Brooke v. Cosumnes River Land LLC ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THERESA BROOKE, a married No. 2:19-cv-02533-MCE-AC woman dealing with her sole and 12 separate claim, 13 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 14 v. 15 COSUMNES RIVER LAND LLC, a Delaware limited liability company dba 16 The Murieta Inn and Spa, 17 Defendant. 18 19 Plaintiff Theresa Brooke (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action against Defendant 20 Cosumnes River Land LLC (“Defendant”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for 21 violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. 22 (“ADA”) and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code §§ 51, et seq. 23 (“Unruh Act”). ECF No. 5. Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 24 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for 25 failure to state a claim for relief. ECF No. 6. For the reasons set forth below, 26 Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.1 27 1 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 28 submitted on the briefs. E.D. Local Rule 230(g). 1 BACKGROUND2 2 3 Plaintiff is a resident of Pinal County, Arizona, and is legally disabled and confined 4 to a wheelchair. She and her husband are avid travelers to California and Plaintiff has 5 an office in San Jose. Plaintiff and her husband plan to visit the Sacramento and Central 6 Valley area over the next several months for purposes of travel, testing ADA compliance, 7 court-related hearings, conferences, and site inspections. Because of Plaintiff’s many 8 special needs, she requires the use of lodging rooms that are accessible to her and have 9 standard accessibility features such as roll-in showers, adequate spacing of the furniture, 10 and grab bars surrounding the toilet. 11 In anticipation of her trip, Plaintiff visited the website of the Murieta Inn and Spa 12 (the “Hotel”) to rent a room and to check compliance with disability access rules.3 13 According to Plaintiff, the Hotel offers two types of suites called the Premium Suite and 14 Signature Suite, one of which Plaintiff wanted to rent because of the larger living space 15 and amenities.4 The website indicates which rooms are ADA accessible, but Plaintiff 16 states that only the standard rooms are ADA accessible, not the suites. As a result, 17 Plaintiff was deterred from reserving a room and will not visit the Hotel until Defendant 18 makes such rooms available for disabled persons. 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 2 The following recitation of facts is taken, sometimes verbatim, from Plaintiff’s FAC. ECF No. 6. 25 3 Defendant owns the land on which the Hotel is located but it does not own, operate, or conduct business as the Hotel. FAC ¶ 2; Def.’s Mem. ISO Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 6-1, at 1. 26 4 Defendant states that the Hotel offers five room types: (1) Classic Room (standard room), 27 (2) Premium Room, (3) Signature Room, (4) Signature Suite, and (5) Parlor. Def.’s Mem. ISO Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 6-1, at 1. Contrary to the Complaint, Defendant says the Hotel does not offer a 28 Premium Suite. Id. at 2. 1 STANDARD 2 3 A. Rule 12(b)(1) 4 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are presumptively without 5 jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 6 377 (1994). The burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 7 jurisdiction. Id. Because subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s power to hear a 8 case, it can never be forfeited or waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 9 (2002). Accordingly, lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by either party at 10 any point during the litigation, through a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 11 Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).5 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also 12 Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Cnty. of Plumas, 559 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 13 2009). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may also be raised by the district court sua 14 sponte. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Indeed, “courts 15 have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, 16 even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) 17 (requiring the court to dismiss the action if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking). 18 There are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: a 19 facial attack and a factual attack. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 20 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, a party may either make an attack on the 21 allegations of jurisdiction contained in the nonmoving party’s complaint, or may 22 challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, despite the formal 23 sufficiency of the pleadings. Id. 24 When a party makes a facial attack on a complaint, the attack is unaccompanied 25 by supporting evidence, and it challenges jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings. 26 Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). If the motion to 27 5 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 28 otherwise noted. 1 dismiss constitutes a facial attack, the court must consider the factual allegations of the 2 complaint to be true and determine whether they establish subject matter jurisdiction. 3 Savage v. Glendale High Union Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.1 (9th Cir. 4 2003). In the case of a facial attack, the motion to dismiss is granted only if the 5 nonmoving party fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 6 However, in the case of a factual attack, district courts “may review evidence beyond the 7 complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” 8 Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 9 In the case of a factual attack, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s 10 allegations.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733 (internal citation omitted). The party opposing 11 the motion has the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction does exist and must 12 present any necessary evidence to satisfy this burden. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 13 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). If the plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdictional facts are 14 challenged by the adversary in the appropriate manner, the plaintiff cannot rest on the 15 mere assertion that factual issues may exist. Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Ind., 16 Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Touche 17 Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1976)). Furthermore, the district court may 18 review any evidence necessary, including affidavits and testimony, in order to determine 19 whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 20 (9th Cir. 1988); Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. If the nonmoving party fails to meet its 21 burden and the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must 22 dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 23 However, “jurisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is inappropriate when 24 the jurisdictional issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of 25 jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits of an 26 action.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (internal citations and quotations 27 omitted). “The question of jurisdiction and the merits of an action are intertwined where 28 a statute provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court 1 and the plaintiff’s substantive claim for relief.” Id. at 1039–40 (internal citations and 2 quotations omitted). 3 “A court may not resolve genuinely disputed facts where ‘the question of 4 jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits.’” 5 Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Augustine v. United 6 States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983)). “In such a case, the district court assumes 7 the truth of the allegations in a complaint . . . unless controverted by undisputed facts in 8 the record.” Id. “Dismissal is then appropriate where it appears beyond doubt that the 9 plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 10 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). “This standard, often cited in Rule 12(b)(6) 11 motions, . . . is equally applicable in motions challenging subject matter jurisdiction when 12 such jurisdiction may be contingent upon factual matters in dispute.” Id. If, after this 13 threshold inquiry, subject matter jurisdiction is not precluded, the Court may entertain 14 arguments “on either a motion going to the merits [i.e., a summary judgment motion,] or 15 at trial.” Id. at 1178. 16 B. Rule 12(b)(6) 17 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 18 Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 19 construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 20 Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain 21 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the 22 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell 23 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 24 47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 25 detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of 26 his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 27 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 28 quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 1 couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 2 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 3 above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & 4 Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the 5 pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a 6 suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)). 7 Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 8 assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and 9 quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 10 to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 11 the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing Wright & 12 Miller, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to 13 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their 14 claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” 15 Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge 16 that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and 17 unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 18 C. Leave to Amend 19 A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 20 grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 21 “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 22 to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 23 amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 24 Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 25 be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 26 merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 27 carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 28 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 1 “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, 2 Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 3 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 4 1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 5 constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)). 6 7 ANALYSIS 8 9 A. First Cause of Action: Violation of Title III of ADA 10 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim on two grounds: (1) Plaintiff 11 lacks standing to sue because she does not allege an injury-in-fact, and (2) Plaintiff fails 12 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because Defendant did not commit 13 any violations under Title III of the ADA or the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible 14 Design (“2010 ADA Standards”). Def.’s Mem. ISO Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 6-1, at 4. 15 Both grounds center on the same inquiry of whether Plaintiff has suffered an injury. 16 Because the jurisdictional inquiry and the merits are fundamentally intertwined, review of 17 Defendant’s Motion under the typical Rule 12(b)(1) standard applicable to factual 18 motions would not be proper. Thus, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC under 19 Rule 12(b)(1) is DENIED and the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s ADA claim under 20 Rule 12(b)(6). 21 Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated § 224.5 of the 2010 ADA Standards by failing 22 to “provide comparable room-type choices for disabled persons as it does for able- 23 bodied persons.” FAC ¶ 15. Section 224.5 provides that guest rooms with mobility 24 features “shall be dispersed among the various classes of guest rooms and shall provide 25 choices of types of guest rooms, number of beds, and other amenities comparable to the 26 choices provided to other guests.” Both Plaintiff and Defendant agree that § 224.5 does 27 not require Defendant to offer an accessible and non-accessible version of the same 28 room type to its guests. Def.s’ Mem. ISO Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 6-1, at 7–8; Pl.s’ Opp., VASO VEEP IVINS ENN IVETE PY □□□ □□ 1 | ECF No. 10, at 5. Instead, Plaintiff argues that Defendant does not provide comparable 2 | accessible rooms to the inaccessible Premium and Signature Suites. Pl.’s Opp., ECF 3 | No. 10, at5. Taking Plaintiff's allegations as true, the Hotel does not offer comparable 4 | accessible rooms and as such, Plaintiff adequately pleads a viable cause of action under 5 | the ADA and § 224.5 of the 2010 ADA Standards. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to 6 | Dismiss Plaintiff's First Cause of Action under Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED.® 7 B. | Second Cause of Action: Violation of Unruh Act 8 A violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act, but the Unruh 9 | Act applies only to “persons within the jurisdiction of this state.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b), 10 | (f) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff is a resident of Arizona which is where she 11 || accessed the Hotel’s website. See Brooke v. RIHH LP, Case No. 19-cv-06852-SI, 2020 12 | WL 788889, at *5 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020) (finding the “alleged injury occurs where 13 | the plaintiff visited that website”). Because the Unruh Act only applies to injuries that 14 | occur in California, Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action is DISMISSED without leave to 15 | amend. 16 17 CONCLUSION 18 19 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6, is 20 | GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. This action shall proceed on Plaintiff's First 21 | Cause of Action. 22 IT 1S SO ORDERED. 23 | Dated: April 28, 2020 24 UNITED STATES DISTRI 26 27 § In ruling on the Motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court finds it premature to consider the 28 Declaration of Nicholas Brent Larkin. ECF Nos. 6-2, 6-3.