(PC) Antilia v. Mansdorfer ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ANTHONY ANTILIA, Case No. 1:20-cv-00298-NONE-EPG (PC) 11 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 12 v. RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 13 A. MANSDORFER, et al., CLAIM 14 Defendants. (ECF NO. 1) 15 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 16 TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS 17 Anthony Antilia (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 18 in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the complaint 19 commencing this action on February 27, 2020. (ECF No. 1). 20 The Court screened the complaint and found that it failed to state any cognizable 21 claims. (ECF No. 8). The Court provided Plaintiff with applicable legal standards, explained 22 why Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim, and gave Plaintiff leave to file a First 23 Amended Complaint. (Id.). The Court also gave Plaintiff the option of standing on his 24 complaint, subject to the Court issuing findings and recommendations to a district judge 25 consistent with the screening order. (Id. at 9). 26 On May 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed a notice, notifying the Court that he wants to stand on 27 his complaint. (ECF No. 9). Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the Court 28 recommends that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 1 Plaintiff has twenty-one days from the date of service of these findings and 2 recommendations to file his objections. 3 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 6 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 7 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 8 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915A(b)(1), (2). As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 5), the Court may 10 also screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 11 portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 12 determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 13 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 14 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 15 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 16 not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 17 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 18 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 19 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 20 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 21 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts 22 “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 23 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a 24 plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 25 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 26 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 27 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 28 \\\ 1 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 2 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges as follows: 3 On or about August 26, 2019, while Plaintiff was at work at his CDCR mandated job 4 assignment, Plaintiff was moving inventory around when he noticed a sharp pain in his right 5 foot. This pain caused him to limp. He went to his supervisor (not a defendant) who noticed 6 the limp. The supervisor made no comments, nor did he file an “incident report.” Plaintiff 7 finished the day in pain. 8 Plaintiff was made to work this way for several days. Then, with noticeable swelling, 9 another officer personally walked Plaintiff to prison medical to get the foot examined. 10 Upon arrival, one of the nurses, Defendant Jane Doe, did a cursory examination and 11 stated “you probably just sprained it.” However, she also called Defendant Owolabi. 12 Defendant Owolabi told nurse Defendant Jane Doe to x-ray the foot. The x-ray came back 13 positive for a foot fracture. 14 Nevertheless, Defendant Owolabi never ordered a “medical lay-in,” i.e., an excuse from 15 work, or gave Plaintiff crutches. All that was given to Plaintiff was some type of oversized 16 shoe that goes on the bottom of a walking cast. Plaintiff had to put it on himself and was still in 17 pain. 18 Plaintiff was forced to work this way for 17 days. Each day when Plaintiff went to pick 19 up medication for his back, he tried to get a “lay-in” and other attention. But other Jane Doe 20 nurse defendants ignored his pleas for help. 21 Finally, on September 10, 2019, Plaintiff was taken by prison officials to an outside 22 medical provider, i.e., a hospital. A “true” medical doctor ordered x-rays and discovered that 23 the broken bone had grown larger in size due to mistreatment in the crack. Also, there was 24 another fracture apparent in the original x-ray, which Defendant Owolabi had missed. 25 Once Plaintiff returned to prison, Plaintiff was provided with a medical lay-in, given 26 crutches, and told to stay off the foot with no weight bearing at all. 27 Defendant U. Baniga was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by not 28 ordering staff at his prison to treat Plaintiff, or for that matter for not ordering proper medical 1 equipment for Plaintiff’s foot in any way. 2 While all this was taking place, Plaintiff filed a “CDCR Medical 602.” The Appeals 3 Staff, A. Mansdorfer, interviewed Plaintiff. She did nothing except downplay Plaintiff’s injury. 4 She stated that she hated her job. Plaintiff asked about getting a cast or something more than 5 the oversized soft shoe, but was denied. 6 Additionally, Ms. Thomas discontinued the medication Plaintiff was taking for his back 7 disease, which is Ankylosing Spondylitis, without ever interviewing or consulting with 8 Plaintiff. Defendant Owolabi did not intervene. 9 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS 10 A. Section 1983 11 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: 12 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 13 causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 14 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 15 injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... 16 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 17 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 18 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see 19 also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los 20 Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 21 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 22 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 23 under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 24 Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 25 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 26 “under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the 27 meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or 28 1 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 2 complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th 3 Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite 4 causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others 5 which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional 6 harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of 7 causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” 8 Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 9 of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 10 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 11 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual 12 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have 13 been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 14 658, 691, 695 (1978). 15 B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs in Violation of the Eighth 16 Amendment 17 “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 18 inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 19 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires 20 Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a 21 prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 22 infliction of pain,’” and (2) that “the defendant's response to the need was deliberately 23 indifferent.” Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation 24 and internal quotations marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies v. 25 Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). 26 Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of 27 and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 28 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 1 Deliberate indifference can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to 2 respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” 3 Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted). Civil recklessness (failure “to act in the face of an 4 unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known”) is 5 insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 6 836-37 & n.5 (1994) (citations omitted). 7 A difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel—or between 8 medical professionals—regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment is not enough to 9 establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); 10 Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, “a complaint that a 11 physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid 12 claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not 13 become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 14 106. To establish a difference of opinion rising to the level of deliberate indifference, a 15 “plaintiff must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable 16 under the circumstances.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 17 Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of his constitutional rights under these 18 standards. Plaintiff alleges that several defendants underestimated his injury, missed a separate 19 fracture, and undertreated the fractures. It was not until Plaintiff was sent to an outside 20 specialist that his injury was sufficiently handled. 21 While Plaintiff has alleged facts demonstrating that he strongly disagreed with his care, 22 and also that the medical providers at the prison failed to diagnose the extent of his fractures, 23 this does not establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment under these legal standards. 24 Instead, Plaintiff’s facts, if true, would at most establish negligence in treating his fracture. 25 Plaintiff’s allegations show, at most, that the medical providers believed the injuries were not 26 as serious as they were. There is no indication that Defendants knew the extent of Plaintiff’s 27 injuries yet failed to treat them. While these allegations may give rise to a claim for medical 28 negligence (which Plaintiff does not assert and would be a claim under state law), they do not 1 give rise to a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 2 Plaintiff’s allegations also do not establish deliberate indifference to serious medical 3 needs because they demonstrate Defendants taking action to diagnose and treat Plaintiff’s 4 injury, although not the action that Plaintiff believes were required. Jane Doe Nurse asked for a 5 second opinion from Dr. Owolabi, who ordered an x-ray. Plaintiff was given a shoe support. 6 Plaintiff was eventually taken to an outside specialist. Once that specialist diagnosed the true 7 extent of Plaintiff’s injuries, Plaintiff received all the care that he believes he needed Although 8 the delay in treatment may have been ill advised or negligent, the fact that Defendants provided 9 care when confronted with the extent of his fracture further suggests that they were not acting 10 with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Moreover, there are no allegations 11 suggesting that the course of treatment chosen was medically unacceptable. 12 Plaintiff also alleges that Ms. Thomas discontinued Plaintiff’s back medication. 13 Plaintiff’s claim against Ms. Thomas does not appear to be related to the other claims in 14 Plaintiff’s case. Moreover, his allegation does not state a claim. There is no information about 15 what medication she discontinued, why Plaintiff needed the medication, who originally 16 prescribed it, and why his medication was taken away. The Court cannot conclude based on 17 these facts that Plaintiff had a serious medical need for the medication, or that Ms. Thomas 18 acted with deliberate indifference in taking away that medication. 19 Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant U. Baniga is liable because he did not order staff 20 to treat Plaintiff and did not provide proper medical equipment for Plaintiff’s foot. Supervisory 21 personnel are not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory 22 of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory position, 23 the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically 24 alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher 25 v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). To state a claim for relief under section 26 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that would 27 support a claim that the supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged 28 deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 1 promulgated or “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 2 constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 3 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Taylor v. 4 List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 5 For instance, a supervisor may be liable for his “own culpable action or inaction in the 6 training, supervision, or control of his subordinates,” “his acquiescence in the constitutional 7 deprivations of which the complaint is made,” or “conduct that showed a reckless or callous 8 indifference to the rights of others.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 9 1991) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 10 Plaintiff has not alleged that U. Baniga had any involvement in Plaintiff’s medical care, 11 let alone any allegations that would suggest that he was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s 12 medical needs as described above. Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that improper medical 13 equipment purchased by U. Baniga caused him to be denied care, or that U. Baniga was aware 14 that any such equipment was faulty. 15 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 16 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state any 17 cognizable claims. The Court provided Plaintiff with applicable legal standards, explained why 18 Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim, and gave Plaintiff leave to file a First Amended 19 Complaint, but Plaintiff chose to stand his complaint. 20 Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 21 1. This action be dismissed for failure to state a claim; and 22 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close the case. 23 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district 24 judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 25 twenty-one (21) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff 26 may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 27 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 28 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. wOoOe 4 OU YOUN ENS RIO ee OY Vv VI 1 || Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 2 || (9th Cir. 1991)). 3 4 TT IS SO ORDERED. > Dated: _ May 28, 2020 sf hey 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE , 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28