Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration ( 2020 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued February 4, 2020               Decided March 17, 2020
    No. 19-1075
    UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
    PETITIONER
    v.
    PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY
    ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,
    RESPONDENT
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    United States Department of Transportation
    Tobias S. Loss-Eaton argued the cause for petitioner. With
    him on the briefs were Raymond A. Atkins and Matthew J.
    Warren.
    Sushma Soni, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued
    the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Daniel
    Tenny, Attorney, Steven G. Bradbury, General Counsel, U.S.
    Department of Transportation, Paul M. Geier, Assistant
    General Counsel, Peter J. Plocki, Deputy Assistant General
    Counsel, and Paul J. Roberti, Chief Counsel, Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.
    2
    Before: HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and
    WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    WILLIAMS.
    Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
    WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: Union Pacific Railroad
    Company asks us to vacate a regulation that the Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration promulgated under
    the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No.
    114-94, § 7302, 
    129 Stat. 1312
    , 1594–96 (2015) (“FAST”).
    The railroad contends that the regulation fell short in protecting
    the security and confidentiality of information it is required to
    disclose.
    FAST § 73021 requires the agency to promulgate
    regulations governing disclosures to be made by railroads
    transporting hazardous materials. The information is to aid
    federal, state and local first responders preparing for and
    combating emergencies and falls into two classes.
    The first type of information includes, for any train
    carrying hazardous materials (as defined by the agency, see
    § 7302(b)(5); see also 
    49 U.S.C. § 5103
    ), accurate, real-time
    “train consist information,” which by statute includes the
    number of rail cars and the commodity transported in each car,
    § 7302(a)(1); see also § 7302(b)(7) (defining “train consist”).
    Railroads are to send this information to a secure “fusion
    center,” § 7302(a)(2), which is a “collaborative effort” of
    1
    FAST § 7302 is codified as a note to 
    49 U.S.C. § 20103
    . For
    reader friendliness, we cite simply to § 7302 rather than the U.S.
    Code to sidestep ungainly references to subsections of a note, e.g.,
    note(a)(3).
    3
    various government entities to combat “criminal or terrorist
    activity,” 6 U.S.C. § 124h(j)(1). In an emergency, the fusion
    centers release the information to local first responders.
    The second type of required information is much more
    general and applies only to trains transporting particular types
    of flammable liquid, known in the statute as “high-hazard
    flammable trains.” § 7302(a)(3), (b)(6). The statutorily
    mandated regulations are to require the information to be
    supplied to state authorities known as emergency response
    commissions. The information is to include “a reasonable
    estimate” of the weekly number of trains that pass through each
    county and some identification of the flammable liquid being
    transported. § 7302(a)(3)(A), (C). These rough estimates
    allow first responders to know the risks they may face and to
    plan accordingly.
    The statute’s mandate as to “security and confidentiality”
    requires the agency to
    . . . establish security and confidentiality protections,
    including protections from the public release of proprietary
    information or security-sensitive information, to prevent
    the release to unauthorized persons [of] any electronic train
    consist information or advanced notification or
    information provided by Class I railroads under this
    section.
    § 7302(a)(6).
    This case concerns the second type of information—the
    aggregated, county-by-county data. In a separate rulemaking
    not at issue here, the agency is addressing the more detailed
    train consist information. See Hazardous Materials: FAST Act
    Requirements for Real-Time Train Consist Information by
    Rail, 
    82 Fed. Reg. 6,451
     (Jan. 19, 2017).
    4
    As required, the agency promulgated a regulation requiring
    railroads to provide state emergency response commissions
    with the aggregated data. See 
    49 C.F.R. § 174.312
    (b). By way
    of establishing “security and confidentiality protections,” the
    regulation directs railroads to indicate to those commissions
    whether they “believe[]” any part of the information is
    “security sensitive or proprietary and exempt from public
    disclosure.” 
    Id.
     § 174.312(c). In adopting this directive to the
    railroads, the agency found it “sufficient to ensure
    confidentiality and security.” See Hazardous Materials: Oil
    Spill Response Plans and Information Sharing for High-Hazard
    Flammable Trains (FAST Act), 84 Fed Reg. 6910, 6932 (Feb.
    28, 2019) (“Final Rule”). The agency’s basic idea was that
    notice of this sort would provide state agencies with the
    necessary “flexibility” to disseminate the information to the
    necessary recipients while also “guard[ing]” against
    inadvertent disclosure and enabling states to hold close any
    information that is at all sensitive and that may be protected by
    state law. Id.; see id. at 6917.
    Union Pacific attacks the regulation as insufficiently
    protecting the railroad’s data and thus failing to meet § 7302’s
    requirement to establish security and confidentiality
    protections to prevent access to the information by
    unauthorized parties. Because the regulation is neither
    dependent on a misreading of the statute nor arbitrary and
    capricious, we deny the petition for review.
    ***
    We do not understand the agency, in tackling its obligation
    under § 7302(a)(6) to “establish” “security and confidentiality
    protections” for the aggregated data, to have supposed that it
    could provide no protection for the aggregate data; certainly the
    railroad points us to no language adopting such a view. Where
    the parties clash is whether the agency can adopt the specific
    5
    protections at issue here, namely a scheme in which railroads
    alert the relevant state agency to the data that they believe the
    states should refrain from disclosing.
    To the extent that the railroad might be arguing that FAST
    requires the agency to adopt the same protective scheme for
    every type of disclosed information, whether detailed train
    consist information or aggregated county-by-county reports, it
    is mistaken. Section 7302 creates multiple classes of
    information posing different levels of risk. And its wording
    reflects Congress’s judgment that those differences should be
    accompanied by other differences. The very precise data go to
    fusion centers, the aggregate data to state emergency response
    commissions. For the very precise data, fusion centers and
    railroads must develop memoranda of understanding regarding
    how the centers will receive “secure and confidential access to
    the electronic train consist information,” § 7302(a)(1)(B),
    whereas no such predicate is stated for the transfer of the more
    aggregated weekly data. These differences reflect Congress’s
    evidently different purposes for the different types of mandated
    notice: responding to an emergency versus preparing for one.
    By establishing this bifurcated scheme, Congress
    authorized the agency to adopt different measures appropriate
    for each type of data. Thus, just as the federal government
    maintains different levels of national security classification
    (e.g., top secret vs. secret), the agency may apply different
    protections for highly sensitive train consist information as
    compared to less sensitive aggregated data.
    Union Pacific argues that the rule fails to fulfill the purpose
    of the security and confidentiality protections as set forth in
    § 7302(a)(6). Specifically it claims that the regulation’s
    confidentiality protections do not pass muster because some
    states require their emergency response commissions to release
    such information under state freedom of information laws; thus,
    6
    competitors might glean the identity of a railroad’s customers
    from the aggregated data, and these competitors may then
    poach a railroad’s business. Appellant Br. at 2. And Union
    Pacific offers a textual hook for what is ultimately a policy
    argument: If a state releases this information to the public,
    everyone will have access to the information and the statutory
    category “unauthorized person” turns out (in such a state) to
    include no one at all.
    This argument runs into two distinct problems:
    First, as a pure matter of language, the agency’s very
    modest solution here has given some substance to the term
    “unauthorized person”:        viewed across the nation, the
    regulation treats as unauthorized those persons not entitled to
    the information under the relevant state’s freedom of
    information law. Further, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion,
    this reading of the statute doesn’t improperly subdelegate the
    agency’s regulatory authority to states. See Diss. Op. at 5–6.
    The agency chose a type of security and confidentiality
    protection—aimed at protecting against inadvertent public
    disclosure (see immediately below)—and adopted regulations
    to effectuate that policy. It is no surprise that a statute which
    weaves state institutions into its program should lead the
    implementing agency to coordinate its action with aspects of
    state law. See, e.g., § 7302(a)(4) (delineating when a state
    emergency response commission is to disseminate information
    to a state “political subdivision,” “public agency,” or “law
    enforcement”).
    Second and most importantly, the agency made a specific
    uncontradicted finding that requiring the railroad to flag the
    information to the state response commissions was “sufficient
    to ensure confidentiality and security.” Final Rule, 84 Fed.
    Reg. at 6932. It noted that the purpose of the statutory scheme
    is to allow state and tribal emergency response commissions
    7
    “to share information with local planning authorities.” Id. It
    then concluded that its approach maintained “flexibility” and
    ensured that state agencies “disseminate information in
    accordance with State laws and procedures.” Id. And it noted
    that the information covered by the rule “does not include
    customer information or other business identifying details.” Id.
    As a result, the agency concluded, its
    approach will help guard against inadvertent public
    disclosure of protected materials by ensuring that the
    information that railroads believe to be confidential for
    business or security reasons is marked appropriately.
    Before fulfilling a request for information and releasing the
    information, States will be on notice as to what information
    the railroads consider inappropriate for public release.
    Id.
    We do not doubt Union Pacific’s suggestion that
    aggregated data may sometimes reveal sensitive information
    upon analysis. Cf. Halperin v. CIA, 
    629 F.2d 144
    , 150 (D.C.
    Cir. 1980) (“[E]ach individual piece of intelligence
    information, much like a piece of jigsaw puzzle, may aid in
    piecing together other bits of information even when the
    individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.”). But
    during the administrative proceedings Union Pacific provided
    not a mote of evidence that the type of data at issue here has
    been or even could be so exploited. In fact, the agency
    repeatedly noted that “railroads have not demonstrated specific
    prospective harm that would be caused by the release of such
    aggregated information.” Final Rule, 84 Fed Reg. at 6932;
    Hazardous Materials: Oil Spill Response Plans and Information
    Sharing for High-Hazard Flammable Trains, 81 Fed Reg.
    50,068, 50,084 (July 29, 2016); see also Proposed Agency
    Information Collection Activities; Comment Request, 79 Fed
    Reg. 59,891, 59,892 (Oct. 3, 2014) (“Commenters do not
    8
    document any actual harm that has occurred by the public
    release of the information required to be provided to the States
    under the EO.”). Neither before the agency not in this court,
    can the agency “be asked to make silk purse responses to sow’s
    ear arguments.” City of Vernon v. FERC, 
    845 F.2d 1042
    , 1047
    (D.C. Cir. 1988).
    Though couching its argument as one of pure statutory
    interpretation (based on the agency’s allegedly rendering the
    “unauthorized persons” category meaningless), the railroad is
    principally making an argument that the agency acted
    arbitrarily in adopting the protections that it did. As we’ve
    observed, claims that an agency has adopted an impermissible
    construction of a statute and that an agency has acted arbitrarily
    both require the court to resolve whether the agency, “in
    effecting a reconciliation of competing statutory aims, has
    rationally considered the factors deemed relevant” by the
    statute. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. v. ICC, 
    872 F.2d 1048
    , 1053
    (D.C. Cir. 1989). Viewed as an APA arbitrary and capricious
    challenge, the claim requires the railroad to shoulder the burden
    of proof. City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 
    292 F.3d 261
    , 271 (D.C.
    Cir. 2002). That means Union Pacific must point to some
    evidence to substantiate its claim. See Abington Crest Nursing
    & Rehab. Ctr. v. Sebelius 
    575 F.3d 717
    , 722 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
    Union Pacific hasn’t done so.
    At oral argument, counsel argued that it would be difficult
    for Union Pacific to marshal historical evidence that its
    competitors had already used this aggregated data to identify
    and poach customers. But assuming the point’s correctness, the
    railroad could (for example) have conducted an experimental
    analysis to demonstrate how a competing carrier might identify
    a customer by piecing together county-by-county information.
    It did not. As the adage goes, something (an agency’s finding)
    beats nothing (Union Pacific’s unsupported assertion) every
    time.
    9
    From our vantage point, the scope of disagreement
    between the majority and dissent is quite narrow. We all agree
    that the statute requires the agency to establish something to
    protect the information at issue. Diss. Op. at 2. Where we
    disagree is whether the agency has met the statutory directive.
    Here, the agency developed a mechanism to prevent
    inadvertent disclosure. See pp. 7–8 above. At that point we
    believe the court must move into the second part of our APA
    inquiry, where Union Pacific’s failure to offer any data or even
    informed hypothesizing leaves us without authority to disturb
    the agency’s factual finding. To be sure, the line between an
    agency misinterpreting statutory text versus acting arbitrarily
    can be difficult to draw—which is why judges may disagree on
    precisely when that line is crossed. But we believe that the
    agency recognized and acted in accordance with the statutory
    mandate—and so the question becomes how reasonable that
    action is in light of the factual record before us. Cf. Diss. Op.
    at 7.
    ***
    Because Union Pacific failed to provide evidence to
    controvert the agency’s express finding that this rule will
    satisfy security and confidentiality concerns as mandated by the
    statute, the petition for review is denied.
    So ordered.
    KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    “Well done is better than well said.” Benjamin Franklin, Poor
    Richard, 1737 (1737), reprinted in Poor Richard's Almanack
    57 (U.S.C. Publ’g Co. 1914). The government would do well
    to heed Poor Richard’s advice. Its insistence that the regulation
    at issue here is “[c]onsistent with the statutory requirements,”
    Resp’ts’ Br. 17, contravenes what it in fact did—i.e.,
    promulgate a regulation that disregards a vital statutory
    requirement. In my view, the majority proceeds
    anachronistically, as though we were deciding whether Union
    Pacific has established that advanced notification information1
    warrants federal protection. The Fixing America’s Surface
    Transportation (FAST) Act has already answered whether
    federal law should protect this information—the answer is
    yes—and delegated to the Secretary of the Department of
    Transportation (Secretary) simply how it should be protected.
    Because the Secretary, acting through the Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA or
    Agency), has not established protections for advanced
    notification information as the statute requires, I would vacate
    the regulation’s information-sharing provision and remand for
    promulgation of regulations that follow the FAST Act’s
    command.
    The FAST Act unambiguously commands the Secretary to
    protect the railroads’ advanced notification information:
    [T]he Secretary, in consultation with
    appropriate Federal agencies, shall issue
    regulations that . . . establish security and
    1
    The majority labels this information “aggregated.” See, e.g.,
    Majority Op. 3 (“This case concerns . . . aggregated, county-by-
    county data.”). I prefer the Congress’s term, “advanced notification”
    information. Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 7302(a)(3), 
    129 Stat. 1312
    , 1595
    (2015). “Aggregated” data in the majority opinion and “advanced
    notification” information in the FAST Act are one and the same.
    2
    confidentiality     protections,      including
    protections from the public release of
    proprietary information or security-sensitive
    information, to prevent the release to
    unauthorized persons [of] any electronic train
    consist information or advanced notification or
    information provided by Class I railroads under
    [§ 7302].
    Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 7302(a)(6), 
    129 Stat. 1312
    , 1594–95
    (2015) (emphasis added). The statutory text makes clear that
    the Secretary, not the states, must establish—that is, “bring
    about or into existence,” Establish, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
    (11th ed. 2019)—security protections for advanced notification
    information. Our sole task, therefore, is to decide whether the
    Agency complied with the Congress’s mandate. See United
    States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 
    489 U.S. 235
    , 241 (1989)
    (“[W]here, as here, the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole
    function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’”)
    (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 
    242 U.S. 470
    , 485 (1917)).
    In response to the FAST Act, PHMSA issued regulations
    implementing its information-sharing provisions (Rule) by
    delegating to Class I railroads the responsibility to “indicate”
    whether their statutorily-mandated disclosures “include[]
    information that a railroad believes is security sensitive or
    proprietary and exempt from public disclosure.” 
    49 C.F.R. § 174.312
    (c)(3). Union Pacific contends that the Rule—
    invalidly—leaves the actual protection of such information to
    state open records and sunshine laws, as was the case before
    the FAST Act. See Resp’ts’ Br. 18 (“The final rule thus
    provides a formal mechanism by which railroads can alert
    states when they believe that particular information should not
    be publicly disclosed. The states can then weigh the railroads’
    3
    assertion of confidentiality or privilege under state law and
    render a final determination about disclosure.”). I agree.
    To support the Rule, the Agency contrasts “highly
    sensitive” train consist information, which presumably
    warrants protection, with the “highly aggregated” advanced
    notification information it claims is at issue here. Resp’ts’ Br.
    16. The majority follows suit, labeling the FAST Act’s
    treatment of the two information categories a “bifurcated
    scheme.” Majority Op. 5. Although that may be correct
    regarding the railroads’ reporting requirements, cf.
    § 7302(a)(1)–(2), (5), (7) (train consist information), with
    § 7302(a)(3)–(4) (advanced notification information), the
    distinctions made elsewhere in § 7302 underscore the
    Secretary’s duty under § 7302(a)(6)—the only paragraph in the
    section that addresses both types of information—to establish
    security and confidentiality protections for advanced
    notification information as well as train consist information.
    Even if the FAST Act does not compel the Secretary to
    establish identical protections for both categories of
    information, her duty to establish something applies both to
    advanced notification information and to train consist
    information.
    The majority declares that it does “not understand the
    agency, in tackling its obligation under § 7302(a)(6) . . . to have
    supposed that it could provide no protection for the aggregate
    data,” Majority Op. 4, but that is precisely what PHMSA did in
    continuing to leave enforcement to the states. Indeed,
    PHMSA’s position is that it—i.e., the agency—need not
    protect advanced notification information because it is
    adequately protected by state law. See Resp’ts’ Br. 17 (“To
    ensure appropriate protection of any information under state
    law . . . the agency did direct railroads to identify information
    ‘that a railroad believes is security sensitive or proprietary and
    4
    exempt from public disclosure’ under state law.”) (emphases
    added) (citation omitted)). The FAST Act’s text states
    otherwise—not only did the Congress express its intent to
    federalize then-existing state protections, see § 7302(a) (“[T]he
    Secretary, in consultation with appropriate Federal agencies,
    shall issue” regulations.) (emphases added), but, if the Agency
    can satisfy § 7302(a)(6) by leaving in place, virtually
    untouched, the state enforcement status quo, the entire
    paragraph—or at least its reference to advanced notification
    information—is superfluous in that it can be totally ignored.
    But neither we nor the Secretary can disregard § 7302(a)(6)’s
    command that “the Secretary . . . shall . . . establish security
    and confidentiality protections” and that the statute applies to
    “advanced notification or information provided by Class I
    railroads under this section.” See Inhabitants of Montclair Twp.
    v. Ramsdell, 
    107 U.S. 147
    , 152 (1883) (“It is the duty of the
    court to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
    statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies
    that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language
    it employed.”). The majority treats the Secretary’s duty to
    establish protections as applying, at most, to train consist
    information in futuro, see Majority Op. 3 (“In a separate
    rulemaking not at issue here, the agency is addressing the more
    detailed train consist information.”), and shrugs off the same
    mandate’s application to advanced notification information.
    The majority further declares that “[v]iewed as an
    [Administrative Procedure Act] arbitrary and capricious
    challenge, the claim requires the railroad to shoulder the burden
    of proof,” meaning “Union Pacific must point to some evidence
    to substantiate its claim.” Majority Op. 8 (citing City of
    Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 
    292 F.3d 261
    , 271 (D.C. Cir. 2002) and
    Abington Crest Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 
    575 F.3d 717
    , 722 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). But the majority, I submit,
    misunderstands Union Pacific’s claim. The claim it makes and
    5
    must substantiate is that PHMSA ignored the FAST Act’s
    mandate to establish security and confidentiality protections
    for advanced notification information. I believe Union Pacific
    has so substantiated its claim and, accordingly, I would declare
    the Rule invalid as inconsistent with the FAST Act. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold
    unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
    found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
    otherwise not in accordance with law.”); see also In re Aiken
    Cty., 
    725 F.3d 255
    , 260 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[F]ederal agencies
    may not ignore statutory mandates or prohibitions merely
    because of policy disagreements with Congress.”). The
    majority defers to the Agency’s “specific uncontradicted
    finding that requiring the railroad to flag the information to the
    state response commissions was ‘sufficient to ensure
    confidentiality and security,’” Majority Op. 6 (citing 
    84 Fed. Reg. 6,910
    , 6,932), because “during the administrative
    proceedings Union Pacific provided not a mote of evidence that
    the type of data at issue here has been or even could be so
    exploited,” id. at 7. But the Agency’s finding is not one that can
    be “met” with evidence—the finding itself misreads the statute
    and the railroads therefore contest the finding not with contrary
    evidence but by relying on the statutory language that PHMSA
    disregarded.
    Under the Rule, railroads “should indicate” whether their
    disclosures “include[] information that [they] believe[] is
    security sensitive or proprietary and exempt from public
    disclosure.” 
    49 C.F.R. § 174.312
    (c)(3). The provision’s force
    is unclear. The Agency delegates responsibility to protect such
    information to the railroads—it is unlikely that states will treat
    as confidential information not labeled as such—but well-
    settled precedent forecloses this path. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n
    v. FCC, 
    359 F.3d 554
    , 566 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Williams, J.)
    (“[F]ederal agency officials . . . may not subdelegate to outside
    6
    entities—private or sovereign—absent affirmative evidence of
    authority to do so.”); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 
    298 U.S. 238
    , 311 (1936) (delegation to “private persons whose
    interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others
    in the same business” is “legislative delegation in its most
    obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or
    an official body.”). In fact, the Rule’s ambiguous language
    renders it unenforceable as to all parties, both federal and state
    governments—on which it places no duty—and the railroads,
    which are informed only that they “should” indicate whether
    they “believe” information is confidential. 
    49 C.F.R. § 174.312
    (c)(3). Unenforceable guidance like this falls far
    short of the FAST Act’s command that “[t]he Secretary . . .
    issue regulations that . . . establish security and confidentiality
    protections.” Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 7302(a)(6).
    The majority accepts the Agency’s core argument that
    advanced notification information does not merit federal
    protection. See Resp’ts’ Br. 19 (“The blanket requirement to
    establish security protections does not compel the agency to
    protect information without regard to whether its release would
    cause demonstrable harm or violate federal law.”). I believe
    PHMSA’s argument fails for at least three reasons. First, it
    fights yesterday’s battle—whether release of advanced
    notification information “causes demonstrable harm” and
    therefore merits protection was resolved by the Congress when
    it enacted the FAST Act. Second, the Agency’s circular
    conclusion that advanced notification information need not be
    protected because it does not “violate federal law” ignores that
    it is required to be protected by the FAST Act, which is a
    federal law. In other words, the Secretary’s failure to comply
    with federal law—§ 7302(a)(6)—is the very reason advanced
    notification information is—again, invalidly—not protected by
    federal law today. Third, notwithstanding the majority
    emphasizes the fact that the FAST Act “weaves state
    7
    institutions into its program,” its point about PHMSA’s
    decision “to coordinate its action with aspects of state law,”
    Majority Op. 6, is especially off key here, as § 7302(a)(6) in no
    way suggests that the Secretary’s duty to establish security and
    confidentiality protections is to be shared with the states, much
    less left to them.
    By upholding the Rule’s information-sharing provision,
    the majority goes beyond deference and permits the Agency to
    ignore unambiguous statutory text. See EEOC v. Arabian Am.
    Oil Co., 
    499 U.S. 244
    , 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
    and concurring in the judgment) (“[D]eference is not
    abdication, and it requires [courts] to accept only those agency
    interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of
    construction courts normally employ.). The FAST Act
    unambiguously commands the Secretary to “establish”
    something and, as the majority observes, “something . . . beats
    nothing . . . every time.” Majority Op. 8. I respectfully dissent.