Carlos Loumiet v. United States ( 2020 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued December 13, 2018            Decided January 28, 2020
    No. 18-5020
    CARLOS LOUMIET, ESQUIRE,
    APPELLEE
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    APPELLEE
    MICHAEL RARDIN, ET AL.,
    APPELLANTS
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:12-cv-01130)
    Tyce R. Walters, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were
    Jessie K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney.
    Carlos Loumiet, pro se, argued the cause for appellee. On
    the brief was Andrés Rivero.
    Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, KATSAS, Circuit Judge,
    and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.
    2
    KATSAS, Circuit Judge: In Bivens v. Six Unknown
    Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
    (1971), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
    creates an implied damages action for unconstitutional
    searches against line officers enforcing federal drug laws. In
    this case, we consider whether the First Amendment creates an
    implied damages action against officials in the Office of the
    Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for retaliatory
    administrative enforcement actions under the Financial
    Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
    (FIRREA). Consistent with the Supreme Court’s marked
    reluctance to extend Bivens to new contexts, we hold that the
    First Amendment does not create such an implied damages
    action.
    I
    In 1999, the OCC began an investigation of Hamilton
    Bank and three of its executives for the allegedly fraudulent
    concealment of some $22 million in loan losses. The bank
    retained an outside law firm to investigate the charges. Carlos
    Loumiet, then a partner at the law firm, prepared two reports.
    The first one, made for the bank’s auditing committee and
    shared with the OCC, was issued in November 2000. It found
    no convincing evidence that the executives had fraudulently
    concealed the losses. The OCC was skeptical and provided
    Loumiet with additional evidence. In response, Loumiet
    prepared a second report, issued in March 2001. It concluded
    that the disputed transactions were poorly handled but still
    found insufficient evidence to conclude that the executives had
    fraudulently concealed the losses. The OCC disagreed and
    placed the bank into a receivership. Later, the executives were
    indicted. Two of them pleaded guilty; the third, Hamilton’s
    former chairman and chief executive officer, was convicted
    3
    and sentenced to thirty years of imprisonment. United States
    v. Masferrer, 
    514 F.3d 1158
    (11th Cir. 2008).
    According to Loumiet, OCC officials engaged in various
    forms of misconduct during the investigation. The alleged
    misconduct included lying to Hamilton officers, threatening to
    retaliate against its lawyers, and making racist statements. In
    March and April 2001, Loumiet raised these allegations with
    the Secretary of the Treasury, the Inspector General of the
    Treasury Department, and the Comptroller. In June 2001,
    Loumiet met with an attorney in the Inspector General’s Office
    to discuss his allegations. In July 2001, the Inspector General
    concluded that there was no basis to investigate them any
    further. Nonetheless, Loumiet represented the bank in suing
    the OCC for alleged civil-rights violations. The bank
    voluntarily dismissed its suit in 2002. Order of Dismissal,
    Hamilton Bank, N.A. v. Comptroller, No. 01-4994 (S.D. Fla.
    Oct. 16, 2002), ECF Doc. 64.
    In 2006, after the Hamilton executives were convicted, the
    OCC brought an administrative enforcement action against
    Loumiet, one of his partners, and his law firm. The OCC
    proceeded under FIRREA, which allows it to seek civil
    penalties from “any institution-affiliated party” who breaches
    a fiduciary duty to a federally-insured bank and thereby
    “causes or is likely to cause more than a minimal loss” to the
    bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(B). In turn, FIRREA defines an
    “institution-affiliated party” to include “any attorney” who
    “knowingly or recklessly participates in” a breach of fiduciary
    duty that “caused or is likely to cause more than a minimal
    financial loss to, or a significant adverse effect on” the bank.
    
    Id. § 1813(u)(4).
    The law firm and Loumiet’s partner settled
    with the OCC and agreed to pay $750,000 in fines. Loumiet
    contested the charges against him. An Administrative Law
    Judge recommended their dismissal on the ground that Loumiet
    4
    had not breached any fiduciary duty. Recommended Decision,
    In re Loumiet, OCC-AA-EC-06-102 (June 18, 2008). The
    Comptroller disagreed, but nonetheless dismissed on the
    alternative ground that Loumiet had not caused the bank any
    harm. Final Decision & Order, In re Loumiet, OCC-AA-EC-
    06-102 (July 27, 2009).
    Loumiet sought fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
    (EAJA). In pertinent part, EAJA allows a prevailing private
    party in an administrative adjudication to recover “fees and
    other expenses” unless the adjudicator “finds that the position
    of the agency was substantially justified.”             5 U.S.C.
    § 504(a)(1). The OCC denied fees, but we reversed on the
    ground that there was no substantial justification for the OCC’s
    position that Loumiet could have significantly harmed the
    bank. Loumiet v. OCC, 
    650 F.3d 796
    (D.C. Cir. 2011). We
    reasoned that even if Loumiet’s false exoneration of the
    executives caused the bank to “retain the dishonest officers,”
    there was no evidence that this harmed the bank. 
    Id. at 800.
    On remand, Loumiet was awarded $675,000.
    Loumiet then filed this lawsuit against the United States
    and four OCC officials. He asserted Bivens claims against the
    officials as well as various tort claims. The Bivens claims rest
    on the theory that the officials caused the OCC enforcement
    action in retaliation for Loumiet’s protected speech criticizing
    the OCC investigation, in violation of the First and Fifth
    Amendments of the Constitution. The district court held that
    the Bivens claims were untimely, and it dismissed the tort
    claims on other grounds. Loumiet v. United States, 
    65 F. Supp. 3d
    19 (D.D.C. 2014). We reversed both rulings. Loumiet v.
    United States, 
    828 F.3d 935
    (D.C. Cir. 2016).
    On remand, the district court declined to dismiss the First
    Amendment Bivens claims. Loumiet v. United States, 255
    
    5 F. Supp. 3d 75
    , 83–96 (D.D.C. 2017). The court reasoned that
    prior decisions had already “recognized the existence of a
    Bivens implied cause-of-action for retaliatory prosecution in
    violation of the First Amendment.” 
    Id. at 84.
    Likewise, the
    court concluded that the procedural and remedial protections
    provided under FIRREA do not counsel against recognizing an
    implied damages action. See 
    id. at 85–90.
    The court further
    held that the complaint plausibly stated First Amendment
    claims against the OCC officials who allegedly “induce[d] an
    enforcement action against Plaintiff in reprisal for critical
    statements that he made against them and the OCC more
    generally.” 
    Id. at 95.
    And it denied those officials qualified
    immunity on the ground that the “First Amendment right to be
    free from retaliatory prosecution” was clearly established long
    before 2006. 
    Id. at 93
    (quotation marks omitted). Finally, the
    court held that the Fifth Amendment count did not state a claim,
    converted the tort claims against the individual defendants into
    claims against the United States, and dismissed some but not
    all of the tort claims. 
    Id. at 97–100.
    After the Supreme Court decided Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
    137 S. Ct. 1843
    (2017), the officials moved for reconsideration.
    The district court denied the motion. Loumiet v. United States,
    
    292 F. Supp. 3d 222
    (D.D.C. 2017). In light of Abbasi, the
    court assumed that Loumiet was seeking to extend Bivens into
    a “new context.” 
    Id. at 229.
    But the court concluded that the
    “special factors counselling hesitation” in Abbasi, which
    involved programmatic actions undertaken by high-ranking
    officials in response to terrorist attacks, were not present in this
    case. 
    Id. at 227
    (quotation marks omitted); see 
    id. at 229–31.
    Finally, the court discounted the significance of EAJA in its
    special-factors analysis because that statute was not enacted as
    part of FIRREA. 
    Id. at 232–38.
                                    6
    The OCC officials now seek review of the district court’s
    refusal to dismiss the First Amendment claims against them.
    II
    We begin, as we must, with our jurisdiction. See Steel Co.
    v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
    523 U.S. 83
    , 94 (1998). We have
    jurisdiction to review “final decisions” of the district court. 28
    U.S.C. § 1291. Under the collateral-order doctrine, the “denial
    of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on
    an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’” within the
    meaning of section 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
    472 U.S. 511
    ,
    530 (1985). We thus have jurisdiction to decide whether the
    OCC officials are entitled to qualified immunity on the First
    Amendment claims.
    We also have jurisdiction to decide whether the First
    Amendment confers upon Loumiet an implied cause of action
    for damages. Because “the recognition of the entire cause of
    action” is “directly implicated by the defense of qualified
    immunity,” both questions are “properly before us on
    interlocutory appeal.” Wilkie v. Robbins, 
    551 U.S. 537
    , 549 n.4
    (2007) (quotation marks omitted); see Liff v. Office of Inspector
    Gen. for U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
    881 F.3d 912
    , 917–18 (D.C. Cir.
    2018).
    III
    In this court, the OCC officials contend that the First
    Amendment creates no implied cause of action for damages
    and that, in any event, they are entitled to qualified immunity
    on the facts alleged by Loumiet. We begin with the cause-of-
    action question, which is antecedent to the question of qualified
    immunity. See 
    Liff, 881 F.3d at 918
    (“it is appropriate to
    determine the availability of a Bivens remedy at the earliest
    practicable phase of litigation”).
    7
    A
    The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment provides
    that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of
    speech.” Neither the First Amendment, nor any other provision
    of the Constitution, provides an express cause of action for its
    own violation. Congress has provided a statutory cause of
    action against state officials for violations of the federal
    Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but it has provided no such
    cause of action against federal officials. Nonetheless, Loumiet
    asks us to hold that the First Amendment, by its own force,
    creates an implied cause of action for damages against OCC
    and other federal officials for retaliatory enforcement activities.
    The Supreme Court first recognized an implied damages
    action under the Constitution in Bivens. There, the Court held
    that the Fourth Amendment creates an implied damages action
    against federal narcotics officers for unconstitutional searches
    and 
    seizures. 403 U.S. at 389
    . Over the next decade, the
    Supreme Court recognized two more implied damages actions
    under the Constitution—one under the Fifth Amendment
    against members of Congress for employment discrimination
    on the basis of sex, Davis v. Passman, 
    442 U.S. 228
    , 248–49
    (1979), and one under the Eighth Amendment against federal
    prison officials for failure to provide adequate medical care,
    Carlson v. Green, 
    446 U.S. 14
    , 19 (1980).
    Since Carlson, however, the Supreme Court has carefully
    circumscribed Bivens and “consistently refused to extend
    Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants.”
    
    Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857
    (quotation marks omitted).
    Recognizing an implied damages action “is a significant step
    under separation-of-powers principles.” 
    Id. at 1856.
    Imposing
    personal liability on federal officers may promote important
    interests in deterring constitutional violations and redressing
    8
    injuries, but it also “create[s] substantial costs” for the officers,
    the government, and citizens who depend on the vigorous
    enforcement of federal law. 
    Id. The Constitution
    itself is silent
    on how to balance these competing considerations in various
    contexts, and judges are not well-suited to do so. Rather, “[i]n
    most instances … the Legislature is in the better position to
    consider if the public interest would be served by imposing a
    new substantive legal liability.” 
    Id. at 1857
    (quotation marks
    omitted). Moreover, in the decades since Bivens was decided,
    the Court has grown wary of creating implied damages actions
    in other contexts. See 
    id. at 1855–56.
    For these reasons,
    “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a disfavored judicial
    activity,” so the Supreme Court demands “caution before
    extending Bivens remedies into any new context.” 
    Id. at 1857
    (quotation marks omitted).
    Exercising this caution, the Supreme Court has not
    recognized a new Bivens action in the four decades since
    Carlson was decided. At the same time, the Court has declined
    to extend Bivens on ten separate occasions. Once, it declined
    to create a Bivens cause of action because Congress had made
    another remedy expressly exclusive. Hui v. Castaneda, 
    559 U.S. 799
    , 805–07 (2010). Twice, it declined to extend Bivens
    to areas where Congress had provided an alternative scheme of
    protections and remedies. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 
    487 U.S. 412
    ,
    424–29 (1988) (Social Security disability benefits); Bush v.
    Lucas, 
    462 U.S. 367
    , 380–90 (1983) (federal employment).
    Three times, it declined to extend Bivens to sensitive areas.
    
    Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860
    –63 (national security); United States
    v. Stanley, 
    483 U.S. 669
    , 678–86 (1987) (military); Chappell v.
    Wallace, 
    462 U.S. 296
    , 298–305 (1983) (military). Three
    times, it declined to extend Bivens to new categories of
    defendants. Minneci v. Pollard, 
    565 U.S. 118
    , 126–31 (2012)
    (private individuals); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 
    534 U.S. 61
    , 70–74 (2001) (private corporations); FDIC v. Meyer, 510
    
    9 U.S. 471
    , 484–86 (1994) (federal agencies). Once, it declined
    to extend Bivens simply because Congress is better positioned
    to evaluate when agency officials “push too hard for the
    Government’s benefit,” and what consequences should follow
    if they do so. 
    Robbins, 551 U.S. at 562
    .
    After reviewing these precedents, Abbasi set out a two-part
    test to decide when to recognize implied damages actions under
    Bivens. First, we must consider whether the plaintiff seeks to
    extend Bivens into a “new context.” If so, we then must
    consider whether there are any “special factors counselling
    hesitation.” 
    See 137 S. Ct. at 1857
    –60.
    B
    The new-context inquiry in this case is straightforward.
    According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he proper test for
    determining whether a case presents a new Bivens context is as
    follows. If the case is different in a meaningful way from
    previous Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the context
    is new.” 
    Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859
    . The Court has provided a
    non-exhaustive “list of differences that are meaningful enough
    to make a given context a new one”:
    the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional
    right at issue; the generality or specificity of the
    official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to
    how an officer should respond to the problem or
    emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other
    legal mandate under which the officer was operating;
    the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into
    the functioning of other branches; or the presence of
    potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did
    not consider.
    10
    
    Id. at 1859–60.
    In addition, a “new context” is present
    whenever the plaintiff seeks damages from a “new category of
    defendants.” See 
    id. at 1857
    (quotation marks omitted);
    Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 
    804 F.3d 417
    , 424 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
    Under these criteria, “even a modest extension is still an
    extension,” and so “the new-context inquiry is easily satisfied.”
    
    Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1864
    –65.
    This case clearly presents a new Bivens context. First, the
    constitutional right at issue differs from the ones at issue in
    Bivens, Davis, and Carlson. Loumiet alleges a violation of the
    Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, but Bivens was a
    Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure 
    case, 403 U.S. at 389
    ;
    Davis was a Fifth Amendment sex-discrimination 
    case, 442 U.S. at 231
    ; and Carlson was an Eighth Amendment medical-
    care 
    case, 446 U.S. at 16
    & n.1. Although the Supreme Court
    twice has assumed that the First Amendment creates an implied
    cause of action for damages, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 675 (2009) (Free Exercise Clause); Hartman v. Moore,
    
    547 U.S. 250
    , 256 (2006) (Free Speech Clause), it has “never
    held that Bivens extends to First Amendment claims,” Reichle
    v. Howards, 
    566 U.S. 658
    , 663–64 n.4 (2012). Abbasi removed
    any possible doubt on this point. There, the Supreme Court
    stressed that “three cases—Bivens, Davis, and Carlson—
    represent the only instances in which the Court has approved
    of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution 
    itself.” 137 S. Ct. at 1855
    . To the extent we suggested otherwise in
    Munsell v. Department of Agriculture, 
    509 F.3d 572
    , 587–88
    (D.C. Cir. 2007)—a case rejecting Bivens claims for failure to
    exhaust, see 
    id. at 591—Reichle
    and Abbasi have displaced that
    dicta. And though we previously recognized First Amendment
    Bivens claims in Haynesworth v. Miller, 
    820 F.2d 1245
    , 1255
    (D.C. Cir. 1987), and Moore v. Valder, 
    65 F.3d 189
    , 196 n.12
    (D.C. Cir. 1995), those cases have been overtaken by Abbasi’s
    holding that the new-context analysis may consider only
    11
    Supreme Court decisions approving Bivens actions. 
    See 137 S. Ct. at 1859
    .
    Second, the legal mandate under which the OCC officials
    were operating is different from the ones in Bivens, Davis, and
    Carlson. The dispute here arose from the enforcement of
    federal banking laws under FIRREA, whereas Bivens involved
    the enforcement of federal drug 
    laws, 403 U.S. at 389
    ; Davis
    involved employment decisions by members of 
    Congress, 442 U.S. at 230
    ; and Carlson involved the provision of medical care
    to federal 
    prisoners, 446 U.S. at 16
    .
    Third, Loumiet seeks damages from a new category of
    defendants. The defendants here are OCC officials, whereas
    the defendants in Bivens were federal narcotics 
    agents, 403 U.S. at 389
    ; the defendant in Davis was a former member of
    
    Congress, 442 U.S. at 230
    ; and the defendants in Carlson were
    federal prison 
    officials, 446 U.S. at 16
    . For each of these
    reasons, this case presents a new context.
    C
    We next consider whether special factors counsel
    hesitation. One factor stands out here: “if there is an alternative
    remedial structure present in a certain case, that alone may limit
    the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of
    action.” 
    Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858
    . Likewise, “when
    alternative methods of relief are available, a Bivens remedy
    usually is not.” 
    Id. at 1863.
    Two Supreme Court cases—Bush
    and Chilicky—illustrate these special factors.
    In Bush, the Court refused to extend Bivens to a federal
    employee allegedly demoted in retaliation for protected speech
    criticizing his 
    employer. 462 U.S. at 368
    –69. As the Court
    explained, federal workers are “protected by an elaborate,
    comprehensive scheme that encompasses substantive
    12
    provisions forbidding arbitrary action by supervisors and
    procedures—administrative and judicial—by which improper
    action may be redressed.” 
    Id. at 385;
    see also 
    id. at 368
    (observing that the scheme affords “meaningful remedies
    against the United States”). The Court held that such an
    “elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by
    step, with careful attention to conflicting policy
    considerations,” should not be “augmented by the creation of a
    new judicial remedy” for the claimed First Amendment
    violation. 
    Id. at 388.
    In Chilicky, the Court refused to extend Bivens to
    individuals denied Social Security disability benefits, allegedly
    in violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
    Clause. 487 U.S. at 414
    . Applying Bush, the Court concluded that the
    “administrative structure and procedures of the Social Security
    system” was a special factor counselling hesitation. 
    Id. at 424.
    That system established “federal standards and criteria” for the
    provision of benefits, created “elaborate administrative
    remedies” for claimants denied benefits, and provided for
    “judicial review, including review of constitutional claims.”
    
    Id. But it
    made “no provision for remedies in money damages
    against officials responsible for unconstitutional conduct that
    leads to the wrongful denial of benefits,” and the Court
    declined to recalibrate the scheme to add that remedy. 
    Id. at 424–25.
    On three occasions, we have applied Bush and Chilicky to
    reject Bivens claims. In Spagnola v. Mathis, 
    859 F.2d 223
    (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc), we confirmed that the Civil Service
    Reform Act bars First Amendment Bivens claims by
    individuals allegedly denied federal employment or promotion
    in retaliation for protected speech. See 
    id. at 224–25,
    229. We
    stressed that, under Bush and Chilicky, “it is the
    comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme involved, not the
    13
    ‘adequacy’ of specific remedies extended thereunder, that
    counsels judicial abstention.” 
    Id. at 227
    . In Wilson v. Libby,
    
    535 F.3d 697
    (D.C. Cir. 2008), we held that the Privacy Act
    barred First and Fifth Amendment Bivens claims brought by a
    plaintiff alleging that her status as a covert agent had been
    unconstitutionally disclosed. See 
    id. at 702–04.
    And we did so
    even though the Privacy Act, which authorizes private damages
    actions for willful violations, exempts the Offices of the
    President and the Vice President from coverage—and thus
    afforded no remedy against the defendants in the case. See 
    id. at 706–08.
    In Liff, we held that the “myriad statutes and
    regulations that provide remedies for contracting-related
    disputes,” which collectively afford a “spectrum of remedies,”
    bar the imposition of Bivens liability for claims arising out of
    federal government contracts. 
    See 881 F.3d at 920
    –21. In each
    of these cases, we declined to question whether the remedial
    scheme at issue was the “best response” in the specific context
    at issue, “for Congress is the body charged with making the
    inevitable compromises required.” 
    Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 228
    (cleaned up).
    Here, FIRREA’s administrative enforcement scheme is
    likewise a special factor counselling hesitation. This scheme
    permits the imposition of civil penalties only for defined
    offenses such as knowingly breaching a fiduciary duty or
    recklessly engaging in an unsound banking practice. 12 U.S.C.
    § 1818(i)(2)(A)–(C). Any party subject to a penalty is entitled
    to advance notice and a hearing, 
    id. § 1818(i)(2)(H),
    which
    must be conducted in accordance with the Administrative
    Procedure Act, 
    id. § 1818(h)(1).
    Thus, the party is entitled to
    make arguments, cross-examine witnesses, and submit oral,
    documentary, and rebuttal evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(1); 
    id. § 556(d).
    Enforcement officials within the OCC bear the
    burden of proof and cannot participate or advise in the decision.
    
    Id. § 556(b)
    & (d). And the presiding official, if not the OCC
    14
    itself, must be a duly appointed ALJ, 
    id. § 556(b),
    who must
    render a recommended decision on a closed record with a
    statement of reasons, 
    id. § 557(c),
    and without any ex parte
    contacts relevant to the proceeding, 
    id. § 557(d).
    FIRREA also
    requires the OCC to augment these procedures with
    implementing regulations, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(K), under
    which administrative respondents are entitled to be represented
    by counsel, 12 C.F.R. § 19.35; seek summary disposition, 
    id. § 19.29;
    apply for document subpoenas, 
    id. § 19.26;
    object to
    evidence, 
    id. § 19.36(d);
    depose unavailable witnesses, 
    id. § 19.36(f);
    and more. The ALJ’s recommended decision is
    then subject to further review by the Comptroller himself,
    5 U.S.C. § 557(b), and his decision in turn is subject to judicial
    review in a court of appeals, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2). Similar
    rules, protections, and review attend other exercises of OCC
    administrative enforcement, including the adjudication of
    cease-and-desist orders, 
    id. § 1818(b),
    and the removal of
    affiliated individuals from participating in a bank’s affairs, 
    id. § 1818(e).
    Together, these provisions afford regulated parties
    an “alternative, existing process for protecting [their] interest.”
    
    Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858
    (quotation marks omitted).
    Moreover, the FIRREA enforcement scheme gives
    regulated parties a sword as well as a shield. Under EAJA, any
    party prevailing in a contested agency adjudication is entitled
    to “fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection
    with that proceeding,” unless the ALJ “finds that the position
    of the agency was substantially justified or that special
    circumstances make an award unjust.” 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1).
    This stands in marked contrast to the American Rule, under
    which “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to
    collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.” Alyeska
    Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 
    421 U.S. 240
    , 247
    (1975). Fee awards under EAJA can be substantial, as
    evidenced by Loumiet’s own award of $675,000. The FIRREA
    15
    scheme thus affords “meaningful remedies against the United
    States,” 
    Bush, 462 U.S. at 368
    , as a general matter and in this
    case.
    One more aspect of the scheme is important—judicial
    review, although available, is carefully circumscribed.
    Specifically, FIRREA provides that “[j]udicial review” of any
    OCC administrative adjudication “shall be exclusively as
    provided” in FIRREA itself, which channels such review to the
    courts of appeals. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1) & (2). Likewise,
    FIRREA provides that, in any district-court action to enforce a
    civil penalty, “the validity and appropriateness of the penalty
    shall not be subject to review.” 
    Id. § 1818(i)(2)(I)(ii).
    These
    provisions come close to foreclosing a Bivens action expressly,
    just as the exclusive-review provision at issue in Castaneda
    expressly foreclosed Bivens actions against officers of the
    Public Health Service. 
    See 559 U.S. at 805
    –06. At a minimum,
    the precise nature of the available judicial review makes clear
    that Congress did not “inadvertently” omit a damages remedy
    from FIRREA, see 
    Liff, 881 F.3d at 921
    ; 
    Wilson, 535 F.3d at 708
    ; 
    Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 228
    , underscoring that the courts
    should not augment the scheme to supply one. See 
    Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1865
    (“legislative action suggesting that Congress
    does not want a damages remedy is itself a factor counseling
    hesitation”).
    Loumiet’s contrary arguments are all without merit. First,
    he contends that the procedural protections afforded in the
    FIRREA administrative process are not remedies at all. True
    enough, but they do help constrain the unconstitutional
    exercise of government power—unlike the largely or wholly
    unregulated search in Bivens, hiring decision in Davis, and care
    provision in Carlson. Moreover, as explained above, we rely
    not only on procedural protections, but also on the affirmative
    EAJA remedy and the channeled nature of the judicial review
    16
    provided. Second, Loumiet contends that EAJA cannot be
    considered because it is a separate statute from FIRREA. But
    in Liff, we assessed special factors by considering the full
    “constellation of statutes and regulations governing federal
    contracts, as well as the Privacy 
    Act.” 881 F.3d at 920
    . There
    is no reason to disregard any of the statutes establishing the
    governing scheme. Third, Loumiet contends that he is not
    subject to the FIRREA scheme at all, because the Comptroller
    concluded that he is not an institution-affiliated party. But
    Loumiet—as an attorney for a federally-insured bank—was not
    wholly outside the regulatory scheme. To the contrary, the
    Comptroller concluded that Loumiet was not an institution-
    affiliated party only because his conduct did not harm the bank.
    If it had, he might have been subject to a penalty. Compare
    12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4) (definition of “institution-affiliated
    party”), with 
    id. § 1818(i)(2)(A)–(C)
    (penalties for institution-
    affiliated parties). Loumiet does not fall outside the FIRREA
    scheme simply because he won his individual case. Finally,
    Loumiet argues that the remedy afforded to him was
    insufficient. But Bush and Chilicky were decided on the
    premise that the available remedy in each of those cases—
    setting aside an adverse personnel decision or denial of
    benefits—was less effective than would be an award of full
    damages for all consequential harms. See 
    Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425
    . Moreover, we later held that, so long as the administrative
    scheme is comprehensive, a Bivens remedy is unavailable even
    if the plaintiff before the court is afforded no remedy at all. See
    
    Wilson, 535 F.3d at 709
    .
    We recognize that retaliatory enforcement actions can be
    hard to ferret out in administrative processes and can impose
    harms well beyond those remediable through EAJA. On the
    other hand, charges of a retaliatory motive are easy to make,
    hard to disprove, potentially crippling to regulators, and
    perhaps not unlikely in the context of hotly contested
    17
    adversarial proceedings. As in Abbasi, there is a hard “balance
    to be struck” in considering whether to create a damages
    remedy for the kind of claim that Loumiet seeks to press 
    here. 137 S. Ct. at 1863
    . That decision is best left to Congress.
    IV
    The First Amendment creates no implied damages action
    against OCC officials for inducing an allegedly retaliatory
    administrative enforcement proceeding. We therefore reverse
    the district court’s judgment and remand the case with
    instructions to dismiss Loumiet’s First Amendment claims.
    So ordered.