(UD)(PS) Wasatch Pool Holdings, LLC v. Cooper ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WASATCH POOL HOLDINGS, LLC, Case No. 2:20-cv-00114-TLN-DB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. SUA SPONTE REMAND ORDER 14 KAPRESHA COOPER, 15 Defendant. 16 17 This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Kapresha Cooper’s (“Defendant”) 18 Notice of Removal and Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1–2.) For the reasons 19 set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIED as 20 moot, and the Court hereby REMANDS the action to the Superior Court of California, County of 21 Sacramento, due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 22 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 23 On December 23, 2019, Plaintiff Wasatch Pool Holdings, LLC (“Plaintiff”) brought an 24 action for unlawful detainer against Defendant for possession of the real property known as 4350 25 Galbrath Drive, #163, Sacramento, California, 95842 (“the Property”). (ECF No. 1 at 10.) On 26 January 15, 2020, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal removing this unlawful detainer action 27 from the Sacramento County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.) 28 /// 1 II. STANDARD OF LAW 2 28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the 3 district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Removal is 4 proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been 5 filed in federal court.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 6 Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 7 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 8 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time 9 determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the 10 improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer 11 v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 12 U.S. 974 (2005). 13 Federal question jurisdiction is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The 14 “presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint 15 rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 16 the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386. Federal 17 question jurisdiction therefore cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third- 18 party claim raising a federal question. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); Hunter 19 v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009). 20 Alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 governs diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 21 Section 1332 states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 22 where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 23 costs, and is between — (1) citizens of different States.” Id. The burden of proving the amount 24 in controversy depends on the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank 25 Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 998–1000 (9th Cir. 2007). When the complaint alleges damages less 26 than the jurisdictional requirement, the party seeking removal must prove the amount in 27 controversy with legal certainty. Id.; Rynearson v. Motricity, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240 28 (W.D. Wash. 2009). 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 Defendant removed this action on the basis of federal question and diversity jurisdiction. 3 (ECF No. 1 at 18.) The Court will address both grounds for federal jurisdiction in turn. 4 As to federal question jurisdiction, Defendant argues that the Complaint alleges violations 5 of the First Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) However, it is clear that the Complaint itself contains 6 only a single claim for unlawful detainer. (ECF No. 1 at 10–12.) The instant Complaint therefore 7 relies solely on California state law and does not state any claims under federal law. Based on the 8 well-pleaded complaint rule as articulated above, removal cannot be based on a defense, 9 counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim raising a federal question. Caterpillar Inc., 482 10 U.S. at 392; see also Vaden, 556 U.S. at 49; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d at 1042–43. 11 Thus, while Defendant seems to contend in the notice of removal that Plaintiff has violated the 12 First Amendment, this assertion relates only to an affirmative defense or potential counterclaim, 13 which cannot be considered in evaluating whether a federal question appears on the face of 14 Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 60-62. 15 As to diversity jurisdiction, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is a limited liability 16 corporation formed in another state. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) But even assuming there is complete 17 diversity of citizenship, the Complaint makes clear that the amount in controversy does not 18 exceed $75,000 because Plaintiff demands “less than $10,000.” (ECF No. 1 at 10.) Moreover, 19 Defendant fails to prove, with legal certainty, that the amount in controversy is in fact higher than 20 $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 998–1000. 21 In sum, because the Complaint indicates that the only cause of action is one for unlawful 22 detainer, which arises solely under state law, this action does not arise under federal law. Further, 23 Defendant’s alternate argument as to diversity jurisdiction also fails because the amount in 24 controversy does not meet the statutory requirement. There being no apparent grounds for federal 25 jurisdiction, it is appropriate to remand this case, sua sponte, for lack of federal subject matter 26 jurisdiction. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th 27 Cir. 2004) (“the district court ha[s] a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the 28 removed action sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.”). 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3 2) is DENIED as moot, and the Court hereby REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of 4 California, County of Sacramento. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: January 16, 2020 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28