(PC) Haygood v. Bostanjian ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 DEON HAYGOOD, Case No. 1:19-cv-01011-EPG (PC) 9 Plaintiff, AMENDED ORDER ALLOWING PLAINTIFF’S 10 CLAIM FOR DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO 11 v. SERIOUS MEDICAL NEEDS IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AGAINST MARINA BOSTANJIAN, M.D. 12 DEFENDANT, DR. MARINA BOSTANJIAN TO Defendants. PROCEED 13 14 (ECF No. 14) 15 16 Plaintiff, Deon Haygood, (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 17 civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his original complaint on July 18, 18 2019 (ECF No. 1), and a first amended complaint on December 2, 2019 (ECF No. 12). Following 19 the Court’s screening order, (ECF No. 13), Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on 20 February 3, 2020. (ECF No. 14). 21 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and finds that Plaintiff’s 22 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment 23 against Defendant Dr. Marina Bostanjian should proceed past the screening stage. 24 I. SCREENING REQUIRMENT 25 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), in any case in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma 26 pauperis, the Court must conduct a review of the complaint to determine whether it “state[s] a 27 claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seek[s] monetary relief 28 1 against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” If the Court determines that the complaint 2 fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id. An action is frivolous if it is “of little weight or 3 importance: having no basis in law or fact” and malicious if it was filed with the “intention or 4 desire to harm another.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). Leave to amend 5 may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. 6 Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 7 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 8 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 9 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 10 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 11 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 12 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 13 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are 14 not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 15 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s 16 legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 17 In determining whether a complaint states an actionable claim, the Court must accept the 18 allegations in the complaint as true, Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 19 (1976), construe pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. 20 Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins 21 v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less 22 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 23 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after 24 Iqbal). 25 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 26 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges as follows: 27 Defendant Marina Bostanjian is a psychiatrist at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”). On 28 August 17, 2018, while housed in the KVSP crisis bed, Plaintiff was experiencing hallucinations 1 and voices, which were keeping Plaintiff up during the night and causing a lack of sleep. Plaintiff 2 reported his symptoms to Defendant. Defendant told Plaintiff that she would check his file and 3 give him some medication to help with the hallucinations, voices, and lack of sleep. 4 Plaintiff alleges he is allergic to Remeron. Without telling Plaintiff, Defendant prescribed 5 Plaintiff Remeron among other medications. Plaintiff took all the medications given to him but 6 did not realize he was taking Remeron. Plaintiff took the Remeron for five days. After the first 7 two days, Plaintiff felt a painful tenderness in his groin and armpits. Plaintiff did not have his 8 prescription eyeglasses at the time, so he could not see “it,” but he could still feel the tenderness, 9 which he later discovered was a rash. Plaintiff reported his symptoms to the nursing staff, but the 10 staff would not examine “it.” 11 Plaintiff left KVSP crisis bed on August 22, 2018, and was then transferred to CMC state 12 prison. Plaintiff requested his medication and was told by a nurse that “the computer wouldn’t let 13 her give [him] Remeron because it was documented as one of his allergies.” 14 The painful rash made it difficult for Plaintiff to walk and move his arms without pain. 15 Plaintiff then filed a healthcare grievance and requested his medication records from 16 August 17, 2018, to August 22, 2018. He was given the following items: “(1) down time 17 medication administration report which lists all of [his] allergies wherein ‘Remeron’ is 18 documented as such, and (2) a list of [his] medications which include the times and dates that 19 [his] meds, including Remeron, were administered to [him].” 20 Plaintiff’s grievance was denied at the institutional level, and it was determined that 21 Defendant did not violate CDCR policy. However, Plaintiff resubmitted his appeal to California 22 Correctional Health Care Services Headquarters, and, after review, Headquarters ruled in his 23 favor, concluding that “staff did violate CDCR policy.” 24 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 25 A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs in Violation of the Eighth 26 Amendment. 27 “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 28 must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1 1096 (9th Cir. 2006), (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). 2 Regarding the objective standard for prisoners’ medical care claims, the Supreme Court 3 of the United States has explained that “[b]ecause society does not expect that prisoners will have 4 unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth 5 Amendment violation only if those needs are ‘serious.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 6 (1992). 7 The Ninth Circuit has defined a “serious medical need” as follows: 8 Failure to treat a prisoner’s condition [that] could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain [;]…[t]he existence of an 9 injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly 10 affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain. 11 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted), overruled 12 on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 13 As to the subjective standard, a prison official or prison medical provider acts with 14 “deliberate indifference” only if “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 15 health or safety[.]” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation 16 and internal quotation marks omitted). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be 17 aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 18 exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 101, 1057 19 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 20 However, “whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a 21 question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from 22 circumstantial evidence,…and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a 23 substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 24 “Indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with 25 medical treatment, or it may be shown in the way in which prison [officials] provide medical 26 care.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he indifference 27 to a [prisoner’s] medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical 28 1 malpractice’ will not support this [claim].” Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 2 1980) (citations omitted). “Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate 3 indifference to serious medical needs.” Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 4 726 F.3d 1062, 1082 (9th Cir. 2013). 5 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations, liberally construed, state a claim for deliberate 6 indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendant 7 Marina Bostanjian. First, as to the objective component, the Court finds that an allergy to 8 Remeron is objectively serious under the Eighth Amendment analysis because Plaintiff alleges it 9 caused a painful rash, making it difficult to walk and move his arms without pain. Thus, it is a 10 “medical condition that significantly affects [Plaintiff’s] daily activities” and causes “chronic or 11 substantial pain…” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 12 Second, construing all facts in favor of Plaintiff, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to 13 infer Defendant’s deliberate indifference to the serious medical need. Plaintiff alleges that 14 Defendant told him she would consult his “file,” which would have revealed his Remeron allergy. 15 Plaintiff knows that his “file” would have revealed his allergy because another nurse told him that 16 the allergy was documented and because his “medication administration report”—which is 17 presumably in his “file”—also documents the Remeron allergy. While it is not clear that 18 Defendant had actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s Remeron allergy as Plaintiff never expressly 19 alleges that Defendant did consult his file, and while the facts uncovered may demonstrate 20 negligence at most, construing the facts liberally in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court will allow the 21 claim to proceed past the screening stage. 22 Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to conclude that Defendant had actual 23 knowledge of the excessive risk that Remeron posed but prescribed it anyway, which is sufficient 24 to state a medical indifference claim. See Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir. 25 2003) (deliberate indifference to medical needs may be shown by circumstantial evidence when 26 the facts are sufficient to demonstrate that defendant actually knew of a risk of harm). 27 \\\ 28 \\\ 1 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 The Court has screened Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and finds that, liberally 3 | construed, it states a cognizable claim against Defendant, Dr. Marina Bostanjian for deliberate 4 | indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 5 As the Court has found that Plaintiff's only claim should proceed past the screening stage, 6 | the Court will, in due course, issue an order authorizing service of process on Dr. Bostanjian. 7 This Amended Order replaces ECF No. 15, which is hereby VACATED. 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 | Dated: __ April 13, 2020 [sf ey i UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28