Cause of Action v. National Archives & Records Administration , 753 F.3d 210 ( 2014 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued February 19, 2014                Decided May 23, 2014
    No. 13-5127
    CAUSE OF ACTION,
    APPELLANT
    v.
    NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION,
    APPELLEE
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:12-cv-01342)
    Daniel Epstein and Marie A. Connelly argued the cause for
    appellant. On the brief were Patrick J. Massari and Reed D.
    Rubinstein.
    Christine N. Kohl, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Stuart
    F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C. Machen Jr.,
    U.S. Attorney, and Leonard Schaitman, Attorney. Edward
    Himmelfarb, Attorney, entered an appearance.
    Kerry W. Kircher, General Counsel, William Pittard,
    Deputy General Counsel, Christine M. Davenport, Senior
    Assistant Counsel, and Todd B. Tatelman, Mary Beth Walker,
    and Eleni M. Roumel, Assistant Counsel, were on the brief for
    2
    amicus curiae Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United
    States House of Representatives.
    Before: HENDERSON and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and
    RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    RANDOLPH.
    RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from
    the judgment of the district court dismissing a complaint brought
    under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. The
    complaint sought, from the National Archives, records of the
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, a legislative branch
    agency charged with investigating “the causes, domestic and
    global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United
    States.” Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L.
    No. 111-21, § 5(a), 123 Stat. 1617, 1625.
    The Commission, established in 2009, was to report its
    findings and conclusions to Congress and the President on
    December 15, 2010, and then terminate 60 days later. 
    Id. § 5(h)–(i).1
    Shortly before it disbanded, the Commission
    transferred its records to the National Archives and Records
    Administration. The Archives accepted the records pursuant to
    its statutory authority to “accept for deposit with the National
    Archives of the United States the records of a Federal agency,
    the Congress, the Architect of the Capitol, or the Supreme
    Court” when the Archivist determines those records to have
    1
    The Commission’s Report was released to the public on January
    27, 2011. See Press Release, Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, Financial
    Crisis Inquiry Commission Releases Report on the Causes of the
    Financial Crisis (Jan. 27, 2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.
    stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-news/2011-0127-fcic-releases-report.pdf.
    3
    “sufficient historical or other value to warrant their continued
    preservation.” 44 U.S.C. § 2107(1).2
    FOIA requires most federal agencies to make their “agency
    records,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), available to the public,
    subject to several exceptions. See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of Navy,
    
    131 S. Ct. 1259
    , 1261-62 (2011). “Agency,” in the FOIA
    context, means “each authority of the Government of the United
    States,” but the definition “does not include” Congress and
    certain other governmental entities, such as the “courts of the
    United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). As a result, FOIA “does not
    cover congressional documents,” United We Stand Am., Inc. v.
    IRS, 
    359 F.3d 595
    , 597 (D.C. Cir. 2004), or documents of
    legislative branch agencies, see Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S.
    Sentencing Comm’n, 
    17 F.3d 1446
    , 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
    Ethnic Emps. of Library of Cong. v. Boorstin, 
    751 F.2d 1405
    ,
    1416 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Financial Crisis Inquiry
    Commission, established in the legislative branch, was therefore
    not an “agency” subject to FOIA. Cause of Action v. Nat’l
    Archives & Records Admin., 
    926 F. Supp. 2d 182
    , 185 (D.D.C.
    2013). On the other hand, the National Archives and Records
    Administration is an agency within the executive branch. 44
    U.S.C. § 2102. As such, it is an “agency” subject to FOIA.
    The issue in this case is whether the Commission’s records,
    exempt from FOIA while the Commission produced, retained
    2
    Beyond its § 2107 authority to preserve records with historical
    value, the Archives accepts and stores documents from other federal
    entities, including lower federal courts and agencies in all three
    branches, in its Federal Records Centers. See 44 U.S.C. § 3103; 36
    C.F.R. § 1232.10; About the Federal Records Centers, FED. RECORDS
    CTR., http://www.archives.gov/frc/about.html (last visited May 2014).
    4
    and relied upon those documents,3 became subject to FOIA
    when the Commission turned its records over to the Archives.
    I
    In an early interpretation of the Freedom of Information
    Act, the Supreme Court held that documents may be considered
    “agency records”—a term not defined in the Act—if the
    documents are created or obtained by an “agency” that receives
    the FOIA request and are in that agency’s “control”—that is, in
    “the agency’s possession in the legitimate conduct of its official
    duties.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 
    492 U.S. 136
    ,
    144-45 (1989). Since Tax Analysts, some of our decisions have
    considered “four factors to determine whether an agency
    controls a document.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Fed. Hous. Fin.
    Agency (Judicial Watch I), 
    646 F.3d 924
    , 926 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
    The factors are
    [1] the intent of the document’s creator to retain or
    relinquish control over the records; [2] the ability of
    the agency to use and dispose of the records as it sees
    fit; [3] the extent to which agency personnel have read
    or relied upon the document; and [4] the degree to
    which the document was integrated into the agency’s
    record system or files.
    
    Id. at 926-27
    (quoting Burka v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
    Servs., 
    87 F.3d 508
    , 515 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
    But this test—sometimes called the Burka test, although
    Burka was itself quoting a vacated opinion—is an uncertain
    guide when “a governmental entity not covered by FOIA”
    3
    Despite its exemption from FOIA the Commission released
    many documents during its existence.
    5
    transfers records to a governmental entity that is covered.
    Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv. (Judicial Watch II), 
    726 F.3d 208
    , 221 (D.C. Cir. 2013). That is what occurred here.
    Three days before the Commission terminated, its Chairman
    wrote to the Archivist of the United States stating that because
    FOIA exempted the Commission, “FOIA will not apply to the
    Commission records even after they are transferred” to the
    Archives. The Chairman requested that the Archivist restrict
    access to any Commission records not already publicly
    accessible on the internet until February 13, 20164—five years
    from the date of the Commission’s shutdown. He also asked
    that, during the five-year hold, the Archivist “conduct a
    systematic review of the records that are not currently available
    to the public with the goal of releasing as much information as
    is allowable” in 2016. The next day, February 11, 2011, the
    records were transferred.
    In October 2011, Cause of Action (then the Freedom
    Through Justice Foundation) submitted a FOIA request to the
    Archives requesting certain Commission records. The request
    asserted that the “records under [the Archives’] control are
    subject to disclosure under FOIA.” The Archives denied the
    request, first in December 2011, then again in February 2012 on
    4
    When the head of an agency deposits records in the Archives,
    he may request in writing that access restrictions be placed on the
    records. 44 U.S.C. § 2108(a). If the Archivist agrees that the
    limitations are “necessary or desirable in the public interest,” he must
    uphold them. 
    Id. But the
    restrictions must be “consistent with FOIA.”
    36 C.F.R. § 1235.30(a). So if the records are “agency records,”
    FOIA’s access provisions prevail over any inconsistent restrictions
    requested by the transferor. 
    Id. If the
    agency that requested the
    restrictions has ceased to exist, and there is “no successor in function,”
    the Archivist is empowered to relax (or otherwise change) the
    restrictions to serve “the public interest.” 44 U.S.C. § 2108; see 36
    C.F.R. § 1235.32.
    6
    Cause of Action’s administrative appeal. The Archives did not
    dispute its own status as a FOIA-covered agency. But it
    maintained that because the Commission was established in the
    legislative branch, Commission records held by the Archives
    were not agency records subject to FOIA. Transferring the
    records to the Archives’ custody, the Archives concluded, was
    not “dispositive of the FOIA access question.”
    The district court applied the four-factor Burka control test.
    Cause of 
    Action, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 187-89
    . Finding that three
    of the four factors weighed in favor of the Archives, the court
    held that the Commission’s records were “not agency records
    subject to FOIA” and granted the Archives’ motion to dismiss.
    
    Id. at 184,
    189.
    II
    The National Archives serves as a repository for the federal
    government, including Congress5 and legislative branch
    agencies. Some of those legislative agencies are permanent.
    The Congressional Budget Office and the Government
    Accountability Office are two of the most well known.
    Temporary legislative commissions also deposit their records
    5
    At the close of each Congress, non-current records of the
    Congress are transferred to the Archives “for preservation, subject to
    the orders of the House of Representatives and the Senate,
    respectively.” 44 U.S.C. § 2118. The records of Congress, including
    committees and subcommittees of the House and Senate, “remain the
    legal property” of those bodies. Congressional Records, NAT’L
    ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/legislative/research (last visited
    May 2014); see Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. 111-
    157, 111th Cong., R. VII § 2 (2011); see also S. Res. 474, 96th Cong.
    (1980). Both the House and the Senate have detailed rules stating
    when records so delivered may be made public.
    7
    with the Archives before they go out of existence, as the
    Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission did in this case.
    The Archives, supported by amicus Bipartisan Legal
    Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives, which
    represents the House’s institutional position in litigation, argues
    that when a legislative commission transfers its records to the
    National Archives, the FOIA status of those records is not
    altered. In other words, a document subject to FOIA before the
    Archives received it remains subject to FOIA after it arrives; a
    document exempt from FOIA before the Archives received it
    remains exempt after it arrives. The Commission’s records,
    when created in the legislative branch, were not subject to
    FOIA. According to this argument, they remained exempt after
    the Commission deposited them with the Archives.
    Although we have never explicitly held that transferring a
    document to the Archives does not affect the document’s FOIA
    status, we suggested as much in Katz v. National Archives &
    Records Administration, 
    68 F.3d 1438
    (D.C. Cir. 1995). There,
    we considered whether autopsy photographs of President
    Kennedy that had been transferred to the National Archives
    were agency records subject to FOIA. 
    Id. at 1440.
    We held
    they were not, in part because they were “personal presidential
    materials when they were first created, and therefore at no time
    were they ever agency records.” 
    Id. at 1441.
    In other words, the
    depositing of these materials with the Archives did not convert
    them into “agency records” subject to FOIA.
    The regulations of the Archives reflect Katz’s reasoning.
    One regulation is entitled, “Does FOIA cover all of the records
    at [the Archives]?” 36 C.F.R. § 1250.6. “No,” it answers,
    “FOIA applies only to the records of the executive branch . . ..”
    
    Id. “If you
    want access to” records of Congress or the federal
    courts, the regulation explains, “FOIA does not apply.” 
    Id. The 8
    regulation then points the researcher to other regulations
    governing access to the FOIA-exempt records. See, e.g., 36
    C.F.R. pt. 1256 (Access to Records and Donated Historical
    Materials); 
    id. pt. 1270
    (Presidential Records).
    Cause of Action argues that rather than relying on Katz, we
    should decide this case using the four-factor Burka test, a test
    intended to determine whether the FOIA-covered agency had
    control over the documents. “Control” became a consideration
    in FOIA cases as a result of the need to distinguish agency
    records from “personal materials in an employee’s possession,
    even though the materials may be physically located at the
    agency.” Tax 
    Analysts, 492 U.S. at 145
    (discussing Kissinger v.
    Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 
    445 U.S. 136
    , 155-
    57 (1980)). If the agency did not control the material, the
    Supreme Court held, the material was not an “agency record.”
    We have questioned whether the Burka test is helpful in
    delineating that distinction. “Our past application of the test
    reveals its considerable indeterminacy.” Judicial Watch 
    II, 726 F.3d at 220
    . In any event, applying the test in this case is
    particularly problematic because documents deposited with the
    National Archives do not present the sort of questions the Burka
    test purports to answer.
    As applied to the Archives, the four-factor test is divorced
    from FOIA’s key objective—revealing to the public how federal
    agencies operate. See Judicial Watch 
    I, 646 F.3d at 927
    . Take
    for example the third and fourth Burka factors. Factor (3) is “the
    extent to which agency personnel have read or relied upon the
    document.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    omitted). Factor (4) is “the
    degree to which the document was integrated into the agency’s
    record system or files.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    omitted). The
    third and fourth Burka factors make these inquiries because
    relied-upon and catalogued documents may be expected to
    reveal something “about agency decisionmaking”—“agency”
    9
    here referring to the Archives, not the Commission. 
    Id. at 928.
    But with respect to the Archives, these inquiries are entirely
    otiose.
    In order to catalog and file documents delivered from
    Congress or, for example, the Supreme Court, archivists review
    the documents and make preservation decisions. We may
    assume that, once those decisions are made, the records are
    “integrated” into the Archives’ “files.” But those typical
    archival functions—common to every record in the Archives—
    do not suddenly convert the records of a defunct legislative
    commission into “agency records” able to expose the operations
    of the Archives “to the light of public scrutiny.” Dep’t of Air
    Force v. Rose, 
    425 U.S. 352
    , 372 (1976).
    Given the difficulties with the Burka test, we have
    “indicated that the standard, four-factor control test does not
    apply to documents that an agency has either obtained from, or
    prepared in response to a request from, a governmental entity
    not covered by FOIA.” Judicial Watch 
    II, 726 F.3d at 221
    . As
    we said in Bureau of National Affairs v. U.S. Department of
    Justice, when “documents originate within the Congress, the
    judiciary, and FOIA-exempt executive agencies, sometimes
    special policy considerations militate against a rule compelling
    disclosure of such records merely because such documents
    happen to come into the possession of [a FOIA-covered]
    agency.” 
    742 F.2d 1484
    , 1491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (alterations
    and internal quotation marks omitted). In this line of cases, we
    have analyzed only the transferring entity’s intent to control the
    documents and their future use. “This focus renders the first two
    factors of the [Burka] test effectively dispositive.” Judicial
    Watch 
    II, 726 F.3d at 221
    .
    Although we, too, will not use the Burka test, we do not
    think it makes sense to apply the analysis from Judicial Watch
    10
    II and the cases discussed in that opinion to the National
    Archives. Like the four-factor test, the Judicial Watch II test
    also measures “control” in a way that is foreign to the sui
    generis nature of the Archives.
    In order for a document to be considered an “agency
    record,” there must be some relationship between the record and
    the FOIA-covered agency. This relationship has been described
    as one of “possession” or “control.” E.g., 
    Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 155
    . And we have looked to possession and control because,
    often, these concepts capture the nature and use of a document
    as it changes hands among federal agencies. See, e.g., Tax
    
    Analysts, 492 U.S. at 146-47
    ; Judicial Watch 
    II, 726 F.3d at 221
    -23. Not so here.
    The main function of the Archives is to preserve documents
    of enduring value from all three branches of government.6 The
    Archives does not use documents created in the three branches
    in any operational way, or indeed in any way comparable to any
    other federal agency. It may control them in a sense, but its
    control consists in cataloguing, storing, and preserving, not
    unlike a “warehouse.” See Ann H. Wion, The Definition of
    “Agency Records” Under the Freedom of Information Act, 31
    STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1111 (1979).7 Variances in this sort of
    6
    The documents may come from any of the three branches of
    government or, as in Katz, from private parties as a donation. See 44
    U.S.C. § 2111(2).
    7
    And if a particular document originated with a FOIA-covered
    entity, the Archives’ responsibilities include disseminating the
    document pursuant to a lawful FOIA request. Cf., e.g., Morley v. CIA,
    
    508 F.3d 1108
    , 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Archives regularly grants
    FOIA requests for FOIA-covered records. See NAT’L ARCHIVES,
    FISCAL YEAR 2012: ANNUAL FOIA REPORT, available at http://www.
    archives.gov/foia/reports/2012.pdf.
    11
    “control” are entirely unhelpful in determining a record’s value
    to a FOIA requester, see Judicial Watch 
    I, 646 F.3d at 928
    (“[A]
    document that could not reveal anything about agency
    decisionmaking is not an ‘agency record.’”), and irrelevant to
    any withholding prerogative that may remain with the transferor,
    see Judicial Watch 
    II, 726 F.3d at 221
    .
    Ultimately we are dealing with a question of statutory
    interpretation and congressional intent. See 
    Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 154
    ; Judicial Watch 
    II, 726 F.3d at 225
    . FOIA does not
    define “agency records,” but we are confident that Congress did
    not intend to expose legislative branch material to FOIA simply
    because the material has been deposited with the Archives. Yet
    that would be the consequence of what Cause of Action
    proposes.
    Affirmed.