Estate of James Barrick v. Moore ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THE ESTATE OF JAMES BARRICK No. 2:18-cv-02216-MCE-DB and PAMELA TAYLOR, individually 12 and as successor in interest to the Estate of James Barrick, 13 Plaintiffs, 14 v. ORDER 15 THE COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, THE SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY 16 SHERRIF’S OFFICE, CINDY BORGES and JOHNNIE MORRIS, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Through the present lawsuit, the Estate of James Barrick along with James 20 Barrick’s mother, Pamela Taylor (“Plaintiffs”) seek damages for civil rights violations, 21 including cruel and unusual punishment, lack of due process, and equal protection 22 violations, as a result of the suicide of James Barrick (“Decedent”) while a pretrial 23 detainee of San Joaquin County on October 1, 2017. Plaintiffs also allege concurrent 24 state law claims. 25 Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Complaint in this 26 matter pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a).1 Plaintiffs’ original lawsuit 27 1 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 28 otherwise noted. 1 was filed on August 24, 2018. The Court’s Initial Scheduling Order, issued that same 2 day, called for fact discovery to be completed within 365 days, or by August 24, 2019. 3 ECF No. 3. On July 8, 2019, both parties lodged a stipulation with the Court which 4 requested, inter alia, that discovery be extended to November 14, 2019, due to the 5 heavy trial schedule of both counsel and the need to take multiple out-of-district 6 depositions. ECF No. 10. That Stipulation was approved by the Court on July 19, 2019, 7 Plaintiffs filed the motion now before the Court, which seeks to name two individuals, 8 Cindy Borges and Johnnie Morris, as additional defendants, on October 31, 2019, prior 9 to the extended deadline for completion of fact discovery. ECF No. 14. 10 Plaintiffs’ initial Complaint named only Sheriff Steve Moore as an individual 11 Defendant in addition to the County of San Joaquin and the San Joaquin County 12 Sheriff’s Department. According to Plaintiffs, it was only through discovery that they 13 gained an understanding of the individuals involved in the care and monitoring of 14 Decedent prior to his death, the applicable role of each individual, and the policies that 15 guided their actions. Plaintiffs’ proposed First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) deletes 16 Sheriff Moore as a party to the lawsuit, but as indicated above seeks to add Borges and 17 Morris as Defendants. 18 With respect to Ms. Borges, Plaintiff Taylor admits she talked to Ms. Borges 19 before her son’s suicide, with Borges allegedly assuring Taylor that the jail already “knew 20 about” her son and presumably the risk that incarceration posed given his suicidal 21 tendencies. Plaintiffs assert, however, that they were not aware until well after suit was 22 filed of the County’s “operational policy applicable in scenarios where a family member 23 alerted jail staff to a detainee’s risk for suicidal behavior.” Pls.’ Reply, 2: 6-10. It was 24 only after “gaining a full understanding“ of such policies and procedures, which 25 apparently included failure to house individuals in a suicide-proof cell and take other 26 precautionary measures even in the wake of such information, that Plaintiffs deemed it 27 necessary to add Ms. Borges as a Defendant. 28 /// 1 As to Johnnie Morris, while the County’s November 6, 2018 Initial Disclosure 2 under Rule 26(a)(1) listed Morris as an individual with information relevant to this lawsuit, 3 that Disclosure described him as only “present during resuscitation attempts.” See Ex. A 4 to the Declaration of Mark Berry, ECF No. 18-1. Plaintiffs assert there was no mention 5 that Morris was the correctional officer responsible for monitoring Decedent during the 6 last hours of his life. Plaintiffs subsequently learned, apparently through discovery, that 7 Morris had allegedly failed to properly monitor Decedent by checking on him periodically. 8 This conduct, according to the proposed FAC, was inconsistent with written 9 departmental policy for checking on sleeping inmates/detainees during the early morning 10 hours when Decedent’s suicide occurred. FAC, ¶ 22. Plaintiffs assert that had the 11 County’s written policies been followed by Morris, and if Decedent had been monitored 12 as he should have been, his death could have been prevented. Id. at ¶ 18. In essence, 13 Plaintiffs assert that adding Morris (as well as Borges) became evident once they were 14 “able to compare formal county policy with the deposition testimony of key individuals.” 15 Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 19, 3:25-27. 16 In opposing the Motion, counsel for the County Defendants, while not objecting to 17 Sheriff Moore’s dismissal, does take issue with amending the lawsuit at this juncture to 18 add Borges and Morris. Defense counsel asserts, as discussed above, that Plaintiffs 19 had long known the identities of Borges and Morris and have failed to justify their delay 20 in not moving to amend earlier. The County further asserts that it would be prejudicial to 21 add those individuals now since doing so may necessitate the retention of additional 22 experts to testify as to the appropriate standard of care.2 23 Rule 15(a), under which Plaintiff’s Motion is brought, provides that “leave [to 24 amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The policy 25 of favoring amendments to pleadings, as evinced by Rule 15(a), “should be applied with 26 extreme liberality.” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981). Once a 27 2 The County further asserts that amendment would be futile in any event because Borges and Morris are purportedly entitled to qualified immunity. That argument, however, is a substantive matter 28 going to the merits beyond the purview of whether amendment should be permitted in the first place. 1 district court has filed a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to Rule 16, that Rule’s 2 standards control. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 3 (9th Cir. 1992). Prior to the final pretrial conference in this matter, which has not yet 4 been scheduled before the undersigned, the Court can modify its scheduling order upon 5 a showing of “good cause.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). 6 As indicated above, the Court issued its Pretrial Scheduling Order on August 24, 7 2018, the same day Plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed. One could therefore argue that on a 8 technical basis Plaintiffs have to satisfy the more rigorous “good cause” standard under 9 Rule 16(b) despite the fact that the Court’s Scheduling Order was issued at the very 10 onset of the case, and further provided no restriction upon the parties’ initial ability to 11 amend their pleadings. Nonetheless, because the Court believes that Plaintiffs have 12 satisfied the “good cause” standard in any event, any distinction between Rule 15(a) and 13 Rule 16(b) is of no moment in this particular matter. 14 “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy, which focuses on the bad faith of 15 the party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party, 16 Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking 17 the amendment.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. In explaining this standard, the Ninth 18 Circuit has stated that: 19 [A] district court may modify the pretrial schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking 20 the extension.” Moreover, carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of 21 relief. Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply additional 22 reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. If that party 23 was not diligent, the inquiry should end. 24 Id. (citations omitted). 25 In the present matter it appears that Plaintiffs have exercised the required 26 diligence. Due to the trial schedule of counsel for both parties, as well as the number of 27 depositions involved, it appears both parties realized discovery had to be extended and 28 therefore stipulated to continue fact discovery from August 14, 2019 to November 4, wOoU 2.40 UV WY RED MMIC CO PCM VA heer OY VI 1 | 2019. Although not completely clear from the papers submitted, given that stipulation 2 | most of the necessary discovery was probably completed after July 19, 2019, when the 3 | Court approved the parties’ requested extension. The deposition of Plaintiff Taylor, for 4 | example, was not taken by defense counsel until November 8, 2019, just days before 5 || discovery was scheduled to close. 6 Plaintiffs filed the present motion on October 31, 2019, some two weeks prior to 7 | the November 14, 2019 discovery cutoff, after discovery obtained during the previous 8 || months showed the alleged culpability of Borges and Morris as indicated above. Under 9 || the circumstances present, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs were not suitably 10 | diligent. Nor is the Court persuaded by the only alleged prejudice identified by Plaintiffs 11 | in permitting the amendment, since, as Plaintiffs point out, expert analysis as to the 12 || standard of care applicable to both Morris and Borges would probably have been 13 || necessary in any event with respect to already existing claims against the County for 14 | negligent supervision. 15 For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 14) 16 | is therefore GRANTED.® Plaintiffs are directed to file their Proposed First Amended 17 || Complaint not later than ten (10) days after the date this Order is electronically filed. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 | Dated: May 12, 2020 20 UNITED STATES DISTRI 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 submitted se ora armen wou eS Oo assistance, the Court ordered this matter