Chava Mark v. Republic of the Sudan ( 2023 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued October 28, 2022               Decided July 21, 2023
    No. 21-5250
    CHAVA RACHEL MARK, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENT AND
    NATURAL GUARDIAN OF TBM, RLM AND EBM, MINORS, ET
    AL.,
    APPELLANTS
    v.
    REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN AND UNITED STATES,
    APPELLEES
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:20-cv-03022)
    Asher Perlin argued the cause and filed the briefs for
    appellants.
    Christopher M. Curran argued the cause for appellee
    Republic of Sudan. With him on the briefs were Nicole Erb,
    Claire A. DeLelle, and Celia A. McLaughlin.
    Sonia M. Carson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for appellee United States. With her on the
    briefs were Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
    2
    Attorney General, and Sharon Swingle and Lewis Yelin,
    Attorneys.
    Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, and WILKINS and RAO,
    Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.
    RAO, Circuit Judge: Chava Mark and her family sued
    Sudan, seeking compensation for a terrorist attack on their
    family. The question on appeal is whether we have jurisdiction.
    Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a state sponsor
    of terrorism may be sued for personal injury arising from acts
    of terrorism. But in 2020, Congress enacted the Sudan Claims
    Resolution Act, which stripped the federal courts of
    jurisdiction to hear most terrorism related claims against
    Sudan. The Marks argue that the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping
    provision is unconstitutional and therefore that their claims
    against Sudan may be heard in federal court. The district court
    dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Finding no constitutional
    infirmity in the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision, we
    affirm.
    I.
    Michael Mark was driving his wife, Chava Mark, and their
    children down a country highway in Israel, when two Hamas
    operatives began tailing them.1 Swerving into the adjacent lane,
    the operatives fired roughly 25 bullets from a Kalashnikov
    assault rifle, killing Michael Mark and injuring his family.
    1
    We accept these allegations as true for purposes of reviewing the
    district court’s dismissal. See Bernhardt v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
    
    47 F.4th 856
    , 861 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
    3
    Chava Mark and her children sued in federal district court,
    contending Sudan provided Hamas with material support for
    the terrorist act. The Marks brought a single claim under the
    terrorism exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
    (“FSIA”), which creates a private right of action against foreign
    states that provide “material support or resources” for
    “personal injury or death” caused by an “extrajudicial killing.”
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 
    Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122
     Stat. 3, 338–40 (codified as amended at
    28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)–(c)). The Marks sought $250 million in
    compensatory damages.2
    After the Marks filed their complaint, the United States
    entered into a claims settlement agreement with Sudan. See
    Claims Settlement Agreement, U.S.-Sudan (“CSA” or
    “Agreement”), Oct. 30, 2020, T.I.A.S. No. 21-209 (entered into
    force Feb. 9, 2021). The Agreement was part of an ongoing
    effort to improve diplomatic relations between the United
    States and Sudan and to promote the latter’s ongoing
    democratic transition. Id. pmbl. At the time the United States
    and Sudan entered into the Agreement, Sudan had
    compensated several victims of the 2000 terrorist attack on the
    U.S.S. Cole but multiple suits against Sudan remained pending.
    Id. The United States agreed to espouse and terminate all
    remaining claims against Sudan in exchange for a $335 million
    settlement payment. Id. art. III(2); see also RESTATEMENT
    (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
    STATES § 213 (1965) (explaining the espousal power allows the
    President to “waive or settle a claim against a foreign
    state … without the consent of [the injured] national”);
    Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 
    735 F.2d 1517
    , 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Under well-established
    2
    Sudan was a designated state sponsor of terrorism during all times
    relevant to this appeal but was removed from the list in 2020.
    4
    principles of international law, a sovereign possesses the
    absolute power to assert the private claims of its nationals
    against another sovereign.”).
    After receiving the $335 million, the United States enacted
    the Sudan Claims Resolution Act (“SCRA”), which effectively
    restored Sudan’s sovereign immunity with respect to terrorism
    claims. 
    Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134
     Stat. 3291 (2020) (codified
    at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (note)) (providing the FSIA’s terrorism
    exception no longer applies to Sudan). The Act preserved only
    one class of suits—the ongoing proceedings brought by
    “victims and family members of the September 11, 2001,
    terrorist attacks.” SCRA § 1706(a)(2)(A).
    Following the Act’s passage, Sudan invoked its immunity
    from suit and moved to dismiss the Marks’ case for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction. Sudan also maintained the
    Agreement terminated the Marks’ cause of action. The Marks
    responded that the Act and the Agreement violated the equal
    protection component of the Fifth Amendment. The United
    States intervened in support of Sudan.
    The district court granted Sudan’s motion to dismiss. Mark
    v. Republic of Sudan, 
    2021 WL 4709718
    , at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 7,
    2021). The court held that the Act and Agreement were
    constitutional and therefore that the court lacked jurisdiction to
    consider the Marks’ claims. 
    Id.
     at *3–5. The Marks timely
    appealed.
    II.
    The Marks acknowledge their claims fit within the
    jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Sudan Claims
    Resolution Act. They maintain, however, that this provision
    violates the Constitution.
    5
    A.
    Although the Act by its plain terms divests this court of
    jurisdiction, we nonetheless may consider whether this
    jurisdictional ouster is “[w]ithin constitutional bounds.”
    Bowles v. Russell, 
    551 U.S. 205
    , 212 (2007); Patchak v. Zinke,
    
    138 S. Ct. 897
    , 909 (2018) (plurality) (considering a
    constitutional challenge to a jurisdiction-stripping statute);
    Belbacha v. Bush, 
    520 F.3d 452
    , 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
    (recognizing that federal courts have “presumptive
    jurisdiction … to inquire into the constitutionality of a
    jurisdiction-stripping statute”).
    The Constitution vests Congress with the authority “[t]o
    constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.” U.S.
    CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; see also id. art. III, § 1. This broad
    power “includes [the] lesser power to limit the jurisdiction of
    those courts.” Patchak, 
    138 S. Ct. at 906
     (plurality) (cleaned
    up). “[T]he subject-matter jurisdiction of the lower federal
    courts is determined by Congress in the exact degrees and
    character which to Congress may seem proper for the public
    good.” Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
    
    488 U.S. 428
    , 433 (1989) (cleaned up). Congress’ “‘control
    over the jurisdiction of the federal courts’ is ‘plenary,’”
    provided it “does not violate other constitutional provisions”
    when exercising its power to constitute inferior tribunals.
    Patchak, 
    138 S. Ct. at 906
     (plurality) (quoting Trainmen v.
    Toledo, P. & W.R. Co., 
    321 U.S. 50
    , 63–64 (1944)); see also
    Sheldon v. Sill, 
    49 U.S. (8 How.) 441
    , 449 (1850) (“[A] statute
    which does prescribe the limits of [the courts’] jurisdiction,
    cannot be in conflict with the Constitution, unless it confers
    powers not enumerated therein.”). Congress’ power to set
    lower federal court jurisdiction serves as an important
    constitutional check on the judiciary.
    6
    With respect to foreign sovereign immunity, Congress has
    exercised its power to specify whether and to what extent
    foreign sovereigns may be sued in federal court. Human v.
    Czech Republic—Ministry of Health, 
    824 F.3d 131
    , 134 (D.C.
    Cir. 2016). In civil suits, the FSIA mandates that “a foreign
    state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
    United States,” unless certain exceptions apply. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1604
    ; see also 
    id.
     §§ 1605, 1605A, 1605B, 1607
    (enumerating exceptions); Argentine Republic, 
    488 U.S. at 439
    (explaining the FSIA is the exclusive avenue for “obtaining
    jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court”). The FSIA’s
    terrorism exception provides federal courts with jurisdiction
    over certain injuries caused by state sponsors of terrorism. 28
    U.S.C. § 1605A(a)–(c).
    The Sudan Claims Resolution Act effectively restored
    Sudan’s sovereign immunity for most terrorism related claims.
    Under the Act, Sudan “shall not be subject to [various]
    exceptions to immunity from jurisdiction,” including the
    FSIA’s terrorism exception. SCRA § 1704(a)(1)(A). The Act
    preserved only one class of suits—the ongoing proceedings
    brought by “victims and family members of the September 11,
    2001, terrorist attacks.” Id. § 1706(a)(2)(A); see also
    id. § 1706(c) (“Nothing in this Act shall apply to … any claim
    in any of the proceedings comprising the multidistrict
    proceeding [related to the September 11 attacks] brought by
    any person who, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, has
    a claim pending against Sudan.”).
    B.
    The Marks concede their claims do not fit within the carve-
    out for the victims of the September 11 attacks and are
    encompassed by the Act’s provision stripping jurisdiction for
    terrorism claims against Sudan. Nonetheless, the Marks
    7
    maintain this provision is unconstitutional because it violates
    the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. See
    Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
    515 U.S. 200
    , 204 (1995)
    (discussing the “equal protection component of the Fifth
    Amendment’s Due Process Clause”). They argue the disparate
    treatment of their claims from those of the September 11
    victims is (1) an arbitrary distinction that fails rational basis
    review, and/or (2) an impairment of their fundamental right to
    access the courts that cannot survive strict scrutiny.3 Because
    the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Act is
    unconstitutional, the Marks contend, this court retains
    jurisdiction over their suit against Sudan for its support of the
    lethal terrorist attack on their family.
    3
    The Marks challenge both the Agreement and the Act as
    unconstitutional. The Agreement, however, espouses their claims
    and therefore “simply effected a change in the substantive law
    governing the lawsuit,” but did not affect our jurisdiction. Dames &
    Moore v. Regan, 
    453 U.S. 654
    , 685 (1981). The Marks’ equal
    protection arguments do not distinguish between the disparate
    treatment with respect to jurisdiction-stripping and the disparate
    treatment with respect to the substantive claims espoused by the
    United States. Because we hold that we lack jurisdiction over the
    Marks’ claims, we do not consider the Marks’ constitutional
    arguments as they pertain to the substance of the Agreement.
    We also note the district court improperly analyzed the
    constitutionality of the Agreement. Although the Marks raised the
    same constitutional arguments against the Act and the Agreement,
    the jurisdictional question should have been addressed first. Finding
    no jurisdiction, the proper course was to dismiss the suit without
    considering the Marks’ claims about the Agreement. See Steel Co. v.
    Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
    523 U.S. 83
    , 94–95 (1998).
    8
    1.
    The Marks first argue the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping
    provision runs afoul of equal protection because it bars their
    claim while allowing the claims of “other similarly situated
    victims of Sudan-sponsored terrorism.” In particular, they
    maintain the Act arbitrarily carves out claims brought by
    certain September 11 claimants.
    We apply rational basis review unless a statutory
    classification “proceeds along suspect lines [or] infringes
    fundamental constitutional rights.” Hettinga v. United States,
    
    677 F.3d 471
    , 478 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting FCC
    v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 
    508 U.S. 307
    , 313 (1993)). The
    parties agree that the Marks’ first equal protection challenge is
    subject to rational basis review. Judged under this standard, we
    must uphold the Act’s statutory classifications “if there is any
    reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
    rational basis for” them. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 
    508 U.S. at 313
    . So long as it does not classify along suspect lines or impair
    fundamental rights, Congress may provide “special treatment”
    to one group if there is a rational basis for doing so. Am. Bus
    Ass’n v. Rogoff, 
    649 F.3d 734
    , 741–42 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see
    also Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 
    508 U.S. at 314
     (explaining that
    under rational basis review a statute “bear[s] a strong
    presumption of validity”).
    The Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision easily satisfies
    this standard. Both Sudan and the United States offer several
    reasonable justifications for the Act. First, the Act’s
    jurisdiction-stripping provision fosters stronger relations with
    Sudan by limiting its potential liability to United States
    nationals. The government exercised its power to espouse
    claims against Sudan, eliminating “sources of friction between
    the two sovereigns.” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
    453 U.S. 654
    ,
    9
    679 (1981) (cleaned up). Consistent with the espousal of claims
    in the Settlement Agreement, the Act stripped jurisdiction over
    certain pending claims, freeing Sudan from potential liability
    that could otherwise impair its relationship with the United
    States.
    Second, the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision
    rationally distinguishes between terrorist attacks in general and
    the September 11 attacks. The Act’s carveout for September 11
    victims and families involves one of the most fatal attacks on
    the United States homeland. And the litigation surrounding
    September 11 has been ongoing for nearly twenty years. The
    Marks’ claims, on the other hand, stemmed from a terrorist
    attack abroad, and their suit arose just a few months before the
    United States and Sudan entered into the Agreement. It was
    rational for the Act to maintain decades-old claims over more
    recent ones and to prioritize attacks on the homeland over other
    attacks.
    2.
    The Marks also contend the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping
    provision violates equal protection by impairing their right to
    access the courts. Because the right to access the courts is a
    fundamental right, the Marks maintain the unequal treatment
    must survive strict scrutiny.
    The Supreme Court has long held that citizens have a
    constitutional right to access the courts. See, e.g., Chambers v.
    Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 
    207 U.S. 142
    , 148 (1907). Circuit
    courts have recognized two types of access claims: forward
    looking claims and backward looking claims. Christopher v.
    Harbury, 
    536 U.S. 403
    , 412–14 (2002) (discussing cases); see
    also Broudy v. Mather, 
    460 F.3d 106
    , 117–21 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
    (recognizing both types). Forward looking claims generally
    arise when the government hinders a litigant’s ability to file or
    10
    prepare for a lawsuit that has not yet commenced. For a forward
    looking claim to succeed, the Marks must show that “systemic
    official action frustrate[d] [the Marks] in preparing and filing”
    their suit. Christopher, 
    536 U.S. at 413
    . The Marks make no
    such showing. Backward looking claims arise when the
    government “cause[s] the loss or inadequate settlement of a
    meritorious case” or “the loss of an opportunity to sue.” 
    Id.
     at
    413–14. To bring a successful backward looking claim, the
    Marks must assert that the government “caused the[ir] suit to
    be dismissed as untimely” or that some sort of official conduct
    “render[ed] hollow [their] right to seek redress.” Sousa v.
    Marquez, 
    702 F.3d 124
    , 128 (2d Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). But
    the Marks assert neither. The Marks challenge Congress’
    restoration of Sudan’s sovereign immunity, but these claims
    simply do not implicate the right to access the courts. See
    Patchak v. Jewell, 
    828 F.3d 995
    , 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2016), aff’d
    sub nom. Patchak, 
    138 S. Ct. at 897
    .
    Moreover, the Marks’ claims are in tension with the
    government’s power to establish inferior courts and espouse
    the claims of its citizens. Since the Founding, the President has
    exercised the power to espouse the claims of citizens. See, e.g.,
    Ware v. Hylton, 
    3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199
    , 259–60 (1796) (statement
    of Iredell, J.); Dames & Moore, 
    453 U.S. at
    679 n.8. Similarly,
    Congress has long exercised its plenary authority to set the
    jurisdictional reach of the federal courts. The right to access
    courts does not constrain either of these longstanding powers.
    C.
    Finally, although we hold the Act validly stripped the
    federal courts of jurisdiction over the Marks’ cause of action,
    the district court erred when it dismissed the Marks’ complaint
    with prejudice. “[A] dismissal for want of subject-matter
    jurisdiction can only be without prejudice.” N. Am. Butterfly
    11
    Ass’n v. Wolf, 
    977 F.3d 1244
    , 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see also
    FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). Accordingly, we modify the district
    court’s judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice.
    ***
    The Marks family suffered a horrible attack by Hamas for
    which it seeks recovery from Sudan. Congress has, however,
    stripped this court of jurisdiction to hear the Marks’ terrorism
    related claims. That provision is constitutional, and we lack
    jurisdiction. We affirm the district court’s judgment as
    modified.
    So ordered.