(SS) Lor v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHOR LOR, No. 2:18-cv-1046-KJN 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER ON PARTIES’ CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff Chor Lor seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social 18 Security. The Commissioner found that Plaintiff received multiple overpayments due to her 19 ineligibility for benefits over a two–year period.1 Plaintiff contends her bank account showed 20 more than $2,000 because it contained proceeds from an oral loan from her children. The ALJ 21 found no evidence of a loan, discredited the testimony supporting Plaintiff’s assertions, and 22 ordered repayment in the amount of $11,442.20. 23 After carefully considering the record and the parties’ briefing, the Court DENIES 24 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, GRANTS the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 25 summary judgment, and AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision. 26 27 1 This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(15), and all parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes pursuant to 28 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF Nos. 8, 10.) 1 Background 2 Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income (SSI) in May 2005, and in 3 2007 was found to be medically disabled. (ECF No. 13–3 at p. 20.) In 2012, the Commissioner 4 opened a review of Plaintiff’s eligibility, and subsequently discovered that for a two–year period 5 between March 2013 and March 2015, Plaintiff’s bank account contained over $2,000. (Id.) The 6 Commissioner determined that Plaintiff had been overpaid (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1382) and 7 ordered repayment of $11,442.20. Plaintiff requested a hearing. (Id.) 8 At the January 19, 2016 hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, Plaintiff testified 9 she deposited a $1,500 loan from her children into the account because her bank required a 10 minimum balance of $1,500 to avoid a service fee. (See Id. at pp. 29–30; p. 151 [Account 11 Summary]) Plaintiff stated her agreement with her children was that once the account was 12 closed, she would pay her children back. (Id. at p. 136.) Plaintiff’s son testified that no 13 paperwork existed for this loan, but that he and his sister pulled money from their accounts to 14 make the initial deposit. (Id. at p. 33) Plaintiff was unaware of the $2,000 limit due to her 15 inability to read or write English, indicated she often lost track of her money, and when she made 16 withdrawals, she would “hand over her debit card and identification” to the teller, “make a 17 gesture,” and the teller would give her “whatever the amount they thought was right.” (Id. at pp. 18 34–35.) 19 On March 2, 2016, the ALJ affirmed the determination. (ECF No. 13–3 at pp. 20–24.) In 20 the written decision, the ALJ cited provisions of law that set a $2,000 cap on resources, which are 21 defined as “cash or other liquid assets,” including checking accounts. (Id. at p. 20–21.) (citing 42 22 U.S.C. § 1382 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201). The ALJ recounted facts regarding Plaintiff’s initial 23 eligibility for SSI, the Commission’s review, and the initial determination of her ineligibility for 24 the two–year period resulting in the $11,442.20 overpayment. (Id. at p. 21.) The ALJ then 25 recounted Plaintiff’s evidence concerning the $1,500, but found it “insufficient to establish that 26 [Plaintiff’s] resources were under the allowable limit[.]” (Id. at p. 22.) He stated: 27 [I]t is unclear when this loan occurred and there is no evidence of the initial 28 deposit. Between 2007 and 2008, claimant received SSI installment payments of 1 over $1,500.00 on three occasions, so the initial deposit could easily have come from her own money, and she had the ability to repay this alleged loan, at those 2 times as well. Thus, the allegation that $1,500.00 was from an original loan has no evidence to substantiate it. 3 4 (Id.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s asserted unawareness of the $2,000 limit, due to her inability 5 to read or write English and her “los[ing] track of her money.” (Id.) However, the ALJ cited to 6 multiple instances in the record where the standard notification was sent to Plaintiff, and noted 7 that at one point she withdrew “just enough money to get below the $2,000 limit.” (Id.) Finally, 8 the ALJ found “dubious” Plaintiff’s assertion that when she would withdraw funds from her 9 account, she would “hand over her debit card and identification” to the teller, “make a gesture,” 10 and the teller would give her “whatever the amount they thought was right.” (Id.) Thus, the ALJ 11 affirmed the determination that Plaintiff “was not eligible for SSI for the period between March 12 2013 and March 2015 because her resources were over the allowable limit.” (Id. at p. 20.) 13 Plaintiff requested review from the Commission’s Appeals Council, who affirmed. 14 Plaintiff then filed the instant action, and the parties filed cross–motions for summary judgment. 15 Parties’ Arguments 16 On appeal to this Court, Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s finding (that the $1,500 was not a 17 loan) was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ applied an incorrect legal 18 standard as to whether the funds were proceeds of a loan. Plaintiff also contends the ALJ failed 19 to set forth clear and convincing reasons why he discredited Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her 20 ignorance of the $2,000 limit. Plaintiff thus requests the Court apply California law, find that the 21 $1,500 in her account is proceeds of a valid loan, and enter summary judgment reversing the 22 overpayment order. Alternatively, Plaintiff requests the Court remand the case for the ALJ to 23 apply California law to the $1,500 as a valid oral loan. 24 Defendant contends each of these findings (that the $1,500 was not a loan, and that 25 Plaintiff was likely aware of the $2,000 limit) rest on the ALJ’s credibility determinations, which 26 are not to be substituted by the opinions of a reviewing court. Further, Defendant argues that any 27 conflicts apparent in the evidence are for the ALJ to resolve. Defendant maintains that substantial 28 1 evidence exists to support the ALJ’s conclusions, and that the ALJ’s report sets forth sufficient 2 findings and rationale. Thus, Defendant requests the Court affirm the ALJ’s decision. 3 Legal Standard 4 The Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 5 proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 6 as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 7 evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 8 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 9 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 10 Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 11 responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 12 ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “The 13 court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 14 interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 15 Analysis 16 Section 1611(a)(1)(B) of the Social Security Act states that for an unmarried claimant to 17 be eligible for benefits, she must not have more than $2,000 in resources. 42 U.S.C. § 1382. 18 Resources are defined as, among other things, “cash or other liquid assets,” which may include 19 “financial institution accounts (including savings, checking, and time deposits).” 20 C.F.R. 20 416.1201(a) and (b). Not included as a resource are proceeds of a loan. 20 C.F.R. 416.1103(f). 21 Loans come in many forms, but must be enforceable under state law. See Ceguerra v. Secretary 22 of Health and Human Services, 933 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Title XVI: SSI Loan 23 Policy, SSR 92-8P2 (S.S.A. Sept. 8, 1992) (defining a loan as “an advance from lender to 24 borrower that the borrower must repay, with or without interest” that applies to any oral or written 25 agreement, and can include a “noncommercial loan (between relatives, friends or others) that is 26 2 Policies like these are binding on the Commission, per 20 C.F.R. 402.35(b)(1), but not on the 27 courts. Paxton v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 856 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1988) (reminding that the SSR interpretive rulings “do not have the force and effect of the law or 28 regulations[,]” but “are often given deference.”). 1 recognized as enforceable under State law.”). It is the claimant’s burden to prove a loan exists. 2 Ceguerra, 933 F.2d at 738; see also SSR 92-8P. 3 It is clear from the ALJ’s report that Plaintiff and her son testified to material terms of a 4 loan that comport with California law. Cal. Civ. Code § 1912 states “[a] loan of money is a 5 contract by which one delivers a sum of money to another, and the latter agrees to return at a 6 future time a sum equivalent to that which he borrowed.” Plaintiff asserted that she borrowed 7 money from her children, in the amount of $1500, and would repay the $1500 when her bank 8 account was closed. (See ECF No. 13–3 at p. 21.); see also Peterson Dev. Co. v. Torrey Pines 9 Bank, 233 Cal.App.3d 103, 115 (1991) (“The material terms of a loan include the identity of the 10 lender and borrower, the amount of the loan, and the terms for repayment.”). 11 The problem for Plaintiff, however, is not that the ALJ failed to consider these assertions 12 in the context of California loan law, but that he found their testimony to lack credibility. The 13 ALJ noted that no paperwork existed to evince the existence of a loan or the source of the funds 14 for the initial deposit. (Id.) True, California law does not require a written document to support a 15 loan agreement (see Cal. Civ. Code § 1622), but the law does place the burden on Plaintiff to 16 submit some evidence to support her argument that $1500 in her account came from a loan. See 17 Ceguerra, 933 F.2d at 738; SSR 92-8P (noting the burden to provide evidence of a bona fide loan 18 “is with the applicant or recipient”). The ALJ questioned Plaintiff’s and her son’s credibility in 19 light of other portions of their testimony, including that at one point she withdrew “just enough 20 money to get below the $2,000 limit,” and that she would “hand over her debit card and 21 identification” to the teller, “make a gesture,” and the teller would give her “whatever the amount 22 they thought was right.” (See ECF No. 13–3 at pp. 21–22). Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156 (“The ALJ 23 is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 24 ambiguities.”); see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that “ordinary 25 techniques of credibility evaluation” may be applied by the ALJ); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 26 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[A] claimant's self-serving statements may be disregarded to the extent 27 they are unsupported by objective findings.”). Further, the ALJ relied on the fact that the 28 documentary evidence showed Plaintiff received SSI payments in excess of $1,500 at multiple 1 points prior when she opened the account, thus indicating to the ALJ an alternative rational 2 source for Plaintiff’s funds. (ECF No. 13–3 at p. 22.); Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 640 3 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that lay testimony is evidence unless the ALJ “expressly determines to 4 disregard such testimony and gives reasons germane to each witness for doing so.”); Bruce v. 5 Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (“If an ALJ disregards the testimony of a lay 6 witness, the ALJ must provide [specific] reasons that are germane to each witness.”) (cleaned up); 7 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989) (“As a reviewing court, it is proper for 8 us to read the opinion and draw inferences if those inferences are there to be drawn.”) (cleaned 9 up). Thus, given that Plaintiff’s evidence of the purported loan was discredited testimony, the 10 ALJ could not find an oral loan under California law. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038 (“The court 11 will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 12 interpretation.”); see also King v. Astrue, 2011 WL 672800, *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2011) 13 (upholding the ALJ’s determination that no bona fide loan exists where the plaintiff introduced no 14 original loan documents of any kind, and where the record required balancing of other evidence 15 and testimony). 16 Plaintiff cites to Ceguerra for support that the ALJ failed to apply California law; 17 however, Ceguerra is distinguishable. There, the Ninth Circuit specifically noted that the ALJ, in 18 determining an oral loan did not exist where the plaintiff’s evidence was testimonial, “did not find 19 that the testimony lacked credibility”; thus, the court deemed the testimony credible, and held the 20 ALJ’s decision lacked substantial evidence. 933 F.2d at 738–39. In Plaintiff’s case here, the ALJ 21 did make credibility determinations, discrediting Plaintiff’s evidence, and thus found no credible 22 evidence existed as to the purported loan. (ECF No. 13–3 at pp. 21–22.) 23 Additionally, Plaintiff requests review of the ALJ’s discrediting of her testimony that she 24 was unaware of the $2,000 limitation. See Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 25 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that when an ALJ finds a claimant's testimony unreliable, the 26 ALJ “must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony undermines the 27 claimant's complaints.”). The Court finds that ALJ did not err in discrediting this testimony. The 28 ALJ noted that the Commission had provided her with multiple notifications of the limit, and–– 1 | more importantly—noted her bank records indicated that at one point she had withdrawn “just 2 | enough money to get below the $2,000 limit.” (ECF No. 13-3 at p. 22.) The ALJ also found as 3 | “highly dubious” Plaintiff's assertion that when she would withdraw funds from her account, she 4 | would “hand over her debit card and identification” to the teller, “make a gesture,” and the teller 5 | would give her “whatever the amount they thought was right.” (Id.) This evidence led the ALJ to 6 | discredit Plaintiffs testimony and conclude she had “manipulated the account to [her] 7 | advantage.” (Id.) See Fair, 885 F.2d at 604; see also Woodmass v. Berryhill, 707 F. App'x 432, 8 | 436 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding no error in a credibility determination where the ALJ referred to the 9 | plaintiffs specific testimony, explained his reasons for discounting it, and cited evidence in the 10 || record to support the decision). Thus, the Court is bound to accept the ALJ’s credibility 11 determinations—despite that the evidence is “susceptible to more than one rational 12 | interpretation.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038; Morgan, 169 F.3d at 599. 13 For these reasons, the ALJ did not err in finding Plaintiff received overpayments because 14 | her resources were over the allowable limit, and his findings are based upon substantial evidence. 15 ORDER 16 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 17 1. The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED, 18 the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED, and judgment is entered for Commissioner; 19 2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is DENIED; and 20 3. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 21 | Dated: August 1, 2019 2 Aectl Aharon 23 KENDALL J. NE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 lor.1046 25 26 27 28