Doe v. El Dorado Union High School District ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JANE DOE, an individual; and No. 2:18-cv-02576-JAM-CKD TIFFANY DOE, an individual; 12 Plaintiffs, 13 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND v. DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR 14 JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS EL DORADO UNION HIGH SCHOOL 15 DISTRICT; CHAS PRIOR, Individually; STEPHEN WEHR, 16 Individually; TONY DEVILLE, Individually; TARA GRUDIN, 17 Individually; JUSTIN GATLING, Individually; and DOES 1 18 THROUGH 20, 19 Defendants. 20 21 Jane Doe and Tiffany Doe (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a 22 complaint against El Dorado Union High School District, and 23 individual Defendants Chas Prior, Stephen Wehr, Tony Deville, 24 Tara Grudin, and Justin Gatling (collectively “Defendants”), 25 alleging Defendants violated Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by 26 failing to redress a hostile educational environment after 27 Plaintiffs were sexually assaulted at El Dorado High School 28 (“EDHS.”). Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1,4-5. Currently before this 1 Court is Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Mot. 2 for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Mot.”), ECF No. 35-1. In this 3 Motion, Defendants only seek judgment on the Title IX claims and 4 section 1983 claims asserted against the individual Defendants. 5 Id. at 1. Plaintiffs oppose this Motion. Opp’n, ECF No. 45.1 6 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and 7 DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. 8 9 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 10 Plaintiffs allege they were “repeatedly sexually harassed 11 and sexually assaulted” by their teacher Daniel Mummy at El 12 Dorado High School during the 2016-2017 school year. Compl. ¶ 4. 13 Plaintiffs were both minors when the assault took place; Jane Doe 14 and Tiffany Doe are fictitious names utilized to protect their 15 privacy. Id. 16 El Dorado High School is in the El Dorado Union High School 17 District (“School District”). Id. ¶ 4. Id. Accordingly, 18 Plaintiffs named the School District as a defendant in this case. 19 Id. ¶ 7. At issue in this motion are the claims against school 20 district employees—individual Defendants Chas Prior, Stephen 21 Wehr, Tony Deville, Tara Grudin, and Justin Gatling. Mot. at 2. 22 Defendant Chas Prior was the El Dorado High School Principal 23 during the school year Plaintiffs were sexually assaulted. 24 Compl. ¶ 8. Defendants Tara Grudin and Justin Gatling were the 25 Vice Principals. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Defendant Stephen Wehr was the 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for February 25, 2020. 1 Superintendent of the School District and Defendant Tony Deville 2 was the Assistant Superintendent of Human Resources (“The Title 3 IX Coordinator”). Id. ¶¶ 9-10. 4 Plaintiffs allege they were sexually assaulted by Mummy “in 5 the classroom, hallway, doorway, and outdoor areas of the 6 schoolyard during school hours.” Compl. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs 7 maintain that individual Defendants, Prior, Grudin and Gatling 8 observed these actions. Id. 9 Mummy was convicted of sexual molestation on October 2017. 10 Id. ¶ 56. After he was arrested, Plaintiffs “were subjected to 11 bullying and unsympathetic conduct by teachers and students.” 12 Id. ¶¶ 57, 61-62. Plaintiffs’ parents attempted to address 13 these issues with Principal Prior and Vice Principals Grudin and 14 Gatling, yet they “took no actions to protect or support the 15 Plaintiffs.” Id. ¶¶ 61, 64-65, 93, 95. Plaintiffs allege the 16 other individual Defendants, School District’s Superintendent 17 Wehr and Title IX Coordinator DeVille, were also informed of the 18 sexual harassment but failed to investigate. Id. ¶¶ 83,86,89. 19 Defendants seek judgment on all claims against these five 20 individual Defendants. Mot. at 2. Plaintiffs are suing the 21 individual Defendants for alleged violations of Title IX and 22 Section 1983 in their individual capacities. 23 Compl. ¶¶ 128,142,148,161. 24 25 II. OPINION 26 A. Legal Standard 27 A party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the 28 pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. 1 R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Rule 12(c) is ‘functionally identical’ to 2 Rule 12(b)(6) and . . . ‘the same standard of review’ applies to 3 motions brought under either rule.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. 4 Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n. 4 (9th Cir. 5 2011). Accordingly, the Court “must accept all factual 6 allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the 7 light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. 8 Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court can 9 properly grant judgment on the pleadings “when there is no issue 10 of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to 11 judgment as a matter of law.” Id. 12 B. Judicial Notice 13 In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the 14 Court is generally limited to the pleadings and may not consider 15 extrinsic evidence. Shame On You Productions, Inc. v. Elizabeth 16 Banks, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1143-44 (C.D. Cal. 2015). However, 17 the Court may consider “documents referenced extensively in the 18 complaint, documents that form the basis of plaintiff's claims, 19 and matters of judicial notice, when determining whether the 20 allegations of the complaint state a claim upon which relief can 21 be granted.” Lopez v. Regents of University of California, 5 F. 22 Supp. 3d 1106, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2013). The Court may take 23 judicial notice of a fact that “is not subject to reasonable 24 dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily 25 determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably 26 questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). 27 Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of the 28 Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial filed on 1 September 18, 2018. Defs’ Req. for Judicial Notice, ECF 35-2. 2 Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of Defendants’ 3 Answer to the Complaint, ECF No. 16. Plfs’ Req. for Judicial 4 Notice, ECF No. 46, Exh. A. Neither party objects to the 5 others’ requests but both requests are unnecessary since both of 6 these documents are court filings of which the Court already has 7 knowledge. Moreover, the Court can only take judicial notice of 8 the existence of these pleadings. As noted above, for purposes 9 of this Motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in 10 the Complaint as true. 11 C. Analysis 12 1. Title IX Individual Liability 13 Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ First and Second claims 14 against the individual Defendants fail as a matter of law, 15 because Title IX does not support claims against individuals. 16 Mot. at 3. 17 Title IX provides in relevant part: 18 [N]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be 19 excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 20 of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 21 educational program or activity receiving financial 22 assistance.” 23 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Whether Title IX supports individual 24 liability claims is not well-established. The Supreme Court 25 has yet to directly address this question, leaving other 26 courts divided on the issue. Compare Doe v. Petaluma, 830 27 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding individuals may not 28 be held liable under Title IX), with Mennone v. Gordon, 889 1 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1995) (finding Title IX does support 2 individual claims). 3 Defendants ask the Court to adopt the reasoning in 4 Petaluma. Reply at 4. In their opposition, Plaintiffs’ 5 request the Court to instead adopt the reasoning in Mennone. 6 Opp’n at 5-6. Plaintiffs overlook however, that only five 7 years after Mennone was decided, the District of Connecticut 8 found its reasoning in Mennone to be flawed when confronted 9 with the same issue. See Norris v. Norwalk Public Schools, 10 124 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797. Notably, the District of 11 Connecticut found the analysis in Petaluma, to be far more 12 persuasive than its own previous ruling. Id. at 796. While 13 neither case is binding authority, the Court is persuaded by 14 the reasoning in Petaluma, especially since it is consistent 15 with statements made by the Supreme Court and the Ninth 16 Circuit. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 528 U.S. 17 629 (Supreme Court observed it had yet to “exten[d] damages 18 liability under Title IX to parties outside the scope of 19 [the government’s enforcement] power.” Id. at 641) and Al- 20 Rifai v. Willows Unified School Dist., 469 Fed. Appx. 647, 21 649 (9th Cir. 2012) (“As Plaintiffs concede, Title IX does 22 not create a private right of action against school 23 officials, teachers, and other individuals who are not 24 direct recipients of federal funding.”) 25 In Petaluma, a student attempted to hold her principal 26 and counselor liable under Title IX for allegedly failing to 27 protect her from sexual harassment by another student. 830 28 F. Supp. at 1565, 1577. The court ultimately dismissed the 1 individual claims against the principal and counselor, 2 finding that “individuals may not be held personally liable 3 under Title IX.” Id. at 1577. The court found that 4 “[s]ince the Act prohibits discrimination against 5 beneficiaries in programs and activities that receive 6 federal financial assistance . . . it is the educational 7 institution that must be sued for violations of Title IX.” 8 Id. at 1576-1577. Further, it found its conclusion was 9 reinforced by the statutory provision for administrative 10 enforcement, since it only refers to “actions federal 11 agencies may take against institutions.” Id. The court was 12 likewise persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s holding that 13 individuals may not be liable for discrimination under Title 14 VII. Id. (citing Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 15 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993)). It found that since the 16 “evils [these two amendments] attack are so intimately 17 related . . . it would make little sense to interpret Title 18 IX to permit individual liability absent clear direction 19 from Congress.” Id. 20 Adopting the reasoning in Petaluma, this Court finds 21 that the five individual Defendants in this case may not be 22 held personally liable under Title IX. The Court therefore 23 GRANTS judgment for these Defendants on Plaintiffs’ First 24 and Second claims under Title IX, finding that they fail as 25 a matter of law. 26 2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 27 Defendants also seek judgment on Plaintiffs Third and Fourth 28 claims for violation of section 1983, claiming they are immune 1 from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Mot. at 4. 2 Plaintiffs argue Defendants are not immune because their claims 3 are asserted against the individual Defendants in their 4 individual capacity, not in their official capacity. 5 Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to create a private cause 6 of action for violations of the United States Constitution. 7 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978). 8 Local governing bodies are considered “persons” under the statute 9 and are therefore subject to liability under section 1983. Id. 10 However, “local governing units that are considered part of the 11 State for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are immune from liability. 12 Id. at 690 n. 54. 13 The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution 14 provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall 15 not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 16 commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 17 citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any 18 foreign state.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. School districts are 19 considered a state agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. 20 Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 21 1992). Official-capacity suits “generally represent only another 22 way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer 23 is an agent.” Monell, 436 U.S. 690, n.55. Since “[t]he State of 24 California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with 25 respect to claims brought under section 1983 in federal court,” 26 official-capacity suits against California school officials are 27 precluded under the Eleventh Amendment. Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of 28 Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009). Personal-capacity 1 suits, on the other hand, are not barred by the Eleventh 2 Amendment. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). This is so 3 even in personal-capacity suits attempting to hold a state 4 official liable for “actions taken in their official capacities.” 5 Id. 6 Plaintiffs do not dispute their suit would be barred had 7 they sued the Defendants in their official capacities. Opp’n at 8 8-9. They do dispute, however, Defendants’ attempt to 9 characterize their suit as an official-capacity suit. Id. 10 Plaintiffs maintain they are suing the individual Defendants in 11 their individual capacity. Id. Defendants argue that while it 12 may seem on its face that Plaintiffs have brought forth a 13 personal-capacity suit, they are merely using a pleading device 14 “to circumvent congressional intent” and hold the school 15 vicariously liable for alleged violations of Title IX. Reply at 16 6-7. The Court disagrees. 17 In determining whether a suit is an individual or official 18 capacity suit, the Court “must consider the ‘essential nature’ of 19 the proceeding.” Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 20 1996) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dept of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459. 21 464 (1945)). “[W]hen the action is in essence one for the 22 recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, 23 substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its 24 sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are 25 nominal defendants.” Ford Motor Co., 323 at 464. However, when 26 an action “seeks damages against [defendants] personally, the 27 Eleventh Amendment does not restrict [plaintiffs] ability to sue 28 in federal court.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31. 1 Here, the intent of the Third and Fourth causes of action 2 are to bring recourse on behalf of Plaintiffs against these five 3 individual Defendants. This is made explicit in their Complaint. 4 For example, in their Fourth cause of action, Plaintiffs allege 5 “the individual Defendants . . . are liable for compensatory and 6 punitive damages for their creation of an actual, particularized 7 danger that Plaintiffs would be sexually abused by a known, 8 sexual predator teacher, done in deliberate indifference. . . .” 9 Compl. ¶ 157. Plaintiffs’ Complaint shows that they seek redress 10 for the emotional and psychological damages they allegedly 11 suffered from the harassment fostered by the deliberate 12 indifference of these individually named Defendants. Compl ¶¶ 13 153, 164. 14 Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs’ allegation that 15 “individual defendants were acting within the course and scope of 16 their employment,” Compl. ¶ 13, is “clearly an attempt to hold 17 the School District vicariously liable.” is without merit. Reply 18 at 7-8. It is well-established that “state officers [are not 19 immune under the Eleventh Amendment] from personal liability 20 under section 1983 solely by virtue of the “official” nature of 21 their acts.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31. Thus, that the individual 22 Defendants “acted pursuant to their respective capacities, or 23 ‘under color of state law’” does not imply they are being sued in 24 their official capacities. Opp’n at 11. 25 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have made clear the 26 “essential nature” of their Third and Fourth Claims as personal 27 capacity claims. Id. The Court therefore need not address 28 Plaintiffs’ argument regarding Defendants’ Answer to their 1 Complaint. Opp’n at 12. Based on the essential nature of their 2 claims alone, it is clear the Eleventh Amendment does not bar 3 these claims. The Court therefore DENIES judgment on these 4 claims. 5 6 Til. ORDER 7 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS in part 8 and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for judgment on the 9 | pleadings. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: March 19, 2020 12 kA 13 teiren staves odermacr 7008 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11