–92; HARRIS PRENDERGAST, THE LAW
    RELATING TO OFFICERS IN THE ARMY 25 (1855).
    Soon thereafter, public opposition forced Parliament to
    reverse course, and the Act’s jurisdiction-extending provision
    was repealed. In 1785 the Court of Exchequer Chamber
    weighed in, finding that half-pay officers did not come within
    the scope of the Mutiny Act’s original terms. See 1 MCARTHUR
    at 195–96; PRENDERGAST at 25; JOHN DELAFONS, A TREATISE
    ON NAVAL COURTS MARTIAL 62–63 (1805). But that judicial
    decision did not limit the legislature’s authority to subject half-
    pay officers to military jurisdiction: one year later, Parliament
    again amended the Mutiny Act to encompass half-pay officers
    with brevet rank. See 1 MCARTHUR at 201. Thus, although it
    was contested throughout the eighteenth century whether half-
    pay officers should be legislatively subject to court-martial
    7
    The amendment provided:
    And whereas it may be otherwise doubted, whether … the
    reduced Officers of His Majesty’s Land Forces and
    Marines on the British and Irish Establishment of Half Pay,
    be within the Intent and Meaning of this Act, … it is hereby
    enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That the … reduced
    Officers of His Majesty’s Land Forces and Marines, on the
    British and Irish Establishments of Half Pay, be at all
    Times subject to all the Penalties and Punishments
    mentioned in this Act.
    22 Geo. 2 c. 5.
    21
    jurisdiction, it was beyond controversy that they were part of
    Britain’s armed “forces” amenable to military jurisdiction. 8
    The Americans who ratified the Constitution were familiar
    with the structure of the British military generally, and with the
    half-pay system specifically. Indeed, some of the Continental
    Army’s most prominent leaders had been half-pay officers in
    the years before independence—Charles Lee of Virginia, for
    instance. See 1 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON,
    REVOLUTIONARY WAR SERIES 18 n.4 (Philander D. Chase ed.,
    1985). During the Revolutionary War, the Continental
    Congress pledged on more than one occasion that after
    hostilities ceased, retired American officers would be given
    half pay, just like their British counterparts. 9 See 11 JOURNALS
    8
    After oral argument, Larrabee directed us to an unpublished article
    arguing that military retirees do not fall within the original meaning
    of “the land and naval Forces” in the Make Rules Clause. See Marc
    J. Emond, Can Grandpa Really be Court-Martialed? The
    Constitutionality of Imposing Military Law upon Retired Personnel
    (2022) (LL.M. dissertation, JAG Legal Ctr. & Sch.),
    https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4089746.
    Emond argues that at the Founding, the American Articles of War
    permitted only the court-martialing of active-duty personnel: those
    Articles were modeled on the British Mutiny Act, and by 1787, the
    Mutiny Act had not expressly authorized the court-martialing of half-
    pay officers for over thirty years. See 
    id.
     at 27–28. But given that
    Parliament had subjected half-pay officers to court-martial
    jurisdiction earlier in the eighteenth century, and that its authority to
    do so was not disputed, the scope of the Founding-era Articles of
    War is not dispositive of the Constitution’s original meaning. The
    fact that Congress chose not to subject inactive-duty personnel to
    court-martial jurisdiction does not settle whether Congress had the
    authority to do so under the Make Rules Clause.
    9
    Because of the federal government’s financial difficulties after the
    Revolutionary War, those plans did not ultimately materialize. The
    22
    OF THE    CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 502–03
    (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1908) [hereinafter
    JOURNALS]; 18 
    id.
     at 960–61. In 1781, Congress directed the
    Continental Army to place certain redundant officers in half-
    pay status and to make them amenable to involuntary recall.
    See 21 id. at 1180. The idea that an inactive-duty soldier might
    be part of the Continental Army’s “forces” was therefore not
    foreign to Founding-era Americans.
    Indeed, a notable historical episode confirms that in the
    early American Republic inactive-duty troops were understood
    to be part of “the land and naval Forces.” 10 The Continental
    Congress was authorized to “mak[e] rules for the government
    of the said land and naval forces.” ARTICLES OF
    CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4. To be court-
    martialed under the laws adopted by the Continental Congress,
    therefore, a person had to belong to the “land and naval forces.”
    Towards the end of the Revolutionary War, Congress elected
    to furlough indefinitely most soldiers in the Continental Army,
    with the understanding that they would be fully discharged
    after a peace with Britain was concluded. See 24 JOURNALS at
    269–71, 364–65, 390. Pursuant to that directive, in 1783
    George Washington instructed his officers to furlough their
    troops—to issue what were, in effect, conditional discharge
    United States’ military retirement system dates from the mid-
    nineteenth century, and Congress has subjected military retirees to
    court-martial jurisdiction since that time. See J. Mackey Ives &
    Michael J. Davidson, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Retirees under
    Articles 2(4) and 2(6): Time to Lighten Up and Tighten Up?, 175
    MIL. L. REV. 1, 3–5, 11–12 (2003).
    10
    We owe this historical argument to Judge Maggs. See Begani, 81
    M.J. at 284–85 (Maggs, J., concurring).
    23
    papers. 11 Between their furlough in June and their eventual
    discharge in October, these troops were not in active-duty
    service and were allowed to return indefinitely to civilian life.
    See Alexander W. Armour, Revolutionary War Discharges, 21
    WILLIAM & MARY Q. 344, 353–57 (1941); 25 JOURNALS at
    702–03.
    We know that these inactive-duty soldiers were part of the
    “land and naval forces” because, while they were furloughed,
    some were court-martialed. See Mary A.Y. Gallagher,
    Reinterpreting the “Very Trifling Mutiny” at Philadelphia in
    June 1783, 119 PENN. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOG. 3, 28 (1995). In
    June 1783, a large contingent of them—angry they had not
    been paid their full wages—staged a violent protest in
    Philadelphia, forcing the Continental Congress to evacuate the
    city. From Princeton, Congress directed the Army’s leadership
    to take “immediate measures … to confine and bring to trial all
    such persons belonging to the army as have been principally
    active in the late mutiny.” 24 JOURNALS at 412–13. After
    restoring order, some of them were court-martialed for
    mutiny. 12 See 25 JOURNALS at 565–66.
    Later, the Continental Congress intervened to pardon the
    convicted soldiers. Id. While Congress knew that many of these
    soldiers had received furloughs before the mutiny, it never
    challenged the court-martial’s power to try them; indeed, it had
    11
    These papers provided: “The within CERTIFICATE shall not avail
    the Bearer [of] a Discharge, until the Ratification of the definitive
    Treaty of Peace; previous to which Time, and until Proclamation
    thereof shall be made, He is to be considered as being on Furlough.”
    Reprinted in Alexander W. Armour, Revolutionary War Discharges,
    21 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 344, 354–55 (1941).
    12
    Under the Articles of War then in effect, only a “soldier or officer”
    could be tried for mutiny. Articles of War of 1776, § 2, art. 3,
    reprinted in 5 JOURNALS at 789.
    24
    ordered their trial. Henry Knox, the Secretary of War, voiced
    no objection to the proceedings. See Begani, 81 M.J. at 285 n.2
    (Maggs, J., concurring) (citing 33 JOURNALS at 666–67). And
    in his later narration of the episode, John Marshall never
    questioned the military tribunal’s jurisdiction. See 4 JOHN
    MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 614–18
    (1805). Although these furloughed soldiers were not currently
    in active duty, and would likely never serve again, Founding-
    era observers evidently had no difficulty conceiving of them as
    part of the “land and naval forces” whose members could be
    court-martialed.
    ***
    The scope of court-martial jurisdiction under the Articles
    of Confederation incorporated the settled meaning of “land and
    naval forces” that the revolutionaries inherited from their
    experience as British subjects. Cf. Felix Frankfurter, Some
    Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
    537 (1947) (“[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from another
    legal source … it brings the old soil with it.”). In drafting the
    Constitution, “the Framers recognized and sanctioned existing
    military jurisdiction by exempting from the Fifth
    Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause all ‘cases arising in the land
    or naval forces’” and “by granting [Congress] power ‘to make
    Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
    Forces.’” Ortiz, 
    138 S. Ct. at 2175
     (cleaned up). In other words,
    those persons who were in the “land and naval forces” under
    the Articles and who could therefore be court-martialed
    remained so under the Constitution.
    In eighteenth-century Britain and the post-revolutionary
    United States, “the land and naval forces” comprehended not
    only active-duty soldiers, but inactive-duty ones as well. Half-
    pay officers were part of “his Majesty’s land forces and
    25
    marines” because they had a relationship with the military that
    entailed an obligation to serve again, if called. The furloughed
    soldiers court-martialed in Philadelphia were part of the
    American “land and naval forces,” and for the same reason.
    These historical examples confirm that a person who has a
    formal relationship with the military that includes an obligation
    to obey military orders is part of the “land and naval Forces,”
    as that phrase was understood at the Founding. Because such
    persons are “actually members or part of the armed forces,” the
    Make Rules Clause permits Congress to subject them to court-
    martial jurisdiction. Toth, 350 U.S. at 15.
    VI.
    Based on the foregoing, it is sufficient for a person to fall
    within the “land and naval Forces” if he has a formal
    relationship with the armed forces that includes a duty to obey
    military orders. Applying that test of military status here, we
    conclude that members of the Fleet Marine Reserve are a part
    of the “land and naval Forces” and therefore that Larrabee’s
    court-martial was constitutional.
    A.
    Larrabee voluntarily joined the Marine Corps in 1994. As
    an active-duty Marine, he was unquestionably in the armed
    forces and amenable to court-martial jurisdiction. After serving
    in active duty for twenty years and attaining the rank of Staff
    Sergeant, he elected to transfer to the Fleet Marine Reserve. In
    practice he became a retiree, but he maintained a legal
    relationship with the armed forces. As a Fleet Marine
    Reservist, he assumed an obligation to obey, “without his
    consent,” an order to reenter active-duty service during a “war
    or national emergency declared by Congress,” a “national
    emergency declared by the President,” or as “otherwise
    authorized by law.” 
    10 U.S.C. § 8385
    (a); see also 
    id.
     § 688(a)–
    26
    (b). These service obligations are central to the identity of the
    Fleet Marine Reserve, whose basic “purpose … is to maintain
    a ready manpower pool of trained Marines for recall and
    mobilization.” MCO 1900.16 ¶ 7001.2. In addition to this duty
    to reenter active service, if ordered, Larrabee was also
    “required” to report to “active duty for training” for up to two
    months in any four-year period. 
    10 U.S.C. § 8385
    (b). Finally,
    he was subject to employment restrictions, as well as military
    reporting requirements. 13
    Through his membership in the Fleet Marine Reserve,
    Larrabee had legally bound himself to the armed forces and
    assumed a duty to obey military orders. He therefore had a
    “military status” and was properly subject to court-martial
    jurisdiction. Solorio, 
    483 U.S. at 439
    ; see also Guagliardo, 
    361 U.S. at 287
     (private military contractor lacked “military status”
    and so could not be court-martialed); MCO 1900.16 ¶ 1002.20
    (discharged soldiers, who may not be court-martialed under
    Toth, lack “all military status”).
    B.
    This conclusion is consistent with the settled position of
    the CAAF, which has long recognized military retirees as
    amenable to court-martial. See Pearson v. Bloss, 
    28 M.J. 376
    ,
    379 (C.M.A. 1989) (upholding military jurisdiction over
    retired personnel in the Air Force); United States v. Overton,
    13
    Our dissenting colleague maintains that until members of the Fleet
    Marine Reserve are recalled to active duty, “their day-to-day lives
    are equivalent to those of ordinary civilians.” Dissenting Op. 3. As a
    practical matter, this is undoubtedly true. As a formal legal matter,
    however, they continue to retain “military status,” even if not all the
    responsibilities of active-duty servicemembers. In times of
    emergency and war, Fleet Marine Reservists must answer the call to
    serve, whereas civilians may choose to stay home.
    27
    
    24 M.J. 309
    , 311 (C.M.A. 1987) (same, for members of the
    Fleet Marine Reserve). It reaffirmed that view last year in
    United States v. Begani, holding that “retired members of the
    armed forces”—including “members of the … Fleet Marine
    Reserve”—are “part of the ‘land and naval Forces’” whose
    members may be constitutionally court-martialed. 81 M.J. at
    276, 279, cert. denied, 
    142 S. Ct. 711
     (2021). In particular, the
    CAAF’s decision rested on the fact that Begani, a naval Fleet
    Reservist, (1) “receive[d] ongoing retainer pay” because he
    was a “current member[] of the armed forces, though not on
    active duty,” and (2) was “require[d] [to] maintain readiness
    for future recall.” 
    Id. at 278
     (emphasis removed). We note also
    that the only Article III court of appeals to have considered
    whether military retirees may be court-martialed reached the
    same result. See United States ex rel. Pasela v. Fenno, 
    167 F.2d 593
    , 595 (2d Cir. 1948) (holding that a naval Fleet Reservist
    could be court-martialed and pointing to the fact that he
    “remain[ed] subject to call to active duty”); cf. Hooper v.
    United States, 
    326 F.2d 982
    , 986–87 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (similar).
    C.
    Our conclusion that Fleet Marine Reservists are in “the
    land and naval Forces” is further reinforced by the fact that, in
    other contexts not raising the constitutional question presented
    here, the Supreme Court has recognized military retirees as part
    of the nation’s armed forces. Barker v. Kansas, for instance,
    concerned whether military retirees’ benefits should be taxed
    as a pension for past service or as “current pay for current
    services.” 
    503 U.S. 594
    , 600 (1992). In resolving that dispute,
    the Court explicitly confirmed that “[m]ilitary retirees
    unquestionably remain in the service and are subject to
    restrictions and recall.” 
    Id. at 599
    . In the similar case of
    McCarty v. McCarty, the Court noted that “[t]he retired officer
    remains a member of the Army, … continues to be subject to
    28
    the Uniform Code of Military Justice, … may forfeit all or part
    of his retired pay if he engages in certain activities,” and
    “remains subject to recall to active duty by the Secretary of the
    Army at any time.” 
    453 U.S. 210
    , 221–22 (1981) (cleaned up).
    In Kahn the Court flatly rejected the argument that, because
    “retired officers” are not in the armed forces, they may not sit
    on court-martial panels: “it is not open to question … that such
    officers are officers in the military service of the United
    States.” 
    255 U.S. at
    6–7.
    Indeed, as early as 1881, in United States v. Tyler, the
    Court found that while retirees are “not required to perform full
    service, they are [still] part of the army, and may be assigned
    to such duty as the laws and regulations permit.” 
    105 U.S. 244
    ,
    245 (1881); cf. Thornley v. United States, 
    113 U.S. 310
    , 315
    (1885) (“The point on which [Tyler] turned was … that an
    officer of the army, though retired, was still in the service.”).
    Finally, the Supreme Court and this court’s predecessor have
    both affirmed court-martial sentences imposed on military
    retirees without questioning the constitutionality of the military
    proceedings. See United States v. Fletcher, 
    148 U.S. 84
     (1893);
    United States v. Page, 
    137 U.S. 673
     (1891); Closson v. United
    States ex rel. Armes, 
    7 App. D.C. 460
     (1896).
    As already noted, the Court has not squarely addressed
    whether military retirees, such as members of the Fleet Marine
    Reserve, may be court-martialed consistent with the
    Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court’s consistent and repeated
    acknowledgement that military retirees are properly regarded
    as members of the armed forces, rather than civilians,
    substantiates our conclusion that Fleet Marine Reservists fall
    within the “land and naval Forces” governed by the Make
    Rules Clause.
    29
    ***
    Because he maintained a relationship with the armed
    forces and was obligated to obey military orders at the time of
    his court-martialing, Larrabee was in “the land and naval
    Forces” and constitutionally subject to court-martial
    jurisdiction.
    VII.
    Larrabee offers five reasons why Fleet Marine Reservists
    may not constitutionally be court-martialed. None are availing.
    First, pointing to Singleton, Larrabee argues that we must
    apply a flexible, functional test to determine whether members
    of the Fleet Marine Reserve “can be regarded as falling within
    the term ‘land and naval Forces.’” 361 U.S. at 241. The salient
    constitutional question, in his view, is whether the person tried
    at court-martial “has any authority or obligation to act in a
    military capacity.” This inquiry requires a case-by-case
    analysis of whether the accused possesses the “substantive
    authorities or responsibilities … relevant to the preservation of
    good order and discipline among troops in active service.”
    Larrabee would have us consider factors such as: Can the
    accused wear a uniform? Can he give orders? Must he obey
    orders? Must he meet the military’s physical fitness
    requirements? When all these factors are taken together,
    Larrabee argues, Fleet Marine Reservists resemble civilians far
    more than soldiers. A stand-alone duty to return to service, he
    insists, is not enough to satisfy this functional test.
    When determining the scope of “the land and naval
    Forces,” the Supreme Court has never resorted to the kind of
    complex multifactor test that Larrabee proposes. In the 1960s
    the Court adopted a balancing test, akin to Larrabee’s, for
    determining which offenses could be prosecuted at court-
    30
    martial. Under O’Callahan v. Parker, 
    395 U.S. 258
     (1969),
    courts were required to weigh a “myriad of factors … in
    determining whether an offense is service connected,”
    including the nature of the offense, the status of the victim, and
    the location of the crime. Solorio, 
    483 U.S. at 448
    . The Court
    has since squarely rejected that approach, holding that the
    permissible scope of court-martial jurisdiction turns “on one
    factor: the military status of the accused.” 
    Id. at 439
     (emphasis
    added). To determine the status of a person tried at court-
    martial, the Court has consistently analyzed whether he has a
    legal relation to the military that entails an obligation to obey
    military orders—or whether, by contrast, he is a “civilian[] …
    entitled to [the] safeguards afforded … by Article III of the
    Constitution.” Toth, 350 U.S. at 23. We therefore reject
    Larrabee’s multifactor balancing test for differentiating
    civilians from military personnel.
    Second, relying on the district court’s analysis below,
    Larrabee argues that even if Fleet Marine Reservists are in the
    armed forces, that is not sufficient to permit their court-
    martialing under the Make Rules Clause. Subjecting them to
    the military courts’ jurisdiction, the district court held, must
    also be “necessary to maintain good order and discipline” in
    the ranks. Larrabee, 502 F. Supp. 3d at 331 (citing Toth, 350
    U.S. at 22). Because members of the Fleet Marine Reserve are
    unlikely to be recalled, the exercise of court-martial
    jurisdiction over them is not necessary and so is
    unconstitutional.
    That objection misses the mark. In Toth, the Court did not
    hold that persons in the armed forces may be court-martialed
    only in cases of military necessity. Rather, it held that that an
    ex-serviceman who is now a civilian may not be court-
    martialed for crimes committed while in military service. In
    reaching that conclusion, the Court rejected the suggestion that
    31
    the Necessary and Proper Clause could stretch the Make Rules
    Clause to cover civilians who did not fall within the letter of
    “the land and naval Forces.” See Toth, 350 U.S. at 21–22; see
    also Covert, 
    354 U.S. at
    20–21. And it noted in passing that
    “[f]ree countries of the world have tried to restrict military
    tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely
    essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active
    service.” Toth, 350 U.S. at 22. But this general statement
    appeared in the context of the Court’s sharp distinction
    between civilians and servicemembers. The Toth Court drew a
    line between civilians receiving the full protections of Article
    III and persons within the armed services subject to military
    trial. Contrary to Larrabee’s claims, the Court did not impose
    limits on court-martial jurisdiction over those persons who had
    a “military status” and were actually within “the land and naval
    Forces.”
    Third, Larrabee and amici protest that members of the
    Fleet Marine Reserve are subject to only one duty—namely, a
    duty to return to active-duty service, if called—and that such a
    self-standing duty is not enough, because a person may be
    court-martialed only if he is legally obligated to obey more
    than one military order. We fail to see why a servicemember
    who must obey one order is less a part of “the land and naval
    Forces” than his peer who must obey two. 14 Cf. id. at 17 (“[I]t
    is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready
    to fight wars should the occasion arise.”) (emphasis added). In
    any event, Larrabee’s repeated assertion that Fleet Marine
    14
    Our dissenting colleague agrees that “whether individuals are
    subject to court-martial jurisdiction turns on their military status,”
    but insists that “a recall order” is not “like any other military order.”
    Dissenting Op. 1. The dissent does not explain why the scope of the
    Make Rules Clause turns on the kind of military order to which a
    person is subject, or why a legal obligation to serve if recalled is not
    enough to place one in “the land and naval Forces.”
    32
    Reservists have only “one duty” fails to account for their
    multiple military obligations, which include a duty to return to
    service, if called, a duty to report to active duty for training in
    peacetime, and a duty to comply with the military’s
    employment and reporting regulations.
    Fourth, Larrabee contends that if members of the Fleet
    Marine Reserve fall within the scope of the Make Rules Clause,
    then if Congress reauthorized a compulsory draft, every person
    presently registered with the Selective Service would become
    subject to court-martial—before they had ever been inducted
    into the military, donned a uniform, or received an order. 15
    Consistent with its authority under the Army and Navy
    Clauses, Congress may require men on the Selective Service
    list to serve in the military. See Arver v. United States, 
    245 U.S. 366
    , 377 (1918). Yet, while those who have been drafted may
    be constitutionally court-martialed, the Court has never implied
    that those yet to be drafted may also face military justice.
    Before a Selective Service registrant has been ordered to serve,
    he has no military status—no current “relationship with the
    military and its institutions,” only a prospective one. Toth, 350
    U.S. at 14; cf. Billings, 
    321 U.S. at 546
     (affirming, in dicta, the
    constitutionality of a statute that authorized military
    jurisdiction over persons “lawfully called, drafted, or ordered
    into [the armed forces] from the dates they are required by the
    terms of the call, draft or order to obey the same”) (emphasis
    added) (quoting Articles of War of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-242,
    art. 2(a), 
    41 Stat. 787
    , 787). Only after being ordered into
    service does a draftee become part of “the land and naval
    Forces” whose members may be court-martialed. See 
    id. at 556
    .
    Before being a drafted, by contrast, he has no ongoing
    15
    “[E]very male citizen of the United States … between the ages of
    eighteen and twenty-six” is required to register with the Selective
    Service. 
    50 U.S.C. § 3802
    (a).
    33
    relationship with the military that obliges him to obey military
    orders. Larrabee’s reductio ad absurdum therefore fails to
    show that Fleet Marine Reservists must fall outside of the Make
    Rules Clause.
    Finally, Larrabee argues that as a matter of policy, “there
    is simply no good argument for why … military retirees need
    to be subject to the UCMJ while they are retired.” Larrabee and
    his amici point out that courts-martial lack many of the
    constitutional protections afforded in Article III courts, and that
    the UCMJ’s procedural safeguards are grants of legislative
    grace and not guaranteed as a matter of constitutional right.
    These features, however, are part of the established operation
    of military justice under our Constitution. Cf. Parker v. Levy,
    
    417 U.S. 733
    , 744 (1974) (“[T]he military constitutes a
    specialized community governed by a separate discipline from
    that of the civilian, and … the rights of men in the armed forces
    must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding
    demands of discipline and duty.”) (cleaned up).
    Our dissenting colleague emphasizes the centrality of the
    right to a trial by jury under our Constitution, Dissenting Op.
    1–2, and we of course recognize the importance of the jury
    system in the Article III courts. Nevertheless, it is not this court
    that has extended court-martial jurisdiction, but Congress.
    Although the judiciary must determine whether military
    retirees like Larrabee actually have “military status,” the
    question of whether subjecting them to court-martial
    jurisdiction is wise or foolish is for the political branches to
    decide. 16
    16
    As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “Congress has the primary
    responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of
    servicemen against the needs of the military.” Solorio, 
    483 U.S. at
    34
    VIII.
    Larrabee argues in the alternative that the Grand Jury
    Clause separately barred his court-martial. He maintains that
    an inactive-duty servicemember may not be tried by a military
    tribunal for an offense that is unrelated to military order and
    discipline, because such a “case[]” does not “aris[e] in the land
    or naval forces.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. In his view, the
    government therefore violated the Grand Jury Clause by court-
    martialing him for the sexual assault of a civilian while he was
    an inactive-duty Fleet Marine Reservist. We disagree.
    The Supreme Court has already rejected this argument. In
    Solorio, it categorically renounced the service-connection test
    set out in O’Callahan, making clear that “the Constitution …
    condition[s] the proper exercise of court-martial jurisdiction
    over an offense on one factor: the military status of the
    accused.” 
    483 U.S. at 439
    . Larrabee argues that Solorio did not
    eliminate O’Callahan’s service-connection test requirement
    for inactive-duty servicemembers, and that the Grand Jury
    Clause requires one. But Solorio’s holding was not limited to
    active-duty troops. Rather the Court held that, as a general
    matter, “determinations concerning the scope of court-martial
    jurisdiction over offenses committed by servicemen [are]
    447. The Executive Branch also must balance these concerns in the
    exercise of its prosecutorial discretion. The Army, for instance, has
    historically adhered to a “policy that retired personnel subject to the
    [UCMJ] will not be tried for any offenses by any military tribunal
    unless extraordinary circumstances are present linking them to the
    military establishment or involving them in conduct inimical to the
    welfare of the nation.” 7 JUDGE ADVOCS. GEN., DIGEST OF OPINIONS
    [1957–58] 108 (1958).
    35
    reserved for Congress” and are not to be second-guessed by
    courts. 17 
    Id. at 440
    .
    Moreover, as the Court explained in Covert, the Fifth
    Amendment’s “exception … for ‘cases arising in the land or
    naval forces’ was undoubtedly designed to correlate with the
    power granted Congress to provide for the ‘Government and
    Regulation’ of the armed services.” 
    354 U.S. at 22
    . In other
    words, the Grand Jury Clause does not limit Congress’ powers
    under the Make Rules Clause. Cf. Ex parte Milligan, 
    71 U.S. 2
    , 138 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring) (observing that the
    Grand Jury Clause’s “exception [has] the same import and
    effect as if the powers of Congress in relation to the
    government of the army and navy and the militia had been
    17
    We note that even if some type of service connection were required
    when the government seeks to court-martial an inactive-duty
    servicemember, Larrabee was still properly subject to court-martial
    jurisdiction. While his offenses were civilian in nature and
    committed against a civilian on private property, they were
    undoubtedly service-connected under O’Callahan. Indeed, it is
    difficult to imagine how the sexual assault of a forward-deployed,
    active-duty Marine’s wife by a retired Marine could not impair
    military order and discipline. In fact, in this case it did: after
    Larrabee’s assault came to light, his victim’s husband was reassigned
    from Japan to the United States.
    The facts in Solorio were very similar. There, a coastguardsman
    was accused of sexually abusing the minor children of his fellow
    coastguardsmen on private property. Before the case reached the
    Supreme Court, the Court of Military Appeals (the CAAF’s
    precursor) upheld the conviction under O’Callahan’s service-
    connection test, reasoning that the sexual abuse of servicemembers’
    civilian dependents has “a continuing effect on the victims and their
    families and ultimately on the morale of any military unit or
    organization to which the family member is assigned.” United States
    v. Solorio, 
    21 M.J. 251
    , 256 (C.M.A. 1986); see also Solorio, 
    483 U.S. at 451
     (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). So too here.
    36
    recited in the [Fifth] [A]mendment, and cases within those
    powers had been expressly excepted from its operation”).
    Congress’ authority to govern and regulate persons in the
    armed forces is “plenary,” and Larrabee offers no compelling
    reason why the Grand Jury Clause constrains that authority in
    the case of inactive-duty troops. Solorio, 
    483 U.S. at 441
    .
    As the text and structure of the two clauses confirm, the
    scope of the Grand Jury Clause’s exception is coextensive with
    that of the Make Rules Clause. Because Larrabee was in “the
    land and naval Forces” at the time of his court-martialing, U.S.
    CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, his “case[] ar[ose] in the land or naval
    forces,” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
    ***
    Military trials are constitutional only for those who have a
    military status. Because the exercise of court-martial
    jurisdiction limits the constitutional protections of Article III
    courts, we must independently determine whether a person is
    in “the land and naval Forces” or is a civilian. The Supreme
    Court’s precedents interpreting the Make Rules Clause, as well
    as historical evidence from the Founding era, both indicate that
    Congress may extend court-martial jurisdiction over a person
    if he has a formal relationship with the military that includes a
    duty to obey military orders. Larrabee had the requisite military
    status because at the time of his arrest he was a member of the
    Fleet Marine Reserve and was subject to ongoing military
    duties. The judgment of the district court is therefore
    Reversed.
    TATEL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
    part: I agree with my colleagues about everything except what
    matters most: their conclusion. I agree that whether individuals
    are subject to court-martial jurisdiction turns on their military
    status and that the unifying pattern in Supreme Court precedent
    “is that the persons found to be properly within ‘the land and
    naval Forces’ had a formal relationship with the military that
    included an obligation to obey military orders.” Majority Op.
    at 13. I also agree with Judge Rao that we owe Congress no
    deference in interpreting the scope of the Make Rules Clause.
    That said, I disagree that the type of order to which Larrabee is
    potentially subject—a recall order summoning him from
    civilian life to take up arms—is like any other military order.
    By treating it as such, the court extends court-martial
    jurisdiction not only to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, but
    also to roughly two million military retirees. Because this
    dramatic expansion of court-martial jurisdiction is beyond
    what the Constitution allows and case law supports, I
    respectfully dissent from that portion of the court’s opinion.
    The court is of course correct that this case is about the
    Make Rules Clause. But we must interpret that clause in the
    context of the rest of the Constitution, which puts a heavy
    thumb on the scale against extending court-martial jurisdiction.
    The Constitution guarantees the right to juries not once, not
    twice, but four times.
    Article III: “The Trial of all Crimes, except in
    Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”
    Fifth Amendment: “No person shall be held to
    answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
    crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
    a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
    or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
    service in time of War or public danger.”
    2
    Sixth    Amendment:      “In    all    criminal
    prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
    to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
    jury.”
    Seventh Amendment: “In Suits at common law
    . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”
    (Emphases added.)
    By contrast, the Constitution has nothing at all to say about
    court-martial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court inferred this
    “very limited and extraordinary jurisdiction . . . from the
    cryptic language in” the Make Rules Clause. Reid v. Covert,
    
    354 U.S. 1
    , 21 (1957) (plurality opinion). Its justification for
    allowing courts-martial is straightforward. As it explained in
    United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, “[c]ourt-martial
    jurisdiction sprang from the belief that within the military ranks
    there is need for a prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling
    obedience and order.” 
    350 U.S. 11
    , 22 (1955). In Toth, the
    Court held that a discharged soldier could not be court-
    martialed because “[i]t is impossible to think that the discipline
    of the Army is going to be disrupted, its morale impaired, or its
    orderly processes disturbed, by giving ex-servicemen the
    benefit of a civilian court trial when they are actually civilians.”
    
    Id.
     Two years later, in Reid v. Covert, the court extended Toth
    to military dependents who commit crimes on military bases,
    holding that they too cannot be court-martialed because such
    conduct bears even less on “the maintenance of order and
    discipline in the armed forces than the conduct of” discharged
    soldiers. 
    354 U.S. at 32
    ; see also Kinsella v. United States ex
    rel. Singleton, 
    361 U.S. 234
    , 248–49 (1960) (extending
    Covert’s reasoning to noncapital offenses committed by
    military dependents).
    3
    Surveying Supreme Court precedent, my colleagues point
    out that only individuals with “a formal relationship with the
    military that include[s] an obligation to obey military orders”
    are “properly within ‘the land and naval Forces.’” Majority Op.
    at 13. This makes sense given that the need for military order
    and discipline is what justifies subjecting military personnel to
    courts-martial. Individuals not subject to military orders are not
    an “‘important’” part of the military “‘machinery’” that
    depends on swift military justice to maintain good order and
    discipline. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 
    361 U.S. 281
    , 285 (1960) (quoting Ex parte Reed, 
    100 U.S. 13
    , 21–
    22 (1879)).
    Although the duty to obey military orders is a necessary
    condition for court-martial jurisdiction, it does not follow that
    the possibility of a recall order is sufficient to subject members
    of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve to such jurisdiction. If the
    military issues an order recalling one or more members of the
    Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, they will be reincorporated into
    the military chain of command and subject to military
    discipline and court-martial. But until then, their day-to-day
    lives are equivalent to those of ordinary civilians. No need to
    take my word for it. Ask the military, which routinely excludes
    the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve from the requirements it deems
    necessary to maintain the armed forces. Members of the Fleet
    Marine Corps Reserve are unassigned to a specific command,
    are ineligible for promotion, lack authority to issue binding
    orders, may refer to their rank and wear their uniforms only
    under limited conditions, need not participate in military
    activities, need not maintain any level of physical fitness, and
    may not serve on or refer charges to courts-martial. And
    especially significant, although the Marine Corps requires all
    “active and reserve component” members to be vaccinated
    against COVID-19 because “a fully vaccinated force is a matter
    of operational readiness and good order and discipline,” it has
    4
    not extended this requirement to members of the Fleet Marine
    Corps Reserve. See MARADMINS 462/21 (Sept. 1, 2021)
    (first quote); MARADMINS 612/21 (Oct. 23, 2021) (second
    quote). The military itself obviously considers the Fleet Marine
    Corps Reserve to lie outside the “force” where “good order and
    discipline” are essential.
    A recall order, then, functions as a gateway to military
    status. The possibility of such an order certainly means that the
    military status of members of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve
    could change, but not that they are currently part of the armed
    forces. Before receiving any such order, they are entitled to all
    jury rights guaranteed by the Constitution. “It is impossible to
    think that the discipline of the [Marine Corps] is going to be
    disrupted, its morale impaired, or its orderly processes
    disturbed” by providing members of the Fleet Marine Corps
    Reserve with an Article III jury trial. Toth, 
    350 U.S. at 22
    .
    Neither English nor American history requires otherwise.
    Like our Supreme Court, Blackstone observed that “[t]he
    necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only thing
    which can give [court-martial jurisdiction] countenance.” 1
    William Blackstone, Commentaries *400. The Founders so
    resented Britain’s curtailment of the right to jury trial that
    military tribunals received special condemnation in the
    Declaration of Independence, which denounced King
    George III’s efforts “to render the Military independent of and
    superior to the Civil power” and chastised the Crown “[f]or
    depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury.” The
    Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Moreover,
    regardless of the turbid history of how individuals like
    members of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve were treated prior
    to 1789, see Majority Op. at 18–24, the Constitution enshrined
    the right to trial by jury and curtailed the scope of courts-
    martial. In sum, our history reveals a “deeply rooted and
    5
    ancient opposition . . . to the extension of military control over
    civilians.” Covert, 
    354 U.S. at 33
    .
    The implications of this case stretch far beyond Larrabee
    and the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. Millions of military
    retirees are also subject to military recall. 
    10 U.S.C. § 688
    (b).
    Indeed, as Larrabee’s counsel pointed out at oral argument,
    under the court’s reasoning “nothing would stop the
    Government from court-martialing a 90-year-old Korean War
    veteran, who retired after being injured in the war, for
    shoplifting a newspaper from his local supermarket.” Oral Arg.
    33:55–34:10. The 200-plus retired generals and admirals who
    spoke out against President Trump and the 120-plus now
    speaking out against President Biden could likewise be court-
    martialed. See 
    10 U.S.C. § 888
     (subjecting military officers to
    court-martial for “us[ing] contemptuous words against the
    President”); Br. for Joshua E. Kastenberg & J. Wesley Moore
    as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee at 22–23.
    The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned of the dangers
    of expanding court-martial jurisdiction. “Every extension of
    military jurisdiction is an encroachment on the jurisdiction of
    the civil courts, and, more important, acts as a deprivation of
    the right to jury trial and of other treasured constitutional
    protections.” Covert, 
    354 U.S. at 21
    ; see also Toth, 
    350 U.S. at 15
     (“[A]ny expansion of court-martial jurisdiction . . .
    necessarily encroaches on the jurisdiction of federal courts . . .
    where persons on trial are surrounded with more constitutional
    safeguards than in military tribunals.”). As a result of today’s
    decision, millions of Americans have lost one such
    constitutional right.