(PC) Khademi v. Langes ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVOOD KHADEMI, No. 2:19-cv-437-JAM-EFB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 J. LANGES, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff was, at the time this section 1983 action was filed, an inmate housed in the Placer 18 County Jail. ECF No. 1. He has filed a motion for default judgment (ECF No. 21) and defendant 19 has filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 22). For the reasons stated hereafter, both motions should 20 be denied. 21 Motion for Default Judgment 22 Plaintiff argues that default judgment should be entered against defendant Langes because 23 he failed to “answer or otherwise defend” against his complaint. ECF No. 21 at 1. The motion 24 must be denied. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) provides that “[w]hen a party against 25 whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that 26 failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.” Entry of 27 default against a defendant cuts off that defendant’s right to appear in the action or to present 28 evidence. Clifton v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 893, 897 (4th Cir. 1927). Here, defendant has appeared in 1 this action and filed a motion in response to plaintiff's complaint. As such, entry of default 2 judgment is inappropriate and the motion should be denied. 3 Motion to Dismiss 4 Defendant argues that the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, taken as true, fail to state a 5 cognizable excessive force claim. ECF No. 22. More specifically, defendant argues that he is 6 entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 5. By way of background, plaintiff alleges that: 7 [I]n October 2018 and while incarcerated at the Auburn Jail, defendant Langes ordered him to clean the day room area. After 8 cleaning the area, Langes ordered plaintiff to return to his cell. However, the door to plaintiff’s cell was closed and, as a 9 consequence, he informed Langes that he could not comply. Langes allegedly became angry and forcefully restrained plaintiff by 10 pressing him to the floor. Langes allegedly proceeded to place his knee on plaintiff’s back and an arm around his neck. Langes pulled 11 on plaintiff’s neck which, the latter claims, resulted in “internal injuries.” 12 13 ECF No. 12 at 3 (Court’s screening order). 14 Legal Standards 15 I. Motion to Dismiss 16 A complaint may be dismissed under that rule for “failure to state a claim upon which 17 relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 18 state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 19 face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility 20 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 21 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 22 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 23 requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 24 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 25 For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only 26 allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 27 subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light 28 ///// 1 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 2 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal 4 theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 5 at 956. Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the 6 claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-1229 (9th Cir. 1984). 7 Pro se pleadings are held to a less-stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 8 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). However, the Court need not accept as 9 true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual 10 allegations. See Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Western Mining 11 Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). 12 II. Excessive Force 13 Plaintiff claims that, at the time of the incident, he was a pretrial detainee. ECF No. 12 at 14 4. Thus, his excessive force claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth. 15 Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003). The court evaluates claims of 16 excessive force under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard. Id. “‘[T]he 17 ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one; the question is whether 18 the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances 19 confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.’” Id. (quoting Graham 20 v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). “In considering an excessive force claim, [the court] 21 balance[s] ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests 22 against the countervailing government interests at stake.’” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 23 III. Qualified Immunity 24 Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages where a 25 reasonable official would not have known that his conduct violated a clearly established right. 26 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987). In resolving questions of qualified 27 immunity, “courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry.” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 28 (2014) (per curiam). “The first asks whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the 1 party asserting the injury, . . . show the officer's conduct violated a federal right.” Id. (citation 2 and bracketing omitted). “The second prong . . . asks whether the right in question was clearly 3 established at the time of the violation.” Id. at 1866 (citation omitted). 4 A right is “clearly established” when “the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that 5 a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson, 483 6 U.S. at 640. Clearly established law should not be defined “at a high level of generality”; rather, 7 it “must be particularized to the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) 8 (per curiam) (citation omitted). While this standard does not require “a case directly on point,” 9 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011), courts typically should identify analogous cases, 10 i.e., ones in which prison officials “acting under similar circumstances” violated the Eighth 11 Amendment, White, 137 S. Ct. at 552. To be analogous, however, the case need not be 12 “materially similar.” 13 In the Ninth Circuit, to assess whether a right is clearly established, courts first look to 14 “Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit law existing at the time of the alleged act.” Cmty. House, Inc. 15 v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Absent binding precedent, 16 courts should consider all relevant decisional law. Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th 17 Cir. 1985). Unpublished circuit and district court decisions inform the analysis. Bahrampour v. 18 Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2004); Krug v. Lutz, 329 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2003). 19 In the Ninth Circuit, it has long been established that “force is only justified when there is 20 a need for force.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, 21 “officers [may not] use excessive force on an arrestee after he or she has surrendered, or is 22 otherwise helpless, and is under complete control of the officers.” Barnard v. Las Vegas Metro. 23 Police Dep’t, 310 F. App’x 990, 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished memorandum) (citing LaLonde 24 v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 961 (9th Cir. 2000)). 25 Analysis 26 Defendant argues that, taken as true, plaintiff’s allegations establish that “[plaintiff] was 27 taken to the ground, handcuffed, and taken to the booking area for less than one hour prior to 28 being taken to the hospital for medical clearance.” ECF No. 22 at 7. He points to a level two 1 response to plaintiff’s administrative grievance as evidence that “[p]laintiff disobeyed multiple 2 orders and actively resisted being handcuffed.” Id. But the account contained in the defendants’ 3 grievance response is at odds with the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint. Thus, dismissal on that 4 basis is inappropriate. See, e.g., Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5 28, 2007) (“Defendants also contend that the written response to Plaintiff’s administrative 6 grievance shows that prison officials complied with Keyhea procedures. . . . Those facts are flatly 7 contradicted by Plaintiff’s allegation that prison staff failed to follow Keyhea procedure. This 8 Court cannot resolve this issue in Defendants’ favor unless they can present conclusive evidence 9 that they made a good-faith attempt to follow Keyhea protocol.”). In the body of the complaint, 10 plaintiff clearly alleges that defendant asked him to do the impossible – to re-enter his cell while 11 the door was closed. ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff goes on to claim that he was not “acting 12 disruptively” when defendant forced him onto the floor, hand-cuffed him, and forcefully pulled 13 plaintiff’s neck three times in a manner that caused him to sustain internal injuries.1 Id. Thus, 14 accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, which must be done on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, there 15 was no justification defendant’s use of force and he is not entitled to qualified immunity at this 16 stage of the proceedings.2 17 Conclusion 18 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 19 1. Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default (ECF No. 21) be DENIED; and 20 ///// 21 ///// 22 1 Defendant also alleges that the complaint is “very light on facts.” ECF No. 22 at 9. As 23 the court previously found in its screening order, however, the facts are sufficient to state an excessive force claim. Plaintiff clearly alleges that defendant made an unreasonable request (to 24 enter a closed cell), that plaintiff did not engage in any disruptive behavior, and that defendant used unjustified force in subduing him. And courts do not hold pro se litigants to a high pleading 25 standard. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (Allegations of a pro se litigant’s 26 complaint are to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). 27 2 Obviously this finding does not preclude a future summary judgment motion which, supported by material outside the four corners of the complaint, conclusively establishes that 28 defendant used only the force necessary to maintain order. 2 VETO EVAN ER □□□ IR eee PAY VI 1 2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 22) be DENIED. 2 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 3 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 4 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 5 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 6 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 7 || within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 8 | Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 9 | Dated: April 21, 2020. 10 tid, PDEA i EDMUND F. BRENNAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28