(PC) Ardds v. Hicks ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTOINE L. ARDDS, ) Case No.: 1:19-cv-01738-SAB (PC) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 13 v. ) RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS ACTION 14 D. HICKS, et.al., ) ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendants. ) RECOMMENDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BE DENIED 16 ) ) [ECF No. 11] 17 ) 18 Plaintiff Antoine L. Ardds is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s “motion in support of 42 USC 2000(d),” filed January 21 3, 2020. Plaintiff seeks a court order directing prison officials to refrain from denying access and/or 22 destroying his legal property. The Court construes Plaintiff’s motion as a request for a preliminary 23 injunction. 24 I. 25 DISCUSSION 26 The purpose of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction is to preserve the 27 status quo if the balance of equities so heavily favors the moving party that justice requires the court to 28 intervene to secure the positions until the merits of the action are ultimately determined. University of 1 Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction [or 2 temporary restraining order] must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely 3 to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 4 favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 5 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 6 “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be 7 granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. 8 Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A party 9 seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction simply cannot prevail when that motion 10 is unsupported by evidence. 11 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for preliminary 12 injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it have before it an 13 actual case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Valley Forge 14 Christian Coll. V. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If 15 the Court does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no power to hear the matter in 16 question. Id. Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the 17 Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the Court find the “relief [sought] is narrowly drawn, 18 extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive 19 means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 20 A federal court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has personal jurisdiction over 21 the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 22 Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one “becomes a party officially, and is required 23 to take action in that capacity, only upon service of summons or other authority-asserting measure stating 24 the time within which the party served must appear to defend.”). The Court may not attempt to 25 determine the rights of persons not before it. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 26 234-35 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983). 27 /// 28 /// 1 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s case is in the preliminary screening stage, and the United States 2 Marshal has yet to effect service on any Defendant, and Defendants have no actual notice. Therefore, 3 the Court has no personal jurisdiction over any Defendant at this time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2); 4 Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999); Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 5 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983). 6 Further, even if the Court had personal jurisdiction over the individuals named in the 7 complaint, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate imminent irreparable harm necessary to support a 8 preliminary injunction. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 9 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). “The fact that plaintiff has met the pleading requirements allowing 10 him to proceed with the complaint does not, ipso facto, entitle him to a preliminary injunction.” 11 Claiborne v. Blauser, No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 2011 WL 3875892, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011), 12 report and recommended adopted, No. CIV S-10-2427 LKK, 2011 WL 4765000 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 13 2011). Instead, to meet the “irreparable harm” requirement, Plaintiff must do more than simply allege 14 imminent harm; he must demonstrate it. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 15 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). Mere “[s]peculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to 16 warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 674-75. 17 Plaintiff seeks a court order preventing prison officials from depriving him of access to his 18 legal property and to prevent them from destroying his property. Inmates have a fundamental 19 constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Silva v. Di 20 Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). 21 However, to state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must show that he suffered an actual injury, which 22 requires “actual prejudice to contemplated or existing litigation.” Nevada Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 23 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348) (internal quotation marks 24 omitted); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Phillips, 588 25 F.3d at 655. To prevail on a claim regarding denial of access to the courts, it is not enough for an 26 inmate to show some sort of denial Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate actual injury. Plaintiff has not 27 shown that without an injunction he will miss a deadline or have this action dismissed. In addition, 28 Plaintiff’s complaints about access and destruction of his legal property are not related to his 1 underlying claims in this action. Thus, an injunction is not proper. See Pacific Radiation Oncology, 2 LLC v. Queen’s Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding there must be a 3 “sufficient nexus between the request in a motion for injunctive relief and the underlying claim 4 itself”). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief he 5 is likely to suffer actual injury in prosecuting his case. “Speculative injury does not constitute 6 irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Caribbean Marine Servs. 7 Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Goldies Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984). 9 Plaintiff is further advised that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 10 United States Constitution protects Plaintiff from being deprived of property without due process of 11 law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and Plaintiff has a protected interest in his 12 personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). Authorized, intentional 13 deprivations of property are actionable under the Due Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 14 517, 532, n.13 (1984); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), but the Due Process 15 Clause is violated only when the agency “prescribes and enforces forfeitures of property without 16 underlying statutory authority and competent procedural protections,” Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. 17 Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 18 2003)) (internal quotations omitted). The Due Process Clause is not violated by the random, 19 unauthorized deprivation of property so long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation 20 remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th 21 Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiff alleges an unauthorized taking of his property which is not actionable under 22 the Due Process Clause because California provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Barnett v. 23 Centoni, 31 F.3d at 816-17 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§810-895). In this instance, Plaintiff has alleged 24 an unauthorized deprivation of his property which is not cognizable by way of section 1983, as he has 25 an adequate remedy under California law. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 Il. 2 ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION 3 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a 4 || Fresno District Judge to this action. 5 Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary 6 || injunction be denied. 7 This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 8 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within twenty-one (2 9 || days after being served with this Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written objections 10 || with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 11 || Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time ma 12 || result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson 13 || v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Ci 14 || 1991)). 15 16 ||IT IS SO ORDERED. Al (re 17 || Dated: _ January 8, 2020 OF 18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28