(PS) Mead v. Williams ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT M. MEAD, No. 2:20-cv-0578 TLN DB PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 14 CAROLYN INEZ WILLIAMS, 15 Defendant. 16 17 On March 17, 2020, plaintiff Robert Mead commenced this action by filing a complaint 18 and paying the applicable filing fee. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Accordingly, 19 the matter has been referred to the undersigned for all purposes encompassed by Local Rule 20 302(c)(21). Plaintiff’s complaint concerns the parties’ settlement of their March 8, 2005 divorce 21 proceedings in the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 1-8.) 22 Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry that must precede the adjudication of any case before 23 the district court. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 24 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may adjudicate 25 only those cases authorized by federal law. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 26 377 (1994); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992). “Federal courts are presumed 27 to lack jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 28 //// 1 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 2 546 (1986)). 3 Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the court at any time during the 4 proceedings. Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 5 1996). A federal court “ha[s] an independent obligation to address sua sponte whether [it] has 6 subject-matter jurisdiction.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). It is the 7 obligation of the district court “to be alert to jurisdictional requirements.” Grupo Dataflux v. 8 Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004). Without jurisdiction, the district court 9 cannot decide the merits of a case or order any relief. See Morongo, 858 F.2d at 1380. 10 The basic federal jurisdiction statutes are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, which confer 11 “federal question” and “diversity” jurisdiction, respectively. Federal jurisdiction may also be 12 conferred by federal statutes regulating specific subject matter. “[T]he existence of federal 13 jurisdiction depends solely on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses to 14 those claims.” ARCO Envtl. Remediation, LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 15 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). 16 District courts have diversity jurisdiction only over “all civil actions where the matter in 17 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” and the action 18 is between: “(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a 19 foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are 20 additional parties; and (4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different 21 States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “To demonstrate citizenship for diversity purposes a party must (a) be 22 a citizen of the United States, and (b) be domiciled in a state of the United States.” Lew v. Moss, 23 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). “Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between 24 the parties-each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff.” In re 25 Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litigation, 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). 26 Moreover, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine a federal district court is precluded from 27 hearing “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court 28 judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court 1 review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 2 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies not only to final state court orders 3 and judgments, but to interlocutory orders and non-final judgments issued by a state court as well. 4 Doe & Assoc. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); Worldwide 5 Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986). 6 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits “a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state 7 court,” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003), and “may also apply where the parties 8 do not directly contest the merits of a state court decision, as the doctrine prohibits a federal 9 district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a 10 state court judgment.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A suit brought in federal district court is a ‘de facto appeal’ 12 forbidden by Rooker-Feldman when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 13 erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that 14 decision.’” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d 15 at 1164); see also Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman 16 doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a proceeding in 17 ‘which a party losing in state court’ seeks ‘what in substance would be appellate review of the 18 state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state 19 judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’”) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 20 997, 1005-06 (1994), cert. denied 547 U .S. 1111 (2006)). “Thus, even if a plaintiff seeks relief 21 from a state court judgment, such a suit is a forbidden de facto appeal only if the plaintiff also 22 alleges a legal error by the state court.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). 23 [A] federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court 24 must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is 25 ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision. 26 27 Doe, 415 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158); see also Exxon, 544 U.S. at 286 n. 1 (“a 28 district court [cannot] entertain constitutional claims attacking a state-court judgment, even if the 1 state court had not passed directly on those claims, when the constitutional attack [is] 2 ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 3 16)); Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898, 900 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (“claims raised in the 4 federal court action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such that the 5 adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to 6 interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16, 7 485). 8 Here, the complaint alleges that “the State courts refused to consider or dispose the issue 9 of subject-matter jurisdiction that was fraudulently acquired and the state courts have resisted in 10 hearing collateral attacks on subject matter jurisdiction[.]” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 9.) 11 Moreover, it appears from documents attached to the complaint and the undersigned’s research 12 that plaintiff has repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged the judgment in the Sacramento 13 County Superior Court action. See In re Marriage of Mead and Williams-Mead, CO82278, 2019 14 WL 1417159, at *1 (Cal. App. 3 Dist., Mar. 29, 2019) (“The divorce settlement spawned lengthy, 15 acrimonious litigation, including three prior appeals to this court.”); In re Marriage of Mead and 16 Williams-Mead, C073814, 2014 WL 3866012, at *1 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. Aug. 6, 2014) (“After 17 nearly 10 years of unsuccessful litigation against his ex-wife, a vexatious lawyer now asserts the 18 trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order him to pay attorney fees following his 19 last appeal.”). 20 In this regard, it appears that plaintiff is a state court loser and is now inviting this court to 21 review and reject those judgments. And disputes over marital dissolution fall squarely within the 22 Rooker-Feldman bar. See, e.g., Moor v. Cnty. of Butte, 547 Fed. Appx. 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2013) 23 (affirming dismissal of suit concerning state court divorce and child custody proceedings on 24 Rooker-Feldman grounds); Gomez v. San Diego Family Ct., 388 Fed. Appx. 685 (9th Cir. 2010) 25 (affirming dismissal of state court custody decision on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Sareen v. 26 Sareen, 356 Fed. Appx. 977 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of action alleging constitutional 27 violation in state court child custody action on Rooker-Feldman grounds). 28 //// wOAOe 2 OU POUT RINGER POMOC eT OY VI 1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within thirty days of the date of this order 2 | plaintiff shall show cause in writing as to why this action should not be dismissed due to a lack of 3 | subject matter jurisdiction. 4 | Dated: May 5, 2020 5 6 4 ORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 DLB:6 22 || DB/orders/orders.pro se/mead0578.jx.osc 23 24 25 26 27 28