Marsh v. AFSCME Local 3299 ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 TERRANCE MARSH; SANDI EDDE; No. 2:19-cv-02382-JAM-DB THEODORE MENDOZA; REBECCA VAN 9 ANTWERP; LINDSAY MACOMBER; KAREN JORDAN; STACEY 10 DAVIDSON; BARBARA GROSSE; ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STAY TAMELA DIOSO; and KISKA DISCOVERY AND INITIAL 11 CARTER, individuals, DISCLOSURES 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. 14 AFSCME LOCAL 3299, a labor organization; JANET 15 NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as President of the 16 University of California; and XAVIER BECERRA, in his 17 official capacity as Attorney General of California, 18 Defendants. 19 20 Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants under 21 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), 22 ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs allege the University of California made 23 unlawful deductions from Plaintiffs’ wages and remitted the funds 24 to AFSCME Local 3299 (the Union) without Plaintiffs’ consent. 25 FAC ¶ 1. They also contend Defendants unduly restricted 26 Plaintiffs’ ability to resign from the Union. Id. Plaintiffs 27 seek declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and money damages for 28 1 these alleged violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment 2 rights. 3 Defendant Xavier Becerra filed a motion to dismiss 4 Plaintiffs’ claims. Becerra Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 20. He 5 also filed a motion to stay discovery and initial disclosures 6 pending the Court’s resolution of that motion.1 Mot. to Stay, 7 ECF No. 21. Defendants Janet Napolitano and the Union likewise 8 filed motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. Napolitano Mot. to 9 Dismiss, ECF No. 23; AFSCME Local 3299 Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 10 30. They also joined in Becerra’s motion to stay. AFSCME Local 11 3299 Joinder, ECF No. 22; Napolitano Joinder, ECF No. 24. 12 Plaintiffs’ claims are premised upon the notion that Janus 13 v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) confers an 14 unqualified right to withdraw union membership and recoup 15 previously-paid dues. See generally FAC. As Defendants argue, 16 this Court rejected that notion in Cooley v. Cal. Statewide Law 17 Enforcement Ass’n, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1079-82 (E.D. Cal. 18 2019). This Court is not alone in reaching that conclusion. See 19 Campos v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n, No. 1:18-cv-1660-AWI- 20 EPB, 2020 WL 9499915, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2020) (collecting 21 cases). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part 22 and denies in part Defendants’ motions to stay discovery and 23 initial disclosures pending the resolution of the outstanding 24 motions to dismiss. Because the Union concedes its motion to 25 dismiss will rely on outside evidence related to Edde’s and 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for March 24, 2020. 1 Mendoza’s Union resignations, the Court allows Plaintiffs to seek 2 reasonable discovery from the Union on that issue. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Plaintiffs are University of California employees. FAC 5 ¶ 20. Each of the ten Plaintiffs became Union members after 6 signing Union membership cards or applications. FAC ¶¶ 30, 50, 7 61, 77, 86, 98, 114, 123, 134, 147. At some point after the 8 Supreme Court decided Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 9 2448 (2018), Plaintiffs learned of the decision and tried to 10 resign from the Union. See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 63, 125, 144. 11 Plaintiffs struggled to terminate their memberships within the 12 Union’s designated time period. See generally FAC ¶¶ 29-156. 13 Plaintiffs allege Sections 1157.12 and 1157.3 of the 14 California Government Code are to blame for the difficulties they 15 faced in withdrawing Union membership and terminating their Union 16 dues. FAC ¶¶ 168-72. Section 1157.3 permits public employees to 17 authorize deductions from their salaries to pay union membership 18 dues. Cal. Gov. Code § 1157.3(a). Once an employee authorizes a 19 deduction covered by subsection a, the public employer must honor 20 it. Cal. Gov. Code § 1157.3(b). Section 1157.12 then regulates 21 how public employers (other than the state) manage these 22 deduction authorizations. In relevant part, it requires an 23 employer to direct an employee’s request to cancel or change a 24 deduction to the “employee organization”—in this case, the Union. 25 Cal. Gov. Code § 1157.12(b). 26 To date, at least eight of the ten Plaintiffs were able to 27 resign from the Union. FAC ¶¶ 41, 81, 91, 103, 108, 117, 128, 28 140, 153. And at least two of the Plaintiffs no longer pay any 1 dues. FAC ¶¶ 58, 121. 2 II. OPINION 3 A party may request an order that stays discovery “pending 4 the resolution of a potentially dispositive motion such as a 5 motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 12(b)(6).” Mlejnecky v. Olympus Imaging America, Inc., No. 2:10- 7 cv-02630, 2011 WL 489743, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011). The 8 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for “automatic” 9 or “blanket” stays of discovery in the face of potentially 10 dispositive motions. Id. But district courts may nonetheless 11 exercise “wide discretion in controlling discovery.” Id. 12 (quoting Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 13 1988)). In exercising this discretion, courts have granted stays 14 of discovery pending the resolution of a potentially dispositive 15 motion when the movant satisfies both prongs of a two-part test. 16 Id. at *6 (collecting cases). 17 First, the pending motion “must be potentially dispositive 18 of the entire case, or at least dispositive on the issue at which 19 discovery is aimed.” Id. As Defendants argue, their motions to 20 dismiss are potentially dispositive of the entire case. See 21 Becerra Mot. to Stay at 5-9; Napolitano Joinder at 2-3; AFSCME 22 Local 3299 Joinder at 5-6. Defendants move to dismiss all of 23 Plaintiffs’ claims. The arguments Defendants raise in their 24 motions mirror those that have already been heard and accepted by 25 several other district courts in cases that are extremely similar 26 this one. See Napolitano Joinder at 2-3 (collecting cases); 27 AFSCME Local 3299 Joinder at 5-6 (collecting cases). 28 Indeed, this Court recently dismissed a comparable suit at 1 the motion-to-dismiss stage. In Cooley v. Cal. Statewide Law 2 Enforcement Ass’n, a union member brought a putative class action 3 against Becerra and two law enforcement unions because the unions 4 would not allow him to resign and stop paying dues without 5 adhering to the formal resignation process. 385 F. Supp. 3d at 6 1078. This Court found that Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486 did not 7 announce the rights plaintiff sought to enforce and dismissed the 8 suit in its entirety. Cooley, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1078. 9 Plaintiffs do not attempt to reconcile this Court’s decision in 10 Cooley with the relief they now seek. Nor do they address any of 11 the recent district court cases that have categorically rejected 12 their theories of First and Fourteenth Amendment liability. See 13 Opp’n at 7-11. Instead, Plaintiffs defend their claims by 14 extrapolating from dicta and overly-broad legal principles pulled 15 from Janus and pre-Janus cases. See id. The Court finds 16 Defendants have shown their pending motions to dismiss are 17 potentially dispositive of the entire suit. 18 Second, “the court must determine whether the pending, 19 potentially dispositive motion can be decided absent additional 20 discovery.” Mlejnecky, 2011 WL489743, at *6. As Becerra and 21 Napolitano argue, their defenses to Plaintiffs’ suit are 22 “entirely legal in nature.” Becerra Mot. to Stay at 9; see also 23 Napolitano Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 23-1. Plaintiffs disagree, 24 arguing they need additional discovery regarding (1) whether they 25 voluntarily signed the Union membership agreements, and (2) 26 Defendants’ past and present dues and/or fee deduction procedure. 27 Opp’n at 6, 19-20. Plaintiffs fail, however, to explain how 28 additional fact-finding on either of these two issues would 1 assist the Court in resolving the arguments raised in Defendants’ 2 motions to dismiss—particularly those surrounding justiciability. 3 See Reply at 2-3. The Court agrees with each of the arguments 4 raised in Becerra’s reply brief on this issue. Id. 5 The Union concedes it will rely on information outside the 6 | complaint in its motion to dismiss. AMFSCE Local 3299 at 6. 7 Specifically, this evidence relates to the Union’s confirmation 8 that Edde and Mendoza terminated their Union membership. Id. 9 The Union represents it will not oppose “discovery limited to 10 that issue.” With this caveat, the Court finds Defendants are 11 entitled to a stay of discovery and initial disclosures pending 12 the Court’s resolution of their motions to dismiss. 13 Til. ORDER 14 The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ 15 | motion to stay discovery and initial disclosures pending the 16 resolution of the outstanding motions to dismiss. The Court 17 stays discovery and initial disclosures for Defendants Becerra 18 and Napolitano. But because the Union concedes its motion to 19 dismiss will rely on documents related to Edde’s and Mendoza’s 20 | union resignations, the Court allows Plaintiffs to seek 21 reasonable discovery from the Union on that narrow issue. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: March 26, 2020 ft 25 HN A. MENDEZ, a UNITED STATES DISTRICT 26 27 28