Santiago v. Chipotle Services, LLC ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIA SANTIAGO, No. 2:17-cv-02350-MCE-AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CHIPOTLE SERVICES, LLC, 15 Defendant. 16 17 By way of this action, Plaintiff Maria Santiago (“Maria”) seeks to recover for 18 injuries sustained when she was terminated from her employment with Defendant 19 Chipotle Services, LLC, (“Defendant”) after purportedly requesting accommodations for 20 her alleged physical disability.1 Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for 21 Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) by which it argues that primarily that: (1) “Plaintiff’s 22 Disability Discrimination, Failure to Accommodate, Failure to Engage in the Interactive 23 Process, and Wrongful Termination Claims Fail because Plaintiff was not disabled”; and 24 (2) her retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claims and her 25 request for punitive damages, fail as a matter of law. Def.’s Mot., ECF Nos. 16-2, at 10, 26 1 Given this Court’s disproportionately high case load, and in the interest of conserving judicial 27 resources and expediting a decision in this case, the Court will not recount details with which the parties are intimately familiar. To be clear, the Court has considered all evidence and arguments in the record, 28 but it limits its written decision to only that which is necessary to resolve the parties’ instant arguments. 1 12, 16, 18. For the following reasons, that Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in 2 part.2 3 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when “the 4 movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 5 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. 6 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to 7 dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. 8 Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary judgment on part of a claim or 9 defense, known as partial summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party may 10 move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each 11 claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. 12 Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The standard that applies to a 13 motion for partial summary judgment is the same as that which applies to a motion for 14 summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); State of Cal. ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic 15 Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying summary 16 judgment standard to motion for summary adjudication). 17 In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial 18 responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the 19 portions in the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 20 material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial 21 responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine 22 issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 23 Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 24 253, 288-89 (1968). 25 In attempting to establish the existence or non-existence of a genuine factual 26 dispute, the party must support its assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in 27 2 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this 28 matter submitted on the briefs. See E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g). 1 the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 2 affidavits[,] or declarations . . . or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do 3 not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 4 cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The 5 opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that 6 might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 7 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and 8 Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party must also 9 demonstrate that the dispute about a material fact “is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is 10 such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 11 477 U.S. at 248. In other words, the judge needs to answer the preliminary question 12 before the evidence is left to the jury of “not whether there is literally no evidence, but 13 whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the 14 party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 15 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)) (emphasis in original). 16 As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under 17 Rule [56(a)], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some 18 metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Therefore, 19 “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 20 nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587. 21 In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to 22 be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed 23 before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 24 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s 25 obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. 26 Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 27 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). 28 /// 1 A variety of factual disputes preclude entry of judgment in Defendant’s favor on 2 the bulk of the arguments before the Court.3 The most fundamental example is that the 3 record is far from clear that Plaintiff was not disabled at the time she sought 4 accommodations from her immediate supervisor, Lafonda Mitev (“Mitev”). While Plaintiff 5 had previously suffered a work-related injury and been released to return to work with no 6 restrictions, she had repeatedly reported to Mitev a return of her pain, which it could be 7 inferred derived from her prior injury. There is no evidence in the record that Mitev or 8 any other of Defendant’s leadership employees requested medical corroboration of 9 Plaintiff’s injury, and she was fired relatively shortly thereafter. Plaintiff was then seen by 10 a physician who opined that she could lift no more than ten pounds and that she was 11 required to take a ten-minute break every hour. A jury could thus conclude that Plaintiff 12 suffered from a disability sufficient to support her claims.4 13 Defendant’s punitive damages arguments also fail. Defendant contends that it 14 cannot be liable for Mitev’s actions because it has not been shown that she was 15 Defendant’s officer, director, or managing agent. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b). That 16 argument ignores evidence that Mitev’s termination decision was purportedly approved 17 by Mitev’s superior, Patrick O’Ryan. Defendant has not offered any evidence regarding 18 Mr. O’Ryan’s role in Defendant’s hierarchy, and thus questions remain for the jury as to 19 whether his conduct can be attributed to Defendant for purposes of punitive damages. 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 3 Plaintiff concedes that she is no longer pursuing a retaliation claim under California Labor Code 24 132a and she failed to provide evidence supporting her IIED claim. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED as to both of those causes of action. 25 4 Since the facts do not support entry of judgment as a matter of law, the Court need not rule on Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s evidence. That said, the Court notes that medical records, among 26 other documents, are not properly authenticated by counsel simply because they were offered at a deposition. At the very least, the Court would expect to see, if not a declaration from an author of a 27 particular record, a citation to the portions of the deposition testimony where the particular records were actually authenticated. Nor can counsel authenticate or provide the foundation for Defendant’s business 28 records. Absent such evidence, Defendant’s substantive arguments would fail in any event. 1 | Accordingly, for all of the reasons just stated, Defendant's Motion for Summary 2 | Judgment (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 3 IT 1S SO ORDERED. 4 | Dated: February 18, 2020 6 MORRISON C. ENGLAND, J UNITED STATES DISTRI 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28