(PC) Garcia v. Baldwin ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GUILLERMO GARCIA, No. 1:19-cv-00184-DAD-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, DENYING 14 M BALDWIN, et al., DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO POST SECURITY AS A 15 Defendants. VEXATIOUS LITIGANT, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S COUNTERMOTION FOR 16 SANCTIONS 17 (Doc. Nos. 13, 21, 29) 18 19 20 Plaintiff Guillermo Garcia is a state prisoner currently proceeding pro se in this civil 21 rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred to a United States Magistrate 22 Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 23 On September 23, 2019, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and 24 recommendations recommending that defendants’ motion to require plaintiff to post security as a 25 vexatious litigant (Doc. No. 13) be denied. (Doc. No. 21.) Specifically, the magistrate judge 26 found that defendants relied solely on California law to argue that plaintiff was a vexatious 27 litigant but “d[id] not address the federal substantive law requirements to show bad faith or 28 willful disobedience of a court’s order by Plaintiff.” (Id. at 6.) On October 14, 2019, defendants 1 filed objections to the pending findings and recommendations and, on December 16, 2019, 2 plaintiff filed his response to those objections, as well as a countermotion for sanctions in 3 response to defendants’ pending motion. (Doc. Nos. 22, 28, 29.) 4 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this court has conducted a 5 de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, including defendants’ 6 objections as well plaintiff’s response thereto, the court finds the findings and recommendations 7 to be supported by the record and by proper analysis. 8 In their objections, defendants contend that, “[a]lthough [their] motion also requested the 9 Court [to] declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant, and the [pending] Findings and Recommendations 10 deny that request,” plaintiff should still be required to post “monetary security.” (Doc. No. 22 at 11 2.) Defendants argue that “[r]equesting Plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigant and requesting 12 he be required to post security are different requests.” (Id. at 3.) Defendants also assert that the 13 magistrate judge “mistakenly conclude[d] that there must be a finding of ‘vexatiousness’ under 14 federal law.” (Id. at 2) 15 The court find defendants’ first objection to be is confusing. Their motion clearly seeks 16 an order from this court “REQUIR[ING] PLAINTIFF TO POST SECURITY AS A 17 VEXATIOUS LITIGANT[.]” (Doc. No. 13-1 at 1; see also id. at 4 (“[T]he Court should grant 18 Defendants’ motion, declare [plaintiff] a vexatious litigant, and require him to post security 19 before this action proceeds.”).) Thus, defendants’ objection—that a finding that plaintiff is a 20 vexatious litigant is not necessary to grant their motion—contradicts the very argument advanced 21 in their motion. 22 With respect to defendants’ second objection that the magistrate judge erred in his 23 analysis of the applicable law, the court finds that defendants are incorrect. Local Rule 151(b), 24 the local rule by which defendants have brought their motion (see Doc. No. 13-1 at 1), states: 25 On its own motion or on motion of a party, the Court may at any time order a party to give a security, bond, or undertaking in such amount 26 as the Court may determine to be appropriate. The provisions of Title 3A, part 2, of the California Code of Civil Procedure, relating to 27 vexatious litigants, are hereby adopted as a procedural Rule of this Court on the basis of which the Court may order the giving of a 28 1 security, bond, or undertaking, although the power of the Court shall not be limited thereby. 2 3 “While Local Rule 151(b) directs the Court to look to state law for the procedure in which a 4 litigant may be ordered to furnish security, this Court looks to federal law for the definition of 5 vexatiousness.”1 Goolsby v. Gonzales, No. 1:11-cv-00394-LJO-GSA, 2014 WL 2330108, at *1 6 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:11-cv-00394-LJO-GSA, 7 2014 WL 3529998 (E.D. Cal. July 15, 2014). “[U]nder federal law, the standard for declaring a 8 litigant vexatious is more stringent” than the standard under California law. Id. The pending 9 findings and recommendations correctly note that under federal law “the simple fact that a 10 plaintiff has filed a large number of complaints, standing alone, is not a basis for designating a 11 litigant as ‘vexatious.’” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007). 12 “The plaintiff’s claims must not only be numerous, but also be patently without merit.” Id. at 13 1051 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The focus is on the number of suits that 14 were frivolous or harassing in nature rather than on the number of suits that were simply 15 adversely decided.” Cranford v. Crawford, No. 1:14-cv-00055-AWI-MJS (PC), 2016 WL 16 4536199, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016). 17 Here, the magistrate judge correctly found that defendants’ citing to eight actions that 18 plaintiff previously filed is not sufficient to designate him a vexatious litigant, especially in light 19 of the magistrate judge’s finding that “of th[ose] eight cases . . ., one was voluntarily dismissed, 20 two were rulings on a motion for summary judgment, one was dismissed as abandoned by 21 Plaintiff, and one was dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee and prosecute the action.” (Doc. 22 No. 21 at 6.) Defendants contend that “courts in this district have not adopted a requirement of a 23 showing of ‘vexatiousness[]’ . . . as a prerequisite to an order to post security.” (Doc. No. 22 at 24 3.) Here, however, defendants specifically moved for an order requiring plaintiff to post security 25 1 Defendants counter, arguing that in other cases judges of this court have applied the standard 26 set by California law to the vexatiousness determination. (See Doc. No. 22 at 3.) The cited 27 opinions, however, are not binding decisions, nor do they address the fact that Local Rule 151(b) incorporated Title 3A, part 2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure “as a procedural Rule,” as 28 opposed to a substantive one. 1 | as a vexatious litigant, but have failed to establish that plaintiff is a vexatious litigant. 2 | Accordingly, defendants’ motion (Doc. No. 13) will be denied. 3 Finally, the court will deny plaintiff's counter—motion for imposition of sanctions (Doc. 4 | No. 29) since the court finds no basis to impose sanctions on defendants. Plaintiff contends that 5 | defendants’ motion “is totally and completely without merit” (id. at 2), but this is not so. 6 | Defendants moved for an order requiring plaintiff to post security as a vexatious litigant and 7 | although that motion will be denied, the court does not find that defendants’ arguments in support 8 | thereof were meritless. Moreover, plaintiff has offered no basis upon which this court could 9 | conclude that defendants’ motion was brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassing him. See 10 | Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court has the inherent power to 11 | sanction ... when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 12 || reasons, as well as for willful[ | abuse [of the] judicial processes.”) (internal quotation marks and 13 | citation omitted). 14 For the reasons set forth above, 15 1. The September 23, 2019 findings and recommendations (Doc. No. 21) are adopted 16 in full; 17 2. Defendants’ motion for an order requiring plaintiff to post security as a vexatious 18 litigant (Doc. No. 13) is denied; and 19 3. Plaintiffs counter—-motion for sanctions (Doc. No. 29) is denied. 20 | IT IS SO ORDERED. me □ Dated: _ January 24, 2020 a al, A 5 anys 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28