(PC) Chavez v. Brown ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 JOSE CHAVEZ, Case No. 1:19-cv-00410-EPG (PC) 10 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 11 RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION PROCEED ON PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS 12 v. AGAINST DEFENDANTS M. FRANCO, R. 13 EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., et al., MAGANA, J. LARA, L. MORENO, AND J. PALOMINO FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE AND 14 FAILURE TO PROTECT UNDER THE EIGHTH Defendants. AMENDMENT, AND THAT ALL OTHER 15 CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS BE DISMISSED 16 (ECF NO. 20) 17 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 18 TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS 19 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 Jose Chavez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 22 this civil rights action. On November 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Northern District 23 of California. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s action was transferred to this Court on March 29, 2019. 24 (ECF Nos. 10 & 11). 25 On October 17, 2019, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, (ECF No. 19), and on 26 November 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (ECF No. 20). Plaintiff’s first 27 amended complaint is now before this Court for screening. 28 The Court has screened the first amended complaint, and finds that Plaintiff states 1 cognizable claims against Defendants M. Franco, R. Magana, J. Lara, L. Moreno, and J. Palomino 2 for excessive force and failure to protect under the Eighth Amendment. The Court finds no other 3 cognizable claims. 4 The Court recommends that these claims be allowed to proceed past the screening stage 5 and that all other claims and defendants be dismissed. 6 Plaintiff has twenty-one days from the date of service of these findings and 7 recommendations to file his objections. 8 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 9 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 10 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 11 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 12 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 13 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 14 As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, (ECF No. 15), the Court may also screen the 15 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that 16 may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the 17 action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 18 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 19 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 20 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 21 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 22 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 23 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 24 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 25 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 26 plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not 27 required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 28 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s legal 1 conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 2 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 3 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 4 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 5 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 6 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges as follows: 7 On December 4, 2017, Plaintiff informed Correctional Officers M. Franco, R. Magana, J. 8 Lara, L. Moreno, and J. Palomino that he was going to be attacked by inmate Perez when they 9 released to yard. Correctional Officers M. Franco, R. Magana, J. Lara, L. Moreno, and J. 10 Palomino said “if you get into another fight on my yard we are going to break your legs.” 11 On December 4, 2017, Plaintiff was released to yard and was attacked by inmate Perez. 12 While Plaintiff was on the ground being punched in the face by inmate Perez, Correctional 13 Officers M. Franco, R. Magana, J. Lara, L. Moreno, and J. Palomino responded to the attack by 14 beating Plaintiff with a metal baton, breaking both of his legs, and using several cans of pepper 15 spray. 16 Correctional Officers M. Franco, R. Magana, J. Lara, L. Moreno, and J. Palomino stated 17 “we are going to break your fuckin legs for fights on my yard punk.” 18 Plaintiff names these five officers as defendants. He asserts causes of action under the 19 First and Eighth Amendment. 20 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 21 A. Section 1983 22 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: 23 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 24 Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 25 deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 26 at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 27 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 28 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 1 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also 2 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 3 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); 4 Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 5 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 6 under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution 7 or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 8 Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of 9 state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, 10 ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act 11 which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” 12 Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 13 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be 14 established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or 15 reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 16 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles 17 the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 18 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 19 (9th Cir. 2008). 20 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 21 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual 22 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been 23 suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 24 695 (1978). 25 Supervisory personnel are not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employees 26 under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 27 supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be 28 specifically alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). To state a claim for relief 2 under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that 3 would support a claim that the supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the 4 alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation 5 of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 6 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Taylor v. List, 7 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 8 For instance, a supervisor may be liable for his “own culpable action or inaction in the 9 training, supervision, or control of his subordinates,” “his acquiescence in the constitutional 10 deprivations of which the complaint is made,” or “conduct that showed a reckless or callous 11 indifference to the rights of others.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 12 1991) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). 13 B. Excessive Force Claim 14 “In its prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ the Eighth Amendment places 15 restraints on prison officials, who may not… use excessive physical force against prisoners.” 16 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused of 17 using excessive physical force in violation of the [Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry 18 is… whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or 19 maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). 20 When determining whether the force was excessive, the court looks to the “extent of 21 injury suffered by an inmate…, the need for application of force, the relationship between that 22 need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ 23 and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 24 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)). While de minimis uses of physical force 25 generally do not implicate the Eighth Amendment, significant injury need not be evident in the 26 context of an excessive force claim, because “[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically 27 use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated.” Hudson, 503 28 1 U.S. at 9. 2 Liberally construed in favor of Plaintiff, Plaintiff has alleged a claim for excessive force in 3 violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendants M. Franco, R. Magana, J. Lara, L. 4 Moreno, and J. Palomino based on the allegations that they beat Plaintiff with a metal baton, 5 broke both of his legs, and used several cans of pepper spray, while they allegedly said “we are 6 gonna break your fuckin legs for fighting on my yard punk.” 7 C. Failure to Protect Claim 8 To establish a failure to protect claim, the prisoner must establish that prison officials 9 were deliberately indifferent to a sufficiently serious threat to the prisoner’s safety. Farmer v. 10 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “‘Deliberate indifference’ has both subjective and objective 11 components.” Labatad v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013). The prisoner 12 must show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate... safety; the 13 official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 14 risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 15 837. “Liability may follow only if a prison official ‘knows that inmates face a substantial risk of 16 serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” 17 Labatad, 714 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). 18 Liberally construed in favor of Plaintiff, Plaintiff has alleged a claim for failure to protect 19 in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendants M. Franco, R. Magana, J. Lara, L. 20 Moreno, and J. Palomino. Plaintiff alleged that he told these defendants he would be attacked by 21 inmate Perez when they released to yard, to which they allegedly responded “if you get into 22 another fight on my yard we are going to break your legs.” Plaintiff also alleged that inmate 23 Perez attacked him when they released to yard, just like Plaintiff told these defendants he would. 24 D. First Amendment Claim 25 Plaintiff asserts a cause of action under the First Amendment, but does not explain the 26 basis for this claim. 27 A retaliation claim requires “five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took 28 some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and 1 that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action 2 did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 3 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted); accord Watson v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th 4 Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). 5 There do not appear to be any allegations in the complaint that would support a First 6 Amendment claim for retaliation or any other First Amendment claim. Accordingly, the Court 7 will recommend that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim be dismissed. 8 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 The Court has screened the First Amended Complaint, and finds that Plaintiff states 10 cognizable claims against Defendants M. Franco, R. Magana, J. Lara, L. Moreno, and J. Palomino 11 for excessive force and failure to protect under the Eighth Amendment. The Court also finds that 12 Plaintiff has failed to state any other cognizable claims. 13 The Court does not recommend granting further leave to amend because the Court 14 provided Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend his complaint with the benefit of the legal 15 standards above, and Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint with the guidance of those legal 16 standards. 17 Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 18 1. This case proceed on Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants M. Franco, R. Magana, J. 19 Lara, L. Moreno, and J. Palomino for excessive force and failure to protect under the 20 Eighth Amendment; and 21 2. All other claims and defendants be dismissed. 22 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 23 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one 24 (21) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 25 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 26 Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 27 specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 28 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 1 Additionally, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge 2 | to this case. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. S| Dated: _March 31, 2020 [Jee ey 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28