(PC) Reid v. Wood ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PHILLIP REID, Case No.: 1:18-cv-01635-DAD-JLT (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 13 v. TO MODIFY SUBPOENA AND DENYING MOTION TO QUASH 14 AMANDA M. WOOD, (Docs. 22) 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 On August 15, 2019, Plaintiff Phillip Reid filed a motion to quash Defendant’s subpoena 20 duces tecum or to request that the subpoena be modified and limited to issues and dates relevant 21 to Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 22.) The subpoena seeks “all [of Plaintiff’s] medical and mental 22 records from January 1, 2018 to the present,” as well as “all special incident reports, IDNs, 23 special movement reports, team meeting notes and any other records/documents that may be 24 stored digitally and/or electronically for [Plaintiff] … from January 1, 2018 to present.” (Id. at 25 18.). Plaintiff objects to the subpoena because he claims it violates the Court’s July 19, 2019 26 order staying this case and on because it seeks information that is irrelevant and unlikely to lead 27 to admissible evidence. (Id. at 2-3.) On August 22, 2019, Defendant Amanda M. Wood filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. 27). Plaintiff did not file a reply, and the Court deems the 1 motion submitted. See Local Rule 230(l). 2 II. DISCUSSION 3 a. Legal Standards 4 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(a)(1)(C), a party may subpoena a nonparty to 5 produce documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things. Under Rule 26(b)(1), a 6 party “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to a party’s claim 7 or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” The Court must quash or modify a 8 subpoena if it “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or 9 waiver applies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii). 10 Courts recognize a constitutional right to privacy, as well as a doctor-patient and 11 psychotherapist-patient privilege. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996); Marin 12 Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1976); Anderson v. Clawson, No. C 13-0307 13 LHK (PR), 2014 WL 3725856, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2014). However, a party’s right and 14 privilege are waived when he raises an otherwise protected matter before the Court. See, e.g., 15 Caesar, 542 F.2d at 1070. For example, a party waives the psychotherapist privilege when he 16 elects to seek monetary damages for emotional distress, since he has placed his mental condition 17 at issue. E.g., Enwere v. Terman Assocs., L.P., No. C 07-1239 JF PVT, 2008 WL 5146617, at *3 18 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2008); Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 568 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 19 However, even when a party waives his right to privacy on a matter, the waiver is limited to 20 information that is relevant to the lawsuit. Enwere, 2008 WL 5146617, at *2 (citation omitted). 21 This coincides with the Federal Rules’ mandate that discovery be limited to matters that are 22 relevant to a party’s claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 23 b. Motion to Quash 24 Plaintiff moves to quash Defendant’s subpoena on two grounds. First, Plaintiff contends 25 that the subpoena violates the Court’s July 31, 2019 order staying this case, since Defendant 26 issued the subpoena on July 31, 2019, as well as an amended version on August 1, 2019. (Doc. 22 27 at 3; see also id. at 10, 14.) The Court finds that the subpoena constituted discovery in 1 August 21, 2019, (Doc. 25), Plaintiff’s objection on this ground is moot. 2 Second, Plaintiff argues that the subpoena “seek[s] material that is outside the scope of 3 this litigation, and … will potentially prejudice Plaintiff should this case be put in front of a jury.” 4 (Doc. 22 at 4.) Plaintiff also contends that the documents sought by Defendant are “irrelevant and 5 unlikely to … lead to … admissible evidence.” (Id.) 6 The Federal Rules make clear that information “need not be admissible in evidence to be 7 discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Thus, whether discovered material will prejudice Plaintiff 8 at trial is not pertinent to whether discovery is allowed. If this case goes to trial, the Court will 9 determine whether specific evidence is admissible at the trial. Thus, the question now is whether 10 the subpoenaed materials are relevant to a party’s claim or defense, whether they are privileged or 11 otherwise protected, and whether they are subject to a waiver or exception to an implicated 12 privilege or protection. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); 45(d)(3)(A)(iii). 13 i. Medical Records 14 In his complaint, Plaintiff contends that the defendant violated his right to safety as a civil 15 detainee and failed to protect him against physical attacks by co-patients at Coalinga State 16 Hospital. (Doc. 1 at 4; see also Doc. 9 at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that he reported threats to his safety 17 to hospital doctors, psychologists, and staff, including Defendant Supervisor Woods. (Doc. 1 at 18 4.) In his request for relief, Plaintiff seeks $400,000 for “physical and mental anguish” suffered as 19 a result of Defendant’s alleged misconduct. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Consequently, Plaintiff has placed his 20 physical and mental condition, as well as discussions with hospital doctors and psychologists, at 21 issue in his lawsuit. See Enwere, 2008 WL 5146617, at *3. Therefore, even though Plaintiff 22 enjoys a privacy right with respect to his medical records, and communications with his doctors 23 and psychotherapists are privileged, Plaintiff has waived his right and privilege. 24 For the same reason, Plaintiff’s medical records are relevant to the parties’ claims and 25 defenses. Because Plaintiff is alleging that hospital personnel failed to protect him after he 26 warned them he was in danger, Defendant has the right to counter this allegation by contending, 27 for example, that Defendant was unaware of Plaintiff’s warnings. Additionally, because Plaintiff 1 right to counter this argument by arguing, for example, that any physical and emotional injuries 2 were caused by something other than Defendant’s conduct. Defendant may look to Plaintiff’s 3 medical records, including records prior to the events at issue, for that purpose. 4 Though Plaintiff’s medical records are discoverable, the defense is entitled only to those 5 records that are directly relevant to a party’s claim or defense. Doe, 196 F.R.D. at 569-570. The 6 time period at issue in the subpoenas is reasonable. January 2018 is only four months before to 7 the first of three incidents underlying this lawsuit. Records from this period of time will allow 8 Defendant to assess the validity of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his injuries, and whether any 9 injuries are ongoing, without allowing a fishing expedition going back years. 10 ii. Other Records 11 In addition to Plaintiff’s medical records, Defendant seeks “all special incident reports, 12 IDNs, special movement reports, team meeting notes and any other records/documents that may 13 be stored digitally and/or electronically for [Plaintiff] … from January 1, 2018 to present.” The 14 Court is unaware of any privilege or protection regarding these requested materials. Regarding 15 relevancy, Plaintiff states that he spoke to hospital staff about the incidents underlying this 16 lawsuit and about his fear that he would be attacked by other patients. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff 17 states that Defendant Woods was present at one meeting with staff at which his discussed “the 18 situation.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that, after this meeting, staff only sought to restrict his movement 19 to his unit. (Id.) Thus, special incident reports, team meeting notes, and special movement reports 20 are clearly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. 21 However, the Court finds that the catch-all phrase, “any other records/documents that may 22 be stored digitally and/or electronically for [Plaintiff]” is overly broad, and would encompass 23 records that may or may not be relevant to this lawsuit. For this reason, the Court will modify the 24 subpoena by removing this catch-all phrase. 25 III. CONCLUSION 26 Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS: 27 1. Plaintiff’s motion to quash subpoena, (Doc. 22), is DENIED; 1 DENIED in part. Defendant’s subpoena issued on July 31, 2019, including the 2 amended subpoena issued on August 1, 2019, is modified to strike the phrase, “any 3 other records/documents that may be stored digitally and/or electronically for the 4 above specified patient/plaintiff.” 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 Dated: October 26, 2019 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27