(PC) Smith v. Hutchinson ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 TOY TERRELL SMITH, Case No. 1:16-cv-01924-LJO-JDP 10 Plaintiff, ORDER VACATING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 v. ECF No. 75 12 J. TORRES, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 Defendants. THAT COURT GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 AND DISMISS CASE WITH PREJUDICE 15 OBJECTIONS DUE IN 14 DAYS 16 ECF No. 69 17 I. Order Vacating August 26, 2019 Findings and Recommendations 18 On August 26, 2019, I recommend granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment 19 without prejudice. ECF No. 75. Defendants responded that the case should be dismissed with 20 prejudice. See ECF No. 76. For good cause shown, I hereby vacate my August 25, 2019 21 Findings and Recommendations. The corrected findings and recommendations that follow are 22 for dismissal with prejudice, but otherwise remain unchanged. 23 II. Procedural History 24 Plaintiff Toy Terrell Smith is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this civil 25 rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Terrell alleges that defendants J. Torres and 26 M. Hoggard, both correctional counselors at California State Prison Corcoran, were 27 deliberately indifferent to his safety and so violated the Eighth Amendment by recommending that he be returned to Kern Valley State Prison. See ECF No. 10 at 13. On February 15, 2019, 1 Torres and Hoggard moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, `` 2 arguing that the move was not objectively dangerous, that the defendants were not subjectively 3 indifferent to any danger, that Smith cannot establish causation, and that defendants Torres and 4 Hoggard are entitled to qualified immunity. See ECF No. 69-2 at 1-2. Smith filed an 5 opposition on May 13, 2019, and the defendants filed a reply on May 21. See ECF Nos. 73 and 6 74.1 7 When Smith’s allegations are viewed in their most favorable light, they fail to show that 8 the decision to move him to Kern Valley State Prison posed an objective, substantial risk of 9 serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (holding that an Eighth 10 Amendment failure to protect claim must allege that there was “objectively” a “substantial risk 11 of serious harm” to which defendant was indifferent). Because Smith’s speculative and 12 general allegations do not satisfy the objective risk requirement, I do not reach defendants’ 13 alternate claimed bases for summary judgment. 14 III. Factual Background 15 In early 2016, Smith was an inmate at Corcoran State Prison. Defendant Torres 16 approached Smith about placement at a different facility. ECF No. 73 at 2. Torres presented 17 Smith with a list of prisons to which he might be transferred, but Smith “informed her that he 18 was not interested in any of them because none of them were mental health care treatment 19 facilities.” Id. Smith also gave Torres a two-page statement intended to inform the committee 20 making the facility assignment. The committee, which included both Smith and Hoggard, 21 recommended based on a variety of factors that Smith be sent to Kern Valley State Prison, 22 where he was previously housed. Smith had been involved in a violent incident and riot at 23 Kern Valley, see generally id. at 21 (“Exhibit B”), and did not want to be returned there. 24 Smith appealed the committee’s decision and met with Hoggard concerning the appeal. Id. at 25 26 1 As required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998), defendants gave 27 plaintiff notice of the requirements for opposing a summary judgment motion via an attachment to the motion for summary judgment. See ECF No. 69-1. 1 4. Smith’s appeal was unsuccessful. He was transferred back to Kern Valley, where he was `` 2 attacked. 3 IV. Legal Standard 4 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 5 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A 6 factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of either party at trial. 7 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). The disputed fact is material if 8 it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” See id. at 248. 9 The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the 10 absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 11 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party may not rest on the 12 allegations or denials in its pleading, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, but “must come forward with 13 ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 14 Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 15 In making a summary judgment determination, a court “may not engage in credibility 16 determinations or the weighing of evidence,” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 17 2017) (citation omitted), and it must view the inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the 18 light most favorable to the non-moving party. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 19 655 (1962) (per curiam); Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002). 20 As detailed below, defendants have met their burden of showing the absence of a genuine 21 issue of material fact, and Smith has not shown that there is an issue for trial. 22 V. Analysis 23 The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects prisoners against a 24 prison official’s “deliberate indifference” to “a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 25 U.S. at 828 (1994). “Deliberate indifference” has both an objective and subjective component: 26 there must be an objective risk to inmate safety, and the official in question must also “draw 27 the inference” that the risk exists and disregard it. Id. at 837; see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 1 be objectively “substantial” it must be more than merely possible, since prisons are, “by `` 2 definition,” institutions “of involuntary confinement of persons who have a demonstrated 3 proclivity for anti-social criminal, and often violent, conduct.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 4 517, 526 (1984); see also Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that 5 the “known risk of injury must be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before a 6 guard’s failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference” (internal quotation marks 7 omitted)). For this reason, “speculative and generalized fears of harm at the hands of other 8 prisoners do not rise to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm.” Williams v. Wood, 223 9 F. App’x 670, 671 (9th Cir. 2007). 10 Even when viewed in their most favorable light, Smith’s allegations do not show that 11 being moved to Kern Valley created a substantial risk of serious harm. While his statement to 12 the corrections committee mentioned the past riot at Kern Valley, it mentioned no specific 13 threats that would attend to his being housed there in the future. See ECF No. 73 at 19-20; see 14 also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3378(b)(2) (“Any offender who claims enemies shall provide 15 sufficient information to positively identify the claimed enemy.”). Smith’s statement also 16 mentioned several other violent encounters at other facilities involving Smith—all of which 17 were mentioned not for the purpose of showing that a move to Kern Valley would be 18 substantially dangerous, but that Smith was repeatedly “set up for harm if not death” by the 19 system more generally, and that all Muslims (like Smith) were mistreated by the California 20 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Id. An incident report on the Kern Valley riot 21 likewise raised no specific and substantial risks that would attend to transferring Smith to a part 22 of the Kern Valley facility where Smith had no documented enemies. See generally id. at 21 23 (“Exhibit B”). Smith’s claims about the move—fears that many prisoners might unfortunately 24 face—are too “speculative and generalized” to amount to a substantial risk of serious harm or 25 preclude summary judgment in defendants’ favor. Williams, 223 F. App’x at 671; see also 26 Labatad v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The record, viewed 27 objectively and subjectively, is insufficient to preclude summary judgment on the claim that 1 | another, since the two prisoners in question “had been in general population together for an . 2 | extended period with no record of any threats or problems between them.”). While reasonable 3 | minds might disagree over the best place to house Smith, a mere difference of opinion does not 4 | create a substantial risk. Cf Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). 5 VI. Findings and Recommendations 6 For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that: 7 1. The court grant in full defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 69. 8 2. This case be dismissed with prejudice. 9 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the U.S. district judge presiding 10 | over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 304. Within fourteen days of the 11 | service of the findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections to the 12 | findings and recommendations with the court and serve a copy on all parties. That document 13 | must be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The 14 | presiding district judge will then review the findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. 15 | § 636(b)(1)(C). 16 7 T IS SO ORDERED. 18 ( {WSs ated: _ August 29, 2019 19 UNI STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 | No. 205 23 24 25 26 27 28