Teen Rescue v. Becerra ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 TEEN RESCUE, CARLTON WILLIAMS No. 2:19-cv-00457-JAM-EFB as an individual and on behalf 11 of all others similarly situated, 12 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ Plaintiffs, MOTION TO DISMISS 13 v. 14 XAVIER BECERRA, Attorney 15 General of the State of California, in his official 16 capacity, WILLIAM LIGHTBOURNE, Director of the State 17 Department of Social Services, in his official capacity, 18 Butte County Department of Children’s Services Division 19 and DOES 1-50, 20 Defendants. 21 22 This case stems from a dispute concerning the California 23 Community Care Facilities Act (“CCFA”) and its implications on 24 the freedom of religion and the rights of parents to raise their 25 kids in the way they see fit. Plaintiff Carlton Williams 26 (“Plaintiff”) brings this suit in his capacity as class 27 representative of the parents and guardians of the students 28 currently attending River View Christian Academy (“RVCA”) and 1 seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. First Amended Comp. 2 (“FAC”), ECF No. 8. Defendants move to dismiss. Mot., ECF No. 3 24. 4 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS 5 Defendants’ motion.1 6 7 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 8 Teen Rescue is a California-based religious organization. 9 FAC ¶ 7. As part of its ministry, Teen Rescue established and 10 operates a Christian boarding school, River View Christian 11 Academy. FAC ¶¶ 7, 23. Plaintiff Carlton Williams is the 12 custodial parent of a child enrolled at RVCA. FAC ¶ 8. Williams 13 is the representative for a class of similarly situated parents 14 and guardians of RVCA students (“Parent Class”). FAC ¶ 8. 15 The CCFA was enacted with the primary purpose of 16 establishing “a coordinated and comprehensive statewide service 17 system of quality community care for mentally ill, 18 developmentally and physically disabled, and children and adults 19 who require care or services by a facility or organization issued 20 a license or special permit.” Cal. Health & Safety Code 21 § 1501(a). Until 2016, RVCA was exempt from licensure as a 22 community care facility and thereby exempt from the CCFA’s 23 regulations. FAC ¶ 57. When the CCFA was amended in 2016 by 24 Senate Bill 524, the legislature changed the definition of 25 private alternative boarding school to mean “a group home 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for July 30, 2019. 1 licensed by the [D]epartment [of Social Services] to operate a 2 program . . . to provide youth with 24-hour residential care and 3 supervision, which, in addition to providing educational services 4 to youth, provides, or holds itself out as providing, behavior- 5 based services to youth with social, emotional, or behavior 6 issues.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1502(A)(19). FAC ¶ 58. 7 Thus, since 2016, the California Department of Social Services 8 has categorized RVCA as a private alternative boarding school, 9 subject to the CCFA, the jurisdiction of the California 10 Department of Social Services, and enforcement by the California 11 Attorney General. FAC ¶¶ 45, 72. Teen Rescue disputes this 12 categorization, alleging it does not provide therapeutic 13 activities or engage in behavior modification other than 14 providing students with a combination of a structured environment 15 and spiritual guidance. FAC ¶¶ 39, 42. 16 RVCA also alleges the CCFA impermissibly requires private 17 alternative boarding schools to allow students full autonomy on 18 matters of religion and sexual identity. FAC ¶ 1. RVCA admits 19 that its religious practices violate those portions of the CCFA. 20 FAC ¶ 62. Williams alleges he specifically sends his child to 21 RVCA for the spiritual guidance it provides. FAC ¶ 64. Thus, 22 Williams alleges it would be a profound interference with the 23 Parent Class’ free exercise of religion and parental rights to 24 place RVCA under the CCFA. FAC ¶¶ 65, 80. 25 On March 13, 2019, Plaintiffs Carlton Williams and Teen 26 Rescue filed the Complaint. Compl., ECF No. 1. Less than one 27 month later, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended 28 Complaint, alleging violations of (1) the First Amendment’s Free 1 Exercise Clause, and (2) the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to 2 parent. FAC, ECF No. 8. 3 On April 5, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Application 4 and Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. ECF No. 10. This 5 Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion and dismissed Teen Rescue’s claim 6 with prejudice based on Younger abstention, leaving Carlton 7 Williams as the sole plaintiff. TRO Order, ECF No. 21, at 5. 8 Defendants now move to dismiss the FAC, arguing Plaintiff 9 lacks standing and failed to state a cognizable claim under 10 either the First or Fourteenth Amendment. Mot., ECF No. 24. 11 Williams opposes the motion. Opp’n, ECF No. 36. 12 13 II. OPINION 14 A. Standing 15 “[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case- 16 or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defs. of 17 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Standing is therefore a 18 “threshold question” in “determining the power of the court to 19 entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 20 Moreover, “federal courts are required sua sponte to examine 21 jurisdictional issues such as standing.” Bernhardt v. Cty. of 22 Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal 23 quotation marks and citation omitted). 24 To establish standing, a “plaintiff must have (1) suffered 25 an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 26 conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed 27 by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 28 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). At the 1 pleading stage “[i]t is the responsibility of the complainant 2 clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party 3 to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute and the exercise of 4 the court’s remedial powers.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 518. 5 For Williams to have standing, he must first establish an 6 injury in fact. To do so, Williams must show that he suffered 7 “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete 8 and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or 9 hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560–61. A concrete injury 10 as to the plaintiff must actually exist. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct., at 11 1548 (citations omitted). An “[a]bstract injury is not enough.” 12 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). “The 13 plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is immediately in 14 danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the 15 challenged official conduct and . . . .” As previously 16 mentioned, “the injury or threat of injury must be both real and 17 immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 101–02 18 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, to 19 be particularized, the injury “must affect the plaintiff in a 20 personal and individual way.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 21 citations omitted). The injury in fact test “requires that the 22 party seeking review be himself among the injured.” Sierra Club 23 v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972). 24 1. The Free Exercise Claim 25 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides 26 that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 27 religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 28 U.S. Const., Amdt. 1. Above all, this affords us the “right to 1 believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.” 2 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 3 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). Thus, the government may not 4 “[1] compel affirmation of religious beliefs, [2] punish the 5 expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, 6 [3] impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views 7 or religious status, or [4] lend its power to one side or the 8 other in controversies over religious authorities or dogma.” 9 Id. (internal citations omitted). 10 The CCFA requires, among other things, RVCA to “submit a 11 staff training plan to the [D]epartment [of Social Services] as 12 part of its plan of operation” which includes training in 13 “[c]ultural competency and sensitivity in issues relating to the 14 lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender communities.” Cal. 15 Health & Safety Code § 1502.2(c)(4). The CCFA also gives 16 students the right “[t]o be free from acts that seek to change 17 his or her sexual orientation . . . .” Cal. Health & Safety Code 18 § 1502.2(d)(1)(P). Neither of these provisions of the CCFA 19 constitute an invasion of Williams’ First Amendment rights 20 sufficient to establish the requisite standing. 21 Merely developing a plan to train RVCA staff in issues 22 relating to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 23 communities does not invade the First Amendment rights of RVCA 24 parents. An injury in fact must be particularized: it must 25 affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. Spokeo, 26 136 S. Ct., at 1548. The training plan is developed to educate 27 RVCA staff. The RVCA staff is not, however, required to teach 28 students about these issues. As such, this provision of the CCFA 1 does not affect Williams’ child, let alone Williams himself, in a 2 personal and individual way. 3 Similarly, preventing a community care facility from 4 attempting to change the sexual orientation of its students is 5 not an invasion of the parents’ First Amendment rights. The 6 First Amendment gives Williams the right to believe and profess 7 whatever religion he desires. If sending his child to an 8 exclusively faith-based educational institution is an important 9 part of Williams’ faith, there is nothing in the CCFA that 10 prevents him from doing so. The provision in the CCFA that bars 11 conversion therapy applies only to facilities that are subject to 12 the CCFA. Williams is free to enroll his child at a CCFA-exempt 13 religious boarding school. Given that nothing in the CCFA 14 prevents Williams from enrolling his child in a religious 15 boarding school that could attempt to change his child’s sexual 16 orientation, any invasion of his First Amendment rights is too 17 abstract to amount to an “injury in fact.” Lujan, 504 U.S., at 18 560–61. 19 Finally, the very language of the FAC is revealing as to 20 whose injury is really at stake. The First Cause of Action 21 states: “Compliance with the [CCFA] will violate the sincerely 22 held religious convictions and practices of this Christian 23 ministry.”. FAC ¶ 93 (emphasis added). It continues: “Requiring 24 [RVCA] to comply with the scope of the [CCFA] and thus fall under 25 the enforcement jurisdiction of the Attorney General and the 26 Director of the State Department of Social Services will violate 27 this religious educational institution’s right to the free 28 exercise of religion as protected by the First Amendment.” FAC 1 ¶ 94 (emphasis added). In framing the injuries alleged as being 2 sustained by “this Christian ministry” and “this religious 3 educational institution,” the FAC leaves no doubt that the only 4 injuries alleged here were suffered by Teen Rescue, not the 5 parents. Williams failed to identify a concrete and 6 particularized injury in fact under the Free Exercise Clause. 7 Thus, Williams and the other RVCA parents lack standing to bring 8 a claim under the First Amendment. The Court DISMISSES this 9 claim WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 10 2. The Parental Rights Claim 11 Among the protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment 12 is the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing 13 and education of children under their control.” Pierce v. 14 Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 15 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (invalidating a statute that would remove 16 the option to send children to private school); see also Meyer v. 17 State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1923) (recognizing the 18 “power of parents to control the education of their own” in 19 abolishing a state law banning the teaching of the German 20 language). 21 The FAC alleges that, “by bringing RVCA under the CCFA, 22 California substitutes its judgment with that of the parents on 23 matters of religion and moral issues,” and denies the Parent 24 Class “an exclusively faith-based residential educational 25 option.” FAC ¶¶ 99, 100. It further alleges that “enrolling 26 their children in a school that is regulated and under the 27 jurisdiction of the California Department of Social Services is 28 not tenable for the Parent Class.” FAC ¶ 101. But the FAC 1 overstates the power of the CCFA to affect the decision-making 2 authority of parents with children currently enrolled at RVCA. 3 Unlike in Meyers or Pierce, the CCFA does not compel or prevent 4 Williams or his child to engage in any particular behavior. The 5 CCFA does not require parents to enroll their children in 6 community care facilities that may be subject to the CCFA. And 7 Williams is not required to send his child to RVCA, nor is he 8 prevented from enrolling his child at a religious boarding school 9 of his choosing. The CCFA’s application to RVCA does not 10 meaningfully interfere with Williams’ ability to raise his child 11 in the way he sees fit. Williams has, therefore, failed to show 12 that he has sustained or is in immediate danger or sustaining a 13 direct injury as a result of the CCFA. 14 Furthermore, Williams’ challenges to specific provisions of 15 the CCFA, like that which states students are to be “free to 16 attend religious services or activities of his/her choice and to 17 have visits from the spiritual advisor of his/her choice,” 22 CCR 18 § 80072, are based on hypothetical injuries. Williams asks this 19 Court to imagine a situation in which RVCA is required to admit a 20 student who does not accept its faith statement and might request 21 access to non-Christian services that are not provided by RVCA. 22 This Court is not convinced such a situation would ever arise 23 given that RVCA is a private facility that is free to admit 24 students as it chooses and can deny students who do not accept 25 its faith statement. Federal courts cannot issue advisory 26 opinions in hypothetical cases. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights 27 Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (The 28 court’s “role is neither to issue advisory opinions nor to 1 declare rights in hypothetical cases, but to adjudicate live 2 cases or controversies consistent with the powers granted the 3 judiciary in Article III of the Constitution.”). Thus, because 4 his alleged injury is neither real nor immediate, Williams failed 5 to establish an injury in fact for his parental rights claim that 6 | meets the requirements for standing. Accordingly, the Court 7 DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim WITHOUT 8 PREJUDICE. 9 Til. ORDER 10 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff Carlton Williams 11 lacks standing to pursue his claims and the suit is DISMISSED 12 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 13 471 F.3d 1100, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that dismissal 14 for lack of standing should be without prejudice). 15 Because Plaintiff lacks standing, this Court need not 16 address whether Plaintiff adequately stated a claim under Rule 17 12(b6) (6). Fleck, 471 F.3d at 1102 (“Because [the plaintiff] 18 lacked standing . . . the district court lacked subject matter 19 | jurisdiction and should have dismissed the complaint on that 20 ground alone.”). If Plaintiff intends to file an amended 21 complaint, he must do so within twenty days of the date of this 22 Order. Defendants responsive pleading is due within twenty days 23 thereafter. If Plaintiff elects not to file an amended complaint, 24 the clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: September 18, 2019 27 kA 28 Geren aaa pebrsacr 00k 10