West Flagler Associates, Ltd. v. Debra Haaland ( 2023 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued December 14, 2022             Decided June 30, 2023
    No. 21-5265
    WEST FLAGLER ASSOCIATES, LTD., A FLORIDA LIMITED
    PARTNERSHIP, DOING BUSINESS AS MAGIC CITY CASINO AND
    BONITA-FORT MYERS CORPORATION, A FLORIDA
    CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS AS BONITA SPRINGS POKER
    ROOM,
    APPELLEES
    v.
    DEBRA A. HAALAND, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
    SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE
    INTERIOR AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE
    INTERIOR,
    APPELLEES
    SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA,
    APPELLANT
    Consolidated with 22-5022
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:21-cv-02192)
    2
    Rachel Heron, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for federal appellants. With her on the briefs
    was Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General.
    Barry Richard argued the cause for appellant Seminole
    Tribe of Florida. With him on the briefs were Joseph H.
    Webster, Elliott A. Milhollin, and Kaitlyn E. Klass.
    Barry Richard, Joseph H. Webster, Elliott A. Milhollin,
    and Kaitlyn E. Klass were on the brief for amicus curiae
    Seminole Tribe of Florida in support of federal appellants.
    Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney
    General for the State of Florida, argued the cause for amicus
    curiae State of Florida in support of federal appellants. With
    him on the brief was Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and
    Christopher J. Baum, Senior Deputy Solicitor General.
    Scott Crowell was on the brief for amici curiae The
    National Indian Gaming Association, et al. in support of federal
    appellants.
    Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General, and Rachel Heron,
    Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, were on the answering
    brief for federal appellees.
    Hamish P. M. Hume argued the cause for appellees West
    Flagler Associates, Ltd, et al. With him on the brief were Amy
    L. Neuhardt and Jon Mills.
    Jenea M. Reed argued the cause for amici curiae Monterra
    MF, LLC, et al. in support of appellees. With her on the brief
    was Eugene E. Stearns.
    3
    Before: HENDERSON, WILKINS and CHILDS, Circuit
    Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.
    WILKINS, Circuit Judge: In 2021, the Seminole Tribe of
    Florida (“Tribe”) and the State of Florida entered into a
    compact under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”),
    the federal law that regulates gaming on Indian lands. That
    gaming compact (“Compact”), along with accompanying
    changes in state law, purported to permit the Tribe to offer
    online sports betting throughout the state. The Compact
    became effective when the Secretary of the Interior failed to
    either approve or disapprove it within 45 days of receiving it
    from the Tribe and Florida.
    The Plaintiffs in this case, brick-and-mortar casinos in
    Florida, object to the Secretary’s decision to allow the Compact
    to go into effect because in their view, it impermissibly
    authorizes gaming outside of Indian lands, violating IGRA.
    They also believe that the Compact violates the Wire Act, the
    Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, and the Fifth
    Amendment, and that the Secretary was required to disapprove
    the Compact for those reasons as well. The suit named as
    Defendants the Secretary of the Interior and the Department of
    the Interior, and the Tribe moved to intervene for the limited
    purpose of filing a Rule 19 motion to dismiss based on its tribal
    sovereign immunity. The District Court denied the Tribe’s
    motion and granted summary judgment for the Plaintiffs,
    finding that the Compact here “attempts to authorize sports
    betting both on and off Indian lands[,]” in violation of “IGRA’s
    ‘Indian lands’ requirement.” W. Flagler Assocs. v. Haaland,
    
    573 F. Supp. 3d 260
    , 273 (D.D.C. 2021).
    4
    We see the case differently. IGRA “regulate[s] gaming on
    Indian lands, and nowhere else.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
    Cmty., 
    572 U.S. 782
    , 795 (2014). Thus, to be sure, an IGRA
    gaming compact can legally authorize a tribe to conduct
    gaming only on its own lands. But at the same time, IGRA
    does not prohibit a gaming compact—which is, at bottom, an
    agreement between a tribe and a state—from discussing other
    topics, including those governing activities “outside Indian
    lands[.]” 
    Id. at 796
    . In fact, IGRA expressly contemplates that
    a compact “may” do so where the activity is “directly related
    to” gaming. 
    25 U.S.C. § 2710
    (d)(3)(C)(vii). The District
    Court erred by reading into the Compact a legal effect it does
    not (and cannot) have, namely, independently authorizing
    betting by patrons located outside of the Tribe’s lands. Rather,
    the Compact itself authorizes only the betting that occurs on
    the Tribe’s lands; in this respect it satisfied IGRA. Whether it
    is otherwise lawful for a patron to place bets from non-tribal
    land within Florida may be a question for that State’s courts,
    but it is not the subject of this litigation and not for us to decide.
    Today, we hold only that the Secretary did not violate the
    Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in choosing not to act
    and thereby allowing the Compact to go into effect by
    operation of law. We also find the Plaintiffs’ remaining
    challenges to the Compact meritless, as a matter of law.
    Finally, because this decision will effectively keep intact
    the Compact, resulting in minimal prejudice to the Tribe, we
    affirm the denial of the Tribe’s motion to intervene, albeit on
    different grounds than did the District Court. Accordingly, we
    reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment for the
    Secretary.
    5
    I.
    A.
    In 1987, the Supreme Court held that states are powerless
    to regulate gaming on Indian lands. California v. Cabazon
    Band of Mission Indians, 
    480 U.S. 202
     (1987). In response to
    that decision, Congress the following year enacted IGRA, 
    25 U.S.C. § 2701
     et seq., which “creates a framework” for doing
    just that. Bay Mills, 
    572 U.S. at 785
    . Through IGRA, Congress
    sought to “balance state, federal, and tribal interests.” Amador
    Cnty. v. Salazar, 
    640 F.3d 373
    , 376 (D.C. Cir. 2011). IGRA’s
    purposes include “promoting tribal economic development”
    and “self-sufficiency,” “ensur[ing] that the Indian tribe is the
    primary beneficiary of the gaming operation,” and “shield[ing]
    [tribes] from organized crime and other corrupting
    influences[.]” 
    25 U.S.C. § 2702
    . Both Cabazon and IGRA
    “left fully intact” states’ “capacious” regulatory power outside
    Indian territory. Bay Mills, 
    572 U.S. at 794
    .
    IGRA “divides gaming into three classes.” 
    Id. at 785
    .
    Class III gaming, the kind at issue in this case, is “the most
    closely regulated” and includes casino games, slot machines,
    and sports betting. Id.; see also 
    25 U.S.C. § 2703
    (8). A tribe
    may offer class III gaming on its own lands “only pursuant to,
    and in compliance with, a compact it has negotiated with the
    surrounding State.” Bay Mills, 
    572 U.S. at 785
    ; see also 
    25 U.S.C. § 2710
    (d)(1)(C). “A compact typically prescribes rules
    for operating gaming, allocates law enforcement authority
    between the tribe and State, and provides remedies for breach
    of the agreement’s terms.” Bay Mills, 
    572 U.S. at 785
    .
    Before it takes effect, a tribal-state compact must be
    approved by the Secretary of the Interior, with notice published
    in the Federal Register. 
    25 U.S.C. § 2710
    (d)(3)(B). When
    presented with a tribal-state compact, the Secretary can do one
    6
    of three things. See Amador Cnty., 
    640 F.3d at 377
    (summarizing the approval process).           First, she may
    affirmatively approve the compact. 
    25 U.S.C. § 2710
    (d)(8)(A).
    Second, she “may disapprove” the compact, but “only if” the
    compact violates IGRA, another federal law, or the federal
    government’s trust obligations to Indians. 
    Id.
     § 2710(d)(8)(B).
    Third, if she does not act within 45 days, the compact is
    “considered . . . approved[,]” “but only to the extent the
    compact is consistent with the provisions of [IGRA].” Id.
    § 2710(d)(8)(C). The Secretary’s decision to take no action
    within 45 days of receiving the compact, thereby allowing the
    compact to go into effect under subsection (C), is judicially
    reviewable. Amador Cnty., 
    640 F.3d at 383
    .
    B.
    The Seminole Tribe of Florida is a federally recognized
    tribal government. In 2010, it entered into a tribal-state
    compact with Florida, so that it could offer certain forms of
    class III gaming on its lands. In 2021, the Tribe and Florida
    entered into a new compact, the one at issue in this case
    (“Compact”). At that time, sports betting was illegal
    throughout the state, with exceptions not relevant here. 
    Fla. Stat. § 849.14
    . The Compact and related amendments to state
    law changed this, purporting to allow the Tribe the exclusive
    right to offer sports betting in the state, including online sports
    betting by individuals not physically located on the Tribe’s
    lands, as follows.
    The Compact requires sports bets to be placed
    “exclusively by and through one or more sports books
    conducted and operated by the Tribe or its approved
    management contractor[.]” J.A. 687 (Compact § III.CC.1).
    Under the Compact, the Tribe and Florida in turn consider all
    bets placed through the Tribe’s sports book, regardless of
    7
    where the person placing the bet is physically located within
    the state, to occur where the sports book servers are located—
    in other words, on tribal land:
    The Tribe and State agree that the Tribe is
    authorized to operate Covered Games on its
    Indian lands, as defined in [IGRA]. . . . Subject
    to limitations set forth herein, wagers on Sports
    Betting . . . made by players physically located
    within the State using a mobile or other
    electronic device shall be deemed to take place
    exclusively where received at the location of the
    servers or other devices used to conduct such
    wagering activity at a Facility on Indian Lands.
    J.A. 692 (Compact § IV.A). Similar language appears in
    another section of the Compact as well. J.A. 687 (Compact
    § III.CC.2).
    The Tribe and Florida executed the Compact in April
    2021, and the following month, Governor DeSantis signed a
    bill that ratified and approved the Compact. That state law
    adopted the same “deeming” language from the Compact
    regarding the location of sports bets.                 
    Fla. Stat. § 285.710
    (13)(b)(7) (noting that all sports wagers “shall be
    deemed to be exclusively conducted by the Tribe where the
    servers or other devices used to conduct such wagering activity
    on the Tribe’s Indian lands are located[,]” and that “[g]ames
    and gaming activities authorized under this subsection and
    conducted pursuant to a gaming compact . . . do not violate the
    laws of this state”). In June, the Tribe transmitted the Compact
    to Secretary Haaland for her review under IGRA. She did not
    act within the 45-day window, and the Compact accordingly
    went into effect under 
    25 U.S.C. § 2710
    (d)(8)(C). The
    Compact was published in the Federal Register on August 11,
    8
    2021, making it effective. Indian Gaming; Approval by
    Operation of Law of Tribal-State Class III Gaming Compact in
    the State of Florida, 
    86 Fed. Reg. 44,037
    -01 (Aug. 11, 2021).
    C.
    The Plaintiffs in this case, West Flagler Associates, Ltd.,
    d/b/a Magic City Casino, and Bonita-Fort Myers Corporation,
    d/b/a Bonita Springs Poker Room (collectively, “West
    Flagler”), operate brick-and-mortar casinos in Florida. They
    sued Secretary Haaland, in her official capacity, and the
    Department of the Interior (collectively, “the Secretary”),
    challenging the decision to not act on the Compact within 45
    days. They allege that the Secretary’s approval through
    inaction violated the APA for four reasons:              (1) its
    authorization of gaming off of Indian lands was unlawful under
    IGRA, (2) it violated the Wire Act, (3) it violated the Unlawful
    Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”), and (4) it
    violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.
    The Plaintiffs sought an injunction vacating and setting aside
    the Compact.
    In the District Court, the Tribe moved to intervene for the
    limited purpose of filing a Rule 19 motion to dismiss. The
    Secretary and Plaintiffs opposed the Tribe’s motion.
    Independently, the Secretary moved to dismiss for lack of
    standing and for failure to state a claim. The Plaintiffs moved
    for summary judgment.
    The District Court considered all three motions together,
    along with parallel motions in another case involving a
    challenge to the same Compact by individuals and entities who
    are wholly opposed to the expansion of gambling within
    Florida. See Monterra MF, LLC v. Haaland, No. 21-cv-2513
    (D.D.C.) (complaint filed Sept. 27, 2021). The District Court
    first denied the Tribe’s motion to intervene, finding that it was
    9
    a required party but that its interests in this litigation were
    adequately represented by the Secretary, and therefore the
    litigation could proceed in the Tribe’s absence in equity and
    good conscience. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). The District Court
    then granted summary judgment for the West Flagler Plaintiffs,
    finding that the Compact violated IGRA because its online
    sports betting provisions impermissibly attempted to authorize
    gaming off of Indian lands; accordingly, the Secretary had an
    affirmative duty to reject it. Finding that the entire Compact
    must be set aside, the District Court finally dismissed the
    motions in the Monterra litigation as moot, and that portion of
    the decision is not on appeal. (The Monterra plaintiffs have
    appeared as amici in this case and urge affirmance.)
    The Tribe appealed the denial of its motion to intervene,
    which the Secretary and Plaintiffs oppose. The Secretary
    appealed the grant of summary judgment for Plaintiffs.
    II.
    We first address the merits of West Flagler’s challenge to
    the Compact, followed by the Tribe’s motion to intervene. We
    review a district court’s decision granting summary judgment
    de novo. Lopez v. Council on American-Islamic Rels. Action
    Network, Inc., 
    826 F.3d 492
    , 496 (D.C. Cir. 2016). No material
    fact is in dispute; the issues on appeal are purely legal.
    West Flagler’s claims arise under the APA. The APA
    requires a reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside
    agency action . . . found to be[] (A) arbitrary, capricious, an
    abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
    [or] (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
    immunity.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A)–(B). When reviewing a
    Secretary’s decision to not act within the 45-day window when
    presented with an IGRA compact, this Court has held that 
    25 U.S.C. § 2710
    (d)(8)(C) “provides the ‘law to apply[]’”—that
    10
    is, “the compact is deemed approved ‘but only to the extent the
    compact is consistent with the provisions of [IGRA].’”
    Amador Cnty., 
    640 F.3d at 381
     (alteration in original).
    A.
    West Flagler’s primary challenge to the Compact is that its
    online sports betting provisions unlawfully authorize class III
    gaming outside of Indian lands, in violation of IGRA. In West
    Flagler’s view, our decision in Amador County stands for the
    principle that “IGRA requires the Secretary to ‘affirmatively
    disapprove’ any compact that seeks to authorize gaming off
    Indian lands.” West Flagler Br. 20. They argue in turn that the
    Compact, both in text and effect, necessarily violates that
    principle. On appeal, the Secretary agrees with the major
    premise of West Flagler’s claim—that IGRA cannot provide
    an independent source of legal authority for gaming outside of
    Indian lands—but with one caveat. In her view, “[g]aming
    outside Indian lands cannot be authorized by IGRA, but it may
    be addressed in a compact.” Gov’t Resp. Br. 2. Thus, the
    Secretary mainly disputes the minor premise of West Flagler’s
    argument by contending that while the Compact here
    “discussed” online sports betting off of tribal lands, it did not
    “authorize” it. And whether or not that gaming is authorized
    or permissible as a matter of Florida state law falls outside the
    scope of the Secretary’s review. Thus, the logic goes, she had
    no obligation to disapprove the Compact.
    We agree with the Secretary. For our purposes, IGRA’s
    complex regulatory scheme contains two important, related
    principles. First, IGRA abrogated tribal sovereign immunity
    for certain gaming activity on Indian lands, and it regulates
    gaming activity on Indian lands, but “nowhere else.” Bay
    Mills, 
    572 U.S. at 795
    . This is the core teaching of Bay Mills,
    in which the Supreme Court stated in no uncertain terms:
    11
    “Everything—literally everything—in IGRA affords tools (for
    either state or federal officials) to regulate gaming on Indian
    lands, and nowhere else.” 
    Id.
     Put another way, IGRA
    generally does not restrict or regulate tribal, or any other,
    activity outside of Indian lands.
    Second, while the function of a class III gaming compact
    is to authorize gaming on Indian lands, it “may include
    provisions relating to” a litany of other topics. 
    25 U.S.C. § 2710
    (d)(3)(C). These include, among other things, “the
    application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the
    Indian tribe or the State that are directly related to, and
    necessary for, the licensing and regulation of such activity;”
    “the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the
    State and the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such
    laws and regulations;” and “any other subjects that are directly
    related to the operation of gaming activities.”                
    Id.
    § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i), (ii), (vii). Bay Mills also teaches that such
    topics can cover state or tribal activity outside of Indian lands.
    For instance, a state may use a gaming compact to bargain for
    a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity for a tribe’s gaming
    activity outside of its lands. See 
    572 U.S. at
    796–97. And while
    there are some limits on what a tribe and a state can agree to in
    an IGRA gaming compact, the purpose of those limits is
    generally to ensure that states do not use gaming compacts as a
    backdoor to exercise regulatory power over tribes that they
    otherwise would not have. That is not a concern in this case.
    Following the precept that “a contractual provision should,
    if possible, be interpreted in such a fashion as to render it lawful
    rather than unlawful,” we find the Compact’s text capable of
    an interpretation in harmony with these two principles. Papago
    Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 
    723 F.2d 950
    , 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
    see also Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 
    105 F.3d 1465
    , 1485
    (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[A]n interpretation that makes the contract
    12
    lawful is preferred to one that renders it unlawful.”); 11
    WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:11 (4th ed. May 2023 update)
    (“Consonant with the principle that all parts of a contract be
    given effect when possible, an interpretation which renders a
    contract lawful is preferred over one which renders it
    unlawful.”). Recall that the key language over which the
    parties quarrel is in Compact § IV.A, titled “Authorization and
    Location of Covered Games.” It reads:
    The Tribe and State agree that the Tribe is
    authorized to operate Covered Games on its
    Indian lands, as defined in [IGRA.] . . . Subject
    to limitations set forth herein, wagers on Sports
    Betting . . . made by players physically located
    within the State using a mobile or other
    electronic device shall be deemed to take place
    exclusively where received at the location of the
    servers or other devices used to conduct such
    wagering activity at a Facility on Indian Lands.
    J.A. 692; see also J.A. 687 (Compact § III.CC.2, containing the
    same phrasing).
    The first sentence of this section simply states that the
    Tribe is authorized to operate sports betting on its lands. This
    is uncontroversial and plainly consistent with IGRA. Next, the
    Compact discusses wagers on sports betting “made by players
    physically located within the State using a mobile or other
    electronic device,” which are “deemed to take place
    exclusively where received.” The Compact does not say that
    these wagers are “authorized” by the Compact (or by any other
    legal authority). Rather, it simply indicates that the parties to
    the Compact (i.e., the Tribe and Florida) have agreed that they
    both consider such activity (i.e., placing those wagers) to occur
    on tribal lands. Because the Compact requires all gaming
    13
    disputes be resolved in accordance with tribal law, see J.A. 702
    (Compact § VI.A), this “deeming” provision simply allocates
    jurisdiction between Florida and the Tribe, as permitted by 
    25 U.S.C. § 2710
    (d)(3)(C)(i)–(ii).
    The discussion of wagers placed from outside Indian lands
    is also “directly related to the operation of” the Tribe’s sports
    book, and thus falls within the scope of § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii).
    The Compact “authorizes” only the Tribe’s activity on its own
    lands, that is, operating the sports book and receiving wagers.
    The lawfulness of any other related activity such as the placing
    of wagers from outside Indian lands, under state law or tribal
    law, is unaffected by its inclusion as a topic in the Compact.
    West Flagler contends that reading subsection
    (d)(3)(C)(vii)—the “catch-all” provision—in this way violates
    the canon that Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes.
    We disagree. To be sure, as one of our sister circuits recently
    noted: “As a residual clause, § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii) takes its
    meaning from, and is limited by, the rest of § 2710(d)(3)(C).”
    Chicken Ranch Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians v. California, 
    42 F.4th 1024
    , 1036 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Yates v. United States,
    
    574 U.S. 528
    , 545 (2015)). But at the same time, “as a residual
    clause, § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii) is inevitably broader than the more
    specific topics enumerated in the paragraphs that precede it.”
    Chicken Ranch, 42 F.4th at 1036 (internal quotations and
    alteration omitted); see also Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 
    556 U.S. 848
    , 860 (2009) (“[T]he whole value of a generally phrased
    residual clause . . . is that it serves as a catchall for matters not
    specifically contemplated—known unknowns[.]”). Indeed,
    § 2710(d)(3)(C) covers vast ground, including not only the
    allocation of civil and criminal jurisdiction between a state and
    a tribe (no small topic), but also state taxation, remedies for
    breach of contract, and licensing standards. The power of a
    state to tax Indian tribes for activity on its own lands, or a
    14
    tribe’s decision to waive its sovereign immunity from suit by a
    state, see Bay Mills, 
    572 U.S. at 796
    , are far from
    “mouseholes.” If they are not mouseholes, subsection
    (d)(3)(C)(vii)—which, as a residual clause, is “inevitably
    broader”—cannot constitute a mousehole. Thus, gaming
    activity outside of Indian lands that is directly related to the
    gaming activity authorized by a compact may appropriately fall
    within the scope of subsection (d)(3)(C)(vii).
    Cases from other circuits interpreting the catch-all
    provision confirm our understanding. In Chicken Ranch, the
    Ninth Circuit held that provisions relating to family law,
    environmental law, and tort law—on which California insisted
    in exchange for permitting the tribe to conduct gaming—could
    not be the subject of a valid IGRA compact, as they were not
    directly related to gaming. 42 F.4th at 1037–39. Similarly, the
    Tenth Circuit has held that subsection (d)(3)(C)(vii) does not
    permit a compact provision allowing state courts to hear tort
    suits arising from injuries at Indian casinos. Navajo Nation v.
    Dalley, 
    896 F.3d 1196
    , 1218 (10th Cir. 2018). The lesson from
    these cases is clear and is confirmed by IGRA’s legislative
    history: states cannot use compacts “as a subterfuge for
    imposing State jurisdiction on tribal lands[,]” contra IGRA’s
    purpose. S. Rep. No. 100-466, at 14 (1988). But that is not
    what happened here.
    Nor does Amador County, on which West Flagler heavily
    relies, compel a different result. There, we emphasized that 
    25 U.S.C. § 2710
    (d)(8)(A) “authorizes approval only of compacts
    ‘governing gaming on Indian lands,’ suggesting that
    disapproval is obligatory where that particular requirement is
    unsatisfied.” 
    640 F.3d at 381
    . But in that case, the entirety of
    the gaming activity discussed in the compact was located on a
    piece of land known as “the Rancheria,” and the dispositive
    issue was whether the Rancheria constituted Indian lands or
    15
    not. In other words, if the Rancheria did not qualify as Indian
    lands, no provision of the compact would seek to authorize
    gaming on Indian lands, and thus any approval would plainly
    exceed the scope of the Secretary’s authority under subsection
    (d)(8)(A). In contrast, the Compact here authorizes a
    substantial amount of gaming on Indian lands separate and
    apart from online wagers placed from outside the Tribe’s lands,
    including Las Vegas-style gambling and in-person sports
    betting at the Tribe’s casinos. That is sufficient to fulfill the
    “particular requirement” that the Compact “govern[s] gaming
    on Indian lands.” 
    Id.
     At bottom, West Flagler’s argument
    invites the Court to read the extraneous word “only” into the
    preceding statutory language, and we decline to do so.
    Finally, West Flagler protests that the Secretary’s
    argument necessarily creates two types of IGRA approvals: (a)
    for activity on Indian lands, approval authorizes the activity,
    while (b) for activity outside of Indian lands, approval has no
    meaning or legal effect. In West Flagler’s view, this is
    problematic because an approved IGRA compact is an
    “instrument of federal law” which “preempts state law[,]” but
    it would be illogical and unworkable for only some parts of an
    approved compact to preempt state law. West Flagler Br. 24–
    25. However, this argument misunderstands the purpose and
    effect of an IGRA approval.
    To start, neither of the two out-of-circuit cases that West
    Flagler cites stand for the novel proposition that an IGRA
    compact has the force of federal law with preemptive power.
    One of those cases merely states that IGRA compacts are a
    “creation of federal law,” which is uncontroversial and
    indisputable given their statutory origin but falls far short of
    supporting West Flagler’s argument. See Citizen Potawatomi
    Nation v. Oklahoma, 
    881 F.3d 1226
    , 1239 (10th Cir. 2018).
    The other cited case simply states that an IGRA compact
    16
    confers upon a tribe a “federal right” to conduct gaming on its
    own lands, for the purposes of establishing federal court
    jurisdiction over the action—again, indisputable and beside the
    point. See Forest Cnty. Potawatomi Cmty. v. Norquist, 
    45 F.3d 1079
    , 1082 (7th Cir. 1995).
    In actuality, the approval process exists so that the
    Secretary may ensure that a compact does not violate certain
    federal laws, and her approval is a prerequisite for the compact
    to have legal effect: nothing more, nothing less. Much
    discussion in the briefs concerns the issue of whether the Tribe
    and Florida sought to circumvent state constitutional law by
    including the online sports betting provisions in the Compact.
    By way of background, in 2018, Florida amended its
    constitution with a section titled “Voter Control of Gambling
    in Florida.” Fla. Const. art. X, § 30. Under that amendment,
    “Florida voters shall have the exclusive right to decide whether
    to authorize casino gambling in the State of Florida[,]” which
    can only be done through “a vote by citizens’ initiative.” Id.
    § 30(a). At the same time, the amendment contains an
    exception for “casino gambling on tribal lands” pursuant to an
    IGRA compact. Id. § 30(c). No voter referendum was ever
    held regarding online sports betting; therefore, West Flagler
    argues, the Tribe and Florida would have to believe that the
    IGRA Compact provides the legal basis for that activity.
    Whatever the Tribe and Florida—who are not parties to
    this litigation—may believe, let us be clear: an IGRA compact
    cannot provide independent legal authority for gaming activity
    that occurs outside of Indian lands, where that activity would
    otherwise violate state law. That is in fact the position
    advanced by the Secretary—who is a party to this litigation—
    and we agree. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 6:14–21 (Counsel for the
    Secretary: “[I]f the state statute . . . related to this action were
    to be challenged in Florida state court and were to fall, the
    17
    compact that they crafted would give no independent authority
    for the Tribe to continue to receive bets from outside Indian
    lands.”).
    Thus, we hold only that the Secretary’s decision not to act
    on the Compact was consistent with IGRA. In reaching this
    narrow conclusion, we do not give our imprimatur to all of the
    activity discussed in the Compact. And particularly, for
    avoidance of doubt, we express no opinion as to whether the
    Florida statute ratifying the Compact is constitutional under
    Fla. Const. art. X, § 30. That question and any other related
    questions of state law are outside the scope of the Secretary’s
    review of the Compact, are outside the scope of our judicial
    review, and as a prudential matter are best left for Florida’s
    courts to decide.
    B.
    The District Court did not reach West Flagler’s Wire Act,
    UIGEA, and Fifth Amendment challenges to the Compact. But
    because they have been “fully briefed” and present “purely
    legal questions[,]” we may decide them. Assoc. of Am. R.R.s v.
    U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
    821 F.3d 19
    , 26 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see
    also Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 
    673 F.2d 425
    , 440
    (D.C. Cir. 1982). We conclude that these other challenges lack
    merit as matter of law.
    First, we address the justiciability of these claims. IGRA
    enumerates a limited number of grounds for which a Secretary
    “may disapprove a compact[,]” including where the compact
    violates federal law. 
    25 U.S.C. § 2710
    (d)(8)(B)(ii). But where,
    as here, a compact goes into effect due to the Secretary’s
    inaction, IGRA states that the compact is “approved . . . but
    only to the extent the compact is consistent with the provisions
    of this chapter.” 
    Id.
     § 2710(d)(8)(C). Because subsection (B)
    uses “may” rather than “shall,” while subsection (C) lists
    18
    inconsistency with IGRA as the only ground for nullifying a
    compact considered approved following secretarial inaction,
    there is a threshold question whether non-IGRA challenges to
    a compact in these circumstances are judicially reviewable.
    Dicta from our opinion in Amador County strongly suggests
    that they are, but we have not definitively resolved the
    question, because the claim in that case was that the compact
    violated IGRA, not a different federal law. 
    640 F.3d at
    380–
    83. But we need not resolve that thorny question here, because
    even assuming that such claims are justiciable, we find that
    West Flagler’s particular challenges fail as a matter of law.
    1.
    First, West Flagler claims that the Compact authorizes
    transactions that would violate the federal Wire Act. The Wire
    Act prohibits anyone “engaged in the business of betting or
    wagering” from “knowingly us[ing] a wire communication
    facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce
    of bets or wagers . . . on any sporting event or contest[.]” 
    18 U.S.C. § 1084
    (a). The Act has a safe harbor provision for bets
    placed to and from states or foreign countries where sports
    betting is lawful. 
    Id.
     § 1084(b). Violating the Wire Act is a
    crime punishable by fine or imprisonment. Id. § 1084(a).
    West Flagler contends that “[o]nline communications are
    almost invariably routed between servers in and out of state
    between their origin and destination[,]” and therefore any
    “realistic implementation of the Compact would require use of
    wire facilities operating in ‘interstate and foreign commerce.’”
    West Flagler Br. 36. They further argue that the safe harbor
    provision does not apply, because Indian lands are neither a
    state nor a foreign country within the meaning of § 1084(b).
    Id. at 36 n.17.
    19
    There are several problems with this line of reasoning. As
    discussed above, the Compact does not itself independently
    “authorize” wagers placed by patrons located outside Indian
    lands. That itself forecloses the Wire Act challenge (and the
    other claims that follow). And even if the Compact did, no
    matter the scope of our judicial review, IGRA does not require
    the Secretary to disapprove a compact based on hypothetical
    violations of federal criminal law that turn on how the Compact
    is implemented as well as the mens rea of the would-be bettors.
    In fact, the Compact contains express language that the
    Tribe “shall ensure” that its sports book operates in “strict
    compliance” with the Wire Act.              J.A. 707 (Compact
    § VII.A.1(c)). West Flagler does not contest that it would be
    technically possible for the Tribe to do so. Moreover, the Wire
    Act is a criminal statute requiring the government to prove
    mens rea in individual circumstances, a principle at odds with
    the argument that the Compact as a general matter violates the
    Act, or that the Secretary was required to disapprove it on that
    basis. Finally, taking West Flagler’s argument to its logical
    end shows why such a challenge cannot be sustained. Under
    their view, even online betting by patrons who are physically
    located on Indian lands would violate the Wire Act, because
    some of those bets may be routed off of Indian lands into a
    state, and then back. There is no support for the novel and
    sweeping argument that the Wire Act poses such a broad
    obstacle to an Indian tribe’s ability to offer online gambling on
    its own lands.
    2.
    In a related vein, West Flagler claims that the Compact
    violates the UIGEA.        That Act prohibits “knowingly
    accept[ing]” certain forms of payment in connection with
    “unlawful Internet gambling” such as credit card transactions,
    20
    checks, and electronic fund transfers. 
    31 U.S.C. § 5363
    . This
    claim suffers from a similar flaw as the Wire Act claim. Even
    without defining the precise contours of the scope of our review
    in this case, our review is of the Secretary’s decision not to act
    when presented with the Compact, not whether all hypothetical
    implementations of the Compact are lawful under all federal
    statutes. How the Tribe and Florida ultimately implement the
    Compact in practice, and whether that implementation is
    consistent with UIGEA, may be the subject of a future lawsuit,
    but the Compact does not as a facial matter violate the UIGEA.
    The Secretary was therefore not required to disapprove the
    Compact on that basis.
    3.
    Lastly, West Flagler argues that the Secretary’s approval
    violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee
    because the Compact impermissibly grants the Tribe a
    statewide monopoly over online sports betting. But even if the
    Secretary’s approval “authorized” all of the activity in the
    Compact (as we have explained supra, it does not), it would
    survive rational basis review, which is the applicable level of
    scrutiny here.
    We have held that “promoting the economic development
    of federally recognized Indian tribes (and thus their
    members),” if “rationally related to a legitimate legislative
    purpose[,]” is constitutional. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-
    CIO v. United States, 
    330 F.3d 513
    , 522–23 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
    see Morton v. Mancari, 
    417 U.S. 535
    , 554 (1974) (upholding a
    preference for members of Indian tribes where “reasonably and
    directly related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal”). The
    exclusivity provisions in the Compact plainly promote the
    economic development of the Seminole Tribe. They are also
    rationally related to the legitimate legislative purposes laid out
    21
    in IGRA by “ensur[ing] that the Indian tribe is the primary
    beneficiary of the gaming operation[.]” 
    25 U.S.C. § 2702
    (2).
    Thus, West Flagler’s equal protection challenge fails as a
    matter of law.
    III.
    Having determined that West Flagler’s challenges to the
    Compact lack merit and judgment for the Secretary is
    warranted, we are left to decide the Tribe’s motion to intervene.
    The Tribe moved to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a), for
    the limited purpose of filing a motion to dismiss under Rule 19.
    In short, a party seeking dismissal under Rule 19 must show
    that it is a required party that cannot be joined, and without
    whom the litigation cannot proceed.
    Formally, “Rule 19 analysis has two steps.” De Csepel v.
    Republic of Hungary, 
    27 F.4th 736
    , 746 (D.C. Cir. 2022). “We
    first determine whether an absent party is ‘required’” under
    Rule 19(a). 
    Id.
     Relevant here, a party is required where it
    “claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and . . .
    disposing of the action in the person’s absence may . . . as a
    practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect
    the interest[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis
    added). If a party is required but cannot be joined (for instance,
    due to its sovereign immunity), the court must next determine
    “whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should
    proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.”
    FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). Courts refer to step two of this analysis
    as determining whether the party is “indispensable.” De
    Csepel, 27 F.4th at 748. In doing so, a court considers four
    factors: (1) whether “a judgment rendered in the person’s
    absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties[,]”
    (2) whether such prejudice can be “lessened or avoided[,]” (3)
    “whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would
    22
    be adequate[,]” and (4) “whether the plaintiff would have an
    adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.”
    FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). The Rule 19 inquiry is equitable and
    discretionary. See Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 
    43 F.3d 1491
    , 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1995); De Csepel, 27 F.4th at 747.
    The District Court first concluded that the Tribe’s
    proposed Rule 19 motion to dismiss lacked merit. It then
    denied the Rule 24 motion to intervene as moot. Because the
    Tribe will suffer minimal to no prejudice in light of this Court’s
    ruling on the merits, we affirm the denial of the motion to
    intervene on alternate grounds.
    Ordinarily, a court decides a prospective party’s motion to
    intervene before summary judgment. The District Court’s
    analysis proceeded in that sequence, though it decided both
    motions in the same order, and both are presented in this
    appeal. Our decision to resolve the merits of the case before
    deciding the Tribe’s motion to intervene in this instance heeds
    the well-settled principle that Rule 19 “calls for a pragmatic
    decision based on practical considerations in the context of
    particular litigation.” Kickapoo Tribe, 
    43 F.3d at 1495
    ; cf.
    Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 
    526 U.S. 574
    , 577–78 (1999)
    (a court may resolve a case by concluding that it lacks personal
    jurisdiction before confirming its subject-matter jurisdiction
    where the former presents an easier question, even though the
    latter delineates more foundational limits on a federal court’s
    Article III power to decide a case). As the Advisory Committee
    Notes to the Federal Rules state, the Rule 19 inquiry is meant,
    above all, to be “practical,” and courts should ask: “Would the
    absentee be adversely affected in a practical sense, and if so,
    would the prejudice be immediate and serious, or remote and
    minor?” FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s note to 1966
    amendment; see also 7 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
    MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1608 (3d ed. Apr. 2023
    23
    update) (“[C]ourts must look to the practical likelihood of
    prejudice . . . rather than the theoretical possibility that [it] may
    occur.”). This principle underlies the rule itself and is the
    reason a case may proceed when a non-party’s interests are
    adequately represented by a party.
    Here, there is little practical difference between a Rule 19
    dismissal on the one hand, and a judgment for the Secretary on
    the other. Both would keep intact the 2021 Compact, the relief
    that the Tribe ultimately seeks. In fact, the Tribe did not shy
    away from expressing its views on the merits of this case; it
    filed an amicus brief explaining the reasons it believes the
    District Court erred in vacating the Compact, separate and apart
    from the denial of its motion to intervene. While the ability to
    file an amicus brief is never per se “enough to eliminate
    prejudice,” Wichita & Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 
    788 F.2d 765
    ,
    775 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the Tribe’s brief lessens whatever
    prejudice it would suffer from having this issue resolved
    favorably in its absence. In reaching this conclusion, we do not
    discount or take lightly the Tribe’s “substantial interest” in its
    sovereign immunity, see Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel,
    
    553 U.S. 851
    , 868–69 (2008), but we ultimately find that any
    infringement on that immunity is “remote” and “theoretical” in
    these unique circumstances. Because Rule 19’s guiding
    “philosophy . . . is to avoid dismissal whenever possible[,]” we
    find that the practical benefits of deciding this case on the
    merits outweighs any prejudice to the Tribe. 7 CHARLES A.
    WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV.
    § 1604 (3d ed. Apr. 2023 update).
    *    *    *
    For these reasons, we vacate the opinion below, and the
    District Court is directed to enter judgment for the Secretary.
    We affirm the denial of the Tribe’s motion to intervene.
    24
    It is so ordered.