(HC) Castillo v. Hatton ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FRANK R. CASTILLO, Case No. 1:18-cv-00251-LJO-JDP 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 13 v. ECF No. 28 14 HATTON, ORDER GRANTING THIRTY-DAY 15 Respondent. EXTENSION OF TIME 16 ECF No. 29 17 18 Petitioner Frank Castillo, a state prisoner without counsel, seeks a petition for a writ of 19 habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before the court are petitioner’s motion for appointment 20 of counsel, ECF No. 28, and motion for extension of time, ECF No. 29. 21 Motion for Appointment of Counsel 22 Petitioner seeks appointment of counsel, stating that he is indigent and has a low level of 23 education. ECF No. 28. A petitioner in a habeas proceeding does not have an absolute right to 24 counsel. See Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1958) (stating that the Sixth 25 Amendment right to counsel does not apply to habeas petitions because they are civil actions). 26 There are three specific circumstances in which appointment of counsel is required in 27 habeas proceedings. First, appointment of counsel is required for an indigent person seeking to 28 1 vacate or set aside a death sentence in post-conviction proceedings under 28 U.S.C §§ 2254 or 2 2255. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2). Second, appointment of counsel may be required if an 3 evidentiary hearing is warranted. See R. Governing § 2254 Cases 8(c). Third, appointment of 4 counsel may be necessary for effective discovery. See id. at 6(a). None of these situations are 5 present here. 6 This court is further authorized to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner in a habeas 7 corpus proceeding if the court determines that the interests of justice require the assistance of 8 counsel. See Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). 9 However, “[i]ndigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus relief are not entitled to 10 appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel is 11 necessary to prevent due process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196. In assessing whether to 12 appoint counsel, the court evaluates the petitioner’s likelihood of success on the merits as well as 13 the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims without counsel, considering the complexity of 14 the legal issues involved. See Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). 15 I cannot conclude that counsel is necessary to prevent a due process violation here. I 16 issued findings and recommendations to deny the petition. ECF No. 27. Petitioner has not 17 demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The legal issues involved in the findings and 18 recommendations are not exceptionally complicated. Petitioner may object to the findings and 19 recommendations without counsel. Accordingly, I find that appointed counsel is not necessary to 20 guard against a due process violation and that the interests of justice do not require the 21 appointment of counsel. 22 Motion for Extension of Time 23 Petitioner seeks an extension of time to file objections to the findings and 24 recommendations. ECF No. 29. For good cause shown, petitioner’s is granted a thirty-day 25 extension of time to file his objections. No further extensions will be granted absent 26 extraordinary circumstances. 27 Order 28 1. Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied without prejudice. 1 ECF No. 28. 2 2. Petitioner is granted a thirty-day extension of time from the date of this order to file his 3 objections to the findings and recommendations. ECF No. 29. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. ° : —N prssann — Dated: _ November 21, 2019 7 UNI STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 | No. 206. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28