Adil Abuzeid v. Alejandro Mayorkas ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 27, 2023 Decided March 17, 2023
No. 21-5003
ADIL MOHAMED ABUZEID, M.D., AND MELISSA ANNE
ABUZEID,
APPELLANTS
v.
ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:18-cv-00382)
Brian Schmitt argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellants.
Cara E. Alsterberg, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief
was Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General.
Before: PAN, Circuit Judge, and SENTELLE and TATEL,
Senior Circuit Judges.
2
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PAN.
PAN, Circuit Judge: Dr. Adil Mohamed Abuzeid is a dual
citizen of the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, who entered
the United States on a visa to receive graduate medical
education. He sought to adjust his immigration status to that
of a legal permanent resident under § 1255 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (the “INA”). The United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) determined
that he was ineligible for adjustment of status and denied his
applications. Dr. Abuzeid and his wife, Melissa Anne
Abuzeid, challenged that decision by filing suit under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court
dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). We affirm.
I. Background
a. Legal Framework
Section 1255 of the INA provides a way for noncitizens
already admitted or paroled into the United States on a
temporary basis to adjust their status to that of a legal
permanent resident. See Meza v. Renaud, 9 F.4th 930, 932
(D.C. Cir. 2021) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1255). An applicant
for adjustment of status must show that he meets three criteria:
“(1) [he has made] an application for such adjustment, (2) [he]
is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the
United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant
visa is immediately available to him at the time his application
is filed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
A J-1 visa is authorized for “exchange visitors” who come
to the United States temporarily to participate in an approved
program for teaching, studying, research, training, or other
similar activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(J); 22 C.F.R.
3
§ 41.62(a). A noncitizen who enters the United States on a J-1
visa to “receive graduate medical education or training” must
commit to returning to the country of his nationality or last
residence upon completion of the education or training.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(j)(1)(C). Such a visa holder is not “eligible to
apply for an immigrant visa, or for permanent residence . . .
until it is established that [he] has resided and been physically
present in the country of his nationality or his last residence for
an aggregate of at least two years” after completion of his
educational or training program, subject to certain exceptions
not at issue here. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e). 1
Even if a noncitizen demonstrates that he is eligible for
adjustment to permanent-resident status, the requested relief is
not guaranteed. The Secretary of Homeland Security —
through USCIS — has discretion to grant or to refuse the
requested status. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 307 (2001)
(noting the “distinction between eligibility for discretionary
relief, on the one hand, and the favorable exercise of discretion,
on the other hand”); Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472, 478–80
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing distinction between eligibility
determination and discretionary decision to grant adjustment of
1
Congress enacted the two-year foreign residency requirement in
1956 to ensure “that those individuals who are brought to the United
States will return either to their own or to another cooperating
country to impart to their friends and the society in which they live
impressions of the United States and its culture.” S. Rep. No. 84-
1608, at 2 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2662, 2663;
accord Chong v. Dir., U.S. Info. Agency, 821 F.2d 171, 177–78 (3d
Cir. 1987). Over the years, the requirement came to serve a related
purpose: “[T]o alleviate possible ‘brain drain’ from various
countries” of medical professionals. H.R. Rep. No. 97-264, at 16
(1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2577, 2585; accord Newton
v. INS, 736 F.2d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 1984).
4
status). 2 A decision to grant discretionary relief to an eligible
applicant is “not a matter of right under any circumstances, but
rather is in all cases a matter of grace.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308(quoting Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 353–54 (1956)).
This case raises the question of what a noncitizen can do
if USCIS denies his application for adjustment of status. In
prior cases, such unsuccessful applicants have brought suit
under the APA in a United States district court, challenging the
agency’s decision as “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see, e.g., Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 141 S.
Ct. 1809, 1812 (2021). The only other way for a noncitizen to
seek review of a denial of adjustment of status is in the context
of a removal proceeding. If the government seeks removal of
a noncitizen from the United States, the noncitizen can move
for adjustment of status before the immigration judge in the
removal proceeding. 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1). If the
immigration judge denies the request for adjustment of status
and enters an order of removal, the noncitizen can seek further
review from the Board of Immigration Appeals, and then by
petitioning for review of the removal order in the appropriate
United States court of appeals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5);
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).
Against this backdrop, the INA limits the role that federal
courts may play in reviewing decisions by the executive branch
regarding requests for adjustment of status. Section
2
Although § 1255 states that the relevant decisionmaker is “the
Attorney General,” Congress has transferred that authority to the
Secretary of Homeland Security, who in turn has delegated it to
USCIS. See Meza v. Renaud, 9 F.4th 930, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2021)
(noting this reassignment of statutory authority).
5
1252(a)(2)(B)(i) of the INA pertains to “[d]enials of
discretionary relief,” and provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of
law . . . and except as provided in
subparagraph (D), and regardless of
whether the judgment, decision, or action
is made in removal proceedings, no court
shall have jurisdiction to review — (i) any
judgment regarding the granting of relief
under section . . . 1255 of this title . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). The statute strips federal courts of
jurisdiction to review “any judgment” related to adjustment of
status under § 1255, subject to an exception that allows review
of “constitutional claims or questions of law” made in removal
proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (“Nothing in
subparagraph (B) . . . or in any other provision of this chapter
(other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial
review, shall be construed as precluding review of
constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition
for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in
accordance with this section.”); Lee v. USCIS, 592 F.3d 612,
620 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[Section] 1252(a)(2)(D), by its express
terms, applies only in the context of removal proceedings.”);
Hamilton v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 564, 566 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“[A] final order of removal is a prerequisite to the application
of § 1252(a)(2)(D).”).
b. Factual and Procedural History
Dr. Abuzeid, a dual citizen of the United Kingdom and
Saudi Arabia, came to the United States on a J-1 visa to receive
graduate medical education. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 1, 19. His
wife and co-appellant, Melissa Anne Abuzeid, is a U.S. citizen,
and the couple live in South Carolina. See id., ¶ 2. Dr. Abuzeid
6
asserts that he has departed the United States and returned to
the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia multiple times since the
completion of his training, spending more than two years (at
least 806 days) in the two countries. See id., ¶¶ 22–23.
Dr. Abuzeid has twice applied to adjust his status to that
of a permanent resident. The first application was made in
conjunction with a request for an immigrant visa based on his
employment. See id., ¶ 26; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(b)(2) (allowing visas for noncitizens “who are members
of the professions holding advanced degrees or [noncitizens] of
exceptional ability”). Dr. Abuzeid’s second application,
submitted while this case was pending in the district court, was
made along with a request for an immigrant visa based on his
marriage to a U.S. citizen. See Am. Compl., ¶ 164; see also 8
U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1204 (allowing visas for
noncitizens who are spouses of U.S. citizens).
USCIS denied both applications for the same reason: Dr.
Abuzeid’s failure to establish that he spent an aggregate of at
least two years after his training “resid[ing] . . . and physically
present in the country of his nationality or his last residence,”
as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e). See Denial of Employment-
Based Application 7; Denial of Family-Based Application 3.
Specifically, the agency determined that Dr. Abuzeid was
ineligible for adjustment of status because he did not
demonstrate that he spent the mandated two years in the United
Kingdom, his last country of residence. Dr. Abuzeid argued
that he should be allowed to combine the time he spent in Saudi
Arabia and the United Kingdom to satisfy the residency
requirement. He contended that, as a dual citizen, he should be
permitted to claim both the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia
as his “country of nationality” under the statute. The agency
disagreed. See Denial of Employment-Based Application 7
(“[T]ime spent in Saudi Arabia cannot be counted toward the
7
fulfillment toward your two-year residency requirement.”);
Denial of Family-Based Application 2 (similar). Moreover, the
agency also concluded that Dr. Abuzeid had not submitted
enough evidence to show that he had resided and been
physically present in the United Kingdom for all the time that
he claimed. USCIS therefore denied his applications.
In response, Dr. Abuzeid and his wife filed a lawsuit in the
district court against the Secretary of Homeland Security and
various other officials tasked with implementing the
immigration statutes (collectively, “the government”).
Appellants asserted that the denials of Dr. Abuzeid’s
applications were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
discretion, and contrary to law, in violation of the APA. See
Am. Compl., ¶¶ 8, 183–86. 3 They sought a declaratory
judgment that the adjudications were unlawful, that Dr.
Abuzeid is eligible for adjustment of status, and that his
applications should be approved. Appellants also asked the
district court to order USCIS to approve his adjustment of
status.
The government moved to dismiss the amended complaint
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
The government argued that “judicial review of the denial[s] is
not available pursuant to the express terms of
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).” Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 5.
3
The Amended Complaint also alleges a due process violation.
See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 188–89. But appellants never explain what
additional process was due, as is required to bring a procedural due
process claim, see Barkley v. U.S. Marshals Serv. ex rel. Hylton, 766
F.3d 25, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014), nor what fundamental right they were
deprived of, as is required for a substantive due process claim, see
Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). Accordingly, they have
not raised a colorable constitutional claim.
8
The district court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss.
See Abuzeid v. Wolf, No. 1:18-cv-382 (TJK), 2020 WL
7629664 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2020). The court held that
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “bars judicial review of [USCIS’s] decisions
denying Dr. Abuzeid’s adjustment of status applications.” Id.
at *1.
After appellants filed their notice of appeal, we held the
case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s decision in
Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614 (2022). Patel has now been
decided. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s interpretation of
§ 1252(a)(2)(B) de novo. See iTech U.S., Inc. v. Renaud, 5
F.4th 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Upon consideration of a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, “[w]e
assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the
complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting
plaintiff[s] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged,’ and upon such facts determine jurisdictional
questions.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970,
972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
III. Analysis
The district court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction
to review appellants’ claims that USCIS violated the APA in
denying Dr. Abuzeid’s applications for adjustment of status.
District courts have federal-question jurisdiction over APA
cases unless such review is precluded by a separate statute. See
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105–09 (1977). Here,
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that “no court shall have
jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting
9
of relief under section . . . 1255 of this title.” Dr. Abuzeid
requested adjustment of status under § 1255. Consideration of
appellants’ APA claim is foreclosed by a straightforward
application of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Patel, 142 S. Ct. 1614.
Patel considered whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precluded
judicial review of a factual finding by an immigration judge in
a removal proceeding — a finding that made Patel ineligible
for discretionary adjustment to lawful-permanent-resident
status. Id. at 1619–20. The Supreme Court ruled that federal
courts lack jurisdiction to consider “any authoritative decision”
by USCIS that applies § 1255 and other enumerated provisions,
noting that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “does not restrict itself to certain
kinds of decisions. Rather, it prohibits review of any judgment
regarding the granting of relief” under those provisions. Id. at
1621–22 (emphasis in original). The Court emphasized that
the word “‘any’ means that the provision applies to judgments
‘of whatever kind’ under § 1255, not just discretionary
judgments or the last-in-time judgment.” Id. at 1622 (quoting
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at 97). In so
holding, the Court explicitly rejected the argument that the
word “judgment” refers exclusively to a “discretionary
decision” that is “subjective or evaluative,” id. at 1623,
forcefully stating that “[a] ‘judgment’ does not necessarily
involve discretion, nor does context indicate that only
discretionary judgments are covered by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)[,]”
id. at 1625.
Here, appellants argue that USCIS based its denial of Dr.
Abuzeid’s applications for adjustment of status on a
“nondiscretionary eligibility decision,” concerning whether he
could aggregate the days that he spent in his two countries of
nationality to satisfy the residency requirement. Appellants’
Br. 14. According to appellants, although “the ultimate
10
exercise of discretion may be unreviewable, the issue of
eligibility is a question of law that is subject to review.” Id.
But under Patel, the agency’s determination that Dr. Abuzeid
was ineligible for adjustment of status was a “judgment
regarding the granting of relief” under § 1255, which a federal
district court may not consider. 142 S. Ct. at 1622 (emphasis
in original). Patel precludes review of all kinds of agency
decisions that result in the denial of relief — whether they be
discretionary or nondiscretionary, legal or factual. See id.
(holding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “does not restrict itself to
certain kinds of decisions”). Thus, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as
interpreted in Patel, squarely applies to this case: The statute
stripped the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over
appellants’ claims under the APA. 4
To avoid the dismissal of their case, appellants seek to
confine Patel’s holding to petitions for review of removal
orders. See Appellants’ Br. 18–19. Although Patel addressed
a judgment made in a removal proceeding before an
immigration judge, and reserved ruling on whether
4
Appellants’ claim that the instant judgment involved a question
of law overlooks USCIS’s alternative factual finding that Dr.
Abuzeid did not submit sufficient evidence to prove the amount of
time he claimed to have spent in the United Kingdom. To the extent
that the agency relied on that unreviewable factual determination,
this case is essentially indistinguishable from Patel. Moreover, the
various pre-Patel circuit court decisions cited by appellants are
unpersuasive. Those cases turned on the alleged difference between
discretionary and nondiscretionary determinations that Patel
rejected. See Melendez v. McAleenan, 928 F.3d 425, 426–27 (5th
Cir. 2019); Abdelwahab v. Frazier, 578 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir.
2009); Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 203 (3d Cir. 2005);
Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 2005) (Sotomayor,
J.); see also Hosseini v. Johnson, 826 F.3d 354, 358–59 (6th Cir.
2016) (not cited by appellants).
11
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars review of analogous judgments by
USCIS that are challenged under the APA in a federal court,
see 142 S. Ct. at 1626, we see no basis for the distinction that
appellants attempt to draw. Section 1252(a)(2)(B) specifically
provides that the relevant jurisdiction-stripping language
applies “regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or
action is made in removal proceedings.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). The “regardless” clause
“makes clear that the jurisdictional limitations imposed by
§ 1252(a)(2)(B) also apply to review of agency decisions made
outside of the removal context.” Lee v. USCIS, 592 F.3d 612,
619 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Britkovyy v. Mayorkas, __ F.4th
__, No. 21-3160, 2023 WL 2059090, at *4 (7th Cir. Feb. 17,
2023) (relying on Patel and the “regardless” clause to hold that
district courts lack jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to
review denials of adjustment of status that are challenged under
the APA).
Appellants make two arguments to avoid the plain
meaning of the “regardless” clause. We need not consider
these arguments because they either were entirely absent from
appellants’ opening brief or, at best, were mentioned in only
“the most skeletal way,” and thus have been forfeited.
Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
In any event, neither argument is persuasive. First, appellants
contend that we should apply § 1252 only in removal
proceedings because the title of the statute is “Judicial Review
of Orders of Removal.” Appellants’ Reply Br. 3 (emphasis
added). But “when a statute is unambiguous, its title cannot be
used to limit the plain meaning of the text.” Murphy Expl. &
Prod. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 481 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). Appellants point to no ambiguity in
the “regardless” clause, and we discern none. Cf. iTech, 5 F.4th
12at 65 (rejecting argument that § 1252(a)(2)(B)’s subsection
heading limits the plain meaning of subparagraph (B)(ii)). 5
Second, appellants note that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) applies
only to decisions “regarding the granting of relief.”
Appellants’ Reply Br. 4 (emphasis in original). Appellants
assert that this refers to relief from removal, and not any other
kind of relief. See id. We reject that interpretation because it
creates an untenable contradiction: The jurisdictional
limitation cannot apply only in cases involving relief from
removal proceedings, while at the same time operate
“regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is
made in removal proceedings.” See Rubin v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 824 (2018) (“[A] statute should be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no
part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”
(quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)).
Finally, appellants fall back on the presumption of judicial
reviewability. They note that in Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S.
233 (2010), the Supreme Court explained that “clear and
convincing evidence” of Congress’s intent is required to
5
The discrepancy between the title of § 1252 and the substance
of § 1252(a)(2)(B) is easily explained. The former originated in the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of
1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-607 (1996). The “regardless” clause was added nine years
later, in the REAL ID Act of 2005. See Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B,
§ 101(f)(2), 119 Stat. 302, 305 (2005); see also Mejia Rodriguez v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 562 F.3d 1137, 1142 n.13 (11th Cir.
2009) (explaining that Congress added the “regardless” clause
“presumably to resolve a disagreement between some of [the]
circuits and district courts as to whether § 1252(a)(2)(B) applied
outside the context of removal proceedings”). It appears that
Congress simply neglected to amend the title of the statute to account
for the new provision that it added.
13
overcome the ordinary presumption that administrative actions
are subject to judicial review, id. at 252 (citing Reno v. Cath.
Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63–64 (1993)); and they further
argue that the “clear and convincing” standard is not met here
because Patel stands only for the proposition that “Congress
may have intended to foreclose judicial review outside of
removal proceedings.” Appellants’ Reply Br. 5 (emphasis in
original). We think that the plain and unequivocal language in
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) is clear and convincing evidence of
Congress’s intent to strictly circumscribe the jurisdiction of
federal courts over cases involving the adjustment of
immigration status. Moreover, the holding in Patel illustrates
that in the Supreme Court’s view, Congress’s intent in enacting
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) was sufficiently clear to overcome any
presumption of judicial review, at least with respect to a
judgment made in a removal proceeding. See 142 S. Ct. at
1627. Discerning no basis to treat APA claims in this context
differently from claims raised in removal proceedings, we
believe that Patel compels the same result here. See Britkovyy,
2023 WL 2059090, at *4–5 (rejecting presumption-of-
reviewability argument in analogous case brought under the
APA).
We recognize that our interpretation of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
leaves no path for judicial review of denials of adjustment of
status by USCIS. That result is dictated by the plain meaning
of the statute and by the reasoning of Patel. The only
remaining avenue for relief from a denial of adjustment of
status is provided by § 1252(a)(2)(D), which allows review of
“constitutional claims or questions of law” raised in removal
proceedings, “upon a petition for review [of a final order of
removal] filed with an appropriate court of appeals.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D). The Supreme Court acknowledged in Patel
that its analysis might well lead to this outcome. See Patel, 142
S. Ct. at 1626 (“If the jurisdictional bar is broad and
14
subparagraph (D) is inapplicable [because it applies only in
removal proceedings], Patel and the Government say, USCIS
decisions will be wholly insulated from judicial review.”). But
the Court stated that “it is possible that Congress did, in fact,
intend to close that door[,]” and further observed that
“foreclosing judicial review unless and until removal
proceedings are initiated would be consistent with Congress’[s]
choice to reduce procedural protections in the context of
discretionary relief.” Id. at 1626–27. Despite understanding
that its ruling might lead to the insulation of USCIS decisions
from judicial review, the Court declined to interpret the statute
to avoid that very consequence, stating that “policy concerns
cannot trump the best interpretation of the statutory text.” Id.
at 1627. 6 Thus, although the Supreme Court avoided deciding
in Patel whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes the review of
decisions by USCIS to deny adjustments of status, the Court
nevertheless considered the implications of its ruling for such
6
We note that a year before deciding Patel, the Supreme Court
ruled on the merits of a case in which a noncitizen challenged the
denial of his application for adjustment of status by USCIS, by filing
a lawsuit in a federal district court under the APA. See Sanchez v.
Mayorkas, 141 S. Ct. 1809 (2021). The Court did not mention or
discuss § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) in Sanchez. Although the Sanchez opinion
appears to assume that the federal courts had jurisdiction to consider
the APA claim at issue, appellants do not cite Sanchez and therefore
forfeit any argument based on that case. See Scenic Am., Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Transp., 836 F.3d 42, 53 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Although a
party cannot forfeit a claim that we lack jurisdiction, it can forfeit a
claim that we possess jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)). In any event,
“when a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed
in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition
that no defect existed.” Schindler Elevator Corp. v. WMATA, 16
F.4th 294, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (alteration omitted) (quoting Ariz.
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 144 (2011)).
Thus, the holding of Sanchez does not contradict our analysis.
15
cases and made clear that “the best interpretation of the
statutory text” should govern. Id. 7
IV. Conclusion
The district court correctly dismissed appellants’ case for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Based on the plain meaning
of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), and the reasoning of Patel v. Garland,
142 S. Ct. 1614, USCIS’s decision to deny Dr. Abuzeid’s
application for adjustment of status is unreviewable by a
federal district court. Accordingly, we affirm.
So ordered.
7
We note that Dr. Abuzeid still has options that might allow him
to receive permanent-resident status, even if he cannot seek review
of USCIS’s decisions in a United States district court and even if the
government does not begin removal proceedings against him. Dr.
Abuzeid can re-submit his application for adjustment of status after
spending the requisite amount of time in the United Kingdom, or he
can seek a waiver of the residency requirement. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(e).