Kaur v. Johnson ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MANDEEP KAUR, et al., No. 1:19-cv-01541-DAD-JLT 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING ACTION TO KERN COUNTY SUPERIOR 14 DAVID JOHNSON, et al., COURT 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 This is an unlawful detainer action brought under California state law by plaintiffs 19 Mandeep Kaur and Parminder Bajwa (collectively “plaintiffs”) against defendants David and 20 Latunja Johnson (collectively “defendants”). On October 30, 2019, pro se defendants removed 21 this case to this federal court from the Kern County Superior Court. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendants 22 assert that the basis for removal is the presence of federal question jurisdiction, because 23 defendants are bona fide tenants under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (“PTFA”). (Id. 24 at ¶ 3.) Defendants argue that plaintiffs were required to state a cause of action under the PTFA 25 but sought to avoid providing the defendants the protections of that statute by filing this action as 26 an unlawful detainer in state court. (Id. at ¶ 7.) 27 A district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action 28 sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell 1 & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is 2 strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 3 559 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010); Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 4 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of 5 the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 6 jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, 559 F.3d at 1106–07; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 7 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, “the existence of federal jurisdiction depends solely 8 on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses to those claims.” ARCO Envtl. 9 Remediation, LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). 10 “The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction” means that “the court resolves all 11 ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042; Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 12 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, federal jurisdiction over a removed case “must be rejected 13 if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Geographic Expeditions, 559 14 F.3d at 1107; Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “If 15 at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 16 case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th 17 Cir. 2001). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “is mandatory, not discretionary.” Bruns v. 18 NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997); see also California ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 19 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). Where it appears, as it does here, that the district court lacks 20 subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, “the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1447(c). 22 “The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 23 complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 24 presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” California v. United States, 25 215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 838; Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485. 26 Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, courts look to what “necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s 27 statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything in anticipation of 28 avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” California, 215 F.3d at 1 1014. Accordingly, “a case may not be removed on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the 2 defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint and both parties concede that the federal defense 3 is the only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); 4 Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Vaden v. 5 Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 70 (2009) (“It does not suffice to show that a federal question lurks 6 somewhere inside the parties’ controversy, or that a defense or counterclaim, or that a defense or 7 counterclaim would arise under federal law.”). 8 Here, defendants have not shown that removal of this action to this federal court is 9 appropriate. Plaintiffs’ complaint is a straightforward unlawful detainer action that is based 10 entirely on state law. Despite defendants’ assertion that plaintiffs were required to state a cause 11 of action under the PTFA, (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 7), plaintiffs are the “master[s] of [their] complaint” 12 and “may generally avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading solely state-law claims.” Valles v. Ivy 13 Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005). Even if plaintiffs’ complaint did reference a 14 federal statute, “the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not 15 automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 16 U.S. 804, 813 (1986). The cause of action brought by plaintiffs here is plainly based on state law. 17 Assuming, arguendo, defendants correctly aver that the PTFA preempts plaintiffs’ state law 18 claim, (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 6), this would still be insufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction. 19 See St. Regis Properties, LLC v. Scott, No. 18-cv-02616-JSC, 2018 WL 4377807, at *2 (N.D. 20 Cal. May 18, 2018) (“[T]he PTFA does not completely preempt Plaintiff’s California unlawful 21 detainer claim such that removal would be proper.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22 18-cv-02616-EMC, 2018 WL 4377798 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2018). Finally, to the extent that 23 defendants rely on the PTFA as a defense against plaintiffs’ state law claims, this does not suffice 24 to confer jurisdiction on this court because the defensive invocation of federal law cannot form 25 the basis of this court’s jurisdiction. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 70; Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392; 26 Wayne, 294 F.3d at 1183; California, 215 F.3d at 1014. 27 Because there is no federal question appearing in plaintiffs’ complaint in this case, 28 defendants have failed to properly invoke this court’s jurisdiction. Remand to the Kern County 1 | Superior Court is therefore appropriate and mandatory. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Wescom Credit 2 | Union v. Dudley, No. cv 10-8203 GAF SSX, 2010 WL 4916578, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010) 3 | (remanding an unlawful detainer action to state court where the defendant sought to invoke the 4 | PTFA to establish federal question jurisdiction). 5 Accordingly, 6 1. This action is remanded forthwith to the Kern County Superior Court, pursuant to 7 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and 8 2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. ? | IT IS SO ORDERED. a 8 Dated: _ October 30, 2019 Ya AL ae 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28