Tornincasa v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DIANE R. TORNINCASA, No. 2:19-cv-02002-MCE-KJN 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF BOSTON, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff Diane R. Tornincasa (“Plaintiff”) brings this suit against Defendant Liberty 19 Life Assurance Company of Boston (“Defendant”) stating claims arising out of the denial 20 of disability benefits. In response to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendant filed an Answer 21 asserting a number of affirmative defenses, several of which Plaintiff now moves to 22 strike. ECF Nos. 7, 9. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is 23 DENIED.1 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 1 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 28 submitted on the briefs. E.D. Local Rule 230(g). 1 ANALYSIS 2 3 At the outset, the Court notes that the parties have narrowed the matters in 4 dispute since the filing of Plaintiff’s Motion, by which she sought to strike Defendant’s 5 first through fifth and seventh affirmative defenses and to deem admitted paragraphs 11, 6 76, 80, 102, and 110 in her Complaint. Defendant has now withdrawn its first five 7 defenses, and Plaintiff concedes that Defendant’s answer to paragraph 11 is proper. 8 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as moot as to those issues. Plaintiff’s 9 remaining arguments are addressed in turn. 10 A. Motion to Strike Seventh Affirmative Defense (Unclean Hands) 11 An affirmative defense is an “assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will 12 defeat the plaintiff’s [] claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Black’s 13 Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Plaintiff makes her motion under Federal Rule of Civil 14 Procedure 12(f),2 which allows a party to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense 15 or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 16 Plaintiff contends that the heightened pleading standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 17 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), applies to 18 affirmative defenses. However, this Court has already held that Kohler v. Flava Enters., 19 779 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2015) resolves the issue of which pleading standard applies to 20 affirmative defenses: “[T]his Court now applies the ‘fair notice’ standard, and not the 21 heightened pleading standard announced in Twombly and Iqbal, when evaluating 22 motions to strike affirmative defenses.” Edwards v. Cty. of Modoc, No. 2:14-cv-02646- 23 MCE-KJN, 2015 WL 4456180, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2015). This is because the Ninth 24 Circuit explained in Kohler that “the ‘fair notice’ required by the pleading standards only 25 requires describing the defense in ‘general terms.’” Kohler, 779 F.3d at 1019 (quoting 26 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1274 (3d ed. 27 2 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 28 otherwise noted. 1 1998)). Plaintiff provides no reasons for why this Court’s prior interpretation of Kohler is 2 incorrect, and therefore the Court analyzes Plaintiff’s motion under the “fair notice” 3 standard. 4 In its seventh affirmative defense, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims are 5 barred under the doctrine of unclean hands. “This statement, despite being vague and 6 general, does put Plaintiff on notice of Defendant’s intentions to claim an affirmative 7 defense under the doctrine of unclean hands.” Springer v. Fair Isaac Corp., 8 No. 14-CV-02238-TLN-AC, 2015 WL 7188234, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015). 9 Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s seventh affirmative defense is 10 DENIED. 11 B. Motion to Deem Paragraphs 76, 80, 102, and 110 Admitted 12 The Court concludes that each of Defendant’s responses is appropriate and the 13 allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be deemed admitted. Defendant 14 appropriately responded to Paragraphs 80, 102, and 110 by noting that “[Defendant] 15 submits that [the paragraph] consists of legal conclusions to which no response is 16 required. To the extent any facts are alleged, [Defendant] denies.” Def.’s Answer, ECF 17 No. 7. That is all that is required. See Li v. A Perfect Franchise, Inc., No. 5:10-cv-01189 18 LHK, 2011 WL 2971046, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2011) (“Where defendants deny factual 19 allegations in addition to identifying legal conclusions, Ninth Circuit district courts 20 generally decline to strike defendants' answers.”). Nor is Defendant’s response to 21 Paragraph 76 insufficient, which very clearly denied the allegation that “Plaintiff . . . has 22 performed all conditions precedent on Plaintiff’s part to be performed under the terms of 23 The Policy.” Whether conditions have been performed is central to resolution of the 24 case and thus the denial is appropriate. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// VAIS VMOU EUINI LENG MMVII AOI OT EN PAYS ST Mt 1 CONCLUSION 2 3 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (ECF No. 9) is DENIED. 4 IT |S SO ORDERED. 5 | Dated: May 19, 2020 7 MORRISON C. ENGLAND, J UNITED STATES DISTRI 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28