(HC) Maine v. Martinez ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSEPH HASKELL MAINE, Case No. 1:20-cv-00303-NONE-JDP 12 Petitioner, ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 13 v. ECF No. 6 14 NDOH, ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S 15 Respondent. MOTION FOR A STAY AND ABEYANCE OF PETITION 16 ECF No. 7 17 18 Petitioner Joseph Haskell Maine, a state prisoner without counsel, seeks a writ of habeas 19 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. On April 15, 2020, we ordered petitioner to show 20 cause why his petition should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust two of his claims at the 21 state-level. ECF No. 6. On May 4, 2020, petitioner moved for a stay and abeyance to exhaust his 22 claims. ECF No. 7. For good cause shown, we will discharge our order to show cause and grant 23 petitioner’s motion for a stay and abeyance. 24 Discussion 25 Petitioner seeks a stay and abeyance under the Rhines procedure. See Rhines v. Weber, 26 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). “Staying a federal habeas petition frustrates AEDPA’s objective of 27 encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to delay the resolution of the federal proceedings. It 28 also undermines AEDPA’s goal of streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a 1 petitioner’s incentive to exhaust all his claims in state court prior to filing his federal petition.” 2 Id. Therefore, a “stay and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances. Id. Under 3 Rhines, a stay and abeyance is available only where: (1) there is “good cause” for the failure to 4 exhaust; (2) the unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless”; and (3) the petitioner did not 5 intentionally engage in dilatory litigation tactics. 544 U.S. at 277-78. 6 “There is little authority on what constitutes good cause to excuse a petitioner’s failure to 7 exhaust.” Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2014). Good cause under Rhines does not 8 require a showing of “extraordinary circumstances,” Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661-62 (9th 9 Cir. 2005), however, a petitioner must do more than simply assert that he was “under the 10 impression” that his claim was exhausted, Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 11 2008). “[T]he first element of the Rhines test can easily be established to the extent that 12 [petitioner was] without counsel” during his post-conviction proceedings. Dixon v. Baker, 847 13 F.3d 714, 722 (9th Cir. 2017). “A petitioner who is without counsel in state post-conviction 14 proceedings cannot be expected to understand the technical requirements of exhaustion and 15 should not be denied the opportunity to exhaust a potentially meritorious claim simply because he 16 lacked counsel.” Id. at 721. Here, petitioner was without counsel during his state post-conviction 17 collateral proceedings. ECF No. 1 at 13. In support of his motion, petitioner states that he 18 “lacked understanding that [he] was able to take [his] habeas petition to the Court of Appeal.” 19 ECF No. 7 at 1. Considering petitioner’s pro se status, we cannot expect petitioner to have 20 understood the technical requirements of exhaustion. Therefore, we find that petitioner has 21 demonstrated good cause for his failure to exhaust. 22 Moreover, petitioner’s unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless.” First, petitioner 23 seeks to exhaust his claim that the cumulative effect of trial court instructional errors requires 24 reversal. ECF No. 1 at 8. Habeas relief for cumulative trial error may lie where, “although no 25 single trial error examined in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the 26 cumulative effect of multiple errors [has] still prejudiced a defendant.” United States v. 27 Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996). Second, petitioner claims that one of the jurors in 28 his trial, a family member of the victim, was biased against him. ECF No. 1 at 10. The Sixth wOAOe □□ □□ VEIN INE VE MMIC OPO ee OY VI 1 | Amendment guarantees a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors to criminal defendants and jurors 2 | should be “capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it.” Smith v. 3 | Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). Because both of petitioner’s unexhausted claims are 4 | cognizable on federal habeas review, they are not plainly meritless. 5 Finally, we have no reason to believe that petitioner engaged in “dilatory litigation 6 || tactics,” such as “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. 7 | Upon receiving our order to show cause, petitioner expeditiously filed a new habeas petition in 8 || the California Court of Appeal in an effort to exhaust his remaining claims. ECF No. 7 at 1. 9 Therefore, petitioner has met the requirements of Rhines and we will grant his motion to 10 || stay and hold in abeyance his petition until his remaining claims are exhausted at the state-level. 11 | Order 12 1. The April 15, 2020 order to show cause is discharged. ECF No. 6. 13 2. Petitioner’s motion for a stay and abeyance of his petition is granted. ECF No. 7. 14 3. Petitioner is directed to file a motion to lift the stay within 30 days of the California 15 Supreme Court issuing a final order resolving petitioner’s unexhausted claims. 16 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 ( Caan Dated: _ May 11, 2020 19 UNI STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 | No. 206. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28